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Summary 
The thesis describes an investigation of the feasibility of resolving anaphors in 
natural language texts by means of a "shallow processing" approach which 
exploits knowledge of syntax, semantics and local focussing as heavily as 
possible; it does not rely on the presence of large amounts of world or domain 
knowledge, which are notoriously hard to process accurately. 
The ideas reported are implemented in a program called SPAR (Shallow 
Processing Anaphor Resolver), which resolves anaphoric and other linguistic 
I 
ambiguities in simple English stories and generates sentence-by-sentence 
paraphrases that show what interpretations have been selected. Input to 
SPAR takes the form of semantic structures for single sentences constructed 
by Boguraev's English analyser. These structures are integrated into a 
network-style text representation as processing proceeds. To achieve 
anaphor resolution, SPAR combines and develops several existing techniques, 
most notably Sidner 's theory of local focussing and Wilks' "preference 
semantics" theory of semantics and common sense inference. 
Consideration of the need to resolve several anaphors in the same sentence 
results in Sidner's framework being modified and extended to allow 
focus-based processing to interact more flexibly with processing based on 
other types of knowledge . Wilks' treatment of common sense inference is 
ex tended to incorporate a wider range of types of inference without 
jeopardizing its uniformity and simplicity. Further, his primitive-based 
formalism for word sense meanings is developed in the interests of economy, 
accuracy and ease of use. 
Although SPAR is geared mainly towards resolving anaphors, the design of the 
system allows _many non-anaphoric (lexical and structural) ambiguities that 
cannot be resolved during sentence analysis to be resolved as a by-product of 
anaphor resolution. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis describes SPAR (Shallow Processing Anaphor Resolver), a natural 
language processing program which resolves linguistic ambiguities in 
non-specialised texts such as stories by taking account of the effects of both 
sentential and textual context. In SPAR, attention is concentrated on 
resolving anaphoric ambiguity. An anaphor is, roughly speaking, an 
abbreviated linguistic form whose full meaning can only be recovered by 
reference to the context; thus in the following sentence pair, both of the 
underlined phrases are anaphors . 
( 1-1) John bought a new car. He drove the car away. 
SPAR exploits previous work by Boguraev, Wilks and Sidner, but goes 
significantly beyond this to achieve an integrated interpretive system, whose 
performance is tested by paraphrase. 
This introductory chapter describes the aims of the ,·,-o rk reported, what is 
original about it , and the methodology adopted in pursuing it. The theories on 
which SPAR is based are then summarised briefly. This summary is followed by 
an overview of the system and an example of its performance . Later chapters 
go into more detail on all these topics . 
1.1 The aims of the work 
SPAR uses as a front end Boguraev's [1979] English analyser , which applies 
syntactic and ~emantic knowledge to isolated sentences in order to resolve 
word sense (lexical) and structural ambiguity. for each sentence in a story in 
turn, SPAR takes as input the one or more semantic structures produ~ed by 
Boguraev's analyser, selects one of the structures as correct if there is more 
than one, and incorporates it into its model of the story, in the process 
resolving any anaphoric ambiguities . It then generates a paraphrase of the 
sentence showing what resolutions have been made; sentence-by-sentence 
paraphrase allows the progress of resolution at each stage in a story to be 
evaluated. 
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At the level of system task, the aim of SPAR is the same as that pf 
Boguraev's program: paraphrase. The two programs have the same general 
philosophy, one which attaches central importance to resolving ambiguity, and 
complement each other in attacking different aspects of the interpretation 
problem. 
A system that resolves anaphors in stories must be able not only to exploit 
linguistic (e .g. syntactic and semantic) knowledge, but also to make common 
sense inferences (CSis) about likely courses of events. However, unrestricted 
CSI is a very complex process requiring vast and varied quantities of 
knowledge about the world, and the development of a system capable of 
flexible, robust and powerful CSI is still, despite much effort, beyond the state 
of the art. 
However, it seems plausible that a considerately written text (i.e . one that is 
perspicuous and unambiguous, in accordance with Grice's [ 1975] maxim of 
manner) will normally be constructed in such a way that constraints on 
interpretation derived from different kinds of knowledge will tend not to 
conflict but rather to c-onfirm one another and work together to guide the 
reader towards correct interpretations. Moreover, because language has some 
degree of redundancy, the same information may often be contained in more 
than one constraint or prediction . For example, when resolving a pronoun, we 
might expect that the most focussed possible referent will usually also be the 
one that CSI suggests is most plausible. 
The second, and main theoretical, aim of this work is therefore to investigate 
the feasibility of a shallow processing approach according to which SPAR 
attempts to carry out as much anaphor resolution as possible using only 
linguistic knowledge, resorting to CSI only when necessary. CSI, when it is 
invoked, has access only to very limited quantities of general world knowledge. 
Under these conditions, CSI will quite often return no results, or even wrong 
results; however, such behaviour (we will see) need not lead to disaster. 
As well as exploiting world knowledge, an anaphor resolving system must, as 
will be argued later, be able to maintain and use a reliable record of what 
characters, objects and events are more or less prominent or focussed as the 
story progresses. Focussed entities are more likely to serve as the referents 
of anaphors; but it is easy to show that a simplistic focussing mechanism 
based purely on recency of mention cannot reliably predict likely referents . 
Section 1.1 2 
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Accordingly, the third aim of this work, which is instrumental to the second 
aim of investigating the feasibility of anaphor resolution by shallow 
processing, is to adapt and develop existing partial solutions to the problems 
of focussing and CSL The approaches chosen, for reasons to be explained in 
section 1.4, are those of Sidner [ 1979, 1981 , 1983) for focussing, and Wilks 
[1975a,1975b,1976,1977a,1977b] for CSL Wilks' formalism for word-sense 
semantics, in combination with Alshawi's [ 1983] work on representation, also 
plays an impor.tant part in SPAR. The process of constructing SPAR according 
to Wilks' and Sidner 's theories brought to light a number of ways in which they 
should be (and were) modified and developed. 
The fourth aim, whose attainment turned out to be crucially important to the 
performance of the system as a whole, is to find a way of coordinating these 
treatments of CSI and focussing (and, less crucially, the basic syntactic and 
semantic components of the system) so as to achieve the maximum accuracy 
for the minimum amount and complexity of processing. Since CSI is more 
complex (and, in SPAR, less reliable) than focussing, a major aspect of the 
coordination task is to allow focussing and other linguistic processing to 
dominate as much as possible, invoking CSI only when it is really essential. By 
doing so, the inevitable weaknesses in CSI are largely hidden or avoided by the 
other parts of the system, thus giving the shallow processing approach the 
best chance of success. 
1.2 What is original about the work 
SPAR represents original work in three major respects . It constitutes: 
( 1) the first thorough test of Wilks' inference ideas ; in Wilks' implemented 
system, only a handful of the inference rules on which the theory is based 
were encoded, and later modifications to the theory were not implemented at 
all. I will argue that while Wilks' ideas are basically sound, his framework 
should be (and, in SPAR. is) extended to incorporate a wider range of 
inference rules than he envisaged. These extensions make the inference 
engine more powerful without changing ils basic character. 
(2) a fairly comprehensive implementation, with alterations and significant 
extensions, of Sidner's anaphor resolution algorithms. The algorithms are 
extended to deal with two phenomena which Sidner's work did not cover: first, 
the possibility of referents arising from the same sentence as the anaphor as 
Section 1.2 3 
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well as from earlier sentences; and second, the extra problems that arise when 
several anaphors in a sentence impose constraints C i preferences on each 
other's referents. These two extensions are necessary for a Sidner-derived 
system to have a realistic coverage of anaphoric phenomena. They result in a 
change in the kind of CSI that tends to be required and an increase in the 
complexity of the interactions between focussing and CSI. 
(3) a test of .the major theoretical claim of this thesis, which I will call the 
shallow processing hypothesis: roughly, that the shallow processing approach, 
of relying heavily on linguistic knowledge and strictly limiting the extent and 
I 
use of world knowledge, can usually achieve accurate results . The particular 
form of this general hypothesis which I will attempt to substantiate is as 
follows: 
A story processing system which exploits linguistic knowledge, 
particularly knowledge about focussing, as heavily as possible, and 
has access only to limited quantities of world knowledge, which it 
invokes only when absolutely necessary, can usually choose an 
appropriate antecedent for an anaphor even in cases where the 
inference mechanism by itself cannot do so. 
There are several points to note about this hypothesis. 
Firstly, the hypothesis as stated is about anaphor resolution in a story 
processor; if it is true in this restricted case, it may well be true for other 
parts of the interpretation task and other types of text, but that is beyond Lhe 
scope of this thesis. 
Secondly, the boundary between linguistic knowledge and world knowledge is 
not easy to define; there is probably no principled way of deciding whether a 
given piece of information is part of the meaning of a word (linguistic 
knowledge) or . is just a fact about the thing the word describes (world 
knowledge). 1 In this thesis, the following pragmatic view will be taken: the 
meaning of a lexical item consists of the handful of pieces of information that 
are in some sense essential to a basic understanding of that item. No a priori 
restriction is placed on the kinds of fact that can count as linguistic 
knowledge; rath!:!r, the restriction is a quantitative one. Thus whereas we 
10f course, aspects of the meaning of a word are also facts about what it 
describes, and so strictly speaking linguistic knowledge (at least about word 
meanings) is a subset of world knowledge. However, I will use the term "world 
knowledge" to ref er only to knowledge that is not deemed to be linguistic. 
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might define the word "restaurant" linguistically as "a place where people 
eat", we would not define it as "a place where people enter, si l down, look at a 
menu, give a waiter an order ... ". Such a quantitative characterization of 
linguistic knowledge reflects the fact that what makes world knowledge 
(however defined) difficult to process is at least as much its quantity as its 
variety. 
Thirdly, the t~rm "limited quantities of world knowledge" in the shallow 
processing hypothesis means that the amount of world knowledge in the 
system should not greatly exceed the amount of linguistic knowledge on any 
I 
intuitive measure of "amount". This point, and its implications for lhe kind of 
world knowledge that is appropriate, are argued in chapter 8. 
Finally, the hypothesis is one of degree; the claim is not lhal any system 
seriously deficient in CSI can always make correct decisions, but that serious 
deficiencies in CSI need not lead to correspondingly serious deficiencies in 
overall performance. 
In relation lo this last point, it is reasonable to ask what the consequences will 
be of the errors that a shallow processing system does make, and how they 
can, if necessary, be detected and corrected. These issues will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 10; they involve such factors as whether user intervention is 
a possibility, and whether the errors, if uncorrected, are likely to be 
cumulative. 
1.3 Methodology 
The work reported in this thesis comes into the category of engineering rather 
than cognitive science or linguistics. Its goal is purely that of performance: lo 
produce a natural language processing system that resolves ambiguities 
correclly and generates correspondingly correct paraphrases. No claim is 
made that the way SPAR does this bears any relation to the way that people 
would go about the same task. 
Similarly, although this work exploits some of the insights of theoretical 
linguistics, no claims are made for any contribution to non-compulalional 
linguistic theory. In particular, no strong position is taken concerning the 
nature of ambiguity; it is merely assumed that a natural language processor 
faces, and must resolve, ambiguities of at least the lexical, structural and 
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anaphoric types. A theoretically motivated characterisation of ambiguity 
might lead to a cliff erent way of distinguishing particular word senses, 
structures and anaphoric behaviours, but I believe this would not materially 
a;'[ect the nature of the problems SPAR and similar systems have to face. 
Similar remarks apply lo the question of paraphrase. I present no rules for 
deciding whether two sentences or texts "mean the same thing"; for the 
purpose of this. project, a paraphrase fulfils its role to the extent that it shows 
that SPAR has assigned to its input one interpretation rather than another, 
and it is intended to be assessed using ordinary linguistic intuitions rather 
than any formal decision procedure. 
Unlike tasks such as translation, summarising, or paraphrasing from one 
sublanguage to another (e .g . Granger (1983]), SPAR's type of paraphrase is 
probably only of limited practical value, but it has the methodological value of 
providing evidence of the system's interpretive abilities to a reader who has no 
knowledge of its internal workings or representations. These interpretive 
abilities are ones that will be needed by many practically useful systems 
( especially translation systems) as well. 
The choice of simple stories as the texts to be processed can be justified along 
similar lines . Their relatively straightforward content and linguistic form 
mean that a realistic range of phenomena can be tackled at a level of 
complexity that presents genuine, but usually not insuperable, problems. Of 
course, the processing required to resolve ambiguities in real texts (even real 
children's stories) would be far more complex than that performed by SPAR, 
but it is reasonable to suppose that the differences in complexity would be 
largely quantitative rather than qualitative: that is, that such processing 
could be done by a system in which components for focussing, CSI and 
syntactic and semantic judgment could be distinguished, as they are in SPAR. 
At least some of those components would be far more powerful than those of 
SPAR. and there would almost certainly be other components not 
corresponding to anything in SPAR. However, I believe that all the problems 
SPAR faces would also be faced in magnified form by a more ambitious system, 
and are therefore worth solving; and that the techniques developed here would 
be a useful basis for those needed in such a system. 
The stories SPAR processes are assumed to be chronologically ordered: that is, 
it is assumed that events are described in the order in which they, occur. In 
chapter 8 it will be argued that if this simplification were removed, the 
solutions developed to the inference problem would need to be augmented (in 
Section 1.3 6 
ways that will be outlined) , but would not be invalidated. 
Although the system was designed to process non-specialised texts about 
sequences of events, it turned out also to be able to deal with s.ome quite 
different texts which were originally written to test other language processing 
systems. Two such texts are shown in appendix B (texts B21 and B22) . This 
kind of flexibility is one of the spinoffs one might expect from a shallow 
processing apP.roach which does not depend on detailed knowledge about any 
tex t type or domain. 
Appendix B in fact contains SPAR's paraphrases of over twenty stories written' 
b y people without a detailed knowledge of the system's workings. The form of 
the stories was constrained only by the linguistic coverage of Boguraev's 
analyser and by the requirement that they describe a chronological sequence 
of events and states. In this way, the danger of "testing" the system only with 
phenomena it can already handle is largely avoided. 
1.4 The selection of starting points for SPAR 
A full survey of work in artificial intelligence (AI) and linguistics relevant lo 
the problems SPAR addresses is presented in chapters 2 , 3, 5 and 7. In this 
section, I explain briefly why Boguraev's analyser and Wilks' and Sidner 's 
theories were chosen as the bases upon which SPAR was developed. 
1.4.1 Boguraev's analyser 
In order lo concenlrale fully on the problems of anaphor resolution, it makes 
s e nse to use an existing sentence analyser if a suitable one is available, since 
the lwo processes of assigning a semantic structure to a sentence and 
incorporating lhat sentence into a representation of lhe larger lexl (which 
involves anaphor resolution) can reasonably be distinguished. This is not to 
say tha t there is a clear-cul theoretical distinction between these two 
processes, nor that the interactions between them will necessarily be 
straightforward (although in SPAR they are) ; the point is merely that many 
a s p e cts of the overall task of sentence interpretation fall naturally inlo one of 
lhe lwo classes, and from a computational point of view, modularity is usually 
desirable, especially if one of the modules already exists. 
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An important consideration in deciding to use Boguraev's analyser was the 
practical one that it was available and its author was on the spot lo provide 
advice and maintenance. However, it is suitable for a number of theoretical 
reasons too. 
Firstly, it is a general-purpose analyser in that its grammar and semantics are 
not biased in favour of any subject area or task to the exclusion of others. It 
n 
produces casG-labelled depe"dency structures that express the meanings of 
sentences in a neutral, application-independent way. These structures 
constitute appropriate input for a system which further processes stories 
written in everyday language about everyday events. 
Secondly, the semantic structure assigned to a sentence is relatively shallow. 
It mirrors syntactic structure to a certain degree (mainly at clause and 
noun-phrase level), and no attempt is made to decompose or otherwise 
transform word meanings to produce deeper representations that might, for 
example, show explicitly the near-equivalence of "John gave Mary a book" and 
"Mary received a book from John". This shallowness of representation means 
that the semantic structures can be deepened or transformed as needed (if at 
all), which fits in well with SPAR's shallow processing methodology. It also 
makes dictionary entries shorter and simpler, and enables a more 
straightforward (although possibly less flexible) generator to be written than 
would otherwise be the case. 
Lastly, Boguraev's semantics are derived from those of Wilks, and in fact many 
of the above remarks about the structures delivered by his analyser are 
equally true of those delivered by the parsing component of Wilks' system. A 
uniform semantics is clearly a desirable feature for SPAR to have, and the fact 
that Boguraev and Wilks share roughly the same semantic theory (preference 
semantics) makes this considerably easier to achieve. 
1.4.2 Wilks' theory of common sense inference 
In Wilks' implemented system, inference rules were invoked whenever a 
pronoun could not be resolved by semantic pattern matching alone. Each rule 
expressed a (usually causal) relationship in terms of two linked semantic 
patterns exploiting his general semantic primitives. The rules were used to 
construct chains connecting the representation of a sentence containing 
problem pronouns with those of sentences containing candidate referents. A 
completed chain would bind one or more pronouns. Inference rules were of 
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two types: analytic extraction rules and non-analytic common sense inference 
rules .2 The second type was only invoked if the first failed to bind all 
remaining pronouns. No attempt was made to find chains longer than a preset 
maximum; thus inference was guaranteed to terminate, albeit perhaps with 
incomplete results, within a certain time. 
According to Wilks [1975b], the essential distinguishing features of his 
approach to inference are "( 1) the inferential use of partial information; that 
is, information weaker than that in dictionaries and analytic (logically true) 
rules ... (2) the preferring of one representation or inferential chain to 
another." Wilks goes on to add (p55) : "The common sense rules of inference 
used in this system are not deductive consequences about the world, but 
correspond to likely courses of events which, if and only if the y match onto 
the available explicit and implicit information in the text, may be said to apply, 
and by applying may enable us to identify mentioned entities and so resolve 
problems of reference." 
The use of "information weab:r than that in dictionaries and analytic 
(logically true) rules" 'is widespread in systems which process texts about 
everyday, non-specialised subjects. It is Wilks' use of this information in a 
partial form, and also his principle of preference, which make his theory 
attractive for use in a "shallow processing" system like SPAR. In Wilks' 
framework, inference rules are not used to impose a complete organisation on 
the text, but merely to provide an explanation of a part of the text, and then 
only when a pronoun cannot be resolved by other means . Partial 
explanations, one hopes, are considerably easier to provide than full ones. 
Wilks' principle of preference further reduces the expected complexity of 
inference because it states that the shortest chain of inferences (i.e . the least 
2The term "inference", in the sense of deriving new information from existing 
information or making implicit information explicit, could in principle be used 
to describe virtually all aspects of natural language processing. However, in 
this thesis, as in Wilks' descriptions of his system, it will be used in the 
narrower sense of finding the connections between propositions in the text. 
At least where story processing is concerned, such inference will in practice 
almost always involve the use of non-analytic, "common sense" knowledge of 
the world, even when some analytic knowledge is used as well. The terms 
" inference" and ··common sense inference" (CSI) will therefore be used 
interchangeably when referring to the process of making inferences. This 
should not obscure the fact that in Wilks ' framework (and also in SPAR), 
"inference rules" are of two disjoint types: extraction rules and CSI rules. 
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complex explanation) leading to the resolution of the pronoun in question 
should be accepted. This removes the need for any separate evaluation of the 
plausibility of a chain on intrinsic grounds. 
The reduced complexity which is to be expected of an inference engine 
designed along Wilks' lines is, as should become apparent in later chapters, 
likely to lead to comparatively robust and flexible performance for a given 
amount of knowledge. This is especially desirable under a shallow processing 
methodology, where the resources available for CSI are limited. On these 
theoretical grounds alone, Wilks' ideas seem highly suitable for incorporation 
I 
into SPAR. but in fact there are at least two other reasons for doing so. The 
first is the already-mentioned common ground shared by the s e mantic 
formalisms of Wilks and Boguraev, which should lessen the problems of 
inconsistency between the various strands in SPAR. The second is that Wilks' 
npproach to inference has not been very thoroughly exploited in implemented 
systems . In Wilks' own system, only a few CSI rules were implemented, so the 
claim that the shortest inference chain would always be correct could not be 
properly tested; and what subsequent development of preference semantics 
has occurred has tended to be in the area of sentence analysis rather than 
inference . A serious evaluation of preference semantics in the domain of 
inference is therefore overdue. 
1.4.3 Sidner's theory of local focussing 
In Wilks' system, anaphors were resolved purely by applying semantics and 
rule-based inference; only if these means were inadequate was some notion of 
focusing brought into play. However, for a text of more than two or three 
sentences, some non-trivial focusing mechanism is needed for delimiting in 
advance the s.et of possible referents of an anaphor and imposing some 
structure or priority order on this set. Such a mechanism will interact with 
the various processes (including CSI) which assess the plausibility of possible 
referents. It will do so by suggesting possibilities and/or by providing a 
priority criterion which operates when several suggested possibilities are 
assessed as equally plausible . 
An essential requirement of a referent-suggesting mechanism for SPAR is that 
it should be able to operate using only the kind of knowledge that, under the 
shallow processing methodology, is likely to be available. This rules out 
approaches such as that of Grosz [ 1977], in which the focus of the discourse is 
recognised and maintained by using detailed knowledge of the structure of the 
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activity being discussed, to which the structure of the discussion is closely 
related. 
In Sidner's theory, however, focus-based rules are applied to each anaphor in 
a sentence. The rules suggest candidate referents, normally one at a Lime, 
according to the contents of a set of focus registers which have been set 
during processing of earlier sentences. Suggestions are assessed by an 
inference component (which Sidner assumed to exist but did not specify) 
which uses semantic and common sense knowledge, and the first plausible 
suggestion is accepted. The focus registers are then updated on the basis of 
the resolutions made. 
Thus Sidner's framework, unlike Grosz's, places no demands on the system's 
knowledge other than those already acknowledged for processes such as 
semantic judgment and CSL In any case, in Sidner's words, "the complexity of 
the inferencing is constrained to asking for confirmation of the sentence 
predication, thereby eliminating combinatorial search for antecedents and 
non-terminating inferencing." (Sidner [1979],p75). This confirmation consists 
of "proving that the sentence with the pronoun replaced by the co-specified 
noun phrase is consistent with other knowledge." (p150). In other words, as 
long as the suggested candidate does not give rise to a contradiction, it is 
accepted. 
Sometimes, however, the rules suggest two or more candidates at once. When 
this happens, a different mode of inference is invoked to judge which (if any) 
is most plausible. Although Sidner viewed this type of judgment as "special", it 
is in practice required quite often. 
As mentioned briefly above, Sidner's theory is incomplete in two important 
respects. Firstly, the PI rules do not specify how or when candidates from the 
same sentence ·as the pronoun should be considered. Secondly, no attention is 
given to any possible interaction between the applications of the rules to 
different anaphors in a sentence. Both problems need to be tackled in a 
practical system, and in fact are largely solved in SPAR. 
A further limitation of the theory, which Sidner acknowledged, is that it is a 
theory of local, not global, focus, so that it breaks down when the global 
structure of a discourse becomes important. However, the stories processed 
by SPAR consist of a linear sequence of events, and are not usually long 
enough for global structure to be a problem. 
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Like Wilks' theory of CSI. Sidner's algorithms have not been much exploited in 
implemented programs; every implementation to date seems to have been 
partial and I or in a restricted domain. SPAR thus represents the first 
reasonably full test (and, we will see, development) of the algorithms for 
non-specialised texts. 
1.5 System i;mplementation 
I 
SPAR consists of about 24,000 lines of Cambridge LISP, and runs on a GEC 
Series 63 in an image of about 2.5 megabytes. A story is processed roughly as 
follows (see also figure 1.1). Underlined terms introduced here will be defined 
more fully in later chapters. 
First, Boguraev's analyser analyses each sentence in the story in isolation, 
constructing a dependency structure for each one.3 The semantic formulas 
for the word senses occurring in the dependency structures are then 
converted into a form based on Alshawi's [1983] memory representation 
formalism, and combined as appropriate into a single net (the word sense 
network). 
Next, SPAR itself is invoked. After the word sense network is loaded, the 
representation of each sentence in the story is processed in turn, and 
eventually integrated into the context provided by earlier sentences. The 
representation of the current sentence (after suitable transformation) and 
the representation of the story context together make up a text model 
network that is parallel to, but distinct from, the word sense network. 
The stages of processing a sentence are essentially as follows. 
( 1) The hierarchical dependency structure is matched with parts of 
the word sense network in order to bring out implicit information, 
and is converted into the current fragment of the text model network 
by a fragment constructor that makes heavy use of word sense 
information. One by-product of this process is the use of case-role 
preferences_ (as contained in the word sense network) to alter some 
network nodes representing pronouns so as to restrict their po'ssible 
3In fact the analyser will produce several readings for a sentence if it cannot 
resolve all the lexical and structural ambiguities . This complication will be 
ignored in the present brief overview. 
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referents. For example, the structure for " it" in the sentence " John 
drank it" might be constrained so that it could only be assigned a 
liquid referent. 
Ne xt , a number of knowledge sources are invoked to predict or further 
constrain the interpretations of anaphors. The resulting predictions are 
evaluated by an arbitrator as soon as they are made. They arise as follows: 
(2) A set bf anaphor resolution rules, based on Sidner's, is applied to 
each anaphor in the sentence independently. A semantic matcher is 
applied to assess each suggested referent ; the first acceptable one is 
returned. If several referents are suggested at once, and more than 
one is semantically acceptable, CSI is not invoked immediately; 
instead, all the acceptable referents are returned. The reference of 
such an anaphor is thus constrained but not fin ally decided. 
(3) A syntactic component, which makes use of approximate versions 
of Reinhart's [ 1983] c-command rule and other syntactic rules 
affecting co reference , is invoked to ensure consistency between the 
possibilities returned by stage (2). This often results in some 
possibilities being discarded. 
If any pronouns are still unresolved, the fourth stage of processing takes 
place : 
(4) A Wilksian CSI component is invoked in order to choose between 
remaining candidate antecedents for unresolved pronouns. CSI 
returns zero or more chains of inferences which bind pronouns to 
antecedents. The arbitrator accepts these chains only if they are 
consistent with the predictions of stages (2) and (3). 
If CSI is insufficient to resolve the pronouns in question, then: 
(5) an ordered set of linguistic colle ctive heuristics, describ e d in 
chapter 6, are applied until the arbitrator decides that all anaphors 
are r e solved . Although less reliable than the earlier stages, they are 
normally successful on the occasions when they are required. 
The current fragment is then incorporated into the "context" part of the text 
model network using the results of anaphor resolution. After incorporation it 
is handed to the -last component of the system: 
(6) an English generator, partly adapted from one written by Tait 
(Tait and Sparck Jones [1983]) to produce sentences intended to 
make ambiguity resolutions , especially anaphoric ones, as clear as 
possible. 
Section 1.5 14 
.....,. .... ---------------------------------
The dependency structure for the next sentence in the story is then 
processed. 
1.6 An example 
To give some i_ndication of SPAR's capabilities , its output for one of the stories 
it processes is shown below. The first sentence of each pair is the input, as 
handed to Boguraev's analyser; the second of each pair is the paraphrase 
finally produc e d by SPAR after all ambiguities have been r e solved . 
[1]. JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT HE WOULD MEND HIS CAR. 
JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT JOHN WOULD REPAIR BILL'S CAR. 
[2]. HE TOOK IT TO HIS FRIEND'S GARAGE. 
TO JOHN'S FRIEND'S GARAGE, JOHN CONVEYED THE CAR. 
[3). HE TRIED TO PERSUADE HIS FRIEND THAT HE SHOULD LEND HIM SOME TOOLS. 
JOHN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE JOHN'S FRIEND THAT THAT FRIEND SHOULD LOAN 
JOHN SOME REPAIR -IMPLEMENTS. 
(4] . HIS FRIEND SAID THAT HE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO LEND TOOLS. 
JOHN'S FRIEND SAID THAT THAT FRIEND WAS NOT ALLOWED TO LOAN ANY REPAIR 
IMPLEMENTS. 
[SJ . JOHN ASKED HIS FRIEND TO SUGGEST SOMEONE FROM WHOM HE COULD BORROW TOOLS. 
JOHN REQUESTED JOHN'S FRIEND TO RECOMMEND SOMEONE WHO JOHN COULD BORROW 
SOME REPAIR IMPLEMENTS FROM. 
[6) . HIS FRIEND DID NOT ANSWER. 
JOHN'S FRIEND DID NOT ANSWER. 
(7]. FULFILLI NG HIS PROMISES WAS IMPORTANT TO JOHN. 
DISCHARGING JOHN'S PROMISES WAS URGENT TO JOHN. 
[BJ. HE WAS ANGRY. 
JOHN WAS ANGRY. 
[9]. HE LEFT. 
JOHN DEPARTED. 
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1. 7 Thesis organisation 
Chapter 2 of this thesis is a survey of anaphora in English; the emphasis is on 
characterising the anaphoric phenomena that must be dealt with, rather than 
al this stage attempting to define ways of dealing with those phenomena 
computationally. 
The layout of subsequent chapters approximately parallels the stages by which 
SPAR processes a sentence, as outlined above. 
Chapters 3 and 4 concern semantic representation and the lower-level 
semantic processing required for SPAR. The first of these chapters describes 
the preference semantics approach lo representation from the point of view of 
anaphor resolution, while the second discusses SPAR's meaning 
representation. 
We then turn our attention to the problem of using knowledge about focussing 
and discourse structure for anaphor resolution. Chapter 5 describes earlier 
attempts to solve this problem, especially that of Sidner, while chapter 6 
presents the approach adopted in SPAR. Because the focussing component in 
SPAR constrains and to a certain extent controls the actions of the other 
components, chapter 6 also explores the problems of coordinating the 
different knowledge sources. Finally, the "collective heuristics" used when CSI 
is insufficient are described. 
Next, world knowledge and its exploitation by inference are discussed. 
Chapter 7 presents the relevant background, particularly Wilks' work, while 
chapter 8 describes SPAR's Wilksian CSI mechanism. 
The last component of SPAR to be examined is the paraphrase generator. 
Chapter 9 sets out the goals of the paraphrase process , discusses other 
relevant research and then describes SPAR's generator itself. 
The last chapter, chapter 10, summarises and evaluates the system and 
suggests directions for further work. 
Finally, there are appendices containing a selection of stories and the 
paraphrases made of them by SPAR. For some of these stories, part of the 
commentary SPAR makes on its own processing is also included. 
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2. Anaphora 1n English 
A proper understanding of the problem of resolving anaphors by computer 
depends on an appreciation of the range of linguistic phenomena encompassed 
by the term "anaphora". This chapter therefore surveys the different types of 
anaphor that occur in English and examines some of the accounts of anaphora 
that have been given by linguists. I will not at this stage consider the process 
by which anaphors may be resolved; rather, I will analyse the properties -
' 
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic - which characterise anaphora and with 
which any attempt to resolve anaphors must come to terms. 
First, in section 2 .1, fundamental terms such as "anaphor", 1 "antecedent" 
and ''text" are defined. Following Sidner [1979], the idea of specification,2 
rather than the more common idea of reference, is proposed as the basis for 
analysing anaphora. Anaphors are seen as specifying3 elements in the 
(human or computational) hearer's or reader's conceptual representation of 
the text, rather than (necessarily) referring to objects in the world. 
Section 2.2 is a descriptive survey, based on the taxonomy of Halliday and 
Hasan [1976], of various anaphoric phenomena that occur in English. In 
section 2 .3, some theoretical analyses of the semantics of anaphora are 
discussed. Such analyses are often used in attempts to defil!c configurational 
(typically syntactic) constraints on coreference between two noun phrases. 
Some of these attempts are therefore reviewed in section 2.4. 
1From this point on, typographical conventions will be defined in footnotes 
when first used. Double quotation marks are used in three ways: 
( 1) to refer to words or phrases, often those in example texts; 
(2) when discussing others' work, for terms which are either not used 
elsewhere in this thesis or are used in a different sense; and 
(3) with the connotation of "so-called" or "supposed". 
2Underlining is used when a new term is introduced or when it is properly 
defined for the 'first time. It is also used in example texts to highlight a 
particular word or phrase; in such cases, it carries no implication of any 
linguistic stress or emphasis. 
3Italics are used for emphasis in the normal way. 
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2 .1 Some basic terms and assumptions 
Natural language is an efficient means of communication because of the 
assumptions that the speaker and hearer4 can make about each oth er. The 
hearer assumes that wh&t the speaker is trying to communicate forms a 
coherent whole rather than a set of isolated and unrelated comments; and the 
speaker assumes that the hearer is making such an assumption and is 
therefore trying to interpret what he hears as a connected message. This 
allows the speaker to use abbreviated linguistic forms, in the hope that the 
hearer will recognise them as such and interpret them with reference to what 
has already been said and the context of situation. The resulting piece of 
language exhibits the phenomenon of cohesion (in Halliday and Hasan's [ 1976] 
sense): i.e . there are semantic relationships between its parts which maintain 
its connectedness and which are independent of grammatical structure. A 
cohesive piece of language, produced by one or more speakers in a given 
context of situation, will be called a discourse. A written discourse produced 
by a single writer, who intends it to be interpreted without reference to any 
particular context of situation, will be called a text. This distinction between 
the terms "discourse" and "text" is not a standard one, but since the stories 
processed by SPAR are all "texts" in my more specialised sense, a separate 
term will be helpful. 
The phenomenon of cohesion can be illustrated by the following contrasting 
examples. 
(2-1) 
(2-2) 
Handelsman is a great cartoonist. In a world currently 
blessed with good cartoonists, he stands skull and 
crossbones above the rest. 5 
Handelsman is a great cartoonist. Before the different cases 
are considered, the methodology used for them must be 
stated· explicitly. 
Example (2-1) is a text; it discusses Handelsman and his stature as a 
cartoonist. Its textuality is exhibited by the cohesive relationships between 
the words "cartoonist" and ··cartoonists", between "Handelsman" and "he", 
41 will use the terms "speaker" and "hearer" to include the writer and reader 
of written language. 
5The beginning of Alan Coren's introduction to "Freaky Fables" by 
Handelsman, Sphere Books, 1979. 
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and between "Handelsman", "good cartoonists", and "the rest" . Example 
(2-2) is not a text; its component sentences were taken from unrelated 
documents, and there are no cohesive ties between items in different 
sentences (although the habit of assuming textuality is so strong that the 
reader may detect cohesion where none was intended). 
Anaphora is the special case of cohesion where the meaning (sense and/or 
reference) of one item in a cohesive relationship (the anaphor) is, in isolation, 
somehow vague or incomplete, and can only be properly interpreted by 
considering the meanings of the other item(s) in the relationship (the 
antecedent(s)). In example (2-1), "he" is an anaphor with antecedent 
"Handelsman", with which it shares what is often called "identity of 
reference". "The rest" is an anaphor with antecedents "Handelsman" and 
"good cartoonists"; this is because the meaning of "the rest" in isolation is 
something like "the members of a given set, excluding a given member or 
members", which is incomplete in that it does not determine the identity of 
the set and the excluded member(s). On the other hand, the cohesive link 
between "cartoonist" and "cartoonists" is not anaphoric, since neither term 
depends on the other for its interpretation. 
This initial characterisation of anaphora will be fleshed out as the different 
types are discussed in section 2.2. However, three points should be noted: 
(1) My definitions of anaphor and antecedent are broader than,many 
in AI, where some kind of identity (rather than just relatedness) of 
meaning is of ten required, and much broader than the use of the 
term by some linguists who use it to describe only farms such as 
reflexive pronouns which relate syntactically to their antecedents. 
My definitions are motivated by the fact that SPAR is geared towards 
resolving anaphors in the broad sense. 
(2) Anaphora is sometimes distinguished from exophora and 
cataphora. Exophora is abbreviated reference to things in the 
nonlinguist.ic context of situation; we will not be concerned with it. 
Cataphora ("pointing forwards") is where the "antecedent" occurs 
later than the "anaphor". However, in this thesis I will use the term 
"anaphora" to subsume cataphora (but not exophora) except where 
otherwise stated. 
(3) Anaphora (in my sense) is to do with vagueness rather than 
ambiguity; although in 
(2-3) The shepherd saw a sheep stuck in a bramble bush. 
He went to fetch a crook. 
the correct interpretation of "crook" (as stick and not criminal) 
depends on its cohesive ties with "shepherd" and perhaps "sheep", 
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these ties are not anaphoric because "crook" has, intuitively, two 
complete meanings rather than one incomplete one, and its 
interpretation involves selecting an already-present meaning rather 
than completing a partial one. (Of course, the line between 
vagueness and ambiguity cannot be drawn sharply, and so the 
presence or absence of anaphora will not always be so clear). 
So far, cohesion and anaphora have been discussed purely as relationships 
within a text; but there is clearly more to them than that. It is conventional to 
say that the nature of the relationship between "he" and "Handelsman" in 
(2-1) is that they both refer to the same person, the cartoonisl Handelsman. 
In the inlerests of readabilily, I will sometimes use the term "reference" 
informally, to describe the relationship between a phrase and what it "points 
to" (if anything) in the world described by the text. I will not use it to 
describe the relationship between anaphor and antecedent, as e .g. Halliday 
and Hasan [1976] do. This relationship will sometimes be called coreference. 
However, the notion of reference is in some ways problematical. If the lext in 
question is a fictional one (as all SPAR's texls are) it is not immediately clear 
to what sort of entities, if any, the phrases in it refer; and even if the status of 
those entities is clarified, it is hard to see what practical relevance they have 
to the working of a computational anaphor resolver. We will therefore 
characterise anaphora in terms of the notion of (co-)specification (Sidner 
[1979], appendix 2), which is adequate for present purposes. If we view the 
process of understanding a text as building up a model or representation of 
what is being discussed, then a piece of language such as a noun phrase can 
be viewed as specifying a single node or element of the model (and creating it 
if it does not already exist6 ). This element is the phrase's specification . Thus 
when (2-1) is understood, the word "Handelsman" is understood as specifying 
the model element which represents Handelsman (creating such an element if 
the reader has not previously heard of him); and "he" will be understood as 
specifying the _ same element. In other words, "he" and ""Handelsman" 
cospecify. The status of these relationships of specification and 
cospecification is independent of Handelsman's status as a real individual; 
however, informally we will say that "he" and "Handelsman" refer to (the 
person) Handelsman. 
6Strictly speaking Sidner would not regard a term that resulted in the 
creation of a model element as specifying that element, but it seems to me 
that doing so leads to a more straightforward exposition without changing the 
content of her account. 
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This set of relationships is summarised in figure 2.1.7 
Word or phrase, 
e.g. "Handelsman" 
refers to 
specifies _. Model element, 
e.g. HANDELSMANl-1 
represents 
Object in some world, e.g . 
the cartoonist Handelsman 
informally 
Figure 2.1: Specification, representation and reference 
An object like a noun phrase might be viewed as introducing elements into the 
model in addition to the element it specifies . For example, the use of the noun 
phrase "a car" in a text might be seen as introducing not only its own 
specification, representing the car itself, but also other elements representing 
related concepts such as the car's driver, the action of driving the car, and 
the generic or prototypic concept of cars. 
2.2 Anaphoric forms in English 
Having defined our basic framework , we will now make a descriptive survey of 
English anaphora, adopting the comprehensive framework of Halliday and 
Hasan [1976]. 
Halliday and Hasan distinguish five types of cohesion between items in a text: 
7Following a convention used by SPAR, model elements will be denoted by 
objects such as HANDELSMANl-1. 
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cospecification,8 substitution, ellipsis, conjunction and lexical cohesion. 
These five types will be introduced by their occurrences in the following 
example, after which some of them will be discussed individually in more 
detail, and finally analysed within our specification-based framework. 
(2-4) [1] One day John found his Jaguar wouldn't start. 
[2] He asked Bill to come and look at it. 
[3] Bill didn't really want to, but he came anyway. 
[ 4] He saw that the plugs were worn, and advised John to fit 
some new ones. 
[5] John did so. 
[6] After that, the car worked perfectly. 
Cospecification, as we have seen, is the relationship of identity of the things 
being talked about; an example is the cohesive link between "he" in [2] and 
"John" in [1], which identify the same individual. 
Substitution, in contrast, operates at the level of sense; for example in the 
link between "some new ones" and "the plugs" in [ 4], "ones" picks up the 
sense of "plugs" but the two sets of plugs are distinct. Similarly, "did so" in 
[5] substitutes for "fit some new [plugs]" in [ 4]. 
Ellipsis is the special case of substitution by zero; the empty string after 
"didn't really want to" in [3] has an elliptical link to "come and look at it" in 
[2]. 
Conjunction is "a specification of the way in which what is to follow is 
systematically connected to what has gone before" (p227). In [6], "after that" 
signals the conjunctive relation of succession in time and perhaps also that of 
result. 
Lexical cohesion is the use of repeated or semantically related words; 
examples are the links between "come" and "came", "Jaguar" and "car", and 
also, on a broad definition of semantic relation, between "Jaguar" and "plugs". 
Of these five types of cohesion, cospecification, substitution and ellipsis are 
clearly anaphoric . Lexical cohesion can have an anaphoric aspect to it, 
according to our definition of anaphora; in (2-4), the semantic relation 
between "plugs" and "Jaguar" must be used to identify "the plugs" as being 
8Halliday and Hasan's own term is "reference", a term which we have decided 
to use only informally and then in a quite -different sense. 
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those of the Jaguar. Conjunction is not anaphoric; it corresponds with what 
Hobbs [1979] and others have called "coherence relations" , which will be 
discussed in chapter 5. In the remainder of this section, English forms 
exhibiting each of the four anaphoric types of cohesion will be discussed in 
turn. The discussion uses the general framework of Halliday and Hasan; 
however, the examples originate elsewhere. 
2 .2.1 Cospecification 
Halliday and Hasan distinguish three types of cospecification: personal , by 
means of function in the speech situation; demonstrative, by means of 
location, on a scale of proximity; and comparative, which is specification by 
means of identity or similarity. Comparative specification is beyond the scope 
of this thesis and will not be discussed. 
(a) Personal cospecification is the type of anaphora to which most attention 
has been directed in linguistics and artificial intelligence. It is exhibited by 
definite personal pronouns such as "I", "it" and "they". It is worth noting in 
passing that such pronouns are more properly called "pro-NPs", since 
syntactically they usually behave as noun phrases and not as nouns; also, "it" 
can be used as a dummy subject filler . However, I will use the word "pronoun" 
in the conventional way. 
Normally, a personal pronoun must have an explicit antecedent in the text, 
with which it agrees in gender, person and number. But neither explicitness 
nor agreement is essential, e.g. respectively 
(2-5) 
(2-6) 
Blend a cup of flour with some butter. Moisten it 9 with some 
milk, then knead it into a ball. (Webber [ 1978a]) 
The most important qualification for the new programmer I 
want to hire is that they be fluent in Cobol. (Hirst [1981]) . 
A plural pronoun such as "they" ( or, indeed, a plural non-pronominal noun 
phrase) may cospecify several items in the text which have not been 
mentioned in syntactic construction: 
9 As already stated, underlining in an example text is intended only to highlight 
a phrase under discussion , and does not indicate any linguistic stress. 
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(2-7) When Ross visited his aunt Cicely, !,hey spent the afternoon 
talking. Then, as arranged, Nadia arrived. Ross kissed his 
aunt goodbye, and set off with Nadia to the discotheque, 
where they danced the night away. (from Hirst [ 1981 ]) . 
In such cases, the problem of deciding which elements are included in the 
specification is non-trivial, involving syntactic, semantic and pragmatic 
factors. 
The pronoun ""it" can have a wide range of referents; as well as non-human 
objects, it can also, according to Webber [1978a], refer to specific events, 
event types, and propositions: 
(2- Ba) John dunked Mary's braids in the inkwell. It made her cry. 
(Specific event) 
(2-Bb) John dunked Mary"s braids in the inkwell. Although it 
usually made her cry, today she held back. (Event type) 
(2-Bc) To prove that all cats have three legs, let's assume its 
converse. (Proposition) 
But not all anaphoric uses of '"it" and "'they" are cospecifying ones; some can 
be classed as substitution, and are discussed below. 
Reciprocal pronominal phrases such as "each other" and reflexive pronouns, 
such as "herself", take antecedents only from the sentence in which they 
occur, and are not covered by Halliday and Hasan, who are only concerned 
with cohesion between sentences. They differ from personal pronouns mainly 
in their syntactic behaviour, as discussed below in 2.4. 
(b) Demonstrative cospecification is, for Halliday and Hasan, exhibited by 
words such as "this", "these" and "here" (for "near" items), "that", "those", 
"there" and "then" (for "far" items), and "the" (with neutral proximity). 
Many of these words can act either as modifiers ("these words") or as heads 
("Think about _ this."). The exact meaning of "near" and "far" in the 
classification of demonstratives is complex, involving spatial and temporal 
aspects (both in the world and in the text) and the degree of association with 
the speaker. 
Definite noun phrases introduced by ''the", although classified by Halliday and 
Hasan as demonstratives, will be discussed below under the heading of lexical 
cohesion. 
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2.2.2 Substitution and ellipsis 
Substitution and ellipsis are anaphoric devices by which anaphors derive from 
their antecedents not their specification but their sense . Such anaphors will 
be called descriptional (after Webber). Since ellipsis is simply "substitution by 
zero", differing from substitution only grammatically and not cohesively, the 
two phenomena may be discussed together. 
Halliday and Hasan distinguish between nominal, verbal and clausal varieties 
of substitution and ellipsis . "Nominal substitution" means not substitution 
for a whole noun group or noun phrase but substitution of one or more items 
in it, and similarly for the other five categories. Verbal and clausal ellipsis 
and clausal substitution will not be discussed here, because they usually 
result in sentences which Boguraev's analyser, and hence SPAR, cannot deal 
with. 
(a) Nominal substitution is, for Halliday and Hasan, exhibited mainly by some 
uses of the English words "one" and "ones". When used as substitutes (rather 
than alone in a noun 'phrase, which is ellipsis) "one" and "ones" serve to 
contrast items . The contrast may be explicit: 
(2-9) Wendy prefers the yellow T-shirt to the red one. 
or it may serve to pick out one member of a set: 
(2-10) Of her two Dior T-shirts, Wendy prefers the yellow one. (from 
Webber [1978a]). 
where by implication one T-shirt is yellow and the other is not. 
(b) Nominal ellipsis occurs when the head of a noun phrase (along with 
perhaps other elements) is deleted, and is replaced by another element, which 
may take a slightly different form. For example, whereas (2-9) exhibits 
substitution, (2-11) exhibits ellipsis : 
(2-11) Wendy prefers the yellow T-shirt to the red . 
In (2-9), the head noun "T-shirt" is substituted by "one"; in (2-11) it is deleted 
altogether, and the modifier "red" acts as the head of the noun phrase. 
When determiners and possessive pronouns move into h ead position, they may 
undergo a change of form. "A" and "an" become "one", and "your" becomes 
"yours", other possessive pronouns changing similarly. Examples of such 
ellipsis are: 
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(2-12) Wendy found the T-shirts so irresistible that she stole one. 
(2-13) I prefer my T-shirt to yours. 
The underlined pronouns can be regarded as derived by ellipsis of the head 
noun from the noun phrases ··a T-shirt" and "your T-shirt(s)" respectively. 
Although the elliptical and substitutionary uses of "one" may appear to be 
similar, they are distinguished by the fact that substitute "one" behaves 
syntactically as a noun, whereas the elliptical "one" behaves as a noun phrase. 
Halliday and Hasan's treatment may be extended to phrases with the 
determiner "the" and to those without any determiners or possessives. Just 
as "a" becomes "one", "the" becomes "that" or "those" depending on whether 
the deleted noun is singular or plural: 
(2-14) The population of China is higher than that of Russia; 
and when there is no determiner, and ellipsis disposes of every element in the 
noun phrase, a pronoun such as "it" or "they" is brought in to prevent the 
noun phrase being deleted altogether (noun phrase deletion does happen, but 
is governed by the rules for verbal and clausal ellipsis). This view explains 
so-called "pronouns of laziness" in paycheck sentences: 
(2-15) The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than 
the man who gave it to his mistress. 
where common sense reasoning tells us that "it" describes the second man's 
paycheck rather than the first, and is therefore a descriptional anaphor; and 
also this example from Webber [1978a] (which Webber in fact classifies as 
generic reference) : 
(2-16) A Rhodesian ridgeback bit me yesterday. They are really 
vicious beasts. 
(c) Verbal substitution occurs when items within a verb phrase are deleted. It 
is marked in English by the verb "do", possibly followed by "so", "it", "this" or 
"that". These forms all have approximately the same meaning, although "do" 
on its own differs from the other forms in its syntactic behaviour. 
2.2.3 Lexical cohesion 
Lexical cohesion is exhibited by the presence of identical or semantically 
related lexical items in a text. It is essential to make use of it in resolving 
anaphors containing significant intrinsic lexical information, such as full (i.e . 
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non-pronominal) definite noun phrases (henceforth FDNPs). 
Halliday and Hasan distinguish between reiteration, where lexically cohesive 
items occur in cospecifying phrases, and collocation, where the relationship is 
less direct. 
(a) In the case of reiteration, an approximate information constraint usually 
operates : that is, the anaphoric lexical item must usually contain no 
information that its antecedent lacks. This is because the function of an 
anaphor is typically to access given information rather than to introduce new. 
So in the following, 
(2- 17) John has bought a new car. The 
(car/vehicle/thing/?Jaguar) 10 goes at quite a speed. 
the use of "the Jaguar" is odd in a neutral context, since it introduces new 
information while being marked, through the definite article, as anaphoric . 
The reader may fail to identify it with the "new car", and expect a 
continuation like " ... but the new car's really slow". 
In fact the information constraint applies to noun phrases in context rather 
than single lexical items; so 
(2- 18) A man came up behind John and hit him on the head. John 
turned round to face his assailant. 
is acceptable since the information that the man is an assailant is inferable 
(i .e. not new) when "his assailant" is read. (Contrast the case where "and hit 
him on the head" is missing). 
An apparent exception to the information constraint is the use of epithe ts : 
( 2-19) John has bought a n ew car. The idiot is always overspending . 
Here, however, the extra information concerns the speaker's opinion of the 
facts rather than the facts themselves. 
Another exception occurs when new information serves to select one or more 
e lements of an already-mentioned set: 
10Items in parentheses separated by slashes indicate alternatives. A question 
mark indicates doubtful acceptability under the interpretation in question. 
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I 
I 
(2-20) John has bought several new cars. The Jaguar is particularly 
impressive. 
Furthermore, a text may still be odd even when the information constraint is 
satisfied: 11 
(2-21) N l2 John has bought a new car. The mammal is very pleased 
with it. 
The oddness here is perhaps because the fact that John is a mammal may not 
be very easily retrievable; "mammal" is a specialised word for many people. 
(b) Collocation, while not always anaphoric, can sometimes be used to identify 
objects whose existence is suggested by the context but which have not 
actually been mentioned. In 
(2-22) John has bought a new car. The indicators use the latest 
laser technology. 
the collocation between "car" and "indicators" is the linguistic counterpart of 
the real-world relationship between cars and indicators. 
The information constraint applies to anaphoric collocation as well as to 
reiteration, although less strictly. In the above example, although the mention 
of the indicators is new, the fact that the car has them is not. Texts such as 
the following (from Sidner [ 1979]) 
(2-23) The heiress lived the life of a recluse. She died under 
mysterious circumstances, but the murderer was never 
found. 
are acceptable , since the phrase "died under mysterious circumstances" 
makes murder highly probable although not certain. The text becomes 
progressively odder if "under mysterious circumstances" is altered to "ten 
years ago" and then to "in hospital", since these phrases make murder 
progressively le·ss likely. 
Even when collocation is not anaphoric, it may still help in interpretation. 
Consider 
11 I am grateful to Peter Bosch for pointing this out. 
12 A "N" is used to indicate a text which is in some way odd even though every 
sentence in it is acceptable on its own. 
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(2-24a) John's going to lose thiJ trick. He hasn't got a jack. 
(2-24b) John will never get that wheel off. He hasn't got a jack. 
where the collocation between particular senses of the words "trick" and 
"jack" on the one hand, and "wheel" and "jack" on the other, leads to the 
correct interpretation of the ambiguous word "jack". 
2.2.4 Cohesion and semantic representation 
Some light can be shed on the relationships between the types of cohesion 
discussed above by comparing their roles in SPAR's semantic representation 
scheme, which we looked at briefly at the end of chapter 1. SPAR maintains a 
pair of networks, each consisting of nodes linked by various semantic 
relationships. The static word sense network (WSN) has nodes representing 
word senses, and the incrementally constructed text model network (TMN) has 
nodes which are specified by phrases in the text. Instance or "is-a" links join 
TMN nodes to WSN nodes which are their "descriptions", and the same set of 
semantic relationships is used within both networks. We will see below that 
relationships in one network can be paralleled by relationships between 
corresponding nodes in the other. 
In such a model, cospecification corresponds to the simple case of anaphor 
and antecedent specifying the same TMN element. Substitution and ellipsis 
correspond to a relationship between specifications which is mediated by links 
to shared WSN nodes; anaphor and antecedent may specify different TMN 
elements, but the descriptions of these elements have something in common. 
Thus in (2-4), the element specified by "the plugs" is distinct from that 
specified by "some new ones", but the two elements both have links to the WSN 
node for (the relevant sense of) "plug". 
Lexical cohesion corresponds to a relationship between WSN nodes which may 
r ell 
or may not be paralled in the text model. In (2-4), the lexical cohesion 
between "plugs" and "Jaguar" might be expressed in the WSN by links stating 
that a Jaguar is a type of car and a (spark) plug is part of a car. These links 
correspond (for (2-4)) to analogous ones in the TMN indicating that these 
specific worn plugs are part of this specific Jaguar. 
To summarize: cospecification is a relationship entirely at the TMN level; 
substitution and ellipsis operate indirectly, via the WSN; while lexical cohesion 
operates at the WSN level and sometimes also, in parallel, in the TMN. Thus 
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different anaphoric relations are modelled in SPAR by different methods of 
representation. 
2.3 How anaphors relate to their antecedents 
Although most work on anaphora in AI has been concerned with selecting 
appropriate referents or specifications from a number of possibilities, a 
logically prior problem is that of identifying what the text makes available as 
possible specifications. In some AI systems it is tacitly assumed that an 
antecedent noun phrase makes available only the specific individual it refers 
to in the world described by Che text. This approach is not in general 
adequate, as can be seen from the following texts. In none of these do the 
pronouns refer to single specific individuals. 
(2-25) 
(2-26) 
(2-27) 
Every farmer owns a donkey. He beats it. 
No child will admit that he's sleepy. 
The lion is a la~ge mammal. It is found all over Africa. 
This section reviews some of the accounts of such phenomena that have been 
offered. Following an overview of accounts within theoretical 
(non-computational) linguistics, I shall review the more computationally 
oriented approaches of Kamp [1981] and Webber [1978a,b]. 
2.3.1 An overview of work on the semantics of definite anaphora 
Many attempts have been made to account for the semantics of definite 
anaphora, and it is impossible to do justice here to the very complex 
arguments invo!ved. Instead, I will briefly summarize some of the phenomena 
which have been seen as problematic and outline the kinds of accounts of 
them that have been offered. 
In early transformational theory (e.g. Lees and Klima [1963]), a 
"pronominalisation transformation" was postulated in which one occurrence 
of a repeated noun phrase was optionally replaced by a pronoun; thus both of 
(2-28a) John threw the ball and Mary caught the ball. 
(2-28b) John threw the ball and Mary caught it. 
were seen as being derived from the same deep structure. On this view, all 
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anaphoric pronouns were regarded as pronouns of laziness (see (2-15)). This 
treatment is inadequate in many ways, failing to account, for example, for 
Bach-Peters sentences such as 
(2-29) I gave the book that he wanted to the man who asked for it. 
where each pronoun is contained in the other's antecedent phrase. 
Since the idea of a pronominalisation transformation was abandoned, authors 
attempting to define a semantics for definite anaphora have typically first 
distinguished a number of categories of such anaphora, and then attempted to 
show that these categories either can or cannot be accounted for in the same 
way. See, for example, Partee [1972,1978]; Stenning [1978]; Bosch [1980]; 
Evans [ 1980]; Kempson [ 1983]. 
Broadly speaking, the most widely-accepted category distinction, and the one 
to which most attention has been devoted, is between the following two types 
of pronoun: 
(1) Bound variable·pronouns (Partee [1978], Reinhart [1983]; cf also 
Bosch's [ 1980] roughly coextensive category of "syntactic" 
pronouns) . These are often thought of as restricted to occurrences 
in syntactic construction with their antecedents, and are fully 
interpreted at the level of semantics, typically by representing 
pronoun and antecedent by the same bound variable in the logical 
form. An example is the following sentence with its accompanying 
logical form. 
(2-30) No boy wants Mary to dislike him. 
(12-30) Vx (Boy(x) => Not(Wants(x,Dislike(Mary,x)))) 
(2) Pragmatic pronouns (Partee [ 1978]; also called "discourse" 
pronouns by Kempson [ 1983], and "referential" pronouns by Reinhart 
[1983]; cf Bosch's [1980] similar category of "referential" pronouns) 
which require pragmatics as well as semantics for their 
interpretation. For example: 
(2-31) The postman gave John a letter. He tore it open. 
It is arguable that the same account can be given for pragmatic 
pronouns whether they are anaphoric or exophoric; in other words, 
that when a pragmatic pronoun has an antecedent, they relate only 
indirectly and secondarily, by way of their shared referent (or 
specification). This is in contrast to bound variable pronouns, which 
are anaphors directly related to their antecedents by syntactic 
agreernent. 
It is often pointed out that a pronoun may be ambiguous between the bound 
variable and pragmatic categories on a particular occasion of use. Such 
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ambiguity does not affect the truth conditions of the sentence in which it 
occurs, but may aff eel those of later sentences. Consider for example 
(2-32) John beats his wife. The Governor of New Hampshire does 
too. 
If "his" is treated as a bound variable anaphor, the anaphoric "does" will be 
interpreted as "beats Ss wife" where Sis the subject of "does", the Governor. 
If "his" is treated as pragmatic, "does" will be interpreted as "beats John's 
wife". 
Some types of definite anaphora do not seem to fall into either the bound 
variable or the pragmatic category. These are often thought to include the 
pronouns of laziness mentioned in section 2.2.2 above. However, in 2.2.2, it 
was argued that pronouns of laziness are in fact substitutes; that is, they are 
cohesive at the level of sense rather than specification. If so, it is 
unsurprising that they are a problem for accounts of definite anaphora. 
Another difficult category is that of pronouns in donkey sentences such as 
(2-33) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
Although "it" here appears at first sight to be a bound-variable pronoun, 
closer examination reveals that under the most natural interpretation, it falls 
outside the scope of the "donkey" variable and therefore cannot be bound by 
it: 
(12-33) \/ f f(farmer(f) & 3 d [donkey(d) & owns(f,d)]) => beats(f,?it)l 
Having set out the kind of problems that arise, we will now summarise the 
conclusions of some of those who have attempted to solve them. The 
arguments on which those conclusions are based are often quite involved, and 
so for the sake of brevity they are not reproduced here. 
Partee [ 1972] considers bound variable pronouns, pragmatic pronouns and 
pronouns of laziness, and attempts to outline a uniform approach. She 
concludes that while pragmatic pronouns could perhaps be accounted for by 
an extended bound variable treatment, pronouns of laziness are more 
difficult. However, in a later paper [1978], she takes the view that the bound 
variable approach is less comprehensive than had earlier seemed likely, and 
cannot be extended to pragmatic anaphora. On the other hand, she argues 
that both pronouns of laziness and "donkey" pronouns (but not bound 
variable pronouns) can be accounted for as an extension of pragmatic 
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pronouns, using the framework of Cooper [ 1979]. 
Stenning [ 1978] also develops an extended pragmatic approach, which he 
applies to a range of bound variable anaphora. However, in this regard Kamp's 
work (see 2 .3.2 below) is perhaps more impressive. 
Kempson [ 1983] questions the traditional bound-variable /pragmatic 
distinction, arguing, with examples, that "every phenomenon which indicates 
the pragmatic nature of discourse anaphora [ what we have called "pragmatic 
anaphora"] is displayed also by bound-variable anaphora", and that therefore 
a pragmatic basis must be assumed for "bound variable" anaphors as well as 
"pragmatic" ones . 
Wiese [ 1983] goes further than Kempson, taking the view that anaphora is a 
fundamentally pragmatic phenomenon, and that the purely linguistic notion of 
antecedence, on which bound-variable and some pragmatic approaches rely, is 
not helpful in accounting for it. He argues convincingly that a pragmatic 
account in terms of speaker reference is adequate for (so-called) 
bound-variable as well ' as "pragmatic" anaphora , and sketches how bound 
variable-anaphora could be dealt with by basing the semantic interpretation 
process on Hintikka's game-theoretical semantics (Hintikka and Carlson 
[ 1979]). 
There are thus reasons to believe that a unified, probably 
pragmatically-based, explanation for definite anaphora of all types does exist. 
However, even if this is the case, it does not follow that one should design a 
language processing system to exploit it, because syntactic and semantic 
processing is much better understood than pragmatic. Thus a treatment 
which ascribes a significant syntactic and/or semantic role to anaphor 
resolution may be preferable for practical natural language processing even if 
its predictions a.re only approximately correct. 
The various approaches discussed nevertheless provide helpful insights into 
the complex nature of anaphora and the difficulty of fully characterising it. 
However their usefulness to the present project is limited by the fact that they 
all attempt to describe only the circumstances under which a statement is 
true and not the process by which it can be understood. This is less true of 
the work of Kamp and of Webber, which will now be discussed in turn. 
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2.3.2 Discourse Representation Theory 
Kamp's discourse representation (DR) theory is an approach to anaphora 
which attempts to address the concerns of both linguists and AI workers. 
Kamp [ 1981] presents a grammar for a small fragment of English and a set of 
DR formation rules which act on syntactic analyses of text sentences derivable 
from the grammar. The formation rules construct a discourse representation 
structure (DRS), which is an implicitly structured set of DR's which can be 
given a model-theoretic interpretation. A single DR consists of a number of 
elements taken from the universe of the representation (for which mappings 
can be defined into a model) and a number of constraints on those elements 
and elements defined in other DR's dominating the first in the DRS. As an 
example, the DRS for the "donkey sentence" (2-33), repeated here, 
(2-34) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
would be as in figure 2 .2 (drawn according to Guenthner and Lehmann's [1983] 
conventions rather than Kamp's own). 
DRO: 
DR1: 
Fi 
Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it 
x u 
farmer(x) 
donkey(u) 
owns(x,u) 
DR2: 
=> 
beats(x,u) 
In model-theore tic terms, a DRS is true if there is an embedding (assignment 
to model elements) of variables bound at the outermost level which satisfies 
the accompanying conslrainls , and for all its substructures of Lhc form ' 'A => 
B" , every embe dding for which A is true can be extended (by assigning values 
to any variables bound in B) to one in which B is also true. Thus the DRS in 
figure 2 .2 may be read "For every assignment of values to x and u such that x 
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is a farmer, u is a donkey and x owns u, it is true that x beats u" . In contrast 
to some of the "bound variable" treatments reviewed above, "donkey" 
pronouns can therefore by treated in the same way as "bound variable" 
anaphora (although the bound-variable/pragmatic distinction is not one that 
Kamp makes). 
Kamp's fragment of English, although small, is non-trivial in that it includes 
the determiners "a" and "every", conditionals (if.. .then), relative clauses, and 
the personal pronouns "he", "she" and "it" . Other work (e .g. van Eijck [1984], 
Klein [ 1984]) has explored possible extensions of DRT to other determiners 
(especially plurals) and verb phrase ellipsis. Kamp's DR formation rules are 
not complete where pronoun interpretation is concerned, since they assume a 
mechanism for choosing a "suitable" referent from among those accessible 13 
in the DRS; the importance of Kamp's work from the point of view of anaphor 
resolution is that it provides the basis of a particularly powerful uniform 
treatment of anaphora (by means of the binding of variables in DR's below top 
level) and a useful constraint on coreference, which explain the 
unacceptability of sentences such as 
(2-35) If Pedro owns every donkey then he beats it. 
in which the element representing the (prototypic) donkey is inaccessible 
from the DR in which "it" must be resolved. This constraint is quite different 
from configurational constraints such as Reinhart's (discussed below) because 
it operates at the level of logical relations . 
Kamp's is probably the best unified treatment of anaphora developed to date, 
because of its relative simplicity and the way in which it is correlated explicitly 
with a small but significant fragment of English. Given the mechanism of 
constructing subsidiary DRs, "pragmatic" and "bound variable" anaphors are 
treated in exactly the same way in that the DR formation rules make no 
distinction between them. In addition, Guenthner and Lehmann [1983] have 
shown in the context of relational database query that Kamp's theory, 
particularly the accessibility constraint, can make a useful contribution to 
computational anaphor resolution. 
13A referent is accessible if it is bo.und in the DR where the pronoun must be 
assigned a referent or in a superordinate DR. DRa is superordinate to DR{3 if 
DRa contains DR{3 or if DRa => DRy, where DRy is or contains DR{3. 
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2.3.3 Webber's formalism 
Webber [ 1978a] made significant sleps towards achieving two aims: that of 
identifying what the text made available to anaphora, and tha t. of developing, 
for NLP purposes, a formalism for representing sentences , and procedures 
operating on that formalism, so as to guarantee that the correct specification 
(or in Webber's terms, referent) for an anaphor was among those made 
available. She assumed the existence of procedures to select the correct 
specifications from among those available. 
Webber examined definite pronouns, descriptional anaphors and elided verb 
phrases. A review of her treatment of each of these would be unreasonably 
long because of the complexity of her formalism; we will therefore only 
consider the her analysis of definite pronouns, which is arguably· the most 
central to her approach. 
For her formalism, Webber developed a 5oned logic which allowed the 
representation of "discourse entities" (DE's; roughly, concepts which SPAR 
would represent as text model network elements) for individuals, sets, stuff, 
generics, prototypes, events, descriptions and predicates, all of which were 
viewed as possible specifications of anaphors. Each DE had at least one 
invoking description (ID), a logical expression which could be used in resolving 
a subsequent anaphor. IDs are exemplified bebw. 
In the processing model she assumed, English sentences were parsed into a 
surface syntactic tree, which was transformed, using information in the 
lexicon, into a semantic representation in which considerable ambiguity 
remained. The derivation from this of a logical form (to be exact, an extended 
predicate calculus representation with restricted quantification) involved ( 1) 
deciding on quantifier scope, (2) choosing specifications of definite pronouns 
(or at least deciding whether a bound variable interpretation was possible), 
and (3) deciding whether FDNPs (full definite noun phrases) were anaphoric 
and if so replacing them by a referent label representing a discourse entity. If 
and when later anaphors required it, a set of ID rules could be applied to 
sentence logical forms to derive ID's to be used in anaphor resolution. 
m rule application may be exemplified as follows. The sentence 
(2-36) I saw a cat. 
gives rise to the logical form 
Subsection 2 .3.3 36 
(12-36) (3x : Cat) . Saw I,x 
(read as "sentence 12-36 : there exists an entity x, which is a cat, such that I 
saw x"). There is an ID-rule which says that from a logical form matching the 
pattern 
(1j) !(3x: C). Fx 
where C is an arbitrary predicate on individuals and F x is an arbitrary open 
sentence in which x is unbound, we can extract the ID 
ix: Cx & F x & evoke(1j,x) 
(read as "'the x such that Cx and Fx and such that sentence 1j evokes 14 x"). 
Thus from (12-36) we can derive 
ix: Cat x & Saw I,x & evoke(12-36 ,x) 
(read as "the x such that x is a cat, I saw x, and sentence 12-36 evokes x"; or 
less formally, "the cat mentioned in sentence 2-36"). 
A more complex and interesting example is 
(2-37) Each cat that Wendy owns dislikes Sam. 
which has logical form 
(12-37) (Vx : 11.(u:Cat) [Own Wendy,u]) . Dislike x,Sam 
(read as "For every x satisfying the complex predicate on u 'u is a cat and 
Wendy owns u', x dislikes Sam"). An ID rule in fact der1.ves two ID's for the DE 
representing the cats: one for the "prototypical cat" and one for the set of 
cats: 
x: .\(u:Cat) [Own Wendy,u] 
Lx : maxset .\(u:Cat [Own Wendy,u]) x 
to be read as "af}y x such that x is a cat that Wendy owns" and "the x which is 
the maximal set of entities satisfying the condition of being a cat that Wendy 
owns". The justification for deriving these two ID's is that each of them allows 
for one of the following alternative continuations: 
(2-38n.) It skulk? in a corner when he's around. 
(2-38b) He's not too fond of them either. 
14DE's are s!_voked by sentences and invoked by ID's. The difference in prefixes 
emphasises the difference in kind between these relationships. 
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Webber's logical form and ID rules are motivated by, and represent adequately, 
a wide range of linguistic phenomena. These include definiteness, types of 
determiner, the bound-variable /pragmatic distinction, the possibility of 
distributive and collective interpretations for sentences involving plural noun 
phrases, and the way that elided verb phrases can create DE's which later 
pronouns can specify. (See Webber [1978a] for details). 
The importance of Webber's work is her analysis of a wide range of .anaphoric 
phenomena not previously considered in the processing context characteristic 
of AI, and her resulting "logical form" representation which is motivated 
primarily by the requirements of eventual anaphor resolution rather than by 
independent, non-linguistic criteria such as proof properties or completeness . 
Her formalisation of the problem and of her partial solution to it is impressive 
since it allows the claims and limitations of her proposals to be rigorously 
examined, something she is careful to do . 
A particularly strong point of her scheme is that it allows a great deal of 
"problem-driven" ambiguity resolution; moreover, before the "problem" 
occurs, the ambiguity is (mostly) represented as a single, vague form rather 
than a number of alternative fully-determined ones. The only serious 
exception to this is in the area of quantifier scoping, where each logically 
distinct reading must be represented separately. See Hobbs [ 1983] for a 
discussion of the drawbacks of such a situation and a suggested solution. 
The limitations of her work, many of which she points out herself, seem to me 
to arise mainly from the fact that she is looking only at a part of the anaphor 
resolution process: the process of determining what the text makes available 
to pronominal and verb phrase anaphora in later sentences. Intra-sentential 
anaphors are not easily dealt with if they must be resolved before they ID's 
they require are derived; Webber is aware of this problem and suggests the use 
of "vague, temporary IDs", but their introduction would probably sacrifice 
much of the elegance of her method. Also, it remains to be shown that her 
approach can be integrated into one that takes account of global discourse 
structure (both to constrain the set of currently available antecedents and to 
allow anaphoric references to larger structures such as sentences, 
paragraphs and · chapters) and allows non-deductive reasoning such as that 
described in chapter 7. Similarly, it is not clear how easily her logic-based 
approach could support the resolution of non-pronominal anaphors, which as 
we have seen can relate to their antecedents in a wide variety of ways. Such 
phenomena seem to be more naturally catered for by, for example, a 
frame- based approach. In this context it is worth noting Charniak's [ 1981 b] 
Subsection 2.3 .3 38 
knowledge representation in which a frame-like organisation is imposed on a 
restricted range of predicate calculus statements, in order to combine the 
organisational advantages of the former with the logical rigour of the latter. 
2.4 Configurational constraints on coreference 
Considerable efforts have been made by linguists, usually working within a 
framework related to Partee's [1978], to state configurational (typically 
surface syntactic) constraints on coreference (more strictly, cospecification; 
however, the distinction is not crucial here). A number of different 
constraints appear to operate; they apply differently to R-pronouns 
(reciprocals such as "each other" and reflexives such as "himself") and non-R 
pronouns, and to definite and indefinite (quantified) antecedents. The 
following constraint, slightly reworded from rule (34) in Reinhart [1983,p158], 
appears to be approximately correct: 
(2-39) In the surface syntactic structure of a sentence, an 
R-pronoun must have an antecedent dominated by its 
minimal governing category (MGC); a non-R pronoun may not 
have an antecedent dominated by its MGC. 
Definition: The MGC of a node ex is the minimal (i.e. lowest) S 
or NP node dominating cx .15 
A further constraint for non-R pronouns has received much attention. The 
position taken in this thesis is that of Reinhart (1983], who shows that her 
original (Reinhart (1976]) rule is inadequate. However, the superior (1983) 
version is best understood by presenting the earlier one first; al s o, it is the 
earlier rule which is used by SPAR, for reasons which will be presented. 
Reinhart's original rule is as follows . 
(2-40) If NPl c-commands (and is distinct from) NP2, and NP2 is 
not a pronoun, then NPl and NP2 are non-coreferential. 
Definition: A c-commands B if the branching node ex 1 most immedi?tely dominating A either dominates B or is 
immediately dominated by a node cx 2 which dominates B, and 
15Striclly speaking, the MGC of ex is the minimal S or NP dominating both ex 
and its governor, where the governor of ex is the node that " assigns case" lo ex, 
e .g . N, V or P (Reinhart [1983,p139]). 
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a 2 is of the same category as a 1. 
A "branching node" is a node with more than one daughter; by "category" 
Reinhart means the label of a node ignoring any bars it may have, so that for 
example S and S are of the same category. 
As a simple example of the application of (2-40), consider 
(2-41) He loves John's mother. 
which has the surface structure shown in figure 2.3 . In this structure, the NP 
node for "he" c-commands that for "John"; Reinhart's rule therefore 
correctly predicts that "he" cannot corefer with "John". Note that the rule 
does not require NP 1 to be a pronoun; thus coreference is also ruled out in 
(2-42) John loves John's mother. 
which is, if not unacceptable, at least odd in isolation. 
c-commands 
NP /VP 
v ~ 
N 
NP POSS 
He loves John 's mother 
Figure 2.3: Surface syntactic structure showing c-command relation 
An alternative (and, we will see, inferior) structural relation to Reinhart's is 
that of Lasnik [1976] . Lasnik's rule can be stated as follows: 
(2-43) lf NP 1 precedes and kommands NP2 , and NP2 is not a 
pronoun, then NP 1 and NP2 are disjoint in reference. 
Definition: A kommands B if the MGC of A also dominates B. 
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Lasnik's rule predicts correctly for sentence (2-41). However, c-command 
performs better for 
(2-44) Near Dan, he saw a snake. 
for which it correctly rules out coreference while Lasnik's rule does not. 
Reinhart [ 1983] discusses a range of other cases in which only c-command 
performs correctly. We may therefore conclude that c-command is the more 
appropriate relation. 
As well as (2-39) and (2-40), Reinhart argues for a stricter restriction for 
quantified (including indefinite) NPs: 
(2-45) A quantified NP can be the antecedent of a pronoun only if it 
c-commands that pronoun. 
(paraphrased from Reinhart [1983,p122]). 
For example, whereas (2-46a) allows a coreference interpretation, (2-46b) 
does not: 
(2-46a) If he turns up, tell John to wait outside. 
(2-46b) If he turns up, tell an applicant to wait outside. 
In (2-46a) neither "he" nor "John" c-command each other, so coreference is 
allowed by rule (2-40) while rule (2-45) does not apply. However, in (2-46b) 
"an applicant" is quantified (in the broader sense) and so (2-45) forbids 
coreference. 
But Reinhart [ 1983] points out that her rule (2-40) has several types of 
apparent counterexample which suggest that no purely configurational 
approach to coreference restrictions can be entirely accurate. 
The first such problem, which is presented by certain sentences containing 
preposed prepositional phrases (PPs), Reinhart disposes of by allowing 
pragmatic factors to influence the determination of syntactic structure . The 
structure a reader assigns to such a sentence depends on pragmatic factors; 
but once the structure is determined, coreference options are, Reinhart 
argues, determined entirely syntactically. Thus pairs such as (2-46a-b) are no 
problem for rule-(2-40). 
The second type of objection is more serious, and, Reinhart shows, 
necessitates a complete reworking of the framework in which the c-command 
rule operates . From a position similar to Partee's ([1978]; see section 2.3.1) 
she argues that although a syntactic rule may prevent two noun phrases being 
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coindexed (i.e. being represented by the same variable at the level of logical 
form), it cannot prevent them taking the same referent anyway, since referent 
selection is a pragmatic rather than a syntactic process. Evans [ 1980] 
presents a number of contexts in which two NPs corefer in spite of breaking 
rule (2-40). For example, 
(2-47) Everyone has finally realised that Oscar is incompetent. 
Even he has finally realised that Oscar is incompetent. 
is acceptable (though perhaps odd) if we interpret "he" as "Oscar"; it is far 
less odd if "he" is replaced by "Oscar" (still violating (2-40)). Evans suggests 
that rules such as (2-40) forbid not coreference but "referential dependency", 
but Reinhart criticises this notion as undefinable. Instead, she proposes that 
a pronoun may only be coindexed with an NP which c-commands it (with rule 
(2-39) also applying), and that coindexing results in a bound-variable 
interpretation (see section 2.3.1). This proposal explains why rules (2-40) and 
(2-45) both make use of the c-command relation, since quantified NPs can (in 
Reinhart's treatment) only act as antecedents by means of the bound-variable 
mechanism and not by coreference. 
To deal with the differences between 
(2-48a) Zelda thinks that she is boring. 
(2-48b) She thinks that Zelda is boring . 
where coreference is possible in the former but not in the latter, Reinhart 
uses the Grice-derived principle that "if a speaker has the means to express a 
certain idea clearly and directly, he would not arbitrarily choose a less clear 
way to express it" (Reinhart [1983,pl66]) and the observation that the bound 
variable mechanism, while not totally unambiguous, is more constrained and 
therefore more "clear and direct" than the coreference mechanism. She 
suggests the fcllowing strategies (trivially reworded): 
(2-49) Speaker's strategy: Where a syntactic structure you are 
using allows bound-variable interpretation, then use it if you 
intend your expressions to corefer, unless you have some 
reasons to avoid bound-variable anaphora. 
Hearer'? strategy: If the speaker avoids the bound-variable 
options provided by the structure he is using, then, unless 
he has reasons to avoid using bound-variable anaphora, he 
did not intend his expressions to corefer. 
Thus in a sentence of the form "x thinks that y is boring", a bound variable 
interpretation is possible if y is a pronoun, as in (2-48a); if the speaker uses 
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(2-48b), the hearer assumes that coreference is not intended. The apparent 
correctness of rule (2-40) therefore arises from the fact that if its condition is 
satisfied (i.e. if NPl c-commands a non-pronoun NP2) then the bound variable 
option could have been used (by making NP2 a pronoun) if coreference h a d 
been intended. 
The third type of problem for Reinharl's approach is represented by a mixed 
bag of sentences which violate (2-45) in a way which can only be repaired, if at 
all, by ad-hoe modifications to the theory. However, Reinhart claims that any 
configurational approach, whether syntax- or semantics-based, would suffer 
from the same problems. Other problems for configurational approaches are 
discussed by Bolinger [ 1979], but it is likely that many of them can be solved 
by allowing pragmatic factors to operate indirectly at appropriate points, as 
Reinhart does for the preposed PP problem and in (2-49), while maintaining 
the purely configurational nature of the constraints. 
Thus although Reinhart's account is not perfect, it seems to be the best yet 
offered , and fails in only a few cases, none of which SPAR is likely to 
encounter. It therefore makes available to SPAR a useful, reliable and 
computationally cheap source of knowledge. The approach taken in applying 
it is, as in other parts of the system, a shallow processing one. It is assumed, 
as is normally the case, that the writer of the story has no "reasons lo avoid 
using bound-variable anaphora"; rules (2-40) and (2-45) may therefore be 
applied . In other words it is effectively Reinhart's earlier ( 1976) rule that is 
used. Adjustments necessitated by the fact that SPAR has no direct access to 
surface structure will be discussed in section 6.4.1. 
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3. Preference Semantics 
In order to resolve anaphors reliably, a language processing system must be 
able to do at least two things: to represent the specifications that an anaphor 
might have, and to select the intended specification from among those 
available . In chapter 2, we looked at some of the phenomena of which a 
solution to the first of these two problems must take account. 
Wilks' theory of preference semantics, which significantly influe nced the 
design of SPAR, can be viewed as an attempted solution both Lo the problem of 
representation and the problem of selection. Wilks developed, firstly, a 
formalism for representing a text, and therefore for representing possible 
specifications for anaphors; and, secondly, a set of procedures for arriving at 
the (hopefully) correct interpretation of a pronoun largely by inferential 
methods. In this chapter, I will describe the first aspect of Wilks' work ; a fairly 
detailed description is necessary to provide sufficient background for the 
description of SPAR's meaning representation in the next chapter. The second 
part of Wilks' theory will be discussed later, in chapter 7 . 
Both · parts of Wilks' preference semantics theory were embodied in an 
experimental system which I will call PS. PS translated short non-technical 
English texts into French, concentrating its efforts on resolving lexical, 
structural and anaphoric (mainly pronominal) ambiguities. The preference 
semantics theory may, I believe, be characterised by the following two 
principles. 
( 1) A possible interpretation of a piece of language should be judged 
acceptable or unacceptable not on intrinsic grounds alone, but by 
comparing it with alternative interpretations (if any) of the same 
piece of language. 
(2) The basis for comparing a set of interpretations is their 
respective degrees of redundancy. More redundant interpretations -
that is, ones that introduce less new information (in some intuitive 
sense) into the system - are to be preferred, since redundancy occurs 
when parts of an interpretation reinforce other parts. 
These principles were applied by PS in its efforts to construct a single 
connected representation for a text. The objects and processes involved in 
these efforts are described in this chapter. Attention is focussed on the 
aspects of PS most relevant to SPAR; for a more complete description, see e .g. 
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Wilks [ 1976a]. The chapter ulso includes a discussion of some of Wilks' later, 
unimplemented plans for extending the system and a brief description of 
Boguraev's analyser, which, as we have seen, provides the input for SPAR, and 
uses and develops some of the ideas of preference semantics. No asse ssment 
of Wilks' or Boguraev's representations is attempted in this chapter; instead, 
their suitability as a basis for anaphor resolution is discussed in chapter 4 as 
part of the motivation for SPAR's own representation. 
PS underwent considerable development between the late sixties and mid 
seventies. The version of the system to be discussed here is, as far as possible, 
the final one, as described in Wilks [ 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 
1978] . 
3.1 Semantic primitives and formulas 
Each open-class word in the dictionary used by PS was assigned one or more 
senses, each defined, in as much detail as desired, by a semantic formula 
represented as a tree of primitive elements . Formulas were intended, 
according to Wilks, to contain information about the meaning of the word 
rather than facts about the thing it stood for . The set of primitives, and the 
rules for constructing formulas from them, evolved over the years, and no 
strong claims were made for their intrinsic correctness; their justification was 
purely in terms of the overall system performance. 
In the fullest description of the system of formulas and primitives Wilks 
[1977a], just under a hundred primitives were defined, rnost of them being 
categorised as substantive (e.g. MAN, STUFF, THING), case (SUBJ, INST), action 
(MOVE, CAUSE, WANT) or qualifier (TRUE, GOOD) primitives . In addition, a number of 
class primitives, whose names began with asterisks, were defined to 
correspond to a set of ordinary ones; so for example *HUM covered both MAN and 
FOLK. Any primitive could in principle be prefixed by NOT to negate its meaning . 
A formula consisted of at least a head primitive, broadly categorising the word 
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sense, 1 and, for verb senses, subtrees expressing preferential constraints on 
role fillers. So for example, the formula for the verb "interrogate" was 
(3-1) ( CMAN SUBJ) ( (MAN OBJE) (TELL FORCE))) ; 
this defines "interrogate" as "force to tell something", done preferably by 
persons ('"MAN") to persons. Each bracketed subtree in a formula consists of a 
governor (primitive or subtree) on the right, and a dependent (primitive or 
subtree) on the left ; the ultimate governor, or head element, of the entire 
formula therefore always occurs at the extreme right, with rol e name s 
occurring Lo the right of constrain Ls on their fillers, as in (•HUM SUBJ) . 
As well as a head and some role constraints, formulas could contain qualifier 
elements and, for noun senses, what Wilks called an inverted nominal 
construction; for example, "policeman" might be defined as 
(3-2) ( ( (FOLK SOUR) ( ( (NOT GOOD MAN) OBJE) PI CK)) (SUBJ MAN)) 
where the case primitive SUBJ, occurring as dependent of Lhe rightmost MAN, 
specifies that the MAN is Lhe agent of the action described by the subtree 
headed by PICK . In . (ps·eudo- )English, this formula defines a policeman as "a 
person who selects bad persons out of the body of people (FOLK)" . 
Wilks intended formulas to be "habitable" - that is, easy to read and write . 
They therefore tended to have considerable implicit content; in the forml)la 
for "interrogate" above, the fact that the two MAN primitives represent 
different entities must be determined using the rules for formula 
interpretation, as must the participant(s) in the TELL action. What is forced is 
not just a generalised "telling" (as represented by the TELL primitive, which 
has no dependents, on its own) but a telling of something by the object of the 
interrogation. 
1In fact this function could also be performed by a "conventional subformula" 
such as (THRU PART), denoting an aperture, whose meaning was more than the 
sum of its parts and which was largely treated by the system as an irre ducible 
object. 
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3.2 Fragmentation and template matching 
PS contained no explicit syntactic knowledge . The first phase of its processing 
was a fragmentation procedure which divided the text into small strings of a 
handful of words each, according to the occurrence of certain predefined key 
words, typically function words. The heads of the formulas for the words in 
each fragment were matched with bare templates taken from an inventory of 
several hundred. A bare template, such as [MAN FORCE MAN], consisted of an 
ordered triple of primitives representing the agent, action (in a very broad 
sense) and object (the first and last of which might be dummies) of what Wilks 
called a "basic message". A successful match resulted in a full template 
(henceforth, simply template) being constructed, in which each of the 
primitives in the triple was replaced by the corresponding formula. In general 
there would be several templates for each fragment. 
I 
As an example (adapted from Wilks [ 1975a]), consider the sentence "The 
policeman interrogated the crook I al night" (fragmented al the "/"), where 
"policeman" and "interrogate" have the definitions given above, and "crook" 
has two definitions, 
(3-3a) 
(3-3b) 
( ( ( (NOTGOOD ACT) OBJE) DO) (SUBJ MAN)) 
((((THIS BEAST) OBJE) FORCE) (INST (LINE THING))) 
for the "criminal" and "shepherd's slick" senses respectively. For the first 
fragment, the bare templates [MAN FORCE MAN] and [MAN FORCE THING] will match 
the formulas for the words "policeman interrogate crook" in the first 
fragment (one for each sense of "crook"), to yield a full template 
(3-4) (( (FOLK SOUR) (( (NOT GOOD MAN) OBJE) PI CK)) (SUBJ MAN)) 
( (MAN SUBJ) ((MAN OBJE) (TELL FORCE)) 
( ( ( (NOTGOOD ACT) OBJE) DO) (SUBJ MAN)) 
and a second one with the "shepherd's stick" formula in third position. From 
now on, I will follow Wilks' convention of indicating templates by the words they 
correspond to; thus the two full templates derived from our first fragment will 
be written 
(3-5a) [ the+policeman interrogated the+crook(MAN) ] 
and 
(3-5b) [ the+policeman interrogated the+crook(THING) ] 
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though it must be remembered that their slots are actually fiiled by formulas 
and not by words . 
The second fragment, "at night", where " night" might have the formula 
(THI s (WHEN SPREAD)) ("a specific period of time") , would match with a bare 
template like [0 DBE *ANY], where 0 is a dummy and DBE matches prepositions, to 
give a full template 
(3-6) [ 0 at night]. 
Next came the first significant application of the two principles of preference 
semantics given earlier. The SUBJ and OBJE preferences of the action formula 
in each template (if any) were examined and compared with the formulas 
filling the agent and object slots respectively. The competing template(s) with 
the smallest number of unsatisfied preferences were retained. Thus in our 
example, template (3-5a) contains two satisfied preferences (the agent and 
object slots of the template are both filled by formulas whose head is MAN, as 
preferred by the "interrogate" formula), but in (3-5b) only one preference is 
satisfied, since the secC?nd formula for "crook", whose head is THING, does not 
satisfy the object preference for MAN. (3-5b) is therefore rejected. However, if 
the sentence had contained the word "stick" instead of "crook", and if "stick" 
only had one sense, defined with a formula such as (THIS CLINE THING)), the 
resulting template would not be rejected in spite of its broken preference, 
because of the lack of any better alternative. 
PS then attempted to link pairs of templates together by applying parapla tes, 
which were structures representing the uses of prepositions and other 
function words. They expressed constraints on the contents of slots in the 
two templates they were intended to link. A constraint could apply to a single 
slot (such as specifying what the head of a formula should be) or to a 
relationship between several slots (such as specifying that the y should contain 
the same subformula in a certain position) . A successful paraplate match 
resulted in the establishment of a case tie between two particular slots in the 
two t e mplates . Thus for our example, a paraplate stored under the 
preposition "at" might specify that if the first template had an action-slot 
formula whose h e ad matched • DO (a ve ry general action primitive), a nd the 
second had an object-slot formula whose head was the conventional 
subformula (WHEN SPREAD), then the templates could be linked by a case tie 
labelled TLOC (time location). This would give the representation (from (3-5a) 
and (3-6)) 
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(3-7) [ the+policeman interrogated the+crook(MAN) ] 
i 
TLOC 
[ 0 at night] 
After paraplates were applied, PS would go on to resolve any pronouns in the 
r 'epresentation and then to generate a French translation. The way this was 
don e is described in later chapters in the context of other, related work. 
Wilks' system of semantic primitives and formulas plays an important role in 
SPAR. as does the process, illustrated in this section, of disambiguation by 
preference maximization. However, the use of these ideas in SPAR is in a 
sense mediated by their use in Boguraev's [1979,] analyser, from which SPAR 
takes its input; and indeed part of SPAR's semantics derives from ideas 
original to Boguraev. It is therefore appropriate at this stage to consider 
Boguraev's work. 
3.3 Boguraev's analyser 
Boguraev's analyser (henceforth BA) has access to two sources of linguistic 
knowledge : a grammar of English encoded as an augmented transition network 
(ATN; Woods [ 1972]). and word-specific information in a dictionary. The 
central part of each word sense definition is provided by a Wilksian word-sense 
formula . 
The processing performed by BA, as opposed Lo the structures it produces, is 
not of direct importance to SPAR and will be discussed only briefly. 
Al various points during ATN-driven syntactic parsing, routines are called to 
construct, using semantic information from the dictionary, one or more 
s e mantic structures for the constituent just recognized. If no coherent 
structures can be produced, the parser backtracks, thus avoiding following up 
incorrect paths. - This extra efficiency is achieved al the price of making BA to 
a certain extent a filtering system rather than a preference one; if the only 
interpretations possible for a sentence contain broken preferences, PS would 
still produce an interpretation, whereas BA will sometimes ( depending on the 
syntactic relationship associated with the broken preference) not do so. 
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The sentence representations produced by BA are dependency trees with 
case-labelled components; for full details see Sparck Jones [1984] . The 
representations cliff er from the structures produced by PS in reflecting 
syntactic structure more explicitly, and in being verb-, rather than template-, 
centred. Thus while PS represented the agent and object of an action 
differently from other participants, by direct inclusion in the template rather 
than by means of a case lie, BA represents all role fillers in the same way. 
Thus for the sentence "The policeman interrogated the crook at night", 
assigned the representation (3-7) by PS, BA produces 
(3-8) (CLAUSE (TYPE DCL) CTNS PAST) 
CV 
(INTERROGATE! FORCE 
(@@ AGENT CN (POLICEMAN MAN (@@ DET (THEl ONE))))) 
(@@ TIME-LOCATION CN (NIGHTl SPREAD))) 
(@@ RECIPIENT 
CN (CROOKl MAN (@@ DET (THEl ONE))))))))) 
where the structures originating from clauses and noun-phrases are marked 
by "CLAUSE" and "N" respectively, and all case roles (marked by @@) are 
represented uniformly.2 
Relative clauses and adjectival modifiers are represented by BA with a "'trace" 
mechanism as follows. For the sentence "The policeman arrested the man who 
stole the red car", BA produces the structure in figure 3.1. Each of the two 
"TRACE" structures in this representation contains a pointer to the head of the 
r e lative clause it expresses . The bottom clause, with verb sense BE2, would 
(a part from syntactic features) be the same as those generated for "The car 
was red" and "The colour of the car was red". 
Another important difference between BA and PS is that BA delivers semantic 
inte rpretations of sentences, whereas PS did not attach any particular 
importance to sentence boundaries, at least as compared to clause (fragment) 
boundaries. (This is related to the fact that BA, unlike PS, contains an explicit 
syntactic component). This sentence-orientation, together with the fact that 
BA ignores anaphoric ambiguity, has important consequences for SPAR's 
2In more detail, this dependency structure may be read as follows. The input 
s e ntence is a clause of declarative type and past tense, whose main verb has 
the sense "INTERROGATE!"; the head primitive of the Wilksian formula for 
INTERROGATE! is FORCE. The explicitly mentioned role fillers of the interrogating 
action are the policeman, the crook and the night, each expressed by noun 
phrases; the first two both having the determiner "the" (modifiers such as 
determiners being represented like more conventional Fillmorean case roles). 
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(CLAUSE (TYPE DCL) (TNS PAST) 
CV 
(ARRESTl PI CK 
(@@ AGENT (N (POLICEMAN MAN (@@ DET (THEl ONE))))) 
(@@ RECIPIENT 
((TRACE (CLAUSE V AGENT)) 
(CLAUSE (TYPE RELATIVE) (TNS PAST) 
CV 
(STEALl SENSE 
(@@ AGENT (N CMAN1 MAN (@@ DET (THEl ONE))))) 
(@@ OBJECT 
((TRACE (CLAUSE V AGENT)) 
(CLAUSE 
(V 
CBE2 BE 
(@@ AGENT 
(N 
(CAR1 THING 
(@@ DET (THEl ONE))))) 
(@@ STATE 
(ST CN (COLOUR NIL)) 
(VAL 
(RED1 
KIND))))))))))))))))) 
Figure 3 .1: BA's analysis of 
"The policeman arrested the man who stole the red car" 
processing strategy. 
The case role names used by BA (AGENT, LOCATION etc.) are different from, and 
rather more discriminating than, the case primitives used by PS. However, the 
formulas in BA's dictionary contain Wilks' PS case primitives, and there is no 
straightforward mapping between the two sets. SPAR converts the BA role 
names into Wilksian primitives by a "hacked" method when constructing its 
text representation, since the whole problem is a historical artifact rather 
than a genuine linguistic phenomenon. 
3.4 Unimplemented extensions to the PS framework 
In two papers written after development of PS ceased, Wilks proposed two 
important extensions to the system, one concerning a modification to the 
inference mechanism, and the other enabling the system to deal with 
"extended use of language", i.e . metaphor. The first extension is incorporated 
into SPAR. as described in chapter 8; the second, described here, is not, for 
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the reasons given below. 
In Wilks [1978], a scheme for actively re-interpreting broken preferences, 
especially those embodied in metaphor , using script-like objects called 
pseudo-texts (PTs) was put forward . A template containing a broken 
preference, such as that for "My car drinks petrol", where the formula for 
" drink" specifies a preference for an animate agent, would be compared with 
templates in the PT(s) associated with objects in that template. The closest 
match would be used to re-interpret the template with the broken preference. 
In our example, if the PT for " car" contained a template stating that its engine 
used a liquid, then "drinks" would be interpreted as meaning "uses". Wilks 
pointed out that the idiomatic element of this use of "drinks", i.e. that it 
means "uses a lot of". could not even in principle be inferred, and would have 
to be pre-stored explicitly. 
Pseudo-tex ts are not implemented in SPAR because they appear to be less 
relevant to anaphor resolution than to other aspects of interpretation, and 
because, when faced with a situation in which only interpretations involving 
broken preferences can be constructed, Boguraev's analyser often (although 
in fact not for the case "my car drinks petrol") assumes that a wrong 
syntactic path has been followed , and backtracks without returning any 
interpretation for the current path . Such behaviour is essential for 
reasonably efficient processing. Thus if pseudo-texts were to be used, they 
would have to be applied during parsing on any occasion that backtracking 
was considered. But as pseudo-texts are fairly complex objects, this would 
make the analyser far too inefficient. 
More recently, Fass and Wilks [ 1983] have outlined an alternative to 
pseudo-texts. They propose to split the metaphor interpretation process into 
a relatively cheap and simple detection phase, which merely recognises that a 
metaphor is occurring, followed by a more complex interpretation phase, 
which determines the metaphor's meaning. Although Fass and Wilks do not 
discuss the issue, it would seem that only the first phase would be necessary 
for an analyser such as Boguraev's to decide whether or not to backtrack. 
However, the assumption that metaphor detection can in fact be separated 
from metaphor -interpre tation in the way proposed by Fass and Wilks is a 
questionable one, as argued in Carter [1984] . 
Thus neither the pseudo- text idea nor Fass and Wilks ' later proposals are 
embodied in SPAR. because metaphor interpretation is a rather different 
problem from anaphor resolution, and because of the difficulty of invoking the 
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appropriate processes efficiently and at the right moment. 
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4. Meaning Representation in SPAR 
This chapter describes the way that SPAR represents both the stories it 
processes and the pre-stored linguistic knowledge which plays a central role in 
that processing. Because SPAR takes input from Boguraev's analyser, the 
representational formalism is quite strongly based on that of Boguraev. As we 
saw in the last chapter, Boguraev's representation is in turn partly based on 
Wilks', specifically in its use of word sense formulas and more generally in ils 
overall philosophy. Rather than presenting an independent and general 
justification of SPAR's representation, therefore, I will assume thal whal one 
might call the "Wilks/Boguraev approach" to representational issues is 
broadly appropriate for performing language-oriented tasks such as 
translation or paraphrase, and will build on that approach. 
In section 4.1 I will argue that a Wilks/Boguraev approach demands that, as 
far as possible, structures of the same general character should be used to 
represent the text at· all stages of processing, and that therefore SPAR's 
representation should resemble Boguraev's as far as possible. However, the 
fact that SPAR is oriented towards resolving anaphoric ambiguities in texts, 
rather than, like Boguraev's analyser, word-sense and structural ambiguities 
in single sentences, means that certain differences are necessary. will 
outline the general nature of these cliff erences and give an overview of the 
rest of the chapter, which presents SPAR's representation in detail. 
Section 4.2 describes in detail SPAR's representation of pre-stored linguistic 
knowledge, while section 4.3 discusses the representation of texts. The form 
of representation as a whole is summarised and evaluated in section 4.4 . 
At various points in this chapter I will comment on SPAR's representation 
scheme compared with the two knowledge representation languages KRL 
(Bobrow and Winograd [1976)) and KL-ONE (Schmolze and Brachman [1982]). 
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4 .1 Requirements 
4 .1.1 Design Methodology 
We have seen that in Wilks' PS system a text was represented at alrpost every 
stage of processing by a set of interlinked actor-action-object templates. 
Templates corresponding to input phrases were constructed early on in the 
analysis phase, and templates continued to represent the input throughout 
subsequent operations, including pronoun resolution, until they were finally 
used as the input to a French generator. Although the representation was 
deepened somewhat during processing, it remained template-based. 
This policy of working throughout with a representation quite closely related 
to the input surface text is especially appropriate for a system which performs 
a language-oriented task such as paraphrase or translation rather than an 
event-oriented one such as question answering, since language-oriented tasks 
seem on average to demand less inference. lf the representation is made more 
regular and canonical, 'for example by removing traces of surface words and 
structures and filling in missing case roles, it will tend to become more 
amenable to inference, but the tasks of constructing such a representation 
and generating natural language from it become correspondingly more 
difficult. The representation must be designed with this trade-off in mind; if. 
as in our shallow processing approach, comparatively little inference is to be 
performed, then a relatively superficial representation (i.e. one whose form 
reflects that of the input text quite closely) is appropriate. 
SPAR takes Boguraev's relatively superficial dependency structures as input, 
and, as chapter 9 will describe, hands such structures to a modified version of 
.... 
Tait's English generator as output. lt also · exploits the Wilksian word sense 
formulas used by Boguraev's analyser. The more SPAR's internal 
representation differs from Boguraev's, the more difficult will be the task of 
transforming one into the other. Similarly, other things being equal, we will 
want to transform the formulas in the dictionary as little as possible. The 
principle used for designing SPAR's meaning representation is therefore the 
following : 
SPAR's representation of texts should be based as closely as possible 
on Boguraev's dependency structures, diverging from them only 
where the differences between the orientations of the two systems 
require it. Similarly, SPAR's representation of pre-stored linguistic 
knowledge should diverge from the word sense formulas in the 
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analyser dictionary only where the differences in system orientation 
require it. The two main such differences are: (1) SPAR is oriented 
mainly towards resolving anaphoric ambiguities, while Boguraev's 
system considers only word-sense and structural ambiguities . (2) 
SPAR works with multi-sentence texts, while Boguraev's system 
analyses single sentences in isolation. 
We will now look at the main way in which Boguraev's representation is 
unsuitable for anaphor resolution in connected texts, and will argue that, 
despite its use for anaphor resolution, Wilks' template-centred representation 
was inadequate in just the same way. 
4.1.2 The need for a text model 
The main drawback of both Boguraev's and Wilks' representations from the 
point of view of anaphor resolution can be summarised by saying that they 
make explicit only information about the senses of the words, phrases and 
clauses they process and leave information relevant to their specifications 
implicit. That is, the re·presentations are both sense-oriented; one might even 
say that the entities in PS's semantic blocks corresponded only to (particular 
senses of) words in the text and not in any direct way lo the objects and 
events the text described.1 
An important consequence of this is that neither representation makes 
explicit provision for distinguishing between distinct entities sharing the same 
sense. Wilks [1975b, p73] comments, about PS's treatment of the sentence 
(4-1) John drank the whisky from a glass and it felt warm in his 
stomach. 
" .. .it is not specified in the notation [i.e. in the representation] whether the 
whisky was, or was not, the Winogradian :WHISKY, which is to say was it or was 
it not particular whisky, different from other samples of whisky. This is a 
Jrl istinction which makes most sense within a micro-world of inventoried items 
and samples, and less so outside." 
In practice the l_ack of such a distinction was not a problem for PS because of 
its task (English to French translation) and its text type (short, and/or 
1This is perhaps suggested by Wilks' [1978,p210] belief that one should "stress 
the form of representation of language and seek to accommodate the 
representation of knowledge to that, rather than the reverse ." 
Subsection 4 .1.2 56 
' 11 
I 
11 I 
without significant anaphora problems) . For example, when processing 
(4-2) John traded in his old car for a new one. It broke down 
within a week. 
it is not necessary to decide which car broke down, or even to realise that 
more than one car is mentioned, in order to translate "it" by a French 
pronoun of the correct gender. Either way, "it" refers to a car, which 
determines the gender. 
However, for longer texts, or for other tasks requiring more detailed 
reasoning, .a sense-oriented approach is unlikely to be adequate. If ( 4-2) 
occurs in the middle of a long story which first talks about John's old car and 
then, after the trade in, talks about the new one , then any inference 
necessary to choose between the (new) car and other candidate pronoun 
referents in the later part of the story must avoid mistakenly accessing 
information about John's old car. 
Furthermore, a focus mechanism such as Sidner's will be misled if similar 
entities are not distinguished. A second reference to a recently-mentioned 
entity is likely to make that entity strongly focussed, whereas the introduction 
of a new entity similar in description to an earlier one will not make either of 
them so strongly focussed. In fact, Sidner assumes, and shows the need for, a 
representation in which specific instances are distinguished both from one 
another and from generic concepts. 
In addition, in chapter 7 we will see that an inference mechanism designed 
along Wilksian lines should be sensitive to intensional context; it should only 
make inferences on the basis of what is actually asserted in the text. The 
representation on which inference is performed should therefore also express 
intensional context. 
We may conclude that Wilks' use of a simpler, sense-oriented representation 
was adequate for the limited number of short texts on which Wilks 
demonstrated PS's pronoun resolution mechanism, but that a system with 
more ambitious aims would have to represent thoroughly not just the 
semantic patterns in the text but also the nature and identity of the objects 
and situations described, as determined by factors like intensional context, 
quantifier scope and genericity (see e.g . section 2 .3). Thus some alteration to 
Boguraev's representation, which is similarly sense-oriented, is also needed. 
More specifically, our representation must qualify as a text model of the type 
assumed in the characterisation of anaphora and specification given in 
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section 2.1. That is, there must be at least approximately a one-to-one 
correspondence between model elements and story entities (in a very broad 
sense of the latter). We will see later in this chapter that this is true of SPAR's 
representation. 
In 4.1.1 above we noted that SPAR's orientation differs from that of Boguraev's 
analyser in two main respects: in concentrating on anaphora, and in 
processing connected texts rather than isolated sentences. The drawbacks 
for our purposes of Boguraev's representation discussed until now have all 
been consequences of the first difference. However, the second difference 
also has important consequences, in that Boguraev's structures are not of a 
tractable form for representing texts as opposed to sentences . Their 
hierarchical form is appropriate for a sentence representation, because 
sentences exhibit governor I dependent relationships such as those of main 
clause to subordinate clause and noun phrase to dependent relative clause, 
and these relationships are arguably part of the meaning of the sentence. 
However, a hierarchy is less sensible for a text representation, in which there 
is usually no single obvious "main clause", and the relationships between 
sentences or propositions are not necessarily best thought of as being of the 
governor/dependent type. 
A related point is that because Boguraev's analyser does not attempt to 
identify cospecifying noun phrases in a sentence, there is usually a one-to-one 
correspondence between noun phrases in the sentence and the "rroun-args" 
that represent them in the dependency structure. This allows the structure 
to be tree-like. However when, in a system such as SPAR, the decision is made 
that two noun phrases cospecify, it is desirable, for the sake of simplicity, to 
merge the structures representing them. Merging makes the hierarchy (if 
there is one) tangled and more difficult to work with. Furthermore, SPAR 
often needs to know what has been said about a given entity, or whether a 
particular patt~rn of elements and case links occurs in the text 
representation, and such information is far more easily recovered from a 
network than from a hierarchy, whether tangled or tree-like . Neither of these 
arguments absolutely rules out the use of a hierarchical representation, but 
they do mean that the fairly minor task of transforming Boguraev's 
hierarchical structures into heterarchical (network) form is worthwhile. 
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4.1.3 Overview of SPAR's meaning representation 
Earlier in this chapter we established the principle that SPAR's meaning 
representation should differ from Boguraev's as little as is consonant with the 
needs of anaphor resolution and of processing texts as opposed to sentences. 
We have also seen that the form of representation should be heterarchical and 
not hierarchical, and that it should qualify as a text model (that is, that 
elements in the representation should approximately correspond one-to-one 
to story entities). The shallow processing approach dictates that we should 
aim to make as much use of linguistic knowledge as possible. On the basis of 
the discussion of lexical cohesion in subsection 2.2.3, it would seem that the 
representation must make it possible to determine not only whether an 
anaphor and suggested cospecifier are semantically compatible, but also 
whether the preferential "information constraint" (that the anaphor does not 
introduce new information) is satisfied, and whether collocation is a 
possibility. Thus in 
( 4-3) [ 1] John has bought a new Jaguar. 
[2] The car is ultra-modern in every respect. 
[3] For example, the indicators use the latest laser 
technology. 
the information that Jaguars are types of cars and typically have indicators 
must somehow be retrievable for the underlined anaphors in [2] and [3] to be 
resolved. 
In SPAR it is assumed, as a corollary of the shallow processing hypothesis, that 
the necessary information can normally be extracted from the word sense 
formulas for the words involved. Formulas encode linguistic knowledge that is 
essential to a basic understanding of the word senses they define . Examples 
of such knowledge are that a "Jaguar" is a type of car, and that an "indicator" 
(in the appropriate sense) is part of a vehicle. 2 
Thus the process of resolving "the car" above must involve reasoning that a 
Jaguar is a car, so as to verify that "a new Jaguar" and "the car" can 
cospecify without "the car" introducing any new information. To resolve "the 
2 As noted in chapter 1, there is ultimately no principled way to decide whether 
a given fact about a concept counts as basic definitional knowledge which 
should be included in a formula, or as world knowledge which should not. The 
fact that a Jaguar is a car is clearly definitional; the fact that indicators are 
parts of vehicles is less obviously definitional but is still arguably one of the 
handful of most central facts about indicators. 
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indicators", the fact that Jaguars have indicators need not (and probably will 
not) be stored explicitly as part of the definition of either "Jaguar" or 
" indicator". However, that fact can be deduced from the knowledge that 
Jaguars are cars (in the formula for "Jaguar"), which are road vehicles (in the 
formula for "car") , and indicators are parts of road vehicles (in the formula 
for "indicator"). "The indicators" can therefore be understood anaphorically 
as "the indicators of John's new Jaguar". 
In SPAR, the information in each formula is transformed into a set of 
assertions in the formalism of Alshawi [ 1983). Assertions relate the sense 
being defined both to primitives occurring in other formulas and directly to 
other senses; thus the assertions for all the senses involved in a story 
together make up a word sense network (WSN). 
When a noun phrase or clause is encountered in the input, provisional text 
model elements are created not only for the specification of the phrase or 
clause itself but also for any other entities mentioned in the formula for ils 
head word sense (as represented in the WSN). Thus if the form1;1Ia for an 
indicator defines it as· a particular part of a road ve hicle, then when "lhe 
indicators" is first encountered, elements, possibly temporary, for both the 
indicators and an unidentified road vehicle, are copied from the WSN to the 
text model network (TMN). The first of these elements is explicit (because il 
represents something explicitly mentioned in the text); the second is implicit. 
Collocation can then be treated as a generalisation of reiteration; during 
anaphor resolution, not only are pairs of explicit elements matched, but also, 
as Sidner's noun phrase resolution algorithm (to be discussed in chapter 5) in 
fact demands, pairs composed of an explicit and an implicit one. In [3] in our 
example, the explicit elements for the indicators and the Jaguar fail to match, 
but the implicit element for the indicators' unidentified road vehicle and the 
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explicit one for the Jaguar do match.3 
This process of copying pieces of network from the WSN to the TMN makes the 
representation of explicitly-mentioned entities uniform with that of entities 
not mentioned but implied to exist. This leads not only to the uniform 
treatment of reiteration and collocation but also, as we will see later, to some 
advantages in common sense inference. The TMN is not made unmanageably 
large because formulas, and hence the WSN, contain only the most basic 
information about word meanings, and so the number of implicit elements per 
explicit one is small. This would not be the case if the mention of an object 
(e.g. a car) caused elements for all possible subsequent collocative anaphors 
(the wheels , the driver, the mudguards .. . ) to be constructed. Thus the 
practice of including only basic definitional knowledge in formulas leads 
ultimately to a representation which is detailed enough to allow most 
collocative anaphors to be resolved, but simple enough to allow uniformity 
between explicit and implicit elements. 
In the next section, 4.2, the WSN and its derivation from formulas is described 
in detail. Section 4 .3 then covers the construction of new pieces of TMN from 
the incoming dependency structures and relevant parts of the WSN, and the 
TMN's use in determining the semantic acceptability of suggested antecedents. 
3Pairs of implicit elements are not matched, because this tends to lead to too 
distant and unreliable a link between anaphor and (supposed) antecedent. 
However, I am grateful to Graeme Ritchie for pointing out that such matching 
can be necessary; an example is 
(4-4) I must phone the garage. The engine's misfiring and _the indicators 
are on the blink. 
However, such examples seem to be unusual and slightly strained in a neutral 
context; ( 4-4) would be most natural in a context where the speaker's car was 
well known to both participants, and therefore as salient as if it had been 
explicitly mentioned. The underlined anaphors could then be resolved using 
explicit-implicit pairings. 
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4.2 The representation of word senses 
As we saw in chapter 3, Wilks ' word sense formulas provide a convenient and 
quite flexible way of characterizing word meanings. However, this flexibility is 
accompanied by considerable vagueness, which has three main causes: 
( 1) As Wilks acknowledged, the conciseness and expressive power of 
formulas in PS was severely limited by their only containing 
primitives and not word senses. 
(2) Wilks' efforts to make formulas "habitable" - easy to read and 
write - led him to allow certain relationships within them to be 
present only implicitly; to make them explicit, the interpretation 
rules in Wilks [ 1977a] had to be applied. However, because 
habitability made formulas look like statements in a kind of 
sub-English, the writers of dictionary entries for Boguraev's system 
have tended to treat them as such, without regard to the rules. (This 
may also be true of Wilks; however, since the primitives and formulas 
evolved over time, it is difficult to be sure). Formulas have therefore 
often inherited some of the vagueness and ambiguity of natural 
language. Although habitability and implicit relationships are in 
theory compatible with correctness, in practice they tend to reduce 
it. Neither Boguraev's system nor, judging by published descriptions, 
Wilks', in fact used Wilks' [ 1977a] interpretation rules directly; 
Boguraev's system normally accesses only the head primitive and 
top-level cases in a formula, while Wilks' relied on "fuzzy matching" 
between formula subparts which would have been largely unaffected 
by any syntactic errors. However, if the information in formulas is to 
be fully exploited, a more rigorous approach to ensuring its accuracy 
is needed. 
(3) Although the syntax of formulas is formally defined in Wilks 
[ 1977a], the semantics accompanying that syntax is specified only 
informally. One consequence is that there is not always a principled 
way to decide whether the formulas for two word senses match (i .e. 
whe ther the word senses could correclly be used to describe the 
same entity), and if so, whether one contains information that the 
other does not. 
These def eels are remedied in SPAR, for ( 1) by allowing word senses in 
formulas; for (2) by defining an intermediate formula syntax in which implicit 
information is made explicit; and for (3) by automatically converting each 
formula via the intermediate form into a s e t of relations of the type used by 
Alshawi [1983], whose semantics are well enough defined for our purposes and 
which allow easier matching . These three modifications are described in the 
next three subsections. 
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4.2.1 Word senses in formulas 
Wilks [1976, p169] believed the chief drawback of his system to be "that 
codings consisting entirely of primitives have a considerable amount of 
vagueness and redundancy. For example, no reasonable coding in terms of 
structured primitives could be expected to distinguish, say, "hammer" and 
"mallet". That may not matter provided the codings can distinguish 
importantly different senses of words. Again , a template for the sentence 
"The shepherd tended his flock" would contain considerable repetition, each 
node of the template trying, as it were, to tell the whole story by itself. 
Whether or not such a system can remain stable with a considerable 
vocabulary, of say several thousand words, has yet to be tested. " This problem 
can at least partially be solved, as Wilks [ 1978] pointed out, by allowing 
formulas to contain word senses as well as primitives, as long as those word 
senses are themselves defined elsewhere. SPAR implements this idea, which 
confers two main advantages. 
Firstly, formulas become more concise and less redundant. "Food" is best 
defined in terms of eating; if we define (one sense of) "eat" by 
EATl: ((:1tANI SUBJ) ((STUFF OBJE) (( (SELF IN) MOVE) CAUSE))) 
("an ANimate being CAUSES some STUFF to MOVE INto him/herSELF") then "food" 
can be defined by 
FOODl: (EATl (OBJE STUFF)) 
('"STUFF which is EATen") . This can be (and is, for use by Boguraev's analyser) 
expanded to a primitive-only formula by substituting EATl 's formula for EATl 
and identifying the two occurrences of STUFF. However, the unexpande d 
ve rs ion is easier to r e ad and write, and the refore more habitable . It also 
eliminates redundancy and therefore the risk of error; a change in the 
formula for EATl _will not prevent a pattern matcher from seeing the similarity 
between the formulas, as it might if FOODl were defined without explicit 
reference to EATl. There is little risk that any reasonable change in EATl's 
formula will render that for FOODl incoherent, because however we define EATl, 
it is hard to imagine that FOODl could be related to it in any way other than 
being its OBJEct. -
Secondly, formulas can be given greater discriminatory power if an ,additional 
device is introduced. In SPAR, a (sub)formula of the form (THIS X) is used to 
mean "a distinct type of X, different in an unspecified way from all othe r 
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distinct types of X" .4 Thus different species of animal can conveniently be 
defined as follows: 
SHEEP 1: 
HORSE 1: 
(THIS BEAST) 
(THIS BEAST) 
ELEPHANT!: (TH IS BEAST) 
SPAR can therefore deduce that the phrases "the sheep" and "the horse" can 
never cospecify, even if it has no knowledge of how the two species differ. Not 
only does the THIS mechanism provide a succinct and usually sufficient 
definition; it is also theoretically appropriate, since the nature of the 
difference between a sheep and a horse is perhaps more naturally categorised 
as world knowledge than linguistic knowledge. (The THIS mechanism also has 
the effect of making it impossible even in principle to determine senses from 
formulas. Senses therefore play a crucial role in processing in their own right, 
and in particular are the basis on which paraphrases are selected). 
The use of THIS to indicate an incomplete definition has some similarities to 
KL-ONE's use of "starred concepts" to r epresent incompletely defined 
"natural kinds" . However, the main use of THIS is to mark pairs of word s e nses 
(such as SHEEPl and HORSEl) as disjoint; analogous pairs of starred concepts in 
KL-ONE are not necessarily disjoint. 
Formulas for word senses related to those defined using THI s can be made 
quite discriminating. If ELEPHANT! is defined as above, we can define 
TRUNK 1: ((ELEPHANT! POSS) NOSEl) 
("the nose of an elephant"), assuming that NOSEl has its own formula . A 
primitive-only formula could not express the fact that it is elephants, and not 
sheep or horses , that have trunks, because ELEPHANT! has the same formula as 
SHEEPl and HORSEl. Such facts can be important in resolving anaphors: 
(4-5) The elephant approached the sheep. It waved its trunk. 
It is sometimes useful to be able to define two word senses in terms of each 
other; for example, to define EATl in terms of FOODl as well as the reverse. Such 
relationships ca!1 be represented in formulas as long as there is no circularity 
in head position. If we replace STUFF in the formula for EATl by FOODl, then the 
4Wilks [1977a] defines THIS as a substantive primitive meaning an 
unidentified, but particular, entity of any type". This may or may not be 
equivalent to my use. 
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formula for EATl can be expanded into primitives without infinite regress, 
simply by replacing any embedded occurrences of EATl by EATl's head primitive, 
CAUSE. However, if there is circularity in head position, this is not possible: 
MONKEY!: (THIS APEl) 
APEl: (THIS MONKEY!) 
4.2.2 Making formulas more explicit 
As we have seen, Wilks' attempt to make formulas habitable by allowing certain 
information to be only implicitly present leads in practice to their being vague, 
hard to exploit fully, and often incorrect. In SPAR, formulas are therefore 
automatically recast in a more explicit intermediate form as a preliminary to 
their conversion into the word sense network itself. This makes them less 
natural-language-like but in fact far more readable and easier to write 
correctly. For example, Wilks [1977a) gives the formula for "break" (as in 
"John broke the window") as: 
(4-6) BREAK 1: C (•HUM SUBJ) 
((•PHY SOB OBJE) 
(((((NOTWHOLE KIND) BE) CAUSE) GOAL) 
((THING INST) STRIK)))) 
meaning "a HUMan agent (SUBJ), using a THING, STRIKes a PHYSical OBject with the 
GOAL of CAUSE-ing the physic.al obj ect NOT to be WHOLE" . Wilks [ 1977a] gives 
"transgroup rules" which allow one to determine that the implicit SUBJ of CAUSE 
is the •HUM , and that of BE is the •PHYSOB . Using these rules, SPAR transforms 
the above formula to 
(4-7) BREAK 1: (STRIK (0) 
(SUBJ (•HUM (1))) 
(OBJE (•PHYSOB (2))) 
(GOAL (BE (4) 
(SUBJ (•PHYSOB (2))) 
(OBJE (WHOLE (5) 
(TYPE (NOT)))))) 
(INST (THING (6)))) 
In this intermed_iate form, the head of the formula is moved into first, rather 
than last, position, and its case role preferences are listed after it as slot-filler 
pairs. This makes it clear what entities are related by case primitives; in Wilks' 
syntax, for example, it is not obvious without reference to the interpretation 
rules that the :1:PHYS OB is the OBJE filler of STRIK rather than, say, BE or CAUSE . In 
intermediate form, each substantive and nominal element has a numeric index 
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which shows clearly whether two substructures represent the same 
participant fulfilling two roles , or different participants. Thus the two 
occurrences of *PHYSOB are equivalent because their indices are equal. In Wilks' 
formulas, the equivalence or non-equivalence of two occurrences of the same 
primitive can be determined only with reference to the interpretation rules. 
Numeric indices in intermediate formulas correspond to KRL constructions of 
the form "(the X from ThisOne)" and KL-ONE's role-value restrictions. In this 
respect, as in most others, SPAR's formalism is simpler than those of KRL and 
KL-ONE, because it is only intended to support the types of processing 
necessary for a shallow processing approach to anaphor resolulion. In 
contrast, KRL and KL-ONE aim at maximising generality and expressive power. 
The TYPE role name, which I have added to those provided by Wilks, serves not 
to relate parlicipants but to attach a modifier to a participant. The semantics 
of various TYPE modifiers are discussed in the next subsection. 
"Inverted nominal" constructions in Wilksian formulas (see 3.1) are 
represented in intermediate form 
corresponding rc u ghly to the KRL 
construction. The Wilksian formula 
using a pseudo-role-name WHICH, 
"(which <Predicate> <Arguments>)" 
ASSAILANT 1: (((*HUM OBJE) STRIK) (SUBJ MAN)) 
("a MAN who STRIKes a HUMan") is converted to the intermediate formula 
ASSAILANTl : (MAN (0) 
(WHICH 
(STRIK (1) 
(SUBJ (MAN (0))) 
(OBJE (*HUM (2)))) 
SPAR's transformation of formulas to intermediate form also involves a slight 
increase in rep'resentational depth. Boguraev's analyser treats the semantic 
case roles SUBJ and OBJE at top level as specifying preferences on syntactic 
subjects and objects . So for example the formula for the "speak to" sense of 
"address" would have the listener in OBJE rather than the more natural FOR 
(recipient) position. SPAR makes the appropriate changes in such formulas so 
as to make the (intermediate form) formulas for verbs like " address" and 
"speak to " more uniform. It also adjusts formulas so that each entity, state or 
event involved in the definition corresponds to only one distinct participant in 
the formula; thus the CAUSE in the formula for BREAKl is r emoved because it does 
not correspond to a separate event or state from the STRIK or the BE, but 
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rather to the relationship between them, and is therefore subsumed by the 
GOAL case link. 
4.2.3 Constructing the word sense network 
Accurate and well-motivated matching of word senses is fundamental to 
reliable anaphor resolution. To achieve this, SPAR uses a variation of the 
structures of Alshawi's [ 1983) Memory network representation to store the 
knowledge encoded in formulas . 
Memory can be viewed as a simplification of NETL (Fahlman [ 1979)), both in 
the distinctions it can represent and in the processing of which it is capable. 
Alshawi designed Memory to facilitate a certain set of retrieval requests useful 
for language interpretation operations, including anaphor resolution, in a 
particular task context; he did not claim that it was able to support full 
inference. 
Alshawi used Memory · to express relationships between entities of many 
different kinds, such as individuals, database concepts and word senses. It 
has a formal semantics defined in terms of the functions ref and rel. The 
function ref maps a memory entity to the set of objects in the world that the 
memory entity may describe: in Lyons' [ 1968) sense, its denotatum. The 
function rel maps a role-owner pair of memory entities to the set of pairs of 
objects in the world, i.e . to a relation, that the pair in memory can describe. 
Memory uses two types of assertion, Specialisation: and Corresponds:. The 
assertion 
(4-8) (Specialisation: COMPUTER of MACHINE) 
has the semantics 
(S4-8) ref (COMPUTER) ~ ref (MACHINE); 
that is, given these senses of "computer" and "machine" , the set of objects 
properly called "computers" is a subset of the set of objects properly called 
"machines". The assertion 
(4-9) (Corresponds: DATA/PROCESSING to COMPUTER as MACHINE/ACTIVITY to 
MACHINE) 
means that when a computer is considered as a machine, data processing is its 
activity. More formally, 
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(S4-9) rel(DATA/PROCESSING,COMPUTER) C rel CMACHINE/ACTIVITY,MACHINE) 
Both types of assertion may be flagged in various ways, as described below. 
It turns out that, with some fairly minor alterations, the Memory formalism is 
adequate for the sense matching operations required by SPAR for anaphor 
resolution. These operations are to determine: 
( 1) The relationship between the denotata (i.e. ref values) of two word 
senses: one of equality, strict inclusion either way, intersection or disjointness. 
(2) When a given word sense is used to describe an entity or event, 
what other entities or events are implied to exist, and what their 
interrelationships are. 
SPAR constructs the word sense network by turning each formula involved in a 
story into a set of Memory assertions. The WSN is the aggregate of these 
assertions and of hand-coded assertions that define the relationships between 
primitives. Primitives therefore have the same status in the WSN as ordinary 
word senses, and so the term "word sense" will henceforth often be used as a 
shorthand for "word sense or primitive". 
The formula for BREAKl given in (4-6) is converted, via its intermediate form 
(4-7), into the assertions in figure 4.1. 
(Specialisation: BREAKl of STRI K) 
(Specialisation: BREAKl/SUBJ of *HUM) 
(Specialisation: BREAKl/OBJE of •PHY SOB) 
(Specialisation: BREAKl/GOAL of BE) 
(Specialisation: BREAKl/INST of THING) 
(Specialisation: BREAKl/WHOLE of WHOLE (NEG)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl/SUBJ to BREAKl as SUBJ to •DO (E 1)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl/OBJE to BREAKl as OBJE to •DO (El)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl/GOAL to BREAKl as GOAL to •DO (El)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl/INST to BREAKl as INST to •DO (El)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl/OBJE to BREAKl/GOAL as SUBJ to •DO (El)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl/WHOLE to BREAKl/GOAL as OBJE to •DO (El)) 
Figure. 4.1: Memory assertions for the formula for BREAK!. 
Each of the Specialisation: assertions in the figure defines one of the indexed 
items in (4-7); thus the •PHYSOB with index (2) becomes the node BREAKl/OBJE 
( the name itself is arbitrary as far as the program is concerned). The 
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Corresponds: assertions define the case relationships these items participate in; 
for example, they say that BREAKl/OBJE is both the OBJEct of BREAKl and the 
SUBJect of the event BREAKl/GOAL.5 
The semantics that SPAR assigns to Memor y assertions is slightly different 
from Alshawi's. SPAR assumes that a formula, and therefore the assertions 
derived from it, are "complete" in the sense that they either contain all the 
information needed to decide on a word sense's denotatum, or indicate 
explicitly that some information is missing. Thus the simple formula 
MONKEY!: APEl 
which is translated to the single assertion 
(Specialisation: MONKEYl of APEl) 
is taken to mean that MONKEY! and APEl are synonymous; their ref values are 
equal. In Alshawi's original formulation, the interpretation would merely be 
that ref (MONKEY!) C:ref CAPED . 
If, however, it is the case that all monkeys are apes but not all apes are 
monkeys, the correct formula is 
MON.KEY 1: (THIS APEl). 
This time, the THIS qualifier results in Alshawi's DISTINCT flag being added to the 
assertion: 
(Specialisation: MONKEY! of APEl (DISTINCT)) 
5The fourth argument (after the second "to") in a Corresponds: asse rtion is 
practice always filled by a very general primitive such as *DO or DUMMY. This is 
because Wilks' set of cases is small and fixed, unlike the set of roles in 
Alshawi's system or the freely definable "slots" of KL-ONE or KRL. 
Charniak [1981a] argues convincingly that no finite , universal set of s e mantic 
cas es can be defined, since cases are in fact just slots, and can be introduced 
at places other than the top a hierarchy of verbs. Evidence for this is that 
certain sets of verbs use idiosyncratic cases (e .g. the "language" case, 
express e d in English by the preposition "in", for "speak") which are not 
applicable to other verbs . The Memory formalism is consistent with Charniak's 
a r gume nt since it allows assertions of the form 
(Corresponds: FRENCH to SPEAKl-1 as LANGUAGE to SPEAKl) 
which imply that only actions of the category SPEAKl have a "language" slot. 
However, to incorporate Charniak's insight into Wilks' formalism is beyond the 
scope of this work (though potentially very worthwhile) . 
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The flag tells SPAR that a MONKEYl is a type of APEl, distinct from all other types 
of APEl , and that there are other types of apes than monkeys: in other words 
ref (MONKEYl)C ref (APEl) . 
Proper names are defined by formulas containing an INDIV qualifier, which also 
gives rise to a DISTINCT assertion. The formula 
JOHNl: CINDIV MAN) 
is translated into 
(Specialisation: JOHNl of MAN) 
(Specialisation: JOHNl of INDIV (DISTINCT)) 
The second of these assertions states that JOHNl is a DISTINCT INDIVidual, and 
prevents JOHNl from matching with any other name (although matches with 
non-names are still possible) . 
SPAR does not use Alshawi's flags for Corresponds: assertions. Instead, it uses 
the flags El, E2, and E12, which specify that a Corresponds: assertion is Essential 
to the meaning of either or both of its first two arguments . These flags 
survive when pieces of the WSN are used in TMN construction. They then 
affect the behaviour of the structure matcher during anaphor resolution, as 
will be explained later. 
4 .3 The text model network 
Having outlined some of the characteristics required of the text 
represe ntation used by a shallow processing anaphor resolver, and di s cusse d 
how word s e nse information is r epresented in SPAR's WSN, it is now time to 
look at the way in which the TMN (text model network) is derived by combining 
word sense information with the structures delivered by Boguraev's analyser. 
First, I will give an overview of the types of information captured in the TMN 
and the structures used to do this . This is followed by a description of the 
structure matcher used at various points in the program to determine 
whether two pieces of network may be regarded as equivalent. This matcher 
plays an important role in the derivation of provisional model elements from 
input dependency structures, which is then described. 
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4.3.1 Overview of the text model 
Text model structures are created as a result of comparing incoming 
dependency structures with appropriate word sense nodes in the WSN. The 
results of matching determine how pieces of the WSN should be used as 
blueprints for constructing TMN structures . The TMN is therefore of the same 
general form as the WSN, and in particular Specialisation: and Corresponds: in 
assertions play a key role" it; however, anaphor resolution and paraphrase 
make demands of the TMN that cannot be met elegantly by the devices that 
Alshawi's Memory formalism (or the variation of it used in the WSN) makes 
available, so the TMN requires a number of additional devices. 
The overall process of TMN formation is depicted in figure 4 .2 . An incoming 
dependency structure is converted by the fragment constructor into the 
current fragment of the TMN, which is augmented with information from the 
WSN. SPAR's subsequent processing essentially involves deciding how to 
incorporate the current fragment part cf the TMN into the already-existing 
context part; this most centrally involves resolving anaphors. 
Text model 
Network 
(TMN) 
Incoming 
Dependency 
Structure 
Word sense 
Network 
(WSN) 
matching by fragment 
constructor 
Current 
Fragment 
Context 
to be 
incorporated 
by anaphor 
resolution 
Figure 4.2: An overview of TMN formation 
Just as in the WSN, TMN nodes are linked by Corresponds: assertions specifying 
Wilksian case relations. Specialisation: assertions relate TMN nodes to WSN 
nodes . However, whereas a WSN node is defined e ntirely by the Specialisation: 
and Corresponds: relationships it participates in, a TMN node also has some 
intrinsic content, as figure 4.3 indicates. The figure shows the dependency 
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structure for the sentence "He wanted to break a window", plus all the 
information associated with the TMN node representing the "break" action in 
that sentence at the point when the current fragment for that sentence has 
been formed but not incorporated by anaphor resolution into the context. 
(Later we will see the changes that result from incorporation into the context 
provided by an initial sentence "John was angry"). 
The various types of information exemplified by the description of BREAKl-1 in 
the figure, which SPAR generated automatically, are as follows. The first four 
types described are essentially WSN-derived; the other four are unique to TMN 
elements. 
( 1) The name of a node is essentially arbitrary; it is used merely as a handle to 
distinguish the node from all others, and for diagnostic purposes. 
1,,1i t \.. 
(2) A Specialisation: assertion is associated"each TMN element, linking it to the 
WSN element (word sense or primitive) from which it was derived. When one 
TMN element is merged into another, the Specialisation: assertions for ___ the 
first are, unless redundant, transferred to the second. 
(3) The primitive attach ed to the node is the most specific nominal or action 
primitive superordinate to all the node's word senses given by (2) . Its main 
purpose is to allow more efficient TMN node matching. 
( 4) The Corresponds: assertions indicate case relationships between nodes, and 
are derived from analogous assertions in the WSN and/or in the dependency 
structure. 
(5) The status of a node is one of the values ··null", "generic " or "specific": 
(a) Null nodes are rare; they prevent cospecifications being sought 
for phrases such as the "it" in "It was raining". 
(b) A generic node, as the name implies, represents a class of entities 
or events, and can only cospecify (trivially) with a generic node for 
the same class. The "'banana" node in "John liked bananas" would be 
generic. 
(c) A specific node represents a particular event, entity or 
determinate set of entities (as in "John ate some bananas") . Specific 
nodes in the current fragment are also marked "new" or "possibly 
given". A "new" node may not be merged with any node in context, 
while a "possibly given" node may (and if possible will) be . 
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(CLAUSE (TYPE DCL) (TNS PAST) 
(V 
(WANT2 WANT (@@ AGENT (N (HEl MAN))) 
(@@ MENTAL-OBJECT 
(CLAUSE (TNS PRESENT) 
(V 
(BREAKl STRIK (@@ AGENT (N (HEl MAN))) 
(@@ OBJECT 
(N (WlNDOWl PART (@@ DET (Al ONE))))))))))))) 
Description of TMN element with name BREAKl-1 
Specialisation assertions: 
(Specialisation: BREAKl-1 of BREAKl) 
Head primitive is STRIK 
Correspondence assertions: 
(Corresponds: HEl-1 to BREAKl-1 as SUBJ to DUMMY (El)) (Corresponds: WINDOWl-1 to BREAKl-1 as OBJE to DUMMY (El)) (Corresponds: BREAKl/GOAL-1 to BREAKl-1 as GOAL to DUMMY (El)) (Corresponds:' 1,INST-l to BREAKl-1 as INST to DUMMY (El)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl-1 to WANT2-1 as OBJE to DUMMY (El)) 
Status is: Specific and new 
Context of identity is: desires of HEl-1 
Derivation: 
Linguistic features are: 
CATEGORY 
RECENCY 
TNS 
directly from the BREAK in 
HE WANTED TO BREAK A WINDOW 
CLAUSE 
4 
PRESENT 
Figure 4.3: Dependency structure for "He wanted to break a window", and resulting TMN element for "break". 
Generic, specific-and-new and specific-and-possibly-given nodes correspond 
approximately to some uses of KRL's specialization, individual and 
manifestation (when used to represent a "ghost") units respectively. However, 
a specific-and-possibly-given node, unlike a "ghost" manifestation unit, may 
not after all turn out to cospecify with an existing node. 
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(5) The context of identity6 of a node is a list representing the "possible 
world" , in a loose sense, in which the entity represented exists . An empty list 
means that the entity represented exists at "top level", i.e . in the world 
described by the story. The context of identity for the node BREAKl-1 described 
in figure 4 .3 is the d esires of HEl-1. Contexts of identity are also ~e t up for 
beliefs, statements, and possible futures, and may be nested, as in for example 
"He thought that Bill wanted to break a window". 
The context of identity device could also be extended to make SPAR s e nsitive 
to qua ntifier scope, which at present it is not. The way this might be done is 
e xpl a in e d in chapter 10. 
( 6) The derivation of a node shows whether it is explicit (i.e. corresponds 
directly to a phrase in the text) or implicit, and the head word of the phrase in 
the text it originates from, directly or otherwise. The head word information 
is used only for diagnostic purposes. 
(7) The linguistic features of a node are mostly shallow, syntactic information . 
Some linguistic features are carried over from the analyser dependency 
structures for use as a short cut to paraphrase generation (see chapter 9), 
and some arise from relationships in the WSN. Most features are used only for 
generation; others are accessed during structure matching, as described in 
the next subsection. This rather ad-hoe aspect of SPAR's representation 
would benefit from being rationalised. 
We have now examined all the types of information that can be attached to a 
TMN node. Since most or perhaps all of these types could be captured instead 
using Alshawi's highly flexible Specialisation: /Corresponds: assertions, the 
reader may wonder why this was not done, and eve .<1 why the distinction 
between the WSN and TMN is necessary. The answer is that the strict 
separation of the_ WSN and TMN, and the use of different formalisms to 
represent them, is motivated by theoretical considerations - the desirability of 
a clearly defined text model in which model elements and story entities are 
ideally in one-to-one correspondence - and also by practical ones. Anaphor 
resolution is easier if the set of nodes and links modelling what is going on in 
6Not to be confused with the term " context" on its own, which always refers to the existing (non-current-fragment) part of the TMN. SPAR's "context of identity" does, however, correspond to some aspects of KL-ONE's "context" 
mechanism. 
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the story is clearly delimited. For example, the feature list of a TMN node 
could be replaced by a set of Corresponds: assertions of the form 
(Corresponds: CLAUSE to BREAKl-1 as CATEGORY to DUMMY) (Corresponds: PRESENT to BREAKl - 1 as TNS to DUMMY) 
but then the TMN would contain nodes representing the concepts CLAUSE and 
PRESENT, which have no obvious counterparts in the story world, and certainly 
cannot participate in anaphor resolution and inference in the way that 
BREAKl-1 can . Thus uniformity in the form of representation can only be 
achieved by ignoring important non-uniformities in content. SPAR's 
representation builds the most important semantic type distinctions (e.g. between word senses and story objects) into the syntax, thus much reducing 
the need to check at each stage that the type of processing being done is 
appropriate to the objects under consideration. 
4.3.2 The structure matcher 
SPAR's structure matcher plays a central role in the manipulation of the TMN 
which is necessary for anaphor resolution. It is oriented primarily towards 
assessing candidate antecedents for anaphors, but is also useful for making 
and matching common sense inferences, and, as we shall see in 4 .3.3, for 
constructing current fragments. The description of the matcher given here is fairly abstract and mechanistic; the uses to which it is put will be described in 
more detail in the next subsection and in chapters 6 and 8. 
Given two TMN nodes, the matcher compares them and decides whether they 
can be identified (or, sometimes, regarded as similar in some other way), and if 
so, what other pairs of nodes must be identified as a consequence. Because 
the representation is not canonical, the matcher must perform a limited 
amount of deductive linguistic inference in order to detect hidden similarities . 
The structure matcher operates as follows. When asked to compare two nodes, it first invokes a node matcher, which determines whether the two nodes are 
compatible if links to other nodes are ignored. This involves inspecting most 
of the information associated with the nodes . The Specialisation: assertions 
are matched to check sense compatibility (and, when desired, satisfaction of Lhe information constraint), but the Corresponds: links to other nodes are not 
accessed at this stage. 
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If the node match is successful, the structure matcher binds the nodes to one 
another so that they are provisionally regarded as equivalent. It may then call 
itself recursively on neighbouring pairs of nodes connected to the original pair 
by analogous Corresponds: links. For example, if the original pair of nodes is 
TELESCOPEl-1 and TELESCOPEl-2, and the relationships 
(Corresponds: PARKl-1 to TELESCOPEl-1 as IN to DUMMY (El)) 
(Corresponds: PARK1-2 to TELESCOPEl-2 as IN to DUMMY (El)) 
hold, then the nodes PARKl-1 and PARKl-2 will be matched. 
If possible, Corresponds: links specifying the same relationship are paired for 
submatching, as in our example where both specify the relationship IN. 
However, deductive linguistic inference will where necessary attempt to 
provide alternative pairings. This allows some flexibility in relation to: 
(1) "vague" cases such as POSS (possessive) and WITH (attribute). For 
example, "John's book" may refer to a book that has virtually any 
relation to John: he may be holding it, reading it, or writing it. 
(2) inclusion relationships: what is true of a set of entities may also 
be true of the individuals in it. 
(3) lack of canonicality: for example the same action may be 
expressed using either GET or GIVE as a head primitive. 
A successful submatch will return one or more node bindings which contribute 
to the overall result. However, the failure of a submatch may cause the whole 
structure match to fail. The effect of a failed submatch on the match as a 
whole depends on whether the matcher has been told to apply the information 
constraint: i.e. whether a successful match depends on all the information 
captured by one of nodes it is handed (typically representing an anaphor) also 
being captured by the other (typically representing a candidate antecedent) . 
We saw in 2.2.3 that if this constraint is broken, the candidate antecedent can 
be much less plausible. 
If the information constraint is in operation, then the overall match will only 
succeed if every Corresponds: assertion which is essential or intrinsic (in a 
sense we are about to define) to the description embodied by the anaphor 
node gives rise to a successful submatch. In a Corresponds: assertion of the 
form 
(Corresponds: <CASE-FILLER> to <NODE> as <CASE-NAME> to DUMMY (<FLAG>)), 
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a <FLAG> value of El indicates that the assertion is "Essential" to the meaning of 
<NODE>. If <NODE> is the anaphor node in a structure match, the information 
constraint can only be satisfied if an analogous assertion involving the 
candidate node exists. If the <FLAG> is E2, the assertion is Essential to the 
meaning of <CASE-FILLER>. If the <FLAG> is E12, the assertion is Essential to both 
<CASE-FILLER> and <NODE>. 
"Essential" flags on Corresponds: assertions often originate in the WSN, but can 
instead be derived from restrictive modifiers. The phrase "the man with the 
hat" would give rise to an assertion of the form 
(Corresponds: HATl-1 to MANl-1 as WITH to DUMMY (El)) 
which is intrinsic to the description of the man but not to that of the hat. This 
reflects the fact that in order to resolve the whole phrase as an anaphor 
without breaking the information constraint, we must identify a man who we 
know to have a hat; but "the hat" can be resolved without breaking the 
constraint merely by identifying a hat, whether associated with a man or not. 
Relative clauses are us'ually treated as restrictive; when they are, they give 
rise to an E12 flag on the Corresponds: assertion connecting the element for the 
matrix NP and that for the relative clause. 
If the information constraint is not in operation, only submatches resulting 
from Corresponds: assertions for case roles whose values are in some sense 
fixed and unique, such as the SUBJ and OBJE roles of action and event nodes, 
can cause overall failure. If two event descriptions have incompatible agents, 
they cannot be the same event. However, not all roles are unique in this way; 
for example, the phrases "the man with the hat" and "the man with the coat" 
can cospecify. 
4.3.3 Construction of current fragments 
Having examined the kind of information represented in the TMN, and the 
operation of the structure matcher, we are now in a position to see how TMN 
current fragments are actually constructed in preparation for: anaphor 
resolution. The "fragment constructor" that carries out this task uses the 
structure matcher to compare WSN-derived information with information 
derived from Boguraev's sentence representations. 
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When SPAR processes a new sentence, it normally constructs one alternative 
current fragment of TMN for each analysis produced by the analyser.7 
Subsequently, as we will see in chapter 6, each fragment is independently 
compared with the context by resolving anaphors, and if there is more than 
one fragment, the one that · fits into the context most naturally (in a way 
explained in later chapters) is accepted as correct. 
Earlier (subsection 4 .3.1) we looked in detail at the TMN node derived from the 
"break" in "He wanted to break a window". We will now see how the whole 
current fragment for this sentence is derived. The Memory assertions in this 
fragment are as shown in figure 4.4 (ignoring, for brevity, certain nodes and 
links derived implicitly from "window"). The parallels with the WSN assertions 
for BREAKl shown in figure 4 .1 should be apparent. 
(Specialisation: HEl-1 of HEl) 
(Specialisation: WANT2-l of WANT2) 
(Corresponds: HE1-l to WANT2-l as SUBJ to DUMMY (El)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl.-1 to WANT2-l as OBJE to DUMMY (El)) 
(Specialisation: BREAKl-1 of BREAK1) 
(Corresponds: HEl-1 to BREAKl-1 as SUBJ to DUMMY (El)) 
(Corresponds: WINDOWl-1 to BREAKl-1 as OBJE to DUMMY (El)) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl/GOAL-1 to BREAKl-1 as GOAL to DUMMY (El)) 
(Corresponds: •INST-1 to BREAKl-1 as INST to DUMMY (El)) 
(Specialisation: •INST-1 of •INST) 
(Specialisation: BREAKl/GOAL-1 of BREAK1/GOAL) 
(Corresponds: BREAKl/WHOLE-1 to BREAKl/GOAL-1 as OBJE to DUMMY (El)) 
(Corresponds: WINDOWl-1 to BREAKl/GOAL-1 as SUBJ to DUMMY (El)) 
(Specialisation: BREAKl/WHOLE-1 of BREAK1/WHOLE) 
(Specialisation: WINDOWl-1 of WINDOWl) 
Figure 4 .4 : Summary of current fragment for 
"He wanted to break a window" 
7Sometimes no fragments or several fragments result from a reading, because 
of limitations in the coverage of SPAR or the accuracy of Boguraev's analyser. Sometimes, because of the limitations of the analyser, obviously incorrect 
readings have to be altered or deleted by hand before SPAR is even invoked; however, such alterations are fairly rare, and in any case do not involve 
sidestepping theoretical problems of any relevance to anaphor resolution. 
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A fragment for a sentence reading is generated in the following three stages . 
( 1) The "skeleton" of what will become the current fragment is constructed by 
creating a TMN node for each noun-arg and clause in the dependency 
structure, and a Corresponds: assertion linking two such TMN nodes for each 
case relationship in the dependency structure .8 
(2) For each word sense occurring in a noun-arg or clause structure , a small 
network of TMN nodes is constructed using as a blueprint the relationships in 
which the word sense participates in the WSN, taking role inheritance into 
account. 9 The blueprint for a clause whose word sense was BREAKl would be 
exactly the assertions in figure 4.1, since in this case there are no roles to 
inherit. 
(3) Pairs of nodes in the dependency-structure-derived skeleton and the small 
WSN-derived networks are handed to the structure matcher. In our e xample, 
the skeleton node for the BREAK! clause would be matched with the node 
derived from BREAKl in the WSN. The resulting bindings provide a measure of 
the "semantic density" (redundancy) of the reading; the more bindings of 
semantically compatible nodes that are made, the higher the density, because 
every such binding derives ultimately from a satisfied preference in a formula. 
Semantic density is one criterion used to decide between competing 
fragments, much as in PS and Boguraev's analyser. 
Pairs of nodes bound by the matcher are then merged together, to make the 
current fragment fully connected. In our example, the explicit nodes BREAKl-1 
and HEl-1 both originated as nodes in the skeleton fragment; WSN-derived 
nodes , bound to them by the matcher, were merged into them and then 
8Since dependency structures do not contain the same case names as formulas , but rather use the more detailed set developed by Boguraev, the 
names used in the Corresponds: assertions are derived by table lookup. No 
exact mapping from Boguraev's cases to Wilks' can be defined, but the 
approximation used by SPAR works well in practice. 
9More formally, lhe relevant WSN nodes are those reachable from the original 
one by paths consisting of transitions from A to B in assertions of any of the forms 
(Specialisation: A of B) 
(Corresponds: A to B as X to Y) 
(Corresponds: B to A as X to Y) 
and terminating in a Corresponds: assertion. 
Subsection 4 .3.3 79 
I 
I 
11 I 
11 11 
11 
I 
11 
destroyed. The implicit nodes •INST-1 and BREAK1/GOAL-1 originated as 
WSN-derived nodes, and survived because they corresponded to nothing in the 
dependency structure and so were not merged into any skeleton nodes. 
This merging can result in the semantic interpretations of pronouns being 
restricted in a way useful for subsequent anaphor resolution . In t)1e c a se of 
the sentence "John drank it", a temporary node derived from the WSN e le ment 
DRINKl/OBJE might be merged into the "it" node, which would inherit a 
Specialisation: link to LIQUID1. 
Once m erging is over, the status and context of identity of each node in the 
fragment are calculated. The algorithms used are ad-hoe and rather 
superficial, and would benefit from being rationalised; however, they give 
accurate enough results to support the other, more central aspects of 
processing. 
If our sentence "He wanted to break a window" is the second sentence of a 
story beginning "John was angry", then once the current fragment has been 
built, anaphor resolutioh will (by methods described in chapter 6) identify our 
node HE-1 with the node JOHNl-1 in the context; no other nodes in the current 
fragment will be identified with nodes in context. When the current fragment 
is incorporated into the context, HEl-1 will be merged into JOHNl-1 and then 
destroyed. The merge will cause JOHNl-1 to inherit much of the information 
formerly associated with HEl-1, as indicated in figure 4.5. 
4 .4 Summary and evaluation 
The aim of this chapter has been to show how SPAR's representation is 
designed to possess a number of characteristics desirable in a shallow· 
processing anaphor resolver. Briefly, the required characteristics were that 
the formalism should: 
(1) represent texts by a text model: distinct events and objects 
should be represented separately, with indications of their status and 
context of identity; and, conversely, each text model element should 
correspond to some story event or object, explicit or implicit; 
(2) be fairly shallow, and deeper (more orthogonal and explicit) than 
Boguraev's input and output structures only to the degree required 
for limited CSI; 
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subj WANT1-1 
obje 
subj ~ 
BREAK1-1 I 
obje ~1 WINDOW1-1 I 
+ 
B E2-1 
sub· obje 
IJOHN1-11 ANGRY1-1 
subj 
BE2-1 
obje 
ANGRY1-1 
WANT1-1 
BREAK1-1 1-------WINDOW1-1 
obje 
pa rt of 
current 
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Figure 4.5: Before and after merging the current fragment into context 
(3) be heterarchical and not hierarchical; 
(4) be constructed by making maximum use of linguistic (specifically, 
word sense) knowledge. 
(5) facilitate the structure matching required for anaphor resolution, 
allowing 
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(5a) reiteration and collocation to be treated uniformly; and 
(5b) both compatibility and the information constraint to be 
checked (hence requiring a moderately well-defined 
s e man ties). 
Requirement ( 1) is met by clearly separating linguistic knowledge (in the WSN) 
from knowledge of the current story (in the TMN), and storing statuses, 
contexts of identity and linguistic features within TMN nodes rather than 
uniformly by Corresponds: links. Requirements (2) and (3) are met by 
converting Boguraev's structures into heterarchical TMN structures as 
directly as possible : deriving one TMN element from each clause and (distinct) 
noun-arg, and leaving the case links between them essentially unchanged. 
Requirements (4) and (5a) are satisfied by augmenting the TMN with implicit 
nodes derived from word sense formulas . Requirement (5b) is met by using 
Alshawi's Memory formalism for the two networks, augmented by the 
" essential" flags on Corresponds: links. 
The need to make maximum use of the information in word sense formulas 
brought to light evidence that Wilks' formula syntax, though designed lo 
provide habitability, in practice makes it hard for formula writers to write 
what they mean. A new syntax, formally equivalent to the old, was proposed, in 
which all information was made explicit. It was argued that this new 
e xpl icitness made formulas less natural-language-like but more habitable . In 
addition, the approximation to a formal semantics provided by the relatively 
trivial conversion to Memory formalism is a more reliable way of ensuring that 
a formula has the intended meaning than Wilks' [ 1977a] rules and descriptions 
of primitives. 
The fact that SPAR's representational scheme meets the five requirements 
listed above means that it is well suited to the kinds of processing necessary 
for anaphor resolution by shallow processing methods; indeed, virtually eve ry 
aspect of the representation was designed with anaphor resolution in mind . 
This makes it, like Alshawi's Memory on which it is based, considerably simpler 
and less powerful than other, more general representational formalisms . For 
this reason it is unlikely to be capable of supporting the inference required for 
many understanding tasks in the way that languages like KRL or KL-ONE may 
b e able to. For example, the simple list format for contexts of identity, and 
(we will s e e in chapter 8) the way it is used in CSI, take little a ccount of th e 
difficulties of reasoning about beliefs, desires and "possible worlds" . Similarly , 
it is perhaps rather naive to assume that every concept involved in a story can 
be treated as straightforwardly specific or generic. Perhaps the most 
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awkward omission is the lack of any thorough treatment of multiple 
perspectives; for example, SPAR cannot represent cleanly, in the way that KRL 
can, the fact that the same event can be viewed as trip from one place lo 
another from one perspective and as a visit to someone from another. 
However, we will see in later chapters that SPAR's simplified representation 
allows us to deal with a surprisingly wide range of anaphoric phenomena and 
types of inference. 
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5. Focussing and discourse structure 
In the last two chapters, we looked at the problem of defining a suitable 
meaning representation for an anaphor resolver. Chapter 3 was a backward 
look at the representations used by Wilks and Boguraev, while chapter 4 
described that of SPAR. This chapter and the next form an analogous pair, 
discussing the phenomenon of focussing. The current chapter describes 
treatments of local and global focus and the related phenomenon of discourse 
structure, in order to provide the necessary background for chapter 6 , which 
concerns SPAR's primarily focus-based anaphor interpretation process. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows . First, in the light of the many and 
varied uses of the word "focus" in the literature, definitions of "focus" and 
related terms are given, and a distinction is made between global and local 
focus. Next, various anaphor-related treatments of global and local focus are 
reviewed . Finally, Sidner's theory of local focus, which is central to SPAR's 
operation, is described in some detail. 
5.1 Focus, foci and focussing 
At any point in a normal discourse, the speaker and hearer focus their 
attention more on some aspects of what is being discussed than on others. 
The speaker uses various devices to show that he is maintaining or switching 
his focus of attention, and the hearer attempts to interpret these and make 
the s a me switches. This focussing process is relevant to anaphor r esolution 
because the hearer will, when pos sible , interpret anaphors as ref e rring lo 
focussed entities . . The speaker assumes that the hearer will do this, and 
therefore uses anaphors for focussed entities in the expectation that they will 
be correctly interpreted .1 
It is easy to see th a t the effects of focus of attention on anaphor resolution 
cannot be modelled purely in terms of recency of mention. In 
1The problems that arise when the hearer is unable or unwilling to maintain 
the same focus as the speaker will not be discussed here. 
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(5-1) There was a zoo in John's town. It was small. 
it is clear that it is the zoo, not the more recently mentioned town, that is 
being described as small, although ei.ther could equally well be small; and for 
(5-2) The winning species would have a greater amount of 
competitive ability than the loser as far as that resource 
axis of the n-dimensional niche is concerned ( e.g. it would be 
more adapted to using that resource in that particular 
habitat). 
Hirst [ 1981] claims that "there is no text which could replace the text after 
"it" and make a well-formed sentence in which 'it' refers to one of the more 
recent NPs" than "the winning species" . 
The task, then, is to define procedures that model the way focus of attention 
and anaphor resolution influence one another. But before considering various 
attempts to do this, some terminological problems mus t be cleared up. The 
term "focus" is used in several ways in the literature: 
( 1) The word or expression in a sentence which is the centre of 
phonological prominence. 
(2) The state of the participants' attention at a given moment. 
(3) The entity, in the world, on which the participants are centering 
their attention; or the element, in the hearer 's or speaker's mode l of 
the world, representing that entity. ("Element" and "entity" are 
used very broadly here). 
( 4) The process of transferring attention from one set of entities to 
another as a discourse progresses. This is often called focussing. 
Se nse ( 1) will be called p-focus; it will be considered briefly later. Sense (2) 
will be called the state of focus or the focus state; it can be represented by 
associating focus v-alues, drawn from some specified set, with elements and (we 
will see below) substructures in the discourse model. When it appears that one 
entity (or the model element representing it) is at the centre of attention and 
all others are of peripheral importance, we will call that entity or element the 
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focus or the current focus in sense (3); 2 in section 5.4 we will refine this 
notion and introduce the terms the discourse focus and the ac'tor focus. 
Sense ( 4), the process, will be called focussing. The term focus (without a 
determiner) will be used in a general sense which subsumes (2), (3) and (4). 
Intuitively it seems that whether or not "the focus" exists in sense (3), some 
entities are more central at a given point in a text than others; in other words, 
that the focus state imposes some kind of ordering on entities. Some theories 
make this ordering explicit, while some do not. We will sometimes talk about 
one entity being more focussed or in focus than another; by this we mean that 
the more focussed entity is preferred as the referent of an anaphor when no 
syntactic, semantic or inferential factors bias the decision either way. Thus in 
(5-1), the zoo is more focussed than the town when "it" is read. Equating 
degree of focus with anaphoric preferences in this way serves to define more 
clearly what we mean by focus; the equivalence is not open to independent 
verification, since we are only interested in focus in so far as it affects 
anaphor resolution. 
However, the focus value of an element is determined by more than the 
sequence of specifications of (i.e. references to) it in a discourse. A discourse 
tends to have a structure over and above the purely linear sequencing of its 
component sentences. A set of sentences may discuss one subject, and there 
may then be a switch to a different, though often related, subject, followed 
perhaps by a return to the original one. These switches are relevant to 
anaphor resolution because, as Grosz's work (see below) shows, they bring 
about wholesale changes in the focus values of the model elements involved. 
Grosz's work suggests that if the hearer is to recognise su::-:h switches and 
their consequences, he must have a discourse model with some degree of 
global structure, and also be able to focus on substructures within the model 
as well as on individual elements. 
A discourse model does not exist in the hearer's mind in isolation from the 
rest of what he knows and perceives; it is related to the wider context of the 
hearer's knowbdge, which ha:.:; its own structure. This wider structuring also 
influences language interpretation, although it is perhaps less important for 
2In order to keep the terminology as simple as possible, our use of the term 
"the focus" is, strictly speaking, ambiguous between entities in the world and 
elements in the model. However the entity I element distinction is orthogonal 
to our concerns here; and since entities and elements are assumed to be in 1-1 correspondence, no confusion should result. 
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anaphor resolution than for other tasks such as word sense disambiguation. 
We may therefore make a distinction, orthogonal to that between senses (2), 
(3) and ('1 ; above, between global focus and local focus . Global focus is that 
aspect of focus which is determined through the broader structure of the 
discourse model and that of the knowledge to which it is related; it is 
therefore knowledge-based and only indirectly linguistic, and can involve 
substructures as well as elements. Local focus is the aspect of focus 
determined through the type and frequency of specifications of elements by 
phrases in the text; it is therefore purely linguistic, and applies only lo model 
elements, not lo substructures . The adjectives "global" and "local" are 
appropriate because the effects of local focussing tend to be shorter range, 
typically lasting for only a sentence or two. 
All the treatments of focus discussed in this chapter can be seen as fleshing 
out and justifying part or all of this characterisation by specifying the nature 
of the discourse model, the set of possible focus values of an element or 
substructure, and how focus interacts with the interpretation process, 
particularly anaphor resolution. 
5.2 Global focus and discourse structure 
This section is concerned with global focussing. I shall start with Grosz's 
[1977,1978] work. the first and perhaps the most significant computational 
treatment of the subject, in order to provide a fuller characterisation of global 
focussing and its relation to global discourse structure. The global structures 
of the discourses Grosz was concerned with were determined by matching the 
discourses onto a predefined framework; next, therefore, we examine 
attempts, based O!} "coherence relations", to determine global structure (and 
hence maintain global focus) when no such framework is avan'able. The 
section ends with a review of some treatments of focussing (in fact both global 
and local) as the cumulative effect of a number of largely independent factors. 
5.2.1 The use of task structure: Grosz's theory 
Grosz [1977,1978] formalized the notion of focussing for dialogues whose goal 
is the completion of a well-defined task. Using examples drawn from dialogues 
between an apprentice attempting to assemble an air compressor and an 
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expert providing advice on how to do so, she argued that communication 
depends on the participants focussing their attention on the same small 
subset of their shared knowledge. Her theory was partly implemented in the 
TDUS system. 
According to Grosz, the hearer can keep track of the (global) focus shifts 
intended by the speaker by following general linguistic clues, such as the use 
of certain conjunctions, and by using knowledge of the structure of the 
domain of discourse . However Grosz only considered the latter method in 
detail. The overall task of assembling the air compressor was analysed as a 
partially ordered hierarchy of subtasks involving particular events and 
objects. Grosz found that her dialogues had a structure similar to that of the 
task they related to. The predefined task structure therefore provided a 
framework for structuring individual dialogues without completely 
determining their form or content. 
At any stage in a dialogue, the current global focus consisted of a number of 
"focus spaces", each corresponding to a particular subtask. The "active" 
focus space corresponded to the subtask currently under discussion, while an 
"open" focus space was associated with each of the superordinate (and 
therefore uncompleted) subtasks in the hierarchy. 
When a FDNP (full definite noun phrase) was encountered, the search for its 
referent began in the active and open spaces, visiting neighbouring spaces in 
the hierarchy only when necessary. If a referent was found in a neighbouring 
space, that space would become active, and the spaces superordinate to it, 
possibly including some or all of the old active and open ones, would become 
or remain open. Thus focussing and anaphor resolution were mutually 
dependent (although a focus shift could also be provoked non-anaphorically, 
e.g . by a phrase such as "OK, what next?"). 
Grosz's work suggests that a fairly detailed representation of the structure of 
the domain of discourse is necessary for the maintenance of global focus, and 
therefore for the reliable resolution of non-pronominal noun phrases. 
However, other work discussed below suggests that significant progress can be 
made without such a representation, partly by exploiting the linguistic clues 
to discourse structure which Grosz largely ignored. Furthermore, it is 
possible that the dependence of anaphor resolution on a knowledge of 
discourse structure is proportional to the degree of structure, and is highest 
in very constrained discourses such as the ones Grosz considers; in Grosz's 
dialogues, the task constrains not only what things can be talked about but 
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also the order of talking about them. In discourses with a less rigid structm·e, 
such as simple narratives or descriptions, the penalty for ignoring that 
structure may be less severe. 
In any case, Grosz argues that whereas FDNP resolution is largely constrained 
by global focus, whose maintenance depends on detailed domain knowledge, 
pronoun resolution is more affected by local (or in Grosz' terms, "immediate") 
focus, which she sees as a linguistic phenomenon; the lack of detailed domain 
knowledge in a shallow processing system may therefore present fewer 
problems for resolving pronominal anaphors than for non-pronominal ones. 
5.2.2 Coherence Relations 
When no predefined framework for recognising discourse structure is 
available, one may attempt to recognise structure using only the linguistic 
form and content of individual utterances. One promising approach to this is 
based on coherence relations such as "elaboration" or "contrast". ln this 
approach, it is assumed that every non-initial sentence in a text is related in 
one of a fixed number of ways to some earlier sentence. A number of 
researchers, including Halliday and Hasan [ 1976] in their analysis of 
"conjunction" as a type of cohesion, have attempted to provide a taxonomy of 
possible coherence relations. In text understanding based on coherence 
relations, the establishment of a relation between an existing sentence and a 
new one ofte11 presupposes, and in turn gives support to, particular choices of 
specifications for the anaphors in the new sentence. 
Hobbs [ 1979] investigates what processing is required to establish that one of 
a given set of coherence relations holds between a given pair of sentences. He 
argues that much anaphor resolution simply "falls out" of the hearer's 
attempt to recog~ize coherence relations in what he hears by constructing 
inference chains. In Hobbs' framework, the second sentence of 
(5-2) John can open Bill's safe. He knows the combination. 
can be connected to the first by a coherence relation (in fact by a r e lation of 
Elaboration, which Hobbs defines) if and only if "he" is interpreted as John 
and "the combination" is interpreted as the safe's combination. The reader's 
assumption that the text is coherent leads him to accept those 
interpreta tions . (Note that "he" here cannot be resolved on grounds of 
plausibility alone; Bill is at least as likely as John to know the safe's 
combination). 
Subsection 5 .2.2 89 
I 
11 
The work of Lockman and Klappholz (henceforth L&K) [ 1980] is 
complementary to that of Hobbs. L&K assume the existence of an inference 
mechanism capable of verifying that a given coherence relation holds between 
a given pair of sentences, perhaps following Hobbs' methods. They propose a 
"contextual reference resolution algorithm" (CRRA) which would call such an 
inference mechanism at appropriate moments while processing connected 
texts. 
L&K represent a text as a hierarchy of nodes, each of which is the semantic 
representation of a sentence. Nodes are linked by coherence relations. The 
hierarchy is initialised to a node for the first sentence. For subsequent 
sentences, the CRRA works by initially hypothesising a coherence relation 
between the new sentence and the most recently added one. If a plausible 
relation (with concomitant anaphor resolutions) is discovered by the inference 
mechanism, it is accepted, and the new node is connected to the hierarchy by 
that relation; if not, the CRRA moves through the hierarchy in a defined way, 
considering ,other nodes and accepting the first plausible relation found. 
L&K's theory has some interesting similarities to Gro.sz's. Both represent 
texts hierarchically; nodes considered early by the CRRA are analogous to 
active or open focus spaces; and focussing (i.e. the CRRA operation) and 
anaphor resolution are mutually dependent, as in Grosz's theory. 
However, the CRRA appears to be potentially more flexible than Grosz's 
approach, because it constructs the text hierarchy dynamically, while Grosz's 
algorithm can only deal with discourses conforming to a predefined task 
structure. But a reliable inference mechanism of the type that L&K assume 
for assessing hypothesised relations is probably beyond the state of the art; 
and any unreliability, for example rejecting a correct hypothesis, is liable to 
result in a great deal of unnecessary computation and perhaps eventually a 
wildly incorrect at~achment. 
5.2.3 Cumulative treatments of focus 
Both Grosz's an-d L&K's theories treat focus solely in structural terms: the 
focus state of an entity depends on its position in a representation of the 
discourse structure. In contrast, a number of researchers have viewed 
focussing as the cumulative effect of several largely independent factors (perhaps including some notion of discourse structure); the focus state of an 
element is then essentially the sum of several numbers. An early approach 
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along these lines was that of Kantor [ 1977], who developed the idea of 
"concept activatedness", where "the more activated a concept is, the easier it 
is to understand an anaphoric reference to it". Kantor characterised 
activatedness as the net effect of factors such as discourse topic, the 
syntactic positions of earlier references, and syntactic parallelism. However, 
since his analysis is a largely qualitative one, its predictions are difficult. lo 
assess. 
Kantor's general approach is echoed in the "principle of factor cumulation" 
used in the Con3Tra project (Pause [1984]). This principle states that 
"various (more or less certain and significant) clues from a given text work 
together in supporting a certain hypothesis about a possible antecedent. for 
an anaphor and that finally the correct hypothesis - indicating the intended 
antecedent - outweighs the other ones" . An assumption very like this in fact 
underlies the shallow processing hypothesis: if in a considerately-written text 
various factors work together, rather than against each other, t.o indicate an 
antecedent., then a less than ideal treatment. of the particular fact.or of 
common sense inference should not. oft.en lead to the wrong antecedent. being 
accepted. 
A third cumulative approach is that. of Alshawi [1983], whose Capture system 
resolved anaphors and other ambiguities in texts as a means to generating 
database creation statements. The "context activation" (roughly, degree of 
focus) of each candidate referent in the text. representati on at a given 
moment was defined as the sum of a number of "context factors", such as 
sentence recency and syntactic emphasis, which decayed over time. For a 
singular definite anaphor, the most activated syntactically and semantically 
plausible candidate would be accepted; resolving plural anaphors could involve 
threshold application as well. 
Alshawi's context fact.ors represented a wide range of context influences in a 
simple and uniform way. It seems likely that because of its flexibility, the 
context fact.or idea could be extended to other domains, tasks and text types . 
Alshawi is careful to stress that the importance of his work lies in its possible 
practical applicability rat.her than in any specific theoretical claims about 
language, since the behavio1 ;:rs of the various context. factors were arrived at 
on a trial-and-error basis rather than as consequences of a comprehensive 
linguistic theory. However, the test set. of over thirty t.ext.s which Capture 
processed correctly is impressive . While it. does not conclusively demonstrate 
the correctness and full generality of the mechanisms involved, it. does suggest 
that global as well as local focus can, for some tasks and domains at. least, be 
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maintained without relying heavily on the detailed domain knowledge used by 
Grosz or on rule-based inference mechanisms. 
5.3 Local focus and sentence structure 
At the beginning of this chapter, local focus was defined as the aspect of focus 
determined by how often and in what way various elements are specified by 
phrases in a text. This section goes into more detail, covering first some 
treatments of local focus and topic in theoretical linguistics, and then some 
approaches to anaphor resolution which do not represent local focus explicitly 
but define it implicitly by using sets of rules which suggest antecedents for 
pronouns in a given order. These rules embody some of the insights discussed 
in 5 .3.1 . (Sidner's work, which will be discussed in section 5 .4, can be seen as a 
related approach in which focus is made explicit.) 
5.3.1 Focus and topic in· sentences 
Much work on s entence organisation has been based on the distinction 
between "given" information, which is derivable from the previous context , 
and "new" information, which is not. For Lyons [ 1968], for example, the topic 
of the sentence is what the sentence is "about"3 and is usually given, while the 
"focus" is often defined as in some sense the centre of phonological 
prominence, and is therefore usually new (e.g . Halliday [1967],, Chornksy 
[1971]). Neither concept is to be identified with our notion of focus , because 
the items that a sentence puts most into focus (in the sense of being 
preferred as referents) can be either given or new. I will therefore use the 
term p-focus (prosodic focus) to refer to the linguists' concept. However, it is 
usually the case _ that the topic is more focussed than any other "given" 
information and the p-focus more focussed than any other "new" information, 
and therefore treatments of both concepts are of interest. 
3This definition is not as vague as it may seem; Reinhart [1982] introduces an 
"aboutness test" for identifying topics. Note also that Halliday [ 1967] uses 
the term "theme" for roughly the same concept as Lyons' "topic"; however, we 
will use " theme" in a different sense. 
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Focussing is affected (or effected) by a range of prosodic, syntactic and 
semantic choices; but because we are concerned only with written language we 
will discuss prosody only where it is essential to the views reported. 
(a) Focus and syntax. A number of marked syntactic constructions determine 
p-focus and direct attention, and therefore focus, away from the topic and 
towards the p-focus, which is underlined in the following examples (however, 
whether the p-focus is also "the focus" is a function of context). 
(5-3) 
(5-4) 
(5-5) 
There was a zoo in John's town. ("There-insertion") 
It was his best suit that John wore to the dance last night. ("Clefting") 
What John wore to the dance last night was his best suit. ( ''Pseudo-clefting'') 
Left-extraposition (typically of the topic) has a similar effect to 
pseudo-clefting, making some of the non-extraposed items more focussed . 
(5-6) To the dance last night John wore his best suit. 
In unmarked cases, nuclear items (subjects and objects) tend to be more 
focussed than items such as prepositional objects. The subject of a passive 
sentence is usually especially strongly focussed. 
(b) Focus and semantics. Gruber [1976] and Anderson [1977] use a semantic 
notion of theme to account for a number of otherwise unexplained regularities 
in English, such as that between the transitive and intransitive forms of 
"break". Neither author provides a specific and comprehensive definition of 
theme, arguing instead for its identification of a variety of different grounds; 
for example, if a sentence describes a change to an entity, that entity is the 
theme. The theme of a sentence often appears as the direct object , or, for an 
intransitive verb, as the subject. 
The importance of the concept of theme for our purposes is that themes are 
often more focussed than other participants: that is, they are preferred as 
referents of subsequent anaphors . Although the concept is not defined for all 
verbs, it is suffi_ciently useful for Sidner 's PI rules to apply it , and SPAR is 
normally able to recognise the theme of a clause by examining the head 
primitive (see 4.3 .1) of the definition of its verb. 
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5.3.2 Rule-based approaches to local focus 
A number of researchers have formulated sets of rules for suggesting 
candidate antecedents for pronouns in a defined order. This order can be 
seen as defining a focus ordering on the candidates' specifications; more 
focussed candidates are suggested first. Because the rules consider only the 
linguistic form and role of antecedents, the type of focus modelled is local and 
not global. 
Winograd's SHRDLU system [ 1972], could resolve a wide variety of anaphors in 
its dialogues about its blocks world, including definite and indefinite pronouns 
and verbal substitutes ("do it/that"). It was impressive in its avoidance of 
simple recency criteria, in the range of anaphors covered, and in the way 
anaphor resolution was coordinated with other aspects of processing. 
However, as has often been remarked, its performance was partly due to the 
finite nature of the micro-world within which it operated; and Winograd 
recognised that the plausibility heuristics used were "fairly arbitrary". The 
focussing phenomena they were meant to cover are treated more rigorously 
and coherently by Sidner. 
Hobbs [ 1976] developed a purely syntactic algorithm for definite pronoun 
resolution which selected antecedent noun phrases from surface syntactic 
parse trees for sentences in a text. The algorithm performed surprisingly well, 
achieving 88% accuracy on 300 pronouns occurring in three (real) texts. This 
figure was increased to 92% when selectional restrictions were allowed. The 
algorithm is too long to reproduce here, but it essentially preferred candidate 
antecedents in the current sentence to those in earlier ones, less deeply 
embedded candidates to more deeply, and for those in the current sentence, 
there was a tendency to favour candidates near the pronoun in the parse tree 
over those further away, and to favour anaphora (in the strict sense) over 
cataphora. 
It might seem that because of its high accuracy, Hobbs's algorithm is the last 
word in anaphor resolution by shallow processing. In particular, one might 
argue that no shallow-processing system whose accuracy is less than 88% has 
any claim to significance. However Hobbs argues that "there is every reason 
to pursue a semantically based approach", for a number of reasons . Firstly, 
no purely syntactic approach can hope to do (much) better than his own, 
which "offers no hope of a total solution"; his algorithm, while impressive, is a 
dead end. In particular, it offers no help in recognising which 12% of its 
decisions are the wrong ones. Secondly, although his algorithm works, it is not 
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explanatory; he argues that his semantic approach (to be discussed in chapter 
7) is more appealing since it "depends on very fundamental properties of 
language" . Thirdly, semantic processing must be done anyway in the analysis 
of texts, and a purely syntactic anaphor resolver is therefore anomalous . 
The real importance d Hobbs's algorithm is that it combines reasonable 
accuracy with computational cheapness; it therefore seems sensible to use it 
as one component in an anaphor resolver. SPAR in fact uses it to impose a 
weak "focus" ordering on intrasentenlial candidate antecedents, since Sidner 
covers thoroughly only intersentential anaphora. 
Guenthner and Lehmann [1983] present a set of six preference rules, 
expressed, like Hobbs', in terms of surf ace syntactic parse trees for the 
current sentence and earlier ones. These rules are used to resolve pronouns 
in the restricted context of relational database query dialogues. The authors 
stress that the rules are only intended to apply to their particular type of 
dialogue, but express the hope that they will be extendible to other types. 
Closer examination reveals striking similarities between the preference rules 
of Winograd, Hobbs (as implied by the algorithm) and Guenthner and Lehmann. 
All express preferences for candidates in more recent sentences and favour 
subjects over objects and both over candidates outside the nucleus. We will 
see below that Sidner's rules, which are more complex, more rigorously 
justified, and in some ways more comprehensive, also reflect most of these 
preferences. 
5.4 Sidner's theory of local focussing 
In chapter 1, I summarised Sidncr's theory of local focussing. This section 
examines some aspects of Sidner's work in more detail in order to prepare for 
the description of SPAR's anaphor-resolving capabilities in later chapters . 
Sidner [ 1979,81,83] assumes that, at a given point, a well-formed discourse is 
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"about" some entity mentioned in it. This entity is the discourse focus .4 As 
the discourse progresses, the speaker may maintain the same discourse focus 
or ma y focus on another entity. A change in discourse focus, or the lack of a 
change, are signalled by the linguistic choices the speaker makes, particularly 
his use of various anaphoric expressions. The hearer must use his knowledge 
of certain rules governing these choices and of the subject-matter of the 
discourse to interpret anaphors and follow changes in discourse focus . 
In d e scribing her work, I will follow Sidner in using the term "the focus" to 
mean "the discourse focus" rather than the "actor focus" which will be 
introduced in due course. 
After setting out Sidner's computational framework, I will describe her rules 
for resolving FDNPs and third-person definite personal pronouns. I will not 
discuss her treatment of "co-present foci", as exhibited by "the one ... the 
other" and "this ... that", because it introduces no radically different ideas and 
because anaphors of this type are uncommon in simple stories . I will then 
discuss Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein's [1983] theory of "centering", which is in 
some ways an alternative to Sidner's, and finally evaluate Sidner's theory and 
compare it with Grosz et al's work and with other work described in this 
chapter. 
5.4.1 Sidner's processing framework 
Sidner 's apparatus is as follows. The state of focus at a given point in the text 
is represented by the contents of six focus registers. The discourse focus (DF) 
and actor focus (AF) registers each contain the representation of a single 
entity m e ntioned in the text; the potential discourse focus (PDF), pote ntial 
a c tor focus (PAF), discourse focus stack (DFS) and actor focus stac k (AFS) 
registers each contain a list of zero or more entities. The uses of these 
registers and the rationale behind them are explained below. Sidner 
formalises the anaphor interpretation process in various algorithms to be 
4However Sidner makes it clear [ 1983,p279] that the discourse focus is 
define d not as what the discourse is about but as what element her algorithms 
select as the discourse focus. The latter is of course an attempt to capture 
the forme r . 
The many footnotes in this section are intended mainly to point out the 
inevitable simplifications in my overview of Sidner's very detailed theory. They 
are not essential to gaining a general understanding of Sidner's work. 
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applied in turn to semantic representations of input sentences: 
( 1) The expected focus algorithm is applied only to the first sentence 
in a text. It uses some of the syntactic and semantic criteria 
described .in 5 .3.1 above to select an expected discourse focus which 
may or may not be confirmed in subsequent sentences. The other 
entities mentioned in the sentence (whether by noun phrases or 
clauses) are alternative or potential foci. The DF register is set to 
the expected focus and the PDF register to the potential foci .5 
(2) For non-initial sentences, an anaphor interpretation algorithm is 
applied to each anaphor. There are different algorithms (Sidner 
[1979] lists seven) for anaphors of various grammatical types and in 
various roles in the sentence representation. Each algorithm is a 
discrimination net containing ten or so rules; those for definite 
pronouns are called PI (pronoun interpretation) rules. Each rule in 
the algorithm appropriate to an anaphor suggests one (or sometimes 
several - see later) specifications (i.e . elements in the text 
representation) for it according to what the focus registers contain. 
The suggested specification is assessed by an inference mechanism 
(which Sidner assumed to exist) which looks for any resulting 
contradictions. The first suggestion not giving rise to a contradiction 
is accepted. 
(3) After anaphor interpretation, a focus update algorithm is applied 
which updates the focus registers, taking the results of anaphor 
interpretation into account. If the DF changes, the old DF is pushed 
onto the DFS, or, if the new DF is already in the DFS, the DFS is 
popped. Whether the DF changes or not, the PDF list consists of 
representations of every entity mentioned in the current sente nce 
other than the DF itself. The AF, PAF and AFS registers, which we will 
discuss later, are updated analogously, except that only animate 
entities can be held in these registers. 
The next sentence is then processed by stage (2). 
Thus in Sidner's theory, definite anaphors are seen as signals which tell the 
hearer what elements are in focus and in what registers , and the focus state, 
as defined by the six focus registers, in turn partly determines the 
5Whether the ~F is "confirmed" or only "expected" is of no procedural 
importance except when a sentence with no anaphors is encountered . When 
this happens, the DF will remain unchanged if it is confirmed; otherwise the DF 
r egiste r is emptied and a list of "focus sets" is crea ted as a tempora ry 
alternative to the normal focus registers. However, the texts which Sidner 
[1979,pp76-77] uses to argue for this special mechanism can be d ealt with 
equally well without it by a small modification to her algorithms. Focus sets, 
and the confirmed / expected distinction, will therefore be ignored from now 
on . 
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interpretation of definite anaphors. Sidner supports her theory by presenting 
evidence for five claims which can be summarised as follows. 
(Cl) Focussing provides a means for determining whetller a definite 
noun phrase specifies something - . alre ady mentioned' "t'.Re discourse, 
specifies an element associated with the discourse, or specifies 
something outside the discourse. 
(C2) Focussing (together with sentence syntactic and semantic 
information) distinguishes pragmatic (discourse) anaphors from 
bound-variable and intrasentential ones . 
(C3) The idea of focussing is the basis for a set of algorithms which 
(together with a suitable inference mechanism to assess suggestions) 
determine the specifications of pragmatic anaphors. 
(C4) Focussing reduces the amount of inference to be done, since 
inference need only attempt to confirm or reject a suggested 
specification, rather than suggest one itself. 
(C5) The data structure representing the current focus indic a t e s 
what items may be_ associated with the focus. The range of phrases 
that may be used to mention those items determines certain 
necessary characteristics of the knowledge representation. 
The evidence Sidner presents for these claims will be discussed in the rest of 
this section. 
5.4.2 Interpreting full definite noun phrases 
Sidner largely substantiates claims (Cl), (C5) and, for non-pronouns, (C3), by 
a set of rules which apply lo the focus registers. These rules assume a 
hierarchical/ associative knowledge representation which provides for generic 
nodes, representing classes of objects or events such as "meeting", and 
specific nodes, representing instances of those classes (e.g. the meeting I am 
going to tomorrow) .6 Nodes may be linked by is-a (instance) and role-filler 
links (such as the "time" role for a meeting). Sidner cites Fahlman's [ 1979] 
6Sidner also states that "prototype" nodes are required, one per generic 
class, to represent a typical member of the class . However, prototype nodes 
are not needed for SPAR's processing, and will therefore not be discussed 
further. 
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NETL as an example of a suitable representation; SPAR's representation also 
meets Sidner's requirements . 
Sidner lists several ways in which a FDNP may derive its specification from a 
focus (current, potential or stacked) . 
(1) Cospecification (1): the FDNP and focus cospecify if the FDNP has 
the same head as the focus and introduces no new information. 
Example: "a small office ... the office". 
(2) Cospecification (2) : the FDNP and focus cospecify if the FDNP has 
a head which lexically generalizes that of the focus and no restrictive 
postmodifiers. Example: "a ferret.. .the animal". 
(3) Associated Specification: if the FDNP names an element associated 
with the focus in the hierarchy, either directly or by role inheritance, 
then the FDNP specifies that element. Any inferences made in the 
course of establishing the association must be analytic (logically 
true). Example: "a meeting ... the participants" . 
(4) Inferred Specification: as for associated specification , but 
establishing the · association involves non-analytic inferences. 
Example: "the dead heiress ... the murderer". 
(5) Set-element Specification: if the focus is a set, and the FDNP is 
singular and has the same head as the focus and some additional 
modifier(s), then the FDNP specifies an element of the focus. 
Example: "a herd of elephants ... the elephant with the limp". 
(6) Computed Specification: if the FDNP has an ordinal modifier, the 
same head as the focus, and no relative clause modifiers, the 
specification of the FDNP may be computed from that of the focus. 
Example: "a meeting ... the last meeting but two". 
The algorithm for determining an FDNP's function specifies an order for 
testing for particular relationships between the FDNP and particular (actual, 
potential or stacked) foci. Not all combinations are allowed. If no test yields a 
positive result, the FDNP is assumed not to be anaphoric. Sidner applies the 
algorithm to a wide range of examples and shows that it mak~s correct 
predictions. Those parts of it implemented in SPAR show similarly reliable 
performance when the required knowledge is present. 
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5.4.3 Interpreting definite pronouns 
For definite pronouns, as for FDNPs, Sidner develops algorithms to suggest 
specifications. These specifications, like those for FDNPs, are to be assessed 
by an inference mechanism; however, the application of selectional 
restrictions and configurational constraints such as c-command plays a more 
prominent part in this inference for pronouns than for FDNPs. 
Sidner begins by arguing for a recency rule and a basic rule . The basic rule is 
similar to that for FDNPs, and states that the focus should be suggested first , 
followed by each potential focus in turn if necessary. This rule is modified as 
the argument develops . The recency rule applies, before the basic rule, to 
sentence-initial subject pronouns only,7 and states that if there is a potential 
focus which was specified by the last constituent of the previous sentence, 
that potential focus should be suggested first. Sidner admits that the recency 
rule "makes focussing seem somewhat ad hoe" and sees no clear reason for 
the phenomenon, but claims to have observed it to be consistently accurate. 
However its inclusion in SPAR led to considerable inaccuracy, and indeed 
Sidner's examples [1979,p145] hardly lend support to it.8 The recency rule is 
therefore not implemented in SPAR. 
7 Sidner in fact states conflicting conditions of application on different 
occasions; e .g. subject position [1979,p144]; sentence-initial [1979,p147]; 
subject position and sentence-initial and second sentence of text [ 198 l ,p230]. 
8For example, for 
(5-7) Mary is giving a surprise party at Hilda's house. It's at 340 Cherry St 
Sidner claims that the "it" cospecifies with " Hilda's house", and so the 
recency rule must intervene to prevent the expected focus of the surprise 
party being suggested. However my intuition is that it is the party which is at 
340 Cherry St; Hilda's house is 340 Cherry St. In any case this seems to be an 
example of a phenomenon which Sampson [ 1983] claims is common: the 
correct antecedent is unclear, but the choice makes little difference to the 
underlying content of the text. 
Secondly, for 
(5-8) Fill the pan with the cake mixture. It will be slightly lumpy 
Sidner implies that the recency rule must override the basic rule to prevent 
the pan being suggested as specification of " it". However this seems 
unnecessary; although selectional restrictions may not rule the pan out (pans 
can perhaps be Jumpy) the stipulation of a lumpy pan in a recipe is so odd that 
an inference mechanism should reject it. 
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If pronouns were resolved using the basic rule alone, they would be treated 
just like FDNPs ( except of course that the only specification relation they can 
participate in is cospecification). However, Sidner argues that a separate 
actor focus is needed to account for the behaviour of pronouns. The actor 
focus is defined as the agent of the most recent sentence that has an agent. 
Other animate specifications in the most recent sentence are potential actor 
foci; if the actor focus changes, the old value is pushed onto the actor focus 
stack. 
Within the framework developed so far, Sidner suggests separate algorithms 
for pronouns which occur as agents, as possessives and as neither (henceforth 
"normal") . They are too long to reproduce in full here. However they may be 
summarised as follows (ignoring their use of the recency rule). 9 
( 1) F'or singular normal pronouns, the suggestions are: first discourse 
focus; then conversationally associated element of discourse focus 
(i.e. an already-mentioned element associated with the disc'ourse 
focus); then potential discourse foci in textual order; and lastly actor 
and potential actor foci. 
(2) For singular agent and possessive pronouns, the relative 
preferences for discourse focus, actor focus and potential actor foci 
are much less clear. If several are acceptable, the usage may be 
judged ambiguous, or there may be a slight preference in some 
direction. 
(3) Plural pronouns are dealt with like singulars, except that 
suggestions for combinations of focus elements (e.g. actor focus plus 
potential actor foci) occur at various points . One advantage of 
Sidner's framework is that it provides a partial solution to the 
difficult problem of computing specifications of plural pronouns 
where no single antecedent phrase exists. 
(4) In most cases candidates are suggested one at a time to be 
assessed by "normal mode" inference, thus imposing strong 
preferences between them. Sometimes, however, several are 
suggested at once and "special mode" inference must choose between 
them; the focus preferences (if any) between such candidates are 
weak. 
The use of these algorithms, without the jettisoned recency rule, may be 
illustrated by the following text (the example is mine). 
9The summary here is of the rules in Sidner [1979]. Sidner [1981] contains a 
description of some slightly different rules. However SPAR uses the 1979 rules 
because of their greater explicitness and completeness. 
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[ 1] Susan was given a computer. 
Expected focus calculation: expected DF is the computer, as 
theme. PDFs are Susan and the giving event, in that order. 
AF is null, since no agent is mentioned; PAF is Susan. 
[2] She used it to write business software. 
PI rule application : (1) She: agent rules predict Susan as PAF 
(there being no AF). Approved by inference. (2) It: normal 
rules predict the computer as (expected) DF. Approved by 
inference. 
Focus update: Computer confirmed as DF. PDFs are the 
business software, Susan, the writing and the using in that 
order. AF is Susan. 
[3] Thousands of people bought it. 
PI rule application: It: normal rules suggest computer as DF. 
Rejected by inference, since thousands of people are 
unlikely to buy one computer. Normal rules then suggest 
the business software as first PDF. Approved by inference. 
Focus update: Business software becomes DF. Computer 
pushed onto DF stack (previously empty). PDFs are the 
thousands of people and the buying. AF becomes the 
thousands of p.eople . No PAFs. Susan pushed onto AF stack 
(previously empty). 
[ 4] She became extremely rich . 
. Pronoun interpretation: She: Agent rules (assuming that 
"becoming" is a deliberate action) suggest thousands of 
people as AF; rejected on agreement grounds . Agent rules 
then suggest Susan as top of AF stack; this is approved by 
inference. 
Focus update: DF becomes Susan. Business software pushed 
onto DF stack. PDF is "becoming" event. AF is Susan; no 
PAFs. AF stack is empty since Susan was popped from it. 
The behaviour of the PI rules supports Sidner's claim (C4) that focussing 
reduces the complexity of inference. In the above text, the inference 
mechanism was on_ly required to approve or reject suggested specifications for 
pronouns, rathe r than to infer those specifications itself, a far more complex 
and expensive task. 
5.4.4 An alternative theory 
Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein (henceforth GJW) [1983] give an account of 
anaphora which they contrast with Sidner 's. Their notions of (backward) 
centre and forward centre c0rrespond roughly to Sidner's discourse focus and 
potential discourse focus respectively. They propose the following rule as a 
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constraint on the speaker: 
(5-9) If the centre of the current utterance is the same as the 
centre of the previous utterance, a pronoun should be used. 
This rule is not hard and fast; however, violations of it force the hearer to 
draw additional inferences to explain the violation. If no explanation can be 
found , the discourse is perceived as ill-formed. For example sentence [2] of 
the following sequence provokes a violation if John is the centre at the outset: 
(5-10) [ 1] He called up Mike yesterday. (he=John) 
[2] He was annoyed by John's call. 
GJW note that Sidner dealt with multiple pronouns in a single sentence by the 
introduction of an actor focus, and imply that their simpler framework can 
handle multiple pronouns without such a device. They take Sidner's [1981] 
text 
(5-11) [ 1] I haven't seen Jeff for several days. 
[2] Carl thinks he's studying for his exams. 
[3] But I think _he went to the Cape with Linda. 
where the pronoun "he" in [3] is potentially ambiguous between Carl and Jeff, 
and observe that "on our account, Jeff is centre after [2] and there is no 
problem", whereas in Sidner's framework, "fairly special rules" are necessary 
to make the choice correctly. 
However, there are problems with this argument. The choice of example is 
unfortunate; Sidner [ 1981,p223] uses (5-11) not to argue for an actor focus 
(which she does using other examples) but to discuss some of the problems an 
actor focus mechanism raises . In fact her basic rule accounts for all the 
pronouns in (5-11) without any extra "special rules"; it is th erefore 
unsurprising that the centering mechanism can also deal with it. In any case, 
GJW set out to state constraints on the speaker's choice of words, not the 
h earer's choice of interpretation. This means that their claim that rule (5-9) 
allows, without the need for a separate actor focus, usages such as the 
replacement of sentence [3] in (5-11) by 
[3'] He thin~s he studies too much. 
while true, is misleading. Although it allows this usage, it does not, at least on 
its own, predict the specification of either pronoun. Thus although the GJW 
[ 1983] framework is simpler than Sidner's, GJW [ 1983] presents no evidence 
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5.4.5 An evaluation of Sidner's theory 
Any theory which aims to restrict and order the set of candidate specifications 
considered for anaphors may be evaluated on a number of different grounds. 
These include: 
( 1) Coverage: to what range of anaphors and related phenomena does 
the theory apply? 
(2) Accuracy: for what proportion of anaphors does the theory make 
predictions which lead to an appropriate specification being 
accepted? 
(3) Simplicity: how simple are the structures and mechanisms 
involved? 
( 4) Efficiency: Inference is expensive and difficult. How far does the 
theory eliminate or· reduce the need for it? 
Sidner's theory is satisfactory in most of these respects. 
( 1) Coverage. Sidner analyses FDNPs and a wide range of definite pronouns . 
However, phenomena not covered include: 
(a) Parallelism. An anaphor resolver sometimes needs to take into 
account syntactic and semantic parallels between the s entence 
containing the anaphor and an earlier one. Sidner recognises this 
problem, but does not attempt to solve it because "proper 
computational recognition of parallelism is still beyond the stale of 
the art" [1981,p229]. None of the other theories we have examined 
tackles parallelism seriously either. 
(b) The influence of global focus. Sidner does not attempt to cover 
anaphoric behaviour when there is a change of global focus . 
10In this context the work of Kameyama [ 1985] is interesting. Kameyama uses 
the centering framework to formulate constraints on both the production and 
interpretation of anaphora in Japanese . Although she avoids introducing an 
actor focus, she shows that an adequate account of anaphor interpretation 
involves far more than a simple preference ordering on backward and forward 
centres. It seems likely that an attempt to formulate a centre-based 
algorithm for interpreting English anaphora would involve a corresponding 
increase in complexity. 
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(c) Interactions between multiple anaphors in the same sentence . If 
the anaphor interpretation rules are applied independently to each 
anaphor, the resulting predictions may be individually acceptable but 
collectively unacceptable, because of e .g. a c-command violation. 
Sidner recommends the principle "choose a pronoun to co-specify 
with the focus before the choice of defnp [=FDNP]". Howev~r she 
does not discuss clashes between pronouns. This problem, and 
SPAR's solution to it, are discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
(2) Accuracy. Experience with SPAR has shown that once the recency rule is 
abandoned, Sidner's algorithms yield highly accurate results in the absence of 
phenomena (a)-(c) above. The only exception is that the algorithms always 
prefer a focus-derived specification (originating from an earlier sentence) to 
one originating in the current sentence; 11 this can lead to wrong results, as in 
(5-12) John walked into the room. He told Bill that someone 
wanted to see him. 
where the intrasentential candidate Bill is at least as plausible as the focus 
John. Interestingly, the algorithms that were discussed in 5 .3 .2 all prefer 
intrasentential candidates over others. 
Sidner tested the accuracy of her theory in two partial implementations : in 
FAL (Personal Assistant Language Understanding Program), and in TDUS, along 
with Grosz' theory of global focussing (see 5.2.1 above). Details of these 
implementations are given in Sidner [ 1979]. In PAL, a simplified version of the 
PI rules, without an actor focus mechanism, was used. In TDUS, Sidner's rules 
were used to resolve only pronouns and not FDNPs. The rules reportedly 
performed well in both systems: in PAL, because the the dialogue was typically 
only one goal deep and so no shifts of global focus occurred, and in TDUS, 
because global focus shifts had already been detected by the time the rules 
were applied. 
11Sidner [ 1979,p148] discusses the sentence "Shem loves his sister" occurring 
in mid-discourse_. and states that "the focus rules force the freely cospecifying 
pronoun to cospecify with a focus if one is established ; the focus is therefore 
the source of cospecification rather than some other noun phrase within a 
sentence". However in Sidner [ 1979b,p249] she says "It a ppears that the 
focus and potential focus ought to be checked for coreference to [he/she] 
pronouns before sentential coreference rules are used. However, further 
experimentation with such cases is needed to confirm this aspect of 
coreference." (my emphasis) . It may therefore be that intrasentential 
candidates are ignored by her theory rather than wrongly treated. 
Subsection 5.4.5 105 
I 1
1 
I 
I 
)[ 
(3) Simplicity. Sidner's rules are not simple; their expression in abbreviated 
form covers twelve pages in Sidner [1979]. The complications may partly arise 
from her placing of the agent of a sentence after oblique (prepositional) 
objects in the expected focus ordering, and a corresponding de-preference for 
agents in discourse focus updating. Kameyama [1985] shows that the 
examples Sidner uses to argue for her expected focus ordering provide equally 
good support for an ordering in which the subject (which is often the agent) is 
preferred to oblique objects. It would appear that if the theme and syntactic 
subject are given approximately equal preference, and are preferred to 
oblique objects, the need for an actor focus and a separate agent-pronoun 
algorithm is much reduced if not eliminated. 
(4) Efficiency. A theory which presents an inference mechanism with 
candidate specifications or antecedents one at a time will enable simpler and 
more efficient processing than one which presents several at a time. In the 
former case, inference need only check for a contradiction; in the latter case, 
it must find a reason to prefer one of the candidates. The fact that Sidner's 
algorithms often present candidates one at a time is a major advantage of her 
theory. However, as we ·have seen, Sidner recognises that the mechanism must 
"be capable of a special judgment when given one actor and one potential 
actor; it must weigh its findings, and choose one of the two candidates as 
superior". Although this judgment is "special" it is quite frequently needed, 
especially, as we will see, when intrasentential candidate antecedents are 
properly treated. Even so, Sidner's algorithms do seem to go as far in the 
direction of presenting candidates one at a time as is consistent with accurate 
predictions. 
Thus in summary, Sidner's theory has very good coverage and efficiency. Its 
accuracy is in practice also good, except for intrasentential anaphora. Its 
simplicity leaves something to be desired . However, as a tool for practical 
anaphor resolution it is the most useful and complete theory of local focussing 
yet formulated. 
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6. Coordinated anaphor resolution in SPAR 
This chapter describes SPAR as a whole, showin;1, how components exploiting 
syntactic, semantic, local-focus and world knowledge fit together and 
presenting solutions to four problems of coordination which arise when the 
attempt is made to apply Sidner's framework to story processing. These 
problems are: 
( 1) How should anaphor resolution be coordinated with the resolution 
of word sense and structural ambiguity? 
(2) How should the different knowledge sources - local focus, syntax, 
semantics and world knowledge - be coordinated so as to achieve 
accurate results as efficiently and simply as possible? 
(3) How should the consideration of candidate antecedents from 
earlier sentences be coordinated with the consideration of 
intrasentential candidates (ISCs)? More specifically, how can Sidner's 
PI rules be extended to predict ISCs at appropriate points? 
(4) How should the application of Sidner's rules to different anaphors 
in the current sentence be coordinated? How can the results of one 
application be used to help another, and how can mutually 
incompatible predictions by different applications be dealt with? 
Each of the sections 6.1 to 6.4 in this chapter is devoted to answering one of 
these questions. Substantial extensions to Sidner's framework are described. 
Briefly, the answers I will argue for are as follows. 
( 1) The processes and results of anaphor resolution can, according to 
a "principle of anaphoric success" which will be formulated, be used 
to resolve many of the word-sense and structural ambiguities which 
depend on textual context for their resolution; that is, anaphor 
resolution often pre-empts word sense and structural ambiguity 
resolution. This fact largely determines SPAR's global organisation. 
(2) Sidner's framework, in which local focus controls the resolution 
process, consulting other knowledge sources when necessary, is 
roughly correct as far as it goes. However, CSI ( corresponding to 
Sidner's "special mode inference") should be invoked, if at all, only at 
the last possible moment. Furthermore, if, as in SPAR. no global 
focus mechanism exists alongside Sidner's local focussing algorithms, 
then certain changes to those algorithms are needed. Other changes 
are dictated by the need, in a shallow processing approach, to avoid 
using world knowledge where possible. Independently of global focus 
and shallow processing considerations, Sidner's framework must also 
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be revised in the light of solutions to problems (3) and ( 4) . 
(3) Extending Sidner's PI rules to consider ISCs is best done not by 
adding new rules but by temporarily augmenting the focus registers 
with elements specified in the current sentence. 
( 4) Where the PI rules alone (i.e. without CSI) are unable to decide 
between two candidates for an anaphor, constraints arising from 
applying the rules to another anaphor often come to the rescue. 
Cases of complete incompatibility between the results of applying the 
rules to two different anaphors are fairly rare, but when they occur, 
the rules must be re-applied. In section 6.4 we will also develop a 
number of motivated preference criteria for dealing with anaphors 
which CSI. because of its limited power in the shallow processing 
framework, is unable to resolve. 
Of the developments to Sidner's framework reported in this chapter, only the 
way in which candidate specifications are assessed (part of point (2)) and the 
introduction of collective preference criteria (part of point (4)) result from 
the use of a shallow processing methodology. The shallow processing 
character of the system is thus more apparent in its meaning representation 
and its CSI component than in its overall control structure. 
6.1 Anaphoric, word-sense and structural ambiguity 
6.1.1 Ambiguity resolution in textual context 
Any ambiguities in the interpretation of an isolated written sentence should 
ordinarily be resolvable when the sentence is interpreted in its textual 
context; if not, the text is in some sense ill-formed. Context can in fact act in 
many different ways to resolve ambiguities; perhaps the most obvious example 
is where the antecedent of a pronoun appears in an earlier sentence. Since 
this research is concerned mainly with anaphoric ambiguity, we will limit our 
coverage of the influence of context on resolving word-sense and structural 
ambiguity to considering the cases where that influence can be seen as being 
mediated by anaphor resolution: that is, where the resolution of an anaphor 
leads naturally to the resolution of another ambiguity. 
Crain and Steedman [ 1985] develop a psychological model of parsing, for which 
they hypothesise three principles of differing generality characterising the 
way in which context influences ambiguity resolution . Although Crain and 
Steedman discuss only structural ambiguity, these principles appear to be 
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applicable to word sense ambiguity as well. From the most specific to the most 
general, they are: 
"The principle of referential success: If there is a reading which 
succeeds in referring to an entity already established in the hearer's 
mental model of the domain of discourse, then it is favoured over one 
that does not." 
"The principle of parsimony: If there is a reading that carries fewer 
unsatisfied but consistent presuppositions or entailments than any 
other, then, other criteria of plausibility being equal, that reading will 
be adopted as the most plausible by the hearer, and the 
presuppositions in question will be incorporated in his or her model." 
"The principle of a priori plausibility: If a reading is more plausible in 
terms either of general knowledge about the world, or of specific 
knowledge about the universe of discourse, then, other things being 
equal, it will be favoured over one that is not." 
It would seem that the cases of word-sense and structural ambiguity in which 
the influence of context can be seen as being mediated by anaphor resolution 
include all those to which Crain and Steedman's principle of referential 
success applies . For example, in each of 
(6- la) 
(6-1 b) 
[ 1] John put a bowl on the floor. 
[2] He picked up some biscuits . 
[3] He put the biscuits in the bowl on the floor. 
[ 1] John picked up some biscuits. 
[2] He put them in a bowl. 
[3] He put the biscuits in the bowl on the floor . 
the preferred attachment of the PP "on the floor" is the one which allows 
more NP's to be resolved as anaphors. 1 
But since, given our definition of anaphora, not every anaphor specifies an 
existing item in the text model (e.g . consider substitutes (2 .2.2) or "inferred 
specification" (5.4.2)) the anaphora-mediated cases go beyond those covered 
by Crain and Steedman's first principle. For example, in (6-2a) and (6-2b) 
below, the word sense ambiguity of "jack" disappears when the anaphoric NP 
" the jack" is resolved, even though neither first sentence implies the 
1Most of the example texts in this chapter and chapters 8 and 9 are ones that 
SPAR processes correctly, as shown in appendices A and B. Their somewhat 
p e destrian quality is due to practical considerations, notably the need to 
conform lo Boguraev's analyser's grammatical coverage. 
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existence of a jack (either in the hearer's mental model or in reality): 
(6-2a) 
(6-2b) 
[ 1] John put the cards on the table. 
[2] He picked up the jack. 
[ 1] John put the tools on the floor. 
[2] He picked up the jack. 
Furthermore, other things being equal, readings accessing more focussed 
antecedents tend to be preferred; in 
(6-3) [ 1] John put the cards on the table. 
[2] He put the tools on the floor. 
[3] He picked up the iack. 
we interpret "the jack" as one of the tools , not one of the cards. 
SPAR is therefore intended to handle the range of contextual influences on 
word-sense and structural ambiguity resolution covered by the following 
variant of the principle of referential success: 
The principle of anaphoric success: If there is a reading which 
succeeds in establishing some anaphoric relation with an element 
already present in the hearer 's text model, then it is favoured over 
one that does not. Readings establishing anaphoric relations with 
more focussed elements are favoured over less focussed . 
Of course this principle is not the only one influencing SPAR's choice of 
reading . As we saw in 4.3 .3, SPAR also takes account of the semantic density 
of each reading; and in any case, Boguraev's analyser will only have 
constructed readings in which most of the semantic preferences of verbs, 
prepositions and other words are satisfied. 
6 .1.2 SPAR's processing strategy 
SPAR's processing strategy, involving the application of the principle of 
anaphoric success, is as follows. Each reading, represented by a current 
fragment of the TMN, is processed separate ly, and effectively in parallel. A 
score is assigned to each reading, partly on the basis of the intrinsic s emantic 
d e nsity calculated during current fragment construction, but also, in 
a ccorda nce with the principle of anaphoric success , on the basis of the ease 
with which a naphors can be resolved: a penalt y is incurred for each suggestion 
of the Sidner-derived anaphor resolution (AR) rules which is deemed 
unacceptable, and for each potential anaphor which cannot be resolved at all. 
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When all anaphors have been resolved, the reading with the highest score is 
accepted. 
For reasons which will be given later in this chapter, CSI is invoked, if at all , 
only after the AR rules have been applied to all potential anaphors . CSI is only 
invoked if some ambiguity remains: that is, if one or more anaphors are not 
fully resolved (because the AR rules required CSI to choose between two 
equally focussed candidates) , and/or if more than one reading exists. The CSI 
mechanism's success in completing inference chains for a reading affects that 
reading's score. Experience suggests that it is safe to discard all but the 
highest-scoring readings after applying the AR rules and before CSI; this has 
the advantage of reducing the number of occasions on which CSI is needed. 
Thus SPAR's overall processing strategy, in which anaphor resolution is 
embedded, is as follows . 
Set the TMN and the focus registers to NIL. 
For each sentence in the story in turn: 
Call the fragment constructor to derive (typically) one current 
fragment from each dependency structure for the sentence . 
For each reading (as represented by a current fragment): 
Set the reading's score to its semantic density. 
Apply the AR rules to each potential anaphor, using only 
linguistic knowledge (i.e . the structure matcher) to assess 
their suggestions. Subtract points from the score according 
to the number of rejected suggestions and the number of 
potential anaphors for which no suggested candidates were 
acceptable. 
Apply configurational constraints. 
Reject all but the highest scoring reading(s). 
If more .than one reading remains, or only one reading remains 
but there are anaphors f or which several candidates remain, 
then for each reading: 
Invoke CS!, and adjust the score accor ding to the number of 
chains completed. 
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If necessary, invoke some " collective" p r eference criteria 
(to be described). 
Accept the highest-scoring reading and merg ri it into the context 
according to the results of anaphor resolution. If there is a tie 
for highest score, apply some weak heuristics to seleqt the 
winning reading . 
These lie-breaking weak heuristics in fact involve comparing not current 
fr agments but the dependency structures from which they were constructed .2 
They are : 
(1) If two structures differ in the sense they select for a word, the 
one with the smaller sense number is preferred: e .g . TOOLl (a tool for 
mending things) is preferred to TOOL3 (a person being manipulated by 
someone in power). Dictionary entries for a word are assumed to be 
ordered with the most commonly used sense (in a neutral conte xt) 
first ; the fact that the story context is not necessarily neutral is 
ignored. 
(2) If two structures differ in the level at which they attach a c a se 
(typically originating from a PP), attachment to a verb phrase (i.e. a 
"clause" structure) is preferred to attachment to a noun phrase (i .e. 
a ··noun-arg"); and , secondarily, low attachment is preferred to high. 
These attachment preferences approximate to Frazier and Fodor's 
[ 1979] rules of right association and minimal attachment. 3 
These heuristics, although better than nothing , are far from ade quate . Some 
ways in which the system's reliance on them might be reduced are discussed in 
chapter 10. 
2The comparisons are actually made before current fragment construction, 
but the results are only used, if at all , in the last stages of processing a 
sentence. 
3s everal authors have pointed out problems with Fra zier and Fodor's rules; 
see Wilks et al [ 1985] for a review. Counterexamples e xist where lexical and 
pragmatic factors override any syntactic preferences. Accordingly , in SPAR. 
the Frazier and Fodor rules are only applied when neither lexical preferences 
(i. e . semantic density) nor pragmatic ones (i.e . anaphor-mediated contextual 
influences) are decisive. 
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6.1.3 An example 
The way in which anaphor resolution also results in non-anaphoric ambiguity 
being resolved, via the principle of anaphoric success, is illustrated by SPAR's 
processing of the text 
(6-4) John put the dog on the table. He examined its legs . 
After processing the first sentence, which has only one reading, the dog is 
established as discourse focus, with the table as a potential discourse focus. 
However, as the analyser dictionary contains two definitions of the noun ""leg", 
LEGl: (THIS C•HUM PART)) ("a distinct part of a human or animal") 
LEG2: (THIS (FURNITURE! PART)) ("a distinct part of a piece of furniture") 
two readings are produced for the second sentence, differing in the sense of 
"leg" selected. When TMN fragments are produced for each reading, the •HUM 
and FURNITURE! WSN nodes are, respectively, associated with "it" , resulting in 
the assertions 
(Specialisation: IT0-:1 of •HUM) 
(Specialisation: IT0-2 of FURNITUREl) 
for the LEGl reading, and 
for the LEG2 reading. 
The resolution of the anaphor "he" is straightforward. However, anaphor 
resolution for "its" proceeds as follows. For the LEG1 reading, SPAR's report on 
its progress (slightly abbreviated) is: 
Resolving IT0-1 as POSSESSIVE pronoun 
Applying df/af ambiguity rule 
DOGl-1 yields successful DIRECT match 
That is. the first suggestion of the AR rules, the TMN element for the dog, 
succeeds. For the LEG2 reading, on the other hand, lhe FURNITUREl reslriclion 
prevents "it" matching with "dog". and we get 
Resolving IT0-2 as POSSESSIVE pronoun 
Applying df/af ambiguity rule 
DOGl-1 yields no DIRECT matches 
Penalty point because DOGl-1 failed 
Predicting discourse focus: CDOGl-1) 
DOGl-1 has a!ready been suggested 
Predicting potential discourse foci: CTABLEl-1 PUTl-1) 
TABLEl-1 yields successful DIRECT match 
PUTl-1 yields no DIRECT matches 
The failed prediction of DOGl-1 resulted in a penalty point being imposed on the 
LEG2 reading. Thus the LEGl reading is accepted because it allows "its" to be 
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given a more focussed specification. 
6.2 The anaphor resolution r ules 
As indicated earlier , the AR (anaphor resolution) rules used in SPAR are 
identical to Sidner's FDNP (full definite noun phrase) and pronoun 
interpretation rules in most respects except where coordination betwe en 
knowledge sources, between sentential and contextual candidates and 
between anaphors is involved. Sidner 's rules have been altered in SPAR only 
as r equired by the shallow processing methodology and in the few cases where 
they seemc::d obviously inappropriate. Although, as we saw in chapter 5, 
Sidner's rules are perhaps more complex than they need be, this research 
aims not to formulate a radically new set of rules but to explore within a 
sh 9- llow processing context the coordination issues that Sidner's rules, or any 
comparable set of local-focus-based rules, raise. 
This section describes SPAR's rules for full noun phrases and pronouns, and 
justifies the use of linguistic knowledge alone to assess single suggested 
antecedents; coordination issues are dealt with more fully later in the 
chapter. Some of Sidner's rules have not been implemented in SPAR because 
the constructions they deal with occur only rarely in the type of stories SPAR 
processes, while on the other hand the rules have been tentatively extended to 
deal with indefinite noun phrases. 
6 .2.1 Rules for full noun phrases 
SPAR's rules for full noun phrases follow Sidner's quite closely. Of the six 
specification relations listed in 5 .4 .2, only computed specification (necessary 
for NP's with ordinal modifiers) is not implemented. Cospecification (types (1) 
and (2)) , associated specification and set-element specification are 
implemented much as recommended by Sidner. Inferred specification , 
however, is implemented rather differently. In a shallow processing system we 
wish to avoid CSl when possible, and in any case Wilksian CSI is geared towards 
constructing causal chains rather than the associations necessary to detect 
inferred specification. In SPAR, therefore, inferred specification is tackled by 
relaxing the information constraint (defined in 2 .2.3) . Such relaxation is in 
many cases equivalent to making the required assumptions (non-analytic 
inferences), as the following example shows. 
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Sidner [ 1979] exemplifies inferred specification using the text (repeated from 
2.2 .3) 
(6-5) [1] The heiress lived the life of a recluse. 
[2] She died under mysterious circumstances, 
[3] but the murderer was never found . 
Interpreting "the murderer" as "the murderer of the heiress" involves making 
the non-analytic inference that the heiress died by being murdered. However, 
linguistic knowledge is sufficient to make this inference. In SPAR. the formula 
for "murderer", and the formula for "kill" on which it depends, are 
MURDERER 1: ((((NOTSAME MAN) OBJE) KILLl) (SUBJ MAN))))) 
((•HUM SUBJ) ((•HUM OBJE) (DIEl CAUSE))) KILLl: 
so that processing the phrase "the murderer" results in an implicit DIEl node, 
with an unknown subject, being created in the TMN. The phrase can then be 
resolved by identifying the DIEl TMN node with that for the "die" event in the 
~ c-•"'4sentence. Making such an identification involves relaxing the information 
constraint because although the phrase "the murderer" presupposes some 
"die" event, the converse is not true. 
The output produced by SPAR while processing (6-5) (slightly simplified for 
reasons irrelevant to our concerns here) is as follows. For each sentence, the 
input is given first, followed, after anaphor resolution, by SPAR's paraphrase 
of it. 4 
(6-6) [1]. THE HEIRESS LIVED AS A RECLUSE. 
AN HEIRESS RESIDED LIKE A RECLUSE. 
[2]. SHE DIED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. 
THE HEIRESS DIED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. 
[3]. THE MURDERER WAS NOT FOUND. 
THE PERSON WHO KILLED THE HEIRESS WAS NOT FOUND. 
The information constraint may need to be relaxed not only to resolve 
(collocative) anaphors like "the murderer" which specify a previously 
unmentioned entity; sometimes a (reiterative) anaphor specifies an 
already-mentioned entity but introduces new information about that entity. 
In such cases we must relax the information constraint and therefore make an 
4 For an explanation of the perhaps surpnsmg use of "an" in [ 1] here 
rather than "the", and of SPAR's paraphrase mechanism in general, see 
chapter 9. 
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assumption; the assumption is that any modifiers which cannot be accounted 
for as "given" information are in fact new. We will therefore differ from Sidner 
in extending the term "inferred specification" to cover these cases as well as 
cases of the "died ... murderer" type . In 
(6-7) The heiress lived as a recluse. Nobody saw the old woman. 
the modifier " old" must be recognised as new information if the 
cospecification of "the old woman" with "the heiress" is to be established. 
However, if the head noun itself contains new information, the text reads more 
awkwardly and cospecification is perhaps less plausible : 
(6-8) The old woman lived as a recluse . Nobody saw the heiress. 
SPAR in fact attempts to handle three forms of inferred specification: where 
( 1) Anaphor and antecedent 
modifier or modifiers that 
Example: (6-7) . 
cospecify, but the anaphor has a 
break the information constraint. 
(2) The anaphor specifies an implicit element derived from the 
antecedent , and breaks the information constraint. Example : 
(6-9) John was driving along the motorway. His Jaguar 
broke down. 
where an implicit "vehicle" node is derived from " driving". 
(3) An implicit element derived from the anaphor is identified with 
the element specified by the antecedent; the implicit element may 
contain more information than the antecedent element. Example: 
(6-6). 
But in cases (2) or (3), the information constraint cannot be broken in 
arbitrary ways, or spurious identifications will be made. The constraint can 
only be broken if the word senses of the identified elements are sufficiently 
close . SPAR regards two word senses as " sufficiently close" if they are in an 
ancestor-descendant relationship in the WSN Specialisation: hi e rarchy and 
neither word sense is a primitive. (We saw in 4.3 .1 that the "word sense" of an 
implicit node is often a primitive). Primitives are ruled out because they are 
so general that matches between them do not constitute enough evidence to 
justify merging the two nodes. For example, when SPAR attempts to resolve 
"the murderer" in (6-6) , the AR rules first suggest that the implicit node for 
the person murdered should be identified with the heiress . This is initially 
rejected on the grounds of the excessive generality of the " person" node; 
evidence that this behaviour is correct is provided by the awkwardness of 
(6-6) with the s econd sentence removed. The rules then go on to suggest that 
the implicit "die" node should be identified with the explicit specification of 
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the "die" event in sentence [2]. This suggestion, which in fact entails the first 
one, is accepted. 
The successful treatment of inferred specification in terms of the information 
constraint and linguistic knowledge, rather than by full CSI, is further 
evidence of the feasibility of a shallow processing approach. Other, less 
important differences between SPAR's full NP rules and Sidner's may be 
summarised as follows. 
( 1) "Usage ambiguity", between specific and generic readings of a noun 
phrase, is not considered, since it is rare in simple stories. 
(2) The rules are applied to inJefinite NPs as well as definite. Although 
cospecification is not normally a possibility for indefinites, other relations are . 
For example, in 
(6-10) John entered a restaurant. A waiter came towards him. 
the underlined phrase can be understood as having "a restaurant" as its 
antecedent, just as if it had been "the waiter". 
(3) It is possible to use FDNPs to refer to entities that have drifted out of 
focus and are therefore never considered by Sidner's rules. SPAR therefore 
searches, if comparison with focussed elements does not resolve an FDNP. for 
any out-of-focus elements introduced earlier in the text with which 
cospecification is possible without breaking the information constraint. This 
search is carried out before inferred specification is considered; it is a simple 
but, given SPAR's aims, adequate substitute for a global focussing mechanism. 
6.2.2 Rules for pronouns 
Except where considerations of intrasentential candidate antecedents 
(discussed in section 6.3 below) are concerned, SPAR's AR rules for definite 
pronouns differ in only minor respects from Sidner's PI rules. Other than in 
the elimination of Sidner's recency rule, which as we saw in 5.4.3 is usually 
incorrect , the only difference is that for non-agent pronouns, nodes in the 
discourse focus stack are suggested if foci and potential foci are rejected. 
This brings the rules for non-agents into line with those for agents, for which, 
in Sidner's algorithms, the actor focus stack is suggested when necessary. 
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Sidner's "co-present foci" rules for noun phrases of the form "this ... " , "that 
.. . ", "(the) one" and "(the) other" are not implemented because such phrases 
were not encountered in the stories processed. However, "one" phrases (both 
with and without modifiers) are catered for by SPAR as follows. 
SPAR's pronoun rules are applied not only to definite pronouns but also lo 
descriplional anaphors (i.e. indefinite pronouns and indefinite and definite 
noun phrases headed by indefinite pronouns). However, a wider range of 
relationships between anaphor and antecedent is assessed than just 
cospecification. The algorithm used for establishing the relationship between 
such an anaphor and a suggested antecedent is: 
( 1) If the anaphor is definite, apply the structure matcher lo see if 
anaphor and candidate antecedent may cospecify without breaking 
the information constraint. If they may, decide whether the anaphor 
is contrastive: ensure that there are one or more elements in the 
TMN that have the same (or a subordinate) head word sense as the 
candidate and that the anaphor cannot match any of them without 
breaking the information constraint. If no contrast is found, the 
anaphor is odd. Examples: 
(6-1 la) . John picke'd a red flower and a yellow flower . Mary 
asked him for the red one. 
(6-llb) N John picked a red flower. Mary asked him for the 
red one. 
(2) If the candidate is plural, hypothesise that the anaphor specifies 
a member (or, if plural, a subset) of the set specified by the 
candidate. This can occur if the head word senses of the anaphor 
and candidate match, and the anaphor has an additional modifier 
and/or is indefinite. (This is an extension of Sidner's "set-element 
specification") . Example: 
(6-12) John picked some flowers. Mary asked him for (the 
red one I a red one I one) . 
(3) Hypothesise that the anaphor and antecedent are related only at 
the level of _sense: i.e . that the anaphor inherits the head word sense 
of the antecedent, but that their specifications are not related in any 
other way. Example: 
( 6-13) John liked bananas. He asked Mary for one. 
When several candidates are suggested at once , tests ( 1) to (3) in turn are 
applied lo all of them together, and the first candidate to satisfy a test is 
accepted. Initial indications are that this approach leads to correct results; 
however, it has not been thoroughly tested. 
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Indefinite pronouns in phrases of the form "<lndefinitePronoun> of <NP>" 
are not dealt with by the above mechanism; instead, they are treated as 
parasitic. Thus in 
(6-14) Wendy examined the T-shirts on the table. She picked one of 
them up. 
the "them" is resolved as a normal definite pronoun, and the "one" is then 
assumed to specify a member of whatever set is specified by "them". 
SPAR's treatment of plural definite pronouns removes some indeterminacy in 
Sidner's rules. In section 2.2.1 we saw that a plural pronoun may cospecify 
several items in the text that have not been mentioned together in syntactic 
construction. For plural pronouns, Sidner's rules at various points make 
suggestions such as "predict from DF and PDF together". However, this does 
not mean that the suggested specification is necessarily composed of all the 
DF and PDF items. When resolving the pronoun in 
(6-15) John met Mary in the park. A policeman saw them, 
the aggregate of the D.F and PDF is John, Mary, the park and the meeting 
event. All of these can be seen by a policeman, yet we understand "them" as 
meaning only "John and Mary". Thus as well as the semantic preferences 
imposed by the pronoun and the role(s) it fills, there seems to be a tendency 
to construct "group" specifications from entities of the same semantic 
category (in some broad sense). In SPAR this tendency is encoded as a 
stipulation that the members of a group must have the same head primitive . 
Since in the first sentence of (6-15) only John and Mary have the same head 
primitive (MAN, whereas those of "park" and "meet" are SPREAD and SENSE 
respectively), "them" is understood as John and Mary. The rule 'that head 
primitives of group members must be the same works well, although in some 
cases it fails, for example in 
(6-16) John took the dog for a walk in the park. A policeman saw 
them. 
where "John" has head primitive MAN and "dog" has head primitive BEAST. 
(Although both MAN and BEAST are subsumed by the starred primitive •ANI, 
starred primitives are in most cases too general to give sufficient 
discrimination, even though in this particular case their use in place of 
ordinary primitives would give the right answer). 
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6 .2.3 Assessing candidate antecedents 
In Sidner's framework, inference is invoked both in "normal mode". to decide 
whether accepting a single suggested antecedent for an anaphor would lead to 
a contradiction, and in "special mode ", to decide between two candidates 
judged equally focussed by the PI rules . Although Sidner recognises that the 
inference mechanisms for the two modes may be quite different, she does not 
attempt to state in detail what inference mechanisms and types of knowledge 
( e.g. linguistic or non-linguistic, analytically true or uncertain) may be 
appropriate for, on the one hand, detecting a contradiction (that is, complete 
implausibility), and on the other hand, choosing between candidates. 5 
However, it seems clear that a genuine contradiction can be established only 
by the use of definitional (linguistic) knowledge and analytically true 
inferences; if any non-analytic, uncertain inferences are made, then an 
apparent contradiction may be due to those inferences being incorrect. 
Because SPAR uses preference semantics, it is necessary to decide which of 
the criteria Wilks used to resolve pronouns qualify as purely linguistic and/or 
analytic. Only these criteria should be used in Sidner's normal mode . For 
present purposes, Wilks' pronoun resolution strategy, which was introduced in 
chapter 1, can be summarised as follows: 
Follow the steps below until only one candidate survives. 
( 1) Collect candidates and match them with the pronoun. 
(2) Apply preference restrictions to case fillers : e.g. "drink" prefers a 
liquid object. 
(3) "Extract" new templates from old using analytic inference rules, 
and try to match new templates to bind the pronoun. 
(4) Apply non-analytic CSI rules to derive new templates, and try to 
match them to bind the pronoun. 
These four stages represent a progression from very strong, analytic criteria 
to weaker, non-analytic ones. Stages ( 1) and (2) are purely linguistic, and can 
therefore safely be used in normal mode inference, while stage (4) is 
5 Clearly normal mode must be a component of special mode in the sense that 
if the PI rules present two candidates and demand special mode inference, the 
special mode inference mechanism should first invoke normal mode inference 
on each one and only proceed further if they are both approved. The issue 
here is, rather, whether some types of reasoning and knowledge appropriate 
for special mode inference proper are inappropriate for normal mode. 
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non-analytic and therefore unsafe. Since extractions (stage (3)) represent 
analytically true consequences of existing facts, it might be thought that they 
too are appropriate for normal mode. However, closer examination reveals 
that although making the extractions is analytic, matching them with one 
another to detect contradictions would not be. For example, for the text 
( 6-1 7) [ 1] Bill stayed at home. 
[2] John went to London. 
[3] Then he travelled from Birmingham to Cambridge, 
Sidner's PI rules would first suggest John as the referent of "he". If normal 
mode inference involved the search for contradictory chains composed of 
extractions, the system would correctly deduce that after [2] John was 
definitely in London, and that before [3] John (temporarily identified with 
"he") was definitely in Birmingham. Since being in Birmingham is 
incompatible with being in London, a contradiction would be detected when 
these two extractions were matched. John would be rejected as referent, and 
the PI rules would suggest Bill instead. Since Bill's home . could be in 
Birmingham, no contradiction would result, and Bill would be accepted. 
However the more natural interpretation of (6-17) is that between events [2] 
and [3], John travelled from London to Birmingham. In other words, the focus 
preference of John over Bill is strong enough to resist any apparent 
contradictions based on extractions, because completing an inference chain 
can involve making an uncertain assumption (in this case, that John stayed 
put between [2] and [3]). Thus the use of extractions is inappropriate in 
normal mode inference, and is confined in SPAR to special mode inference. 
In normal mode inference, therefore, SPAR uses only knowledge corresponding 
to Wilks' criteria ( 1) and (2) in deciding whether to reject candidates. 
Candidates are assessed using the structure matcher described in chapter 4. 
Case filler preferences detected by criterion (2) have already been applied 
during construction of the current fragment. Such preferences are important 
in restricting the range of possible specifications for very general pronouns 
like "it" and "they". For example in 
(6-18) I bought the wine. I sat on a rock. I drank it, 
SPAR correctly rejects the AR rules' suggestion of the rock as the referent of 
"it" because the "drink" formula restricts "it" to matching a liquid. The 
subsequent suggestion of the wine is, however , accepted. 
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But there are situations where a suggested antecedent leads not to a logical 
contradiction but to an interpretation so bizarre that it should be rejected. 
SPAR's structure matcher cannot detect such cases, and is therefore 
occasionally too permissive in approving candidate antecedents . However the 
fact that the structure matcher judges a candidate antecedent acceptable 
does not always mean that that antecedent will ultimately be accepted. We will 
see in section 6.4 that consideration of sentential candidate antecedents and 
of the interactions between anaphors can result in the AR rules' conclusions 
being revised or refined. For example in 
(6-19) I took my dog to the vet on Friday. He bit him in the hand. 
the structure matcher does not detect the oddness of accepting the vet as 
referent of "he"; it only knows that animate entities can bite, and not that it 
would be bizarre for a vet to bite his patients. (In fact, since "him" may not 
have been resolved, the system might not be able to detect the oddness even if 
it knew that vets do not bite patients). However, the suggestion that "he" 
specifies the vet is ultimately rejected because "him" can only specify the vet 
(since, according to the formula for "hand", only humans have hands) and the 
MGC (minimal governing category) configurational constraint states that "he" 
and "him" cannot cospecify. SPAR's processing of this text will be described 
more fully in section 6.4. 
Thus the use of linguistic knowledge alone for normal mode inference in SPAR 
is justified quite independently of the shallow processing hypothesis . In a 
shallow processing approach we want to avoid using world knowledge whenever 
it is safe to do so; but it turns out that not only is :~ safe to ignore world 
knowledge in normal mode inference, it is actually not safe to do anything 
else. 
Common sense inference is, however, clearly necessary for specie).! mode 
inference . In SPAR, when the pronoun rules demand special mode inference, 
CSI is not invoked immediately; instead, the alternative predictions involved 
are all returned as the result of the pronoun rule application. This is 
necessary because, as section 6.4 will show, CSI and the other criteria relevant 
to choosing between alternative predictions are best applied to the sentence 
as a whole rather than to each individual anaphor in it. SPAR thus invokes CSI 
at most once per reading of a sentence, and postpones invocation as long as 
possible in the hope that applying other, linguistic criteria will make it 
unnecessary. 
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6 .3 Intrasentential candidate antecedents 
As we saw in the last chapter, Sidner's PI rules do not deal with intrasentential 
candidate (ISC) antecedents for pronouns. However, sentential 
cospecification is very common in most kinds of text, including simple stories, 
and so Sidner's framework must be extended in SPAR to deal with it. In this 
section, I will argue that this should be done not by inserting extra 
suggestions in the PI rules but by temporarily augmenting the contents of the 
focus registers. First, however, a potentially serious ordering problem must 
be disposed of. 
6.3.1 When an antecedent is important 
In chapter 2 we defined an antecedent as a phrase whose meaning must be 
taken into account to correctly interpret an anaphor with which it has a 
cohesive relationship. Therefore in 
(6-20) [ 1] John bought a new car the other day. 
[2] He also bought a television. 
[3] The car was so unreliable that he soon wished he'd never 
set eyes on it. 
the phrase "a new car" is the antecedent of "the car", and both of the phrases 
"a new car" and "the car" are antecedents of "it", because knowing their 
meaning (John's new c,ar) is essential to determining the meaning of "it" .6 
Analogous observations hold for the underlined phrases in 
(6-21) [ 1] John bought a new car the other day. 
[2] He also bought a television. 
[3] It was so unreliable that he soon wished he'd never set 
eyes on it. 
The fact that ari anaphor may itself be the antecedent of another anaphor in 
the same sentence seems at first to present a serious coordination problem. 
How can we evaluate the plausibility of a candidate antecedent until we know 
what the candidate itself specifies; or, alternatively, how can we decide in 
6It is not claimed that both antecedents must be considered when "it" is being 
resolved; merely that their (shared) meaning must be considered. 
Nevertheless, both phrases are antecedents according to our cohesion-based 
defini lion. 
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advance in what order to resolve the anaphors in a sentence so that we are 
never faced with an unresolved candidate antecedent? Linear ordering is 
inadequate because of the possibility of cataphora; however, some solution to 
this problem is essential for the proper treatment of intrasentential 
anaphora. 
My answer is that when the AR rules suggest candidates for assessment, 
certain kinds of intrasentential antecedence can be ignored, and that 
consequently there is an ordering for anaphor resolution which effectively 
guarantees that, except for certain, hopefully rare, cases to be discussed, 
unresolved candidate antecedents never arise. 
To see this, note that there is an important difference between the texts 
(6-20) and (6-21) . In both, after [2], the television is more focussed than the 
car. In (6-20), the phrase "the car" in [3] brings the car back into focus so 
that "it" is able to specify it. In (6-21), the first "it" has little or no effect on 
the state of focus, since the television is already strongly focussed; the fact 
that the first "it" is interpreted as specifying the television is therefore 
largely irrelevant, in focussing terms, to the fact that the second "it" is also 
so interpreted. These claims can be verified by observing what happens to the 
interpretation of the (final) "it" when the words "(the car/it) was so 
unreliable that" are deleted from each text. In (6-20), the interpretation 
switches from the car to the television, whereas in (6-21) it remains 
unchanged. 
In extending Sidner's rules to deal with intrasentential antecedents, we 
therefore need to take account of cases like (6-20) but not cases like (6-21). 
That is, considering for the moment only definite anaphors and not 
descriptional ones, an intrasentential antecedent is only important (a) if it 
introduces a new element, or (b) if it makes an existing but not very focussed 
(or unfocussed) element more focussed so that the anaphor is able to specify 
it where it would not otherwise be able to. But case (b) can in fact only occur 
when the antecedent is more informative than the anaphor: i.e. in texts like 
(6-20) but not in texts like (6-21). 
Thus since definite pronouns are minimally informative and never introduce 
Subsection 6.3.1 124 
I 
II 
I 
11 
i 
new elements.7 the only cases of possible intrasentential antecedence we need 
to consider are 
( 1) where neither the anaphor nor the possible antecedent is a 
definite pronoun, and the antecedent is strictly more informative; 
and 
(2) where the anaphor is a definite pronoun and the possible 
antecedent is not. 
Therefore, if we always resolve more informative non-pronominal anaphors 
before less informative, and full NPs before definite pronouns, any potentially 
important ISCs (intrasentential candidates) will already have been resolved by 
the time they are considered. SPAR's structure matcher (see 4.3.2) can 
determine whether one anaphor is more informative than another by 
matching their TMN nodes with the information constraint switched on. 
How does descriptional anaphora (in Halliday and Hasan's terms, nominal 
substitution or ellipsis) fit into this picture? On the one hand, a descriptional 
anaphor (e.g. '"one" or "a red one") can introduce or make focussed a new 
entity which acts as the -antecedent of a definite pronoun, either anaphorically 
or cataphorically: 
(6-23a) John sold his old car. He bought a new one and drove it 
away. 
(6-23b) John has two cars. When he bought it, the newer one was 
faster. 
On the other hand, sucl;i a phrase can itself be either anaphoric or cataphoric 
(at the level of sense rather than specification): 
( 6-24a) Before I bought a new car, I never realised how noisy my old 
one was. 
(6-24b) Before I bought a new one, I never realised how noisy my old 
car was. 
It is thus necess·ary to resolve such anaphors after full NPs and before definite 
pronouns. The ordering adopted in SPAR is therefore the following: 
( 1) Full NPs, with more informative before less informative, and 
otherwise in textual order; 
7Definite pronouns occasionally mention an element for the first time, as in 
(6-22) I went to a concert last night. Ihey played Beethoven's Fifth. 
However, such elements are not obviously new; the existence of the orchestra 
is quite strongly implied by the use of "concert". 
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(2) Descriptional anaphors; 
(3) Definite pronouns. 
An anaphor (in the strict, i.e. non-cataphoric sense) relating to its antecedent 
by associated or inferred specification (see 5.4.2) will be correctly dealt with 
by this ordering. However problems will arise for associated or inferred 
cataphora, as in 
(6-25) Someone has removed the indicators from my car. 
(where the cataphor "the indicators" relates to "my car" by inferred 
specification), if the car has not been previously mentioned. No such 
cataphors arise in the texts SPAR has processed. To deal with them properly, 
the system could perhaps include some tentative intrasentential anaphor (and 
cataphor) resolution during TMN construction. However, how the results of 
such processing could be integrated with the results of the subsequent .main 
anaphor resolution phase remains to be worked out. 
6 .3.2 Two ways to extend Sidner's algorithms 
How should consideration of ISCs be incorporated into Sidner's framework? 
Perhaps the most obvious possibility is to insert extra rules; thus if originally 
the PI rules predicted the DF (discourse focus), and then the PDFs (potential 
discourse foci), we might enlarge the rule set to predict ISCs in between these 
two . However, there are at least two reasons why this is a bad idea. 
The first reason is that much of the complexity in Sidner's rules is due to the 
existence of two independent types of focus register (discourse and actor); so 
introducing a third independent source of predictions (the intrasentential 
one) would, if thoroughly carried through, make the complexity far worse. 
The second reason is that focus preferences between contextual and 
intrasentential candidates are, as we will see in more detail below, very hard to 
establish, and so extra rules would be difficult to formulate. When resolving a 
non-agent pronoun, Sidner's rules strongly prefer the DF to PDFs: that is , 
PDFs are only considered if normal mode inference decides that the DF is 
implausible. However, it would not be safe for the rules to prefer the DF over 
ISCs (or vice versa) in the same strong way. If such preferences exist, they are 
weak (i.e. secondary to the results of special mode inference - see 5.4.3); thus 
the first rule for non-agent pronouns would have to say something like 
"suggest the DF and (some) ISCs together, performing special mode inference 
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if more than one is acceptable , and preferring the DF only if special mode 
inference is inconclusive". 
Since we are forced to consider contextual and intrasentential candidates in 
the same rule, an alternative approach suggests itself: to temporarily augment 
the focus registers themselves , and apply Sidner's rules with only the few 
necessary modifications. The register contents can be augmented with ISCs so 
as to reflect any weak preferences (for example, we might add ISCs to the 
beginning of the PDF list rather than to the end) , and the rule s themse lve s can 
remain virtually unaltered. In this way, Sidner's framework can be e x tend e d 
to cover ISCs without any great increase in complexity. 
6 .3.3 Augmenting the focus registers 
Given that Sidner's rules reflect weak and strong focus preferences between 
contextual candidates (i.e . the various actual, potential and stacked foci), 
what analogous preferences hold between different ISCs and between 
intrasentential and contextual candidates? In 5.3.2 we looked at the 
algorithms of Winograd, Hobbs, and Guenthner and Lehmann. All three 
algorithms preferred intrasentential to contextual candidates and (with minor 
exceptions in Hobbs' case) anaphora to cataphora, subjects to objects and 
objects to oblique cases. Conversely, Sidner leans towards favouring the DF 
(which is contextual) over ISCs . 
None of these authors claim that their preference rules are always correct; 
and indeed, Cantrall [ 1975] found in a psycholinguistic experiment that "lest 
subjects differed idiosyncratically in their tendencies to determine 
co referents in each of the following ways, at least: grammatical function, 
relational function , order, distance, relative position in the utterance, and 
pitch, not to mention perception (and indeed creation) of 'semantic' 
associations". Thus there is unlikely to be any complete and correct set of 
preferences, whether expressible in Sidner's framework or not; and even if 
there is, finding them would be very difficult because of all the complicating 
factors. The best that can be hoped for is a set of preferences, like Hobbs ' , 
that works most. of the time; and these preferences should be used only as a 
last resort. (Indeed, we will see in section 6.4 that it is usually possible to 
avoid using them). 
But having said that, one strong preference does seem to exist. ISCs are 
strongly preferable to candidates not mentioned in either the current 
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sentence or the previous sentence; that is, they should be predicted before 
stacked foci are considered. We therefore only need to consider what weak 
preferences hold between ISCs and current and potential foci (and of course 
other ISCs). 
A useful starting point for establishing such preferences is Hobbs' algorithm, 
which is fully specified and has been shown to be quite accurate . This 
algorithm is used in SPAR to impose a weak ordering on ISCs. The way these 
ordered candidates are added to the focus registers is determined by 
procedures based on the following observations: 
(1) Since the default action in a text seems to be to maintain the 
focus rather than switch to a new one, the DF is preferred weakly to 
ISCs. Sidner [ 1979b] notes that the DF (Bruce) is preferred for "his" 
in the following: 
(6-26) [ 1] I want to have a meeting this week. 
[2] Bruce will be the guest lecturer. 
[3] He will speak on slavery in ant colonies. 
[ 4] Mike wants to read his report before the talk. 
But we can see that this preference is only weak by changing [ 4] to 
[ 4'] Mike wants to invite his friends to the talk. 
Here it more likely that Mike wants to invite his own friends than that 
he wants to invite Bruce's , but the latter is not impossible . 
(2) On the other hand, an ISC occurring before the anaphor is 
marginally preferable to a potential focus. In 
(6-27) [ 1] Mary arrived at the club with John. 
[2] Susan was telling Bill's sister all about his 
behaviour the previous evening. 
where John becomes both PAF (potential actor focus) and PDF after 
[ 1], there is perhaps a slight preference for Bill, rather than John, as 
referent of "his". 
(3) However, cataphora (i.e. an ISC after the anaphor) is less plausible 
than cospecifying with a potential focus, at least in children's stories; 
consider for example 
(6-28) [1] Mary arrived at the club with John. 
[2] Susan was telling his sister all about Bill's 
behaviour the previous evening. 
where this time John is the weakly preferred referent of "his". 
Thus if strong preference is marked by">>" and weak preference by ">", the 
situation may be summarised as follows . Without ISCs, Sidner's rules (for 
"normal" pronouns) essentially stipulate the preferences 
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(6-29) DF >> PDF >> DF stack 
However, observations ( 1) to (3) suggest that when ISCs are considered, the 
preferences become 
(6-30) DF > pre-anaphor ISC > PDF > post-anaphor ISC >> DF stack 
The examples given are far from conclusive, and there are other, stronger, 
relevant factors, some of which are analysed in section 6.4 below. However, in 
accordance with (6-30), SPAR's focus registers are temporarily augmenled as 
follows jusl before the AR (anaphor resolution) rules are applied lo a pronoun . 
( 1) Apply Hobbs' algorithm (slightly allered) 8 to derive an ordered list 
of ISCs. 
(2) If the current pronoun could consistently (according to the 
structure matcher) specify the DF, then append those ISCs preceding 
the pronoun to the DF register (so we now may have several discourse 
foci). If the current pronoun cannot specify the DF, append 
preceding ISCs not to the DF, but onto the front of the PDF list. This 
apparently ad-hoe behaviour follows from the observations above 
that while the DF is· strongly preferred to PDFs, the DF is only weakly 
preferred to pre-anaphor ISCs, which in turn are only weakly 
preferred to PDFs (see (6-29) and (6-30)). 
In either case, append those preceding candidates which are animate 
to the actor focus register (so we may now have several actor foci). 
(3) Append those ISCs following the pronoun to the PDF list and 
(when animate) to the PAF list. 
When applied to "his" in (6-28) above, the results would be as follows. At the 
end of [ 1], we have 
DF = Mary 
AF = Mary 
PDF = the club, John, the arrival 
PAF = John-
Hobbs ' algorithm returns the candidates Susan, Bill's behaviour, the previous 
8Hobbs' algorithm as published [1976] does not predict all possible cataphoric 
candidates; it ignores those which cannot be reached from the anaphor node 
wilhout going down through an S or NP node. In [2] of (6-28) above, the "Bill" 
NP node can only be reached from "his" by passing down though the "Bill's 
behaviour" NP node that dominates it, and so is ignored. In SPAR, any 
cataphoric candidates not reached by Hobbs' algorithm are appended in 
textual order to the list of those reached. 
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evening, and Bill, in that order. On applying steps (2) and (3) of the algorithm, 
we get 
DF = Mary, Susan 
AF = Mary, Susan 
PDF = the club, John, the arrival, Bill's behaviour, the previous evening, Bill 
PAF = John, Bill 
Thus John precedes Bill in the PDF list, and is accordingly weakly preferred as 
referent of "his" . 
6.4 Interactions between anaphors 
Many of the factors that influence anaphor interpretation are constraints or 
preferences not on the interpretation of single anaphors in isolation but on 
the relationships between their interpretations. A syntactic constraint such 
as Reinhart's c-cornmand rule says nothing about what an individual anaphor 
may or may not specify; rather, it says that given pairs of noun phrases 
cannot cospecify. A completed Wilksian CSI chain typically binds several 
pronouns rather than one; accepting the chain as valid means we must accept 
all its bindings as correct. Factors such as c-cornmand and CSI which apply to 
several anaphors at a time will be called collective; factors such as semantic 
compatibility and those aspects of focussing embodied in the AR rules will be 
called distributive. 
SPAR uses distributive factors, encoded in the AR rules, to constrain the 
interpretation of each anaphor to a small number of alternatives; it then uses 
as many of the collective factors to be described in this section as are 
necessary to reduce the number of alternative interpretations per anaphor to 
one. When several alternative interpretations for an anaphor have been 
suggested by the AR rules and not yet eliminated, we will say that that 
anaphor is undetermined. The part of SPAR that integrates the predictions of 
the distributive AR rules with those of subsequently-applied collective factors 
is the arbitrator . 
With one exception (syntactic constraints) collective factors are weaker than 
distributive ones, and therefore the arbitrator does not allow collective 
factors other than syntactic constraints to overturn the distributive factors' 
decisions altogether; they can only further constrain them. 
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The collective criteria SPAR uses are discussed in the order of their 
application: strongest to weakest. Thus subsection 6.4.1 concerns syntactic 
constraints, 6.4.2 describes the use (but not the operation) of CSI, and 6.4.3 
discusses three weaker preference criteria. 
6.4.1 Applying syntactic constraints 
When the AR rules have terminated, the first collective factor invoked, in fact 
whether or not there are any undetermined anaphors, is that of syntactic 
constraints. Approximations to Reinhart's c-command and MGC constraints 
(see section 2.4) are applied to detect mutually inconsistent predictions for 
different anaphors. For the text 
(6-31) I took my dog to the vet on Friday. He bit him in the hand. 
the AR rules predict that "he" is either the dog or the vet, and "him" is the vet 
(since, according to the formula for "hand", only people have hands). The 
MGC rule tells SPAR that the predictions "he=vet" and "him=vet" are 
inconsistent, since the two pronouns have the same MGC (the topmost S node) 
and are non-reflexive. The arbitrator rejects the "he=vet" prediction because 
it has an alternative (he=dog) whereas "him=vet" does not. Similarly, for 
(6-32) I took my dog to the vet on Friday. He injected him with a 
new medicine. 
the AR rules predict that "he" is the vet (not the dog, since animals cannot 
perform injections) and "him" is either the dog or the vet. This time it is the 
"him=vet" prediction that arbitrator rules out on the basis of the MGC 
constraint. In these two texts, as in many others, syntactic constraints are 
sufficient for the arbitrator to determine all anaphors and therefore make CSI 
unnecessary. 
As in our two · examples, the arbitrator always displaces predictions with 
alternatives in favour of those without. If two clashing predictions both have 
alternatives, nothing is done for the time being, because neither is clearly 
wrong . Occasionally, however, neither prediction in a clash has an alternative, 
and more drasti_c action is required; the AR rules must have terminated too 
soon on at least one of the anaphors involved. In such cases, the AR rules are 
reapplied lo those anaphors, starling from where they terminated before, in 
order to generate some further, alternative predictions. If this does not solve 
the problem, it is assumed that one or both of the anaphors is unresolvable, 
and the current reading is rejected. If all readings are rejected the sentence 
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is ignored. (When all readings are rejected, it is usually because a wrong 
decision has been made earlier in the text; in chapter 10 I will suggest ways in 
which SPAR could be made to go back and correct such errors). 
How can the c-command and MGC rules, which are both stated in terms of 
surface syntax, be applied accurately to pieces of the TMN? In practice it is 
usually possible to apply them because, as we saw in chapter 4, case 
relationships between explicit TMN nodes are nearly isomorphic to those in the 
analyser dependency structure from which they originated, and the 
dependency structure is sufficiently shallow for relevant aspects of the shape 
of the corresponding surface syntactic parse tree to be determined quite 
reliably. Almost every noun-arg in the dependency structure corresponds to 
an NP node, and almost every clause (other than adjectival relatives, which 
can be recognised) corresponds to an S node. Further, it is usually true that, 
for active voice sentences, an AGENT case link corresponds to a syntactic 
subject, OBJECT and RECIPIENT links to syntactic objects, and all other case links 
to noun-args to prepositional objects . 
The relationship between dependency structures and surface syntactic trees 
is not always as straightforward as these assumptions suggest, and syntactic 
relationships can perhaps never be decided with complete certainty on the 
basis of one of Boguraev's dependency structures. However, no problems have 
been encountered in this area in the texts SPAR has processed, and in any 
case the difficulty is of no theoretical importance to the present work. 
Rather, it is an indication to builders of sentence analysers that if, as seems 
likely, constraints such as c-command are real and act at the level of surface 
syntax, then certain aspects of surface syntactic structure should be 
preserved in the sentence representation if anaphors may have to be resolved 
later. 
6.4.2 Incorporating the results of common sense inference 
Syntactic constraints are often sufficient to remove any indeterminacy in the 
results of the AR rules and make CSI (i.e. Sidner's special mode inference) 
unnecessary. However, if any anaphors remain undetermined, and/or if more 
than one sentence reading survives (i .e . if the processing performed up to this 
point has not revealed any differences in semantic density or ease of anaphor 
resolution), CSI is invoked. In the former case, any chains it completes will be 
a source of predictions which should enable anaphors to be fully determined; 
in the latter case, completed chains are some indication that the current 
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reading fits in well with context and should be preferred over other readings. 
The functioning of the CSI mechanism, and the way it is simplified and made 
more reliable by being constrained by focussing, will be described fully in 
chapter 8. For the moment, we are only concerned with the CSI mechanism's 
input and output and the way these relate to the overall anaphor resolution 
process. 
When CSI is invoked, it is handed a set of undetermined anaphors (or, if 
inference is only taking place because of the existence of competing rea dings, 
the pronouns in the current sentence) and their possible specifications as 
determined by the AR rules. CSI returns an ordered list of predictions, each 
prediction resulting from a completed chain and consisting of a set of 
anaphor-candidate bindings. The application of CSI rules is constrained by 
the sets of anaphors and candidate specifications initially handed to the CSI 
mechanism, so that most bindings will involve only members of those sets. 
The fact that a completed chain typically binds several anaphors to 
antecedents means that CSI is collective and not distributive. If CSI is treated 
distributively - that is, if the AR rules are able to invoke it to resolve a single 
pronoun - several problems arise. Suppose the current sentence is "He hit 
him", and the referents John and Bill are suggested for "he". Suppose further 
that the system knows that John hates James and can infer that hating 
someone can motivate hitting them. If CSI is invoked while "he" is being 
resolved, the system cannot decide whether to accept a chain binding "he" to 
John and "him" to James without knowing whether the AR rules will predict 
James as referent of "him": i.e . whether James is sufficiently in focus . 
Furthermore, invoking CSI separately for each anaphor can be inefficient, as 
the inferences made on each occasion may overlap significantly. These 
problems are avoided if CSI is only invoked after the AR rules have terminated 
on all anaphors. 
Of the predictions returned by CSI, the arbitrator only accepts those 
consistent with the results of the AR rules. Thus if in a given text, the AR rules 
had decided that some pronoun "he" specified either John or Bill. then a CSI 
prediction binding "he" to Bill would be acceptable (as long as its other 
bindings were also satisfactory) but one binding "he" to Fred would not be. 
This filtering of CSI predictions lakes place because CSI is used only lo choose 
between candidates for which focus has no strong preferences, and not to 
generate suggestions itself. This limitation on the role of CSI, and the 
resultant easing of its task, is one of the main attractions of Sidner's theory. 
Subsection 6.4.2 133 
When two CSI predictions are mutually inconsistent (e .g. if they bind the same 
pronoun to different antecedents or if together they would break a syntactic 
constraint), the arbitrator rejects the one constructed from a longer, and 
therefore less reliable, chain of inferences. If the chain lengths are the same, 
both predictions are provisionally accepted; the clash will be resolved by the 
"MCS" mechanism explained below. 
The way the arbitrator combines the predictions of the AR rules, syntactic 
constraints and CSI is illustrated for the third sentence of the example text 
presented in chapter 1, repeated here in part: 
(6-33) [1]. JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT HE WOULD MEND HIS CAR. 
JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT JOHN WOULD REPAIR BILL'S CAR. 
[2]. HE TOOK IT TO HIS FRIEND'S GARAGE 
TO JOHN'S FRIEND'S GARAGE, JOHN CONVEYED THE CAR. 
[3]. HE TRIED TO PERSUADE HIS FRIEND THAT HE SHOULD LEND HIM SOME TOOLS. 
JOHN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE JOHN'S FRIEND THAT THAT FRIEND SHOULD LOAN 
JOHN SOME REPAIR IMPLEMENTS. 
When [3] is processed, the AR rules find that both "he's" and the "him" are 
ambiguous between John and his friend; Bill is not considered since he is out 
of focus . The c-command constraint rules out the possibility of the first "he" 
cospecifying with "his friend"; the arbitrator therefore rejects this possibility 
and firmly resolves the first "he" as John. The MGC constraint prevents the 
second "he" and "him" from cospecifying. This fact is remembered, but since 
both pronouns are still ambiguous, the arbitrator cannot firmly resolve either 
of them yet. CSI is therefore invoked. 
Rather than reasoning, as a more powerful inferencer might, that "him" is 
John because John is likely to want tools to mend the car, CSI simply predicts 
that "him" and the first "he" cospecify, using a shallower, more general rule 
stating that people are more likely to want to possess things themselves than 
to want other people to possess them. Since the arbitrator has already 
decided that the first "he" is John, it decides that "him" is also John and not 
the friend. 
Now that "him" is firmly resolved as John, the arbitrator is able to apply the 
constraint that the second "he" and "him" (=John) do not cospecify. IL rules 
out the possibility that the second "he" is John, and selects the friend as the 
referent. 
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In many cases, as in this one, the arbitrator is able to resolve any 
undetermined anaphors using only the predictions of the AR rules, syntactic 
constraints and possibly CSL Any wrong predictions made by CSI will usually 
be rejected because they are inconsistent with other, more reliable 
predictions. However, the results of CSI are sometimes incomplete rather 
than (or as well as) wrong: that is , CSI can make errors of omission (failing to 
bind anaphors) as well as errors of commission (attempting to bind anaphors 
to the wrong candidates) . When this happens, further processing, which will 
now be described, is necessary. 
6.4.3 Some further collective criteria 
The techniques discussed up to this point are all quite r e liable in the sense 
that any answers they provide are, if accepted by the arbitrator, very likely to 
be correct. However, because of the limited power of the CSI mechanism, some 
anaphors remain undetermined even after CSL What preference criteria can 
we use to make intelligent choices in such situations? Sidner's rules provide 
weak heuristics for this purpose, but we saw in section 6.3 that neither 
Sidner's nor anyone else's weak distributive heuristics are reliable enough to 
be used except as a last resort. It is therefore important to formulate, if 
possible, some collective criteria which, although less reliable than the factors 
we have looked at so far, are n evertheless stronger than weak distributive 
heuristics . 
Once the arbitrator has applied the results of CSI to the set of existing 
predictions, hopefully reducing the size of that set, SPAR finds the maximal 
consistent subse ts (MCSs) of the set, and uses up to three colle ctive criteria 
(in addition to the configurational contraints and CSI already discussed) in 
succession9 to choose between them. Thus if for the text 
(6-34) John spoke to Bill. He hit him 
CSI failed to complete any chains, the set of predictions would be (in simplified 
form) 
9I have not experimented with any orderings of the criteria other than the 
on es d escribed here. The order presented here is motivated by the appare nt 
usefulness of the criteria on the stories SPAR has processed. However, in 
those storie s it is unusual for more than one of the criteria to apply in a given 
situation; the ordering may therefore not be very important. 
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fhe=John, he=Bill, him=John, him=BillJ . 
Because the MGC constraint prevents the two pronouns from cospecifying, the 
arbitrator finds two maximal consistent subsets: 
(MCSl) fhe=John, him=Billl 
(MCS2) fhe=Bill, him=John! 
The first criterion used to choose between MCS 's is that of repetition. This can 
be viewed as an attempt, at a very shallow level, to detect certain kinds of 
coherence relation. For every explicit TMN node in the current fragment for 
which the AR rules made no suggestions (including clausal nodes, to which 
they were not applied), a fuzzy "repetition match" is carried out with explicit 
nodes in the "context" (non-current-fragment) part of the TMN. This match 
does not attempt to establish possible cospecification, but merely tries to pair 
off nodes with similar senses. Each successful match is assigned a score which 
depends on how recent the context node is and how close (in the WSN) the 
word senses of the paired nodes are to one another. 10 When the repetition 
criterion is applied to choose between competing MCS's, the weight given to an 
MCS is the sum of the weights of repetition matches involving pairings in that 
MCS. Thus if (6-34) occurred in a text after it had been stated that John hit 
someone, the repetition match of the "hit" node in (6-34) with that for the 
earlier "hit" action would pair "he" with John. On application of the repetition 
criterion, MCSl would pick up some points from this match and MCS2 would 
not; the arbitrator would therefore prefer MCSl. More intuitively, we might 
say that SPAR reasons that if it has been told about John hitting someone, 
then in the absence of any other indications (which CSI might be expected to 
pick up) he is more than averagely likely, and therefore more likely than Bill, 
to do it again . 
Re petition matching can also be seen as a rudimentary attempt to take 
account of the discourse topic of a story. In the remainder of text (6-33) , the 
beginning of wqich we looked at above, repetition matching is the deciding 
factor in resolving the three underlined anaphors. 
lOThe exact way in which this score is calculated is somewhat ad-hoe; 
however, the underlying principle seems sound. 
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[1] John promised Bill that he would mend his car. 
[2] He took it to his friend's garage. 
[3] He tried to persuade his friend that he should lend him some tools. 
[ 4] His friend said that he was not allowed to lend tools . 
[5] John asked his friend to suggest someone from whom he could 
borrow tools . 
[ 6] His friend did not answer. 
[7] Fulfilling his promises was important to John. 
[8] He was angry. 
[9] He left. 
In [ 4] and [5], the repetition criterion favours John rather than his friend 
because sentence [3] mentions tools being lent to John (the " him" in [3] being 
decided by CSI) . In [7] , John is favoured again because sentence [ 1] talked 
about John's promise. In all three cases, the pronoun could be resolved by a 
sufficiently powerful inference mechanism; however, the fact that the 
essentially linguistic repetition criterion is able to arrive at the same answers 
by quite different means is evidence for the shallow processing hypothesis. 
If the repetition criterion does not select one MCS as superior, the second 
criterion applied is that of focus retention. The default action in any text 
would seem to be to maintain the focus: that is, to continue to talk about the 
same thing rather than to keep switching between foci. SPAR therefore 
calculates what the new discourse focus would be if each of the competing 
MCS's were approved. Those which would maintain the discourse focus are 
preferred . (No analogous preference seems to exist for maintaining the actor 
focus). 
In the absence of appropriate CSI (here, perhaps taking the form of script 
application) the focus reter,,tion criterion provides correct decisions in 
(6-35) [ 1] John went to a restaurant. 
[2] He asked the waiter for a curry. 
[3] He ate it. 
[ 4] He paid the cashier. 
[5] He left. 
For the underlined pronouns, Sidner's rules indicate an ambiguity between 
actor f;cus (John) and potential actor focus (the waiter and the cashier 
r e spectively) whi_ch may be resolved by CSL However, if CSI fails , the pronouns 
can still be resolved by noting that only if they are resolved to "John" will the 
discourse focus (John) be maintained. 
If the focus retention criterion is insufficient, a third criterion, the 
c-commanded pronoun (CCP) criterion, is applied. This criterion acts to 
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prefer the MCS in which the greatest number of pronouns are c-commanded 
by a cospecifying noun phrase ( either full or pronominal). Thus if none of the 
earlier, more powerful factors were effective, the CCP criterion would resolve 
the "his" in 
(6-36) On his arrival, John realised that Bill was drunk. 
to John rather than Bill, because the NP node for "John" c-commands that for 
''his", while that for "Bill" does not. 
The reasoning behind the CCP criterion is based on the same Grice-derived 
principle that Reinhart used (see section 2 .4) to reformulate the c-command 
constraint: "if a speaker has the means to express a certain idea clearly and 
directly, he would not arbitrarily choose a less clear way to express it ". Thus 
when a pronoun still appears ambiguous after the application of every other 
knowledge source available, the hearer may assume that the speaker did not 
have any clearer way to express it: in other words, that the speaker did not 
have the option of using a non-pronoun. And the most obvious reason why the 
speake r would not have had that option is that had he used it, he would (under 
his intended interpretation) have broken the c-command constraint and 
thereby misled his hearer. Therefore it is likely that the pronoun in question 
is c-commanded by a cospecifying phrase of some kind. 
Although this argument is similar in form to Reinhart's, it is quite independent 
of it in content. It relies only on the fact that the c-command constraint has 
been observed to be highly accurate and very strong; this fact is independent 
of Reinhart's explanation of it. 
This motivated (although possibly incomplete) set of three collective criteria -
repetition, focus retention and CCP - is usually capable of resolving pronouns 
which CSI leaves undetermined. However, they cannot always do so; and when 
they cannot, the weak distributive preferences suggested by Sidner for 
contex tual candidates and further developed for intrasentential candidates in 
section 6.3 are applied . These preferences are better than nothing but the 
choices they make are not reliable. Alternatives to applying them irrevocably 
are discussed in chapter 10. 
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6.5 Summary and evaluation 
In this chapter we have seen how SPAR's processing is directed. The 
processing framework is similar to Sidner's in as much as anaphor resolution 
is driven by focus-based rules that suggest candidate specifications. However, 
significant alterations and extensions have been made to Sidner's framework 
in order to achieve coordination in four areas: between the resolution of 
different types of ambiguity, between different knowledge sources, between 
intrasentential and contextual candidate specifications, and between the 
resolution processes of different anaphors in a sentence. The results of 
addressing these four problems are as follows; evidence for the conclusions 
reached is provided mainly by the stories processed, details of which are given 
in the appendices. 
( 1) The "principle of anaphoric success" is quite widely applicable in 
stories, and can be used to resolve many, though not all, word-sense 
and structural ambiguities as a by-product of anaphor resolution. 
Sentence readings differing structurally and/or in word senses are 
processed separate"ly; which one is ultimately accepted is determined 
by an internal criterion, semantic density, and an external criterion, 
ease of anaphor resolution. 
(2) Sidner's rules for definite anaphors in isolation are quite accurate 
and do not require major changes. "Inferred specification" can 
generally be detected without CSI, by allowing the information 
constraint to be broken in a controlled way. The extension of 
Sidner's PI rules t<? indefinite pronouns seems promising but has not 
been thoroughly tested. 
Sidner's "normal mode" inference, which is capable of rejecting I 
suggested candidates, should (given a Wilksian theory of semantics 
and CSI) use only linguistic knowledge, since constructive inference is 
unreliable even if only analytically true inference rules are used. 
When "special mode" inference, involving CSI, is required, it should be 
postponed as long as possible and then applied, if at all, to all 
anaphors at once. 
(3) The best way to incorporate ISCs (intrasentential candidates) into 
Sidner's rules is not to write extra rules but temporarily to augment 
the focus register contents with ISCs. With a few exceptions, the 
focus preferences between ISCs and between ISCs and contextual 
candidates are very weak and should be applied only as a last resort. 
( 4) "Collective" factors should be invoked after "distributive" 
factors. Collective factors include syntactic constraints, CSI. and Lhe 
criteria of repetition, focus retention and c-commanded pronouns. 
Of these, only syntactic constraints are able to overturn the 
conclusions of distributive factors, but in practice they seldom do so. 
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The other collective factors are applied preferentially and are used to 
choose between maximal consistent subsets of the set of surviving 
predictions. 
In a shallow processing framework, all is far from lost if CSI fails to 
return the results that a powerful CSI mechanism would, since the 
three remaining collective criteria often guide the system towards 
appropriate conclusions. 
These conclusions provide support for the shallow processing hypothesis in at 
least three ways. Firstly, they suggest that complex inference is not often 
necessary for recognising "inferred specification" of full NPs . Secondly, it is 
not merely the case that Sidner's "normal mode" inference can be performed 
without the use of world knowledge, as shallow processing would require; in 
fact, world knowledge cannot , in a system using Wilksian semantics and 
inference, safely be used in normal mode inference. Thirdly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the thorough exploitation of purely linguistic collective factors 
often enables the same conclusions to be reached as would be reached by a 
powerful inference mechanism. 
However, there are some ambiguities for which the methods presented here 
are inadequate. They include those non-anaphoric ambiguities not covered by 
the principle of anaphoric success; such ambiguities fall outside the scope of 
this work. · (Some ways in which they might be dealt with are discussed in 
chapter 10). More serious are those anaphoric ambiguities which ultimately 
have to be resolved by applying unreliable weak distributive preferences; some 
possible solutions to this difficulty will be a main strand of chapter 10. 
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7. Inference and world knowledge 
The ability to makes inferences about the situations and events described in a 
text is an essential attribute of any program which is intended to understand 
natural language. The deeper the level of understanding required, the more 
sophisticated are the necessary inference processes. 
Inference is necessary for intelligent processing of virtually any kind, and 
much research has been directed at it in all branches of AI; see, for example, 
Hobbs and Moore [1985]. However, given our concern with the specifically 
linguistic problem of anaphor resolution, we will restrict our attention to the 
use of inference in natural language understanding, and particularly in story 
processing . Emphasis will be placed on the way that inference brought about 
anaphor resolution. Further, as noted in chapter 1, the term "inference" (or, 
equivalently, CSI) will be used not in the very broad sense of deriving new 
information from old, but in the narrower one of finding the connections 
between propositions in· a text. 
We will see that the inference required for "open world" texts such as stories, 
where the possible types of object and event in the domain cannot even in 
principle be fully captured or formalised, is quite different from (and normally 
more complex than) that required for reasoning about closed, fully specifiable 
domains. Because this thesis is concerned with the processing, and in 
particular the anaphor resolution, necessary to paraphrase simple stories, the 
projects selected for discussion in this chapter are ones which have proved 
particularly influential in research into story understanding , and/or approach 
inference along the same general lines as SPAR, and/or tackle anaphor 
resolution in an interesting way. 
I will not try to provide complete descriptions of the projects discussed, since 
most of them are well-known and all are fully described elsewhere; rather , I 
will concentrate on how they treated anaphora and how, if it all, their 
treatments of anaphora applied focussing criteria as well as inference . I will 
also attempt to demonstrate , given the immense complexity of full-scale, deep 
inference, the importance of considering an alternative, shallow processing 
approach for some tasks. 
The many and varied knowledge structures and associated inference processes 
which have been proposed over the years , under names such as demons, 
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scripts, plans, and MOPs, can be distinguished along at least four dimensions. 
These dimensions are in principle independent although in practice certain 
characteristics tend to appear together. 
Firstly, inference may be local or global in range . Local inference consists of 
inferring a new pattern or proposition from a small number of old ones 
without reference to the story representation as a whole, w~ile global 
inference takes a large part of the story representation into account and may 
lead to a global interpretation of all or part of the story (e .g. that it describes 
a restaurant visit). 
Secondly, we may classify inference according to content, or the class of 
knowledge it uses: a particular system may specialise in applying knowledge 
about physical causation, about stereotyped situations, or about how people 
form plans. 
Thirdly, the mechanisms and structures which have been used for inference 
are very varied . For example, a piece of knowledge may be encoded as a 
demon, a frame, or a discrimination net. 
Fourthly, the knowledge exploited for inference may be more or less abstract; 
that is; it may be more or less directly related to what we expect to find 
explicitly stated in the text. This will affect the way it is mapped onto the text. 
The knowledge that "people often try to kill two birds with one stone" is more 
abstract than the knowledge that "visiting a restaurant normally involves 
opening the door, being shown to a table ... " . 
Early story understanding work, such as Charniak's DSP and Rieger's MEMORY 
which we will examine first, tended to concentrate on local inference, largely 
about physical causation, at a low level of abstraction. 
The inability of such systems to process stories of any significant complexity 
led to a series of research projects based, as MEMORY was, on Schank's 
Conceptual Dependency (CD) representation. Some of the resulting systems 
were specialised: they used a single mechanism to exploit a single class of 
knowledge, but did not assume that other classes could be exploited with the 
same mechanism. Inference was predominantly global, and increasingly 
abstract in successive projects. Other, mostly later, projects were 
heterogeneous: they used different specialised mechanisms to apply different 
classes of knowledge . Both global and local inference was performed; in some 
cases, knowledge was encoded at various levels of abstraction. 
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Although both specialised and heterogeneous systems performed quite 
impressively, the former were limited to texts of a particular type, while the 
latter were very complex. This prompted some researchers to develop 
homogeneous or uniform systems which represented and processed different 
classes of world knowledge, however abstract, in the sa~e way. Among such 
systems, eater's AD-HAC is described. 
This description of the development of story understanding work in the CD 
paradigm provides a suitable background for the subsequent discussion and 
evaluation of Wilks' theory of inference, on which SPAR is based, and related 
work. 
Quite other approaches to anaphor resolution have been proposed, notably by 
Mellish, and the chapter finishes with a description of his "incremental" 
approach to reference evaluation in mechanics problems. I argue that the 
type of inference appropriate for processing reference in such constrained 
texts is quite different from that required for "open world" texts. 
Many of the projects chosen for discussion in this chapter are CD- based. This 
is partly because much of the important work in story understanding has been 
in the CD tradition, and partly for the sake of continuity in tracing the 
development of ideas. 
In most of the systems discussed (Wilks' being the main exception), anaphor 
resolution is not treated as a distinct, separable part of the overall 
understanding process; rather, anaphors are resolved as a by-product of 
inference. All the systems covered assign a very minor role to local focus; 
typically, they use recency as an approximation to focus, and only apply even 
that when inference alone is inadequate. This can result in large amounts of 
very complex inference being performed. One of the main goals of this thesis 
is to show that in a system whose main purpose is anaphor resolution rather 
than, say, question answering or summarising, such complex inference is not 
often required for considerately-written texts. 
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7 .1 Two early story understanders 
Charniak [1972] and Rieger [1974,1975] were among the first to investigate 
the inference needed to understand stories. 
Charniak 
Charniak attempted to discover what inference was necessary to understand 
stories in sufficient depth to answer questions about them and to resolve 
anaphors. His DSP (Deep Semantic Processing) system accepted as input 
hand-coded assertions which together constituted the story representation. 
These assertions were simple predications such as might have been derived 
from sentence analysis . As assertions arrived, they were passed through four 
stages of processing. This processing might give rise to new assertions which 
were queued to be processed in turn. 
The most important stage of processing consisted of applying demons. A 
demon was a piece of code which was dynamically created during the 
processing of an assertion matching a certain pattern. When created, it would 
wait for new assertions matching a second pattern. If and when such an 
assertion arrived , the demon would take some action, such as making a new 
assertion. For example , if it was asserted that it was raining, a demon would 
be set up to wait for an assertion that some person was outside. If it found 
such an assertion, it would assert that that person would get wet. 
Anaphors were resolved during inference as follows. When an assertion was 
processed which contained a new token representing a pronoun or FDNP, a 
possible referent list (PRL) was constructed for that token. The PRL would 
consist of all possible referents mentioned earlier which were not ruled out on 
syntactic (configurational), semantic or gross recency grounds. If the 
newly-constructed PRL had only one member, it was accepted as the referent ; 
if it had several, the anaphor would be represented by a variable which, when 
demons containing it were applied to assertions in the queue, could only be 
bound to a member of the PRL. After a certain time, any unresolved anaphor 
was taken to refer to the most recently-mentioned member of its PRL. 
The defects of Charniak's model are well known, and motivated further 
research. We concentrate here on two which directly concerned anaphor 
resolution. 
Section 7 .1 144 
Firstly, when several demons could apply to an assertion to resolve an 
anaphor in it in different ways, the most recently created one would always 
resolve it. However, this heuristic will not in general lead to correct results. 
A second drawback, which DSP shared with all early systems, was that focus 
was not properly treated. An unfocussed candidate was pref erred over a 
focussed one whenever required by a demon. Charniak considered an 
alternative to this: a "backup method", in which candidates are considered 
one at a time and the first plausible candidate is accepted. He presented 
evidence that neither recency or topichood provides an adequate ordering for 
such a method. However, his argument assumed a rather narrow definition of 
plausibility and very straightforward algorithms for ordering candidate 
referents, and is therefore not convincing. 1 
Rieger 
Rieger's MEMORY improved on Charniak's DSP in allowing interaction between 
uncertain inferences; in DSP, uncertain inferences (in the form of demons) did 
not interact. Furthermore, MEMORY's use of the Schank's primitive-based 
Conceptual Dependency (CD) representation allowed its inference procedures . 
to apply to a wider range of patterns than Charniak's had done, giving it 
greater generality. 
Rieger developed MEMORY as the inference component of the MARGIE story 
understanding system (Schank [ 1975]). MEMORY accepted CD representations 
of structures for single sentences from Riesbeck's English analyser and made 
inferences in order to establish the connectivity of a text. These inferences 
were extensively cross-referenced, making MEMORY's representation more 
integrated than DSP's list of assertions. They could be expressed in English by 
Goldman's sentence generator BABEL. 
Processing in MEMORY consisted of a . relaxation cycle in which reference 
resolution and inference were performed alternately. In the reference phase, 
recency and semantic constraints (both explicit and inferred) were used to 
eliminate candidate referents for an anaphor much as in DSP; however, a firm 
1Specifically, the argument assumed that the ordering used for a pronoun in a 
direct quotation is the same as that used for one in normal text. However, it is 
arguable that when processing a quotation, the reader tries to model not the 
writer's focus of attention but that of the character being quoted. A different 
candidate ordering may therefore be appropriate. 
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identification, resulting in an anaphor being merged into a candidate referent, 
was made only if exactly one candidate was clearly superior. Otherwise the 
decision was postponed. In the inference phase, all original and inferred 
conceptualisations judged sufficiently interesting (on the basis of their 
content and their "strength", i.e. the certainty with which they were believed) 
were used to trigger inference. Reference resolution would often allow two 
inferences to be recognised as identical in content, thus completing a causal 
chain; however, inference procedures were of sixteen distinct. types, and only 
certain combinations of types could form chains. 
Reference resolution sometimes enabled further inference because the 
merging of two concepts made some inferences valid for the first time . 
Inference in turn enabled reference resolution to advance because it 
produced further semantic constraints. 
Thus whereas in DSP a single demon was allowed to resolve an anaphor, 
MEMORY's approach was more cautious. The effects of all relevant inferences 
were considered together during the reference phase, and the anaphor was 
only resolved if one candidate clearly stood out as superior to the others. 
However, MEMORY's main defect was that its inference was too undirected . 
The effort to construct long causal chains meant that great numbers of 
irrelevant inferences were produced. This was largely because the knowledge 
encoded in inference molecules was all local and mainly causal; there was no 
global inference able to perceive larger patterns . Consequently, MEMORY was 
defeated by stories of more than a few sentences. 
One possible way to inhibit the explosion of inferences, at least for some tasks, 
is to adopt Sidner's proposals and let focussing constrain inference . Another 
way (which could be combined with the first, but in the CD tradition at least, 
has not been) is to provide the system with knowledge in a more structured 
form. Later CD-based programs, which we will examine in the next two 
sections, did just this. 
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7.2 Specialised and heterogenous approaches to story 
understanding 
Cullingford 
Cullingford's [ 1978] SAM (Script Applier Mechanism) was a specialised system 
which exploited knowledge about stereotyped situations to understand stories 
describing such situations. It accepted input from Riesbeck's ELI analyser and 
was able to summarise it, translate it and answer questions about it. SAM 
prevented the combinatorial explosion of inference from which MEMORY had 
suffered by mapping scripts onto a text. A script encodes knowledge, in the 
form of one or more prepackaged causal chains, about the typical features of 
an activity or event such as a car accident or a cinema visit. In SAM, a script 
would be activated by the arrival of input matching certain of its patterns; 
subsequent input would then be matched against the patterns in the activated 
script. 
A script also included ·a set of roles representing the people, objects and 
places participating in it. When a script was activated, some of its roles were 
bound to story participants; other roles were assigned default values, so that 
later references to them could be understood. Thus in 
(7-1) John entered a restaurant. He asked the wailer for the 
menu. 
both the underlined FDNPs would be understood as references to roles in the 
restaurant script. Pronouns were resolved as a by-product of matching 
events with patterns in the script; if the above story continued 
(7-2) He ordered a hamburger. 
the pronoun would be interpreted as referring to John and not the wailer 
because ordering -food is specified in the script as an action of the customer -
in this case, John. 
SAM was able to handle longer and more realistic stories than MEMORY, 
including many taken from newspapers . However, although it was capable of 
some MEMORY-style low-level inference to bridge gaps between story events 
and script patterns, it was defeated by stories which could not be accounted 
for by single scripts (and, of course, by stories which required 
non-script-based inference) . SAM raised, but did not solve, the difficult 
problems of how to decide when a script should be activated, when it is no 
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longer relevant, and how script interactions should be managed. Tait [ 1982] 
attempts to solve some of these problems. 
SAM did not make explicit use of the concept of focussing, although one might 
identify the global focus of a script-based story with the currently active 
script(s). In SPAR. local focus sometimes acts to disallow otherwise plausible 
inferences; although these inferences are not usually scriptal, it may be that a 
local focussing mechanism could provide useful guidance when deciding what 
script(s) were applicable at a given point in a story. 
DeJong 
SAM was very slow and quite fragile, partly because it tried to understand 
every detail of the stories it processed. In contrast, De Jong [1979] provided 
his FRUMP system with "sketchy scripts" which were much less detailed than 
SAM's, containing patterns only for the most important events in a 
stereotyped situation. FRUMP did not attempt to understand or even to parse 
all its input, but aimed only to recognise the essentials specified in sketchy 
scripts. The significant ·assumption that all the essential information in a text 
would match scriptal expectations was perhaps more justified for the routine 
newspaper reports processed by FRUMP than for other genres, in which the 
stereotyped events tend to be less interesting than the unusual, unexpected 
ones. FRUMP's ignoring all but the essentials of a text enabled it to provide 
quite accurate, if very basic, summaries of a wide range of real news reports. 
However, like SAM, it was limited to stories corresponding to its scripts; and 
anaphors were resolved, if at all, as a by-product of script application. 
FRUMP's processing strategy has something in common with SPAR's. Both 
systems operate using incomplete knowledge. FRU:MP's success showed that 
complete understanding is not essential to accurate performance of some 
tasks. However, FRUMP's processing was not so much shallow as partial; much 
of the input was fgnored altogether, while the rest was processed at a fairly 
deep level, using quite specific world knowledge. In contrast, SPAR processes 
all its input, but mostly at a shallower level than that of script application. 
This important difference corresponds to the difference in the tasks the two 
systems perform. To generate summaries, FRUMP had to identify the 
important events and their role in the text as a whole, and could ignore 
everything else; SPAR generates paraphrases, and must therefore process 
everything in the input, although not necessarily in such depth. 
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Wilensky 
One large class of stories for which scripts (as ordinarily formulated in terms 
of stereotyped event sequences) alone are inadequate is those involving the 
goals of actors and the often novel plans they formulate to achieve those 
goals. Wilensky's [1978] PAM (Plan Applier Mechanism) was aimed at 
understanding such stories. PAM resolved pronouns as a by-product of 
inference which related an actor's plans, goals and actions and traced the 
progress of a goal towards fulfilment or frustration. The stated or inferred 
goals of an actor gave rise to certain expectations about his actions, and, just 
as in SAM, the matching of a subsequent sentence representation with an 
expectation often entailed resolving a pronoun in a particular way. 
PAM was a more flexible system than SAM because it did not require stories to 
follow a rigid pattern. However, this greater flexibility was accompanied by 
considerable complexity in the knowledge represented and the processes 
using it. Furthermore, like SAM, PAM was a specialised system, limited to 
understanding stories of a particular type (in PAM's case, those involving the 
goals of a single actor}. Subsequent research in the CD paradigm identified 
other varieties of knowledge which were essential for full comprehension of 
some stories. Attempts were therefore made to build heterogeneous system~ 
which could apply knowledge structures varying widely in both form and 
content to a story in a coordinated fashion . 
The BORIS system 
One such system was BORIS (Lehnert et al [1983]), an experimented program 
which used over fifteen different knowledge sources to understand, in depth, 
realistically complex stories of two to three hundred words. It was capable of 
answering a wide range of questions about the events in the stories and the 
reasons for them. The system's knowledge base consisted of interlinked 
structures of various kinds. These included MOPs (Memory Organisation 
Packets), which can be seen as generalisations (and in fact abstractions) of 
scripts and contain information about goals and intentions as well as events, 
and still more abstract TAUs (Thematic Affect Units) which represent 
knowledge about how generalised event patterns such as a " close call" or a 
"broken obligation" affect people's emotions. Activated knowledge structures 
could be combined and conflated to generate predictions about subsequent 
events. These predictions were used not only to integrate text sentences into 
the story representation but also to fill in missing semantic roles, resolve 
pronouns and disambiguate word senses . 
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BORIS showed clearly the immense complexity of the inference involved in 
in-depth understanding and the difficulty of specifying, encoding and using 
the necessary knowledge. Although the theory behind BORIS is in principle 
applicable to a wide range of stories, the implemented system as described in 
Lehnert et al [1983] was only capable of understanding two or three different 
stories. 
The history of CD-based story understanding is, with the notable exception of 
FRUMP, one of successively more flexible and complex inference mechanisms 
using an increasing number of ever more abstract kinds of knowledge. In spite 
of the significance of BORIS and many of its predecessors in showing what 
deep inference might involve, it would appear that for the foreseeable future, 
"robustness" (in the sense of being able to cope with variations of stories 
already processed) and in-depth understanding are mutually exclusive in a 
language processc r, at least for "open world" texts. 2 In response to this, the 
purpose of the research described in this thesis is to discover how far it is 
possible to avoid such complex inference in a system which performs a 
primarily language-based task such as paraphrase. 
The complexity and limited applicability of many of MEMORY's successors led 
some researchers to question whether each type of knowledge used by a story 
understander had to be represented dif{erently:'I. that is, whether a wide 
difference between the contents of two knowledge structures had to imply a 
similarly wide difference between their forms and the ways they were used. 
Two systems adopting the alternative uniform approach will now be discussed. 
7 .3 Uniform approaches to story understanding 
The AD-HAC system (Cater [ 1981]) was a complete CD-based story 
understander whose inference component represented an attempt to 
overcome the problems of Rieger's MEMORY while avoiding the complex, 
special-purpose and widely varying knowledge structures used by SAM, PAM 
and their successors. As in MEMORY, the inference component alternated 
2or course , it might also be the case that for such texts, robustness is 
impossible without in-depth understanding. If so, robust processing of open 
world texts is altogether impossible for the foreseeable future . However, this 
is a conclusion we should not adopt without being forced to it. 
Section 7.3 150 
between generating new inferences and identifying pairs of inferences 
("compacting"); inference was controlled by interest ratings, and' certainty 
(confidence) ratings were used to deal with incompatibilities. However, the 
construction of long causal chains did not play such a central role as in 
MEMORY, and AD-HAC jettisoned MEMORY's unrestricted inference procedures 
in favour of more structured inference networks, which were based not only 
on conceptual primitives but also (to allow the kind of inference for which SAM 
used scripts) on classes of object. Inference networks are generalisations of 
discrimination nets, and are described below. They provide a uniform 
representation for both causal and stereotyped knowledge, and potentially for 
oth er types (e .g. goals, plans and thematic affects) as well. 
AD-HAC was capable of resolving the pronouns in, and answering questions 
about, stories several sentences in length. When the inferencer received 
conceptualisations from the analyser, it fed each one to the entry point of the 
inference network associated with its head primitive. As the conceptualisation 
passed through the network, certain actions were performed such as inferring 
new conceptualisations and marking certain entities as referentially distinct. 
The path taken through the network depen~ed on the outcome of tests, both 
on the semantic content of the conceptualisation itself, and on the wider story 
representation. If the result of a test was indeterminate ( e .g. if neither a fact 
nor its negation was believed) both continuations were followed; the resulting 
alternative inferences were cross-referenced as incompatible with one 
another. 
Processing by an inference network might be temporarily suspended by the 
issuing of a complaint. Complaints were made when a role filler lacked a 
necessary semantic feature; for example, the INGEST network demanded an 
unambiguously animate agent, so that the "they" in "They ate some bananas" 
would provoke a complaint. The network could only be restarted with the 
offending pronoun replaced by candidate referents having the desired feature; 
if there were several such candidates, they gave rise to mutually incompatible 
alternative continuations. 
When all inference networks had terminated, the story representation was 
compacted. Similar inferences with certainty ratings of the same sign and 
preferably large magnitude were merged. As a side effect of this, pronoun 
referents were selected. Merging of inferences resulted in an increase in their 
certainty and interest ratings; the effect of these increases percola ted to 
other inferences via cross-reference links . In particular, any infere r;ce s 
marked as incompatible with the merged ones were made less certain . 
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Thus the reletionship between inference and reference resolution was 
different in h.D-HAC and MEMORY. In MEMORY, the reference phase compared 
the entire occurrence sets of (the representations of) anaphors and 
candidates, and accepted a candidate only if it matched better overall than its 
competitors. In AD-HAC, anaphors were resolved either as dictated by the 
most certain pair of matching conceptualisations they took part in, or (less 
of ten) by the complaint mechanism excluding all candidates but one. The role 
of certainty and interest ratings in the whole understanding process was much 
greater in AD-HAC than in MEMORY. 
AD-HAC was able to process longer texts than MEMORY was without the 
introduction of multiple knowledge structures. AD-HAC's inference networks 
with their complaint mechanism, and the sophisticated treatment of 
alternative sets of inferences by certainty ratings and cross-referencing, 
suggest that systems based on a single general inference mechanism need not 
suffer from the combinatorial explosions that afflicted MEMORY. However, 
from the point of view of anaphor resolution, AD-HAC's machinery was very 
heavy-handed, doing by inference work which could often be done much more 
easily by coordinated lise of a focussing mechanism.3 lexical knowledge and 
syntactic coreference restrictions, as this thesis attempts to show. 
It might be objected that the advantages of a uniform approach are likely to 
be illusory, because the gain in simplicity in the inference mechanism will be 
offset by extra complexity in the knowledge base. However, Norvig [ 1983], 
whose FAUSTUS system is another uniform CD-based program, argues that 
while in FAUSTUS "the complexity has not disappeared; it has merely moved 
from the processor to the knowledge base", uniformity gives greater 
ex tensibility and flexibility. Whereas an extension to a heterogeneous system 
will typically only improve the way the system processes one kind of 
knowledge, an extension to a uniform system will have a more global e ff e ct. 
The performance of AD-HAC, and indeed FAUSTUS, suggests that a system 
which applies many types of world knowledge need not use a similar number of 
knowledge structures and processing mechanisms . However , the evide nce is 
not conclusive because these systems have not (yet) been shown capable of 
3Inte restingly enough, Cater state s that AD-HAC resolves one difficult pronoun 
in an example story not as a result of infere nce but because one c a ndidate 
referent is ··more in focus" (Cate r [1981], p179) . However, the focus 
mechanism is not described. 
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processing stories as complex as those understood by e .g . BORIS. 
7 .4 Inference and preference semantics 
It is natural to ask, given the complexity of "deep" understanding, whether an 
alternative shallow approach might be equally successful for some tasks. We 
will now therefore look at Wilks' relatively shallow preference semantics theory 
of inference. This theory has a number of weak points, which will become 
apparent below. However, the principles underlying it are attractive; and 
because it is the basis of SPAR's inference mechanism, it will be discussed in 
some detail, and then compared with the closely related theory of Hobbs 
[ 1976] . 
7.4.1 Wilks' theory of common sense inference 
Wilks divided definite pronouns into three types, A, B and C, according to the 
type of processing that was required to resolve them. 
Type A pronouns were ones which the PS system could resolve by special 
anaphora paraplates in the paraplate matching procedure described in 
section 3.2. In Wilks' [ 1975b] example 
(7-3) Give the bananas to the monkeys although they are not ripe, 
because they are very hungry. 
paraplate matching procedures inspected the formulas for the adjective s 
"ripe" and "hungry" and saw that they prefer to be applied to plantlike and 
animate entities respectively. These preferences were satisfied only b y 
interpreting the first ;,they" to mean "the bananas" and the second to mean 
"the monkeys" . 
If the preference criteria involved in paraplate matching were insufficie nt to 
resolve all pronouns, PS entered e x tended mode . The process of e x traction, as 
shown b e low, wa,s a pplied to every template containing the formula of th e 
pronoun or a possible antecedent. Extraction consisted of "the unpacking of 
every possible case tie: both those in the formulas of the template and those 
labelling a link to other templates" (Wilks [1975b]). It resulted in the 
construction of further templates which were in some sense analytically 
implied by existing ones . Pairs of templates , both old and new, were then 
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Tl : 
Ell: 
E12: 
T2: 
E21: 
T3: 
T4: 
E41: 
[ John drank the+whisky] - - ... - .... 
' ' 
' ' \ \ 
I I 
I \ 
[[ the+whisky (IN in) John+PART ]¥ \ 
\ 
o,.u:: 
/ [[ the+whisky (DIRE to) John+PART ]](:-
0 (DIRE from) a+glass ]- - - - - , 
' 
' 
J 
I 
I 
\ 
[[ the+whisky (DIRE from) a+glass ]]~" 
[ it felt warm] 
J (~ . 
Y 0 (IN in) his+stomach] - - -, 
\ 
[[ it (IN in) his+stomach JN·-~ J 
' I 
\ 
I 
I 
Figure 7 .1: PS representation for "John drank the whisky 
from a glass and it fell warm in his stomach" 
matched together in the hope of binding the pronoun to a possible antecedent. 
Thus PS resolved the "it" in 
(7-4) John drank the whisky from a glass, and it felt warm in his 
stomach. 
as follows . Template and paraplate matching resulted in the single-bracketed 
templates (Tl to T4) in figure 7.1 being constructed, with case ties linking Tl 
to T2 and T3 to T4. The formula for "drink", 
DRINK 1: CC• ANI SUBJ) ( ( (FLOW STUFF) OBJE) ( (SELF IN) 
( ( (WRAP THING) FROM) ( ( C•ANI 4 PART) TO) (MOVE CAUSE))))) 
4Wilks has MAN rather than •ANI here , which is presumably an error since the 
entity in question must be the agent of the drinking. 
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specified that the stuff drunk (" (FLOW STUFF)") ends up in the drinker ("SELF"); 
the extraction El 1 could therefore be made. (The IN in El 1 indicates that it is 
the location sense of the word "in" that is being used here . Extracted 
templates are indicated by double square brackets). The extraction E12 arose 
in a similar way. The IN case tie linking templates T3 and T4 justified the 
extraction E41. 
When extractions had been made, type B pronouns would yield to a simple 
··zero point" matching strategy in which pairs of (original and/or extracted) 
templates containing the pronoun and a possible antecedent respectively were 
matched by comparing the formu\as in corresponding slots . For (7-4), 
extractions El 1 and E41 matched because the formulas for "the whisky" and 
"it" matched, as did those for "John+PART" and "his stomach" (the action slots 
for the two extractions being identical) . PS accepted this match, thereby 
deciding that "it" referred to the whisky. (The other consequence of 
accepting the match, that "his" referred to "John", was of little interest since 
it only confirmed what had presumably already been decided by paraplate 
matching). 
However, in situations where no (useful) zero-point match could be made, 
Common Sense Inference Rules (CSIRs) were invoked. A CSIR consisted of a 
pair of template patterns (i.e. template-like objects, the formulas in whose 
slots could contain variables as well as primitives; see below for an example) 
which could be applied in one or both directions to generate a new 
(temporary) template5 from·an old. one. Matches between templates were then 
sought as before. If · no useful match occurred, another round of CSIR 
5The sequence of inferences on Wilks [ 1975b,p69] shows the results of CSIR 
application in template form, but Wilks [1977b] says that "[CS]) rules do not 
produce fresh template-like forms the way extractions do". However, it would 
appear that the objects that CSIR application produces are template-like in 
their actor-action-object form, even if they differ from templates in being 
temporary and in containing objects such as variables, # signs and perhaps 
functions (e .g. " "*judges" [in the right hand side of a particular CSIR] is 
represented by a general function satisfied by actions ·of liking ... " (Wilks 
[1977b,p242])). it would seem that in practice the templates in CSIRs usually 
contained formula-like structures, to be fuzzy matched with existing formulas 
in roughly the same way as formulas were matched during zero-point 
matching; but there was in principle nothing to stop them containing matching 
predicates of arbitrary complexity. However the concept of a CSIR is far from 
being a vacuous one because a CSIR, viewed as a procedure, was res}icted to 
accessing the information in a single template at a time, and returning a 
single new template as a result. 
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application could in principle (though in the implemented system, did not) 
take place, again followed by matching. 
Wilks [ 1975b] described the way that PS used CSI%to process the text 
(7-5) John left the window and drank the wine on the table. It was 
good. 
The following templates were derived directly from the text: 
T5: [ John left the+window ] 
T6 : [ John drank the+wine] 
T7 : [ the+wine (LOCA on) the+table ]6 
TB : [ ?it was good ] 
Extraction from T6 produced 
E61 : [[ the+wine (IN in) John]]. 
CSJRs stored under the head element of the action formula (if any) of each of 
the above templates we~e then applied. One rule stored under CAUSE (the head 
primitive of the formula for "drink") was 
(7-6) C C•ANI 1) C (SELF IN) (MOVE CAUSE)) (•REAL 2) ) -t (1 hJUDG 2) 
which can be paraphrased as "if an animate being causes a real object to move 
into him/her /itself, then that animate being may judge that real object".7 
When applied lo T6, the resulting temporary template (marked by triple square 
brackets) was 
CSI61: [[[ John judges the+wine ]]]. 
Inference from TB proceeded as follows. First, a copy of TB was created in 
which "?it" was replaced by the formula for "the+wine", as one of the 
candidate antec·edents. (Presumably other copies representing the other 
6 Although Wilks _ presents this template as an original one, it seems by 
comparison with the "whisky" example that it is in fact an extraction from a 
similar template with a dummy symbol in agent position. However this does 
not affect subsequent processing. 
7The "#" indicates that any NOT prefixes in primitives should be ignored during 
matching. The numbers 1 and 2 in the CSJR are variables which show how 
formulas in the source template should be used in the new one. 
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possibilities were also created, but did not lead to successful chains) . Next, 
the following rule stored under the primitive BE (the head of the formula for 
"is") was applied : 
(7-7) (1 BE (GOOD KIND)) +-+ C (tANI 2) WANT 1) 
This gave the temporary template 
CSI81: [[[ tANI 8 want the+wine ]]] 
which matched CSI61 to form a complete chain. The assumption made in 
creating the copy of T8 from which CSI81 was derived, that "it" referred to the 
wine, was vindicated by the fact that no chains of the same or shorter length 
were found, and the pronoun was resolved. 
In the version of PS described in Wilks [1975b] , no attempt was made to 
construct chains involving more than two CSIR applications. Wilks commented 
"This length limit could easily be extended, but I suspect that understanding 
of normal situations rarely requires chains longer than three" (p69) . If CSIRs 
failed to resolve a pronoun, then " ... the top level of the system tries to resolve 
the problem by default, or what a linguist would call focus . Roughly, that 
means: assume that whatever was being talked about is still being talked 
about" (p65). However, the working of this application of focus was not 
explained, if indeed there was any significant mechanism. 
7.4.2 An evaluation of Wilks' theory 
As argued in chapter 1. Wilks' theory of inference is attractive for two main 
reasons: firstly, its "partial" approach, according to which the inference 
mechanism is only asked to provide sufficient partial explanations to resolve 
specific ambiguities, rather than having to construct a global explanation of 
the events described by a text; and secondly, its simple heuristic (preferring 
shorter chains to longer) for deciding on the validity of a set of inferences. 
But as Wilks admitted, the theory was not very extensively tested in its 
implementation in PS, especially as far as pronoun resolution was concerned. 
This was because the texts PS processed were either very short or presente d 
8Wilks has "John" instead of tANI, but the information that the (tANI 2) in the 
CSIR is in this case John is not available before a comparison is made with 
CSI61. 
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no significant pronoun problems, and in any case the number of texts in either 
category presented in the literature was fairly small. The inference 
mechanism had four further drawbacks; however, these do not, in my view, 
outweigh the two fundamental advantages of Wilks' theory mentioned above. 
(1) Wilks [1975b,p69] states that " much of the effort of the program is in the 
inexact matching of the template forms to the [CSI] rules", but he provides no 
significant description of what this matching involves. Similar remarks apply 
to the processes of extraction and of paraplale matching, which can involve, 
respectively, primitive-specific and paraplate-specific procedures as distinct 
from any general "extractor" or "paraplate matcher" functions. The content 
of these specific procedures is not stated lo be subject to any constraints, 
making it difficult to construct texts which PS could not in principle interpret 
correctly. The problem of unconstrained or unspecified processing is 
especially serious in the area of CSI, because the implemented PS system 
contained very few CSIRs , and so it is fair to assume that it constructed very 
few distinct inference chains. It is thus not clear that the matching 
procedures used for CSI would have been extensible had a large number of 
rules and possible inference chains existed. 
(2) The lack of a non-trivial focussing mechanism was also a potential 
drawback. Because PS only processed texts which were either very short or 
presented no significant anaphor resolution problems, it was able to assume 
that every entity in the semantic representation was sufficiently focussed to 
be a possible antecedent. However, for longer texts, this would often have led 
to wrong answers; the inference component would frequently be misled by a 
spurious chain of inferences into recommending a candidate antecedent which 
a human reader, or a system maintaining an adequate representation of focus 
or context, would never consider; and in PS (unlike SPAR), the results of 
inference, if unambiguous, were always accepted. Focus was only used to 
s elect between candidates when inference was unable to do so, and therefore 
could never override inference. In addition, the system would risk doing a lot 
of unnecessary work making inferences about insufficiently focussed possible 
antecedents, even if such inference did not lead to wrong answers . We may 
conclude that for longer texts, PS would have needed to give a more 
prominent role to focus, both lo delimit candidate s e ts and to take part more 
actively in selecting correct antecedents. 
(3) As Wilks recognised, " .. .it remains to be shown that a large body of common 
sense inference rules can be controlled, and that solutions can be found to 
pronoun problems without the chains becoming inordinately long. There may 
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also be something inherently implausible about always preferring a rule chain 
of length, say, 3 to one of length 4 . (Though preferring length 1 to length 4 
might be clearer and more plausible). This difficulty may mean that 
preferences in the system will have to be weighted in a way they are not at 
present." (corrected9 from Wilks [1976,p169]). This issue is addressed in the 
next chapter; see also Hobbs' use of "rule salience" below. 
(4) Finally, PS's inference mechanism apparently did not take account of the 
possible falsehood of statements in intensional contexts. The examples Wilks 
gives of CSIR application do not involve intensional contexts, and in fact 
ignoring intensional context in short texts of the type Wilks processed does 
not often lead to a Wilksian inference mechanism misresolving pronouns . 
Quite often, such a mechanism will get a plausible answer (choice of 
antecedent) from a wrong chain of reasoning. For example, when processing 
the sentence (from Wilks [ 1975a]) 
(7-8) The soldiers fired at the women, and we saw several of them 
fall, 
PS decides that "them". refers to the women, by using a CSI rule stating that 
entities who are shot at are likely to fall. There is no reason to suppose that it 
would not make the same decision, for exactly the same reasons, if the first 
clause read "The officer ordered the soldiers to fire at the women". Although 
the "them=women" decision is still plausible, PS would fail to realise that it 
was not asserted that the soldiers actually obeyed the order, and that 
assuming that th~y did should really be a common sense inference in its own 
right. The reason that plausible decisions are still made in spite of the system 
failing to distinguish what is asserted as true from what has to be assumed, is 
that guessing that an event in an intensional context gets realised is usually 
quite reasonable . That is, people's beliefs are often correct, their statements 
are often true, and they often do what they want lo do . However, an inference 
mechanism that chooses the right answers for the wrong reasons is not 
theoretically satisfactory, and there is no reason to suppose that it would 
continue to deliver right answers for more complex texts . 
Thus in summary, Wilks' preference semantics provides a very prorrusmg, 
though inadequately tested, approach lo anaphor resolution. Its advantages 
are its shallow (and therefore not over-demanding) approach to semantic 
9Jn the original, the numbers 3 and 4 are the other way round, as are the 
numbers 1 and 4; but the meaning seems clear. 
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representation, its policy of invoking common sense inference only when 
necessary for specific ambiguity problems, and its prefential chain-length 
heuristic for choosing between inferences. Its drawbacks for anaphor 
resolution, which however are not so serious as to warrant abandoning it, are 
its unconstrained and/or undocumented use of data-specific pattern 
matching procedures, its lack of an adequate focus mechanism, its 
insensitivity to intensional contexts, and possibly the untestedness of the 
chain-length heuristic. 
One question we have not addressed here is whether Wilks' basically local and 
causal inference mechanism can be extended to other types of inference, such 
as that performed by the systems described in sections 7 .2 and 7.3. In the 
next chapter we will see how SPAR implements the beginnings of such an 
extension. 
7 .4 .3 Hobbs' theory of inference 
Hobbs [ 1976] suggested not only the syntactic pronoun resolution algorithm 
described in section 5.3.2 but also a "semantic" (i .e . CSI-based) theory which 
used preference-like principles and was relatively shallow. It is not clear how 
extensively, if at all, the theory was implemented and tested. Hobbs, like Wilks, 
invoked Joos' "semantic axiom number one", which he stated as 
The important facts in the text will be repeated, explicitly or 
implicitly. 
In Hobbs' theory, the inference mechanism would accept hand-code d 
predicate calculus-like input such as might have been derived from a text by 
syntactic and semantic interpretation rules. With each predicate was 
associated a collection of inference rules. These rules were divided into 
clusters roughly _according to their topic; the use of a rule served to increase 
the salience of all rules in its cluster. The mechanism attempted to discover 
the connectivity of the text by applying rules and merging the resulting 
conclusions where redundancy was recognised. Like PS, Hobbs' mechanism 
favoured chains involving fewer rules, but unlike PS, it also favoured those 
involving salient rules, thus making inference context-dependent. 
The four primary semantic operations were: 
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(1) Detecting or verifying the inlerscntence connective~ (i.e. 
coherence relations), approximately as discu:.,sed in 5.2.2 . 
. (2) Predicate interpretatiori. A statcm<;nt of the form "X walks out" 
would be encoded as out (walk (X)). The lexicon entry for "out" stated 
that an inference of tlie form go Czl, z2, z3) must be drawn (i.e. proved) 
from its argument. Any intermediate stages in the proof were 
instantiatccJ (asserted). This strategy resulted in a great reduction 
of the number of senses stored for each word, and also allowed 
omitted material to be recovered, as in "(The price of) meat is high 
this month". 
(3) J(nitting. Whenever the predicate of a newly instantiated 
statement was identical Lo that of an existing one, the mechanism 
a:::sumed a redu!l.dancy, and merged the two (and their corresponding 
arguments) unless an obvious inconsistency was found. This might 
result in pronouns being :::-esolved. 
( 4) Idenlifving entiUes. If any definite pronoun remained unresolved 
after (3), the mechanism initiated a bidirectional inference search 
from statements involving the pronoun and statements involving the 
antecedent predicted by Hobbs' syntactic algorithm (see 5.3.2). This 
search might result in " proofs" of different antecedents; if so, the 
simplest proof was accepted. Hobbs does not say what happened if no 
proofs were found. 
Hobbs' inference mechanism has many similarities to Wilks'. "Predic::i.te 
interpretation" is equivalent lo extraction since it involves drawing out the 
(usually analytically true) implications of the use of particular words. 
Operation (4) , "identifying entities", consists of applying (apparently 
non-analytic) rules in 'salient clusters to !""elevant statements, rather like 
Wilks' CSJR process. 
Hobbs' mechanism is perhaps an advn::i.ce on Wilks' in its use of cluster 
salience and in using the syntactic algorithm's suggestions lo constrain Lhe 
bidirectional search, · much as Sidner recommends that focussing should 
constrain inference. 
However Wilks' theory (as reported) scores over Hobbs' in having a more 
explicitly defined semantic representation. Whereas Wilks' use oi primitives 
and formulas enables inexact matching between assertions in Lhe 
representation, Hobbs does not specify .how the corresponding relationships 
between his predicates could be established. Wilks' theory of inference must. 
atso be regarded as better tested than Hobbs', since, even assuming that the 
la!".te:- was properly implemented, the input it accepted was band-coded rnther 
than, as in PS, derived by automatic analysis of an input text.. 
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7 .5 Anaphor resolution in a fully-specified dornaL."l. 
The inference mechanisms discussed so far have all been intended to operate 
on "open world", in some ways unrestricted texts such as stories. However 
Mellish [ 1982] tackled anaphor resolution for the well-specified, "closed" 
domain of mechanics problems, and was therefore able to resolve anaphors 
using rather different inference processes. 
Mellish developed his ideas in the context of the MECHO system (Bundy et al 
[ 1979]) which solved mechanics problems stated initially in English. Jn Lhis 
restricted domain, it was safe to assume thal the relevant information could 
be fully and exactly represented. Anaphors could therefore largely be 
resolved by means of absolute constraints rather than uncertain inferences. 
Mellish aimed to resolve anaphors, or at least to reduce the size of their 
candidate sets, as soon as possible in the understanding process. Early 
anaphor resolution can, he claimed, provide useful information for other 
disambiguation procedu:res and help diminish unnecessary computation. 
As constraints (predicates derived from parsing) accumulated during 
processing of a sentence, they were handed to an inference mechanism which 
performed "incremental evaluation" to resolve anaphors when possible. In 
Mellish's "extensional approach", an anaphor was represented by the set of 
candidate referents which could be shown to satisfy all the constraints 
associated with it. New constraints caused candidates to be eliminated . When 
only one candidate remained, it would be accepted; if the constraints 
eliminated all the candidates, it was assumed that a wrong path had been 
taken in parsing, and the system backtracked. Candidate elimination for one 
anaphor could propagate to another via a constraint mentioning them both; 
thus all anaphors were resolved in parallel. 
Mellish's approach to anaphor resolution relies on a number of properties of 
the mechanics problems domain which are unlikely to hold for more general, 
"real world" texts. In such texts, one cannot assume 
(1) that the lack of any constraint-satisfying candidate referents for 
a definite noun phrase indicates a wrong parsing decision. Indeed, it 
is doubtful that any absolute criterion could sensibly control parsing; 
rather, a preferential criterion that chooses between alternative 
parses, such as the principle of anaphoric success discussed in 
chapter 6, seems to be needed. 
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(2) that the existence in the text representation of more than one 
candidate referent satisfying the available syntactic and semantic 
constraints is grounds for postponing a reference decision; although 
this may be true for mechanics problems, which are generally short 
and stated as clearly as possible, it is not true in general, and a focus 
mechanism will (as Mellish acknowledges) be required to choose 
between candidates. 
(3) that encugh absolute (as opposed to preferential) constraints 
exist to enable the resolution of one anaphor to have much effect on 
others . 
Mellish's approach therefore does not seem to be applicable to story 
understanding . Since the points ( 1)-(3) above would probably apply to any 
attempt to resolve anaphors by strictly deductive means, it s eems that the 
· inference methods appropriate for constrained, "closed world" texts cannot in 
ge neral be extended to "open world" ones. The idea of constraint 
propagation, though, is still useful for story processing: as we saw in 6.4 .1, 
SPAR sometimes uses configurational constraints to propagate the resolution 
of one pronoun to the resolution of another. However, firm constraints, 
whether syntactic or se.mantic, cannot be expected to be available to resolve 
every ambiguity. 
7. 6 Summary 
The conclusions drawn from our discussion of inference so far are: 
( 1) Many classes of world knowledge are needed for story 
understanding: knowledge with various degrees of abstractness, 
about physical causation, plans, affects and many other areas. 
(2) In-depth understanding, using all these classes, is too complex to 
be compatib-le with practical performance for the foreseeable future. 
/ (3) However, this complexity may perhaps be reduced by using the 
same knowledge structure and inference mechanism for each class of 
knowledge: that is, to keep the same form regardless of content. 
(4) Wilks' theory of inference suggests that the complexity may be 
further reduced if what is required is ambiguity resolution rather 
than full understanding. 
(5) In any case, inference methods appropriate for processing texts 
about "closed" domains cannot easily be applied to story 
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understanding. 
A further claim, which the next chapter will attempt to substantiate, is: 
(6) If anaphor resolution, rather than complete understanding, is 
desired, the complexity and quantity of the necessary inference and 
world knowledge can be greatly reduced without serious loss of 
accuracy, by making thorough use of linguistic knowledge. 
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8. Inference in SPAR 
This chapter is about SPAR's inference mechanism. 
Section 8 .1 examines some of the issues that arise from the shallow processing 
requirement (see 1.2) that SPAR have access to only limited amounts of world 
knowledge . This requirement turns out to have implications both for the way 
in which world knowledge should be encoded, and for the mechanism that is 
appropriate for exploiting that knowledge. It is argued that Wilks' model of 
inference is a promising basis for SPAR's inference component. 
The rest of the chapter describes and evaluates this inference component. 
The evaluation is designed to answer the following questions: 
( 1) Do Wilks' basic ideas on inference, which were not thoroughly 
tested in PS, seem plausible under closer examination and more 
thorough testing? 
(2) Does Sidner's framework significantly reduce the difficulty and 
amount of CSI needed for anaphor resolution, as she claims? If so, 
how? In what ways can Wilksian inference be further controlled, 
independently of focussing, so as to maintain accuracy and 
efficiency? 
(3) How can a Wilksian inference mechanism be extended lo make 
best use of the limited amounts of general world knowledge that are 
available to it in a shallow processing system? How can it take 
maximum advantage of the available linguistic knowledge, especially 
that provided by word sense formulas? In terms of the classification 
of inference mechanisms given in chapter 7, does extending the 
mechanism in these two ways make it specialised, heterogeneous or 
uniform? 
Because SPAR is built to test the shallow processing hypothesis, its inference 
mechanism is not intended to be a powerful. general purpose inference engine; 
so I will not attempt to evaluate it from this point of view. It should also be 
stressed that I am not attempting lo address the global problem of how 
infere:1ce should be done in story understanding, but only the more specific 
one of how a Wilks-based inference mechanism in a Sidnerian, 
shallow-processing system can help to resolve anaphors in stories . This is 
nevertheless an interesting problem because a full or partial solution lo it 
would provide support for the shallow processing hypothesis and for both 
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Sidner's and Wilks' theories. 
Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 describe the main features of SPAR's inference 
mechanism, and in so doing attempt to provide some answers to questions (1), 
(2) and (3) respectively. Thus section 8.2 sets out the way that the basic 
Wilksian procedure of constructing and completing inference chains is 
implemented. Section 8.3 concerns the way in which the inference process is 
controlled, firstly by means of a development of Wilks' previously 
unimplemented ideas on classifying inference rules, and secondly by using the 
partial results of the focus-based AR (anaphor resolution) rules. In both these 
sections, Wilks' ideas are seen to work quite well and are accepted without 
major modifications. However, some development of them is needed to allow 
some types of inference which Wilks ' implemented system did not perform; 
section 8.4 therefore describes how the mechanism has been extended lo 
incorporate inference about stereotyped situations, inference about actors' 
goals, and very weak, very general inference rules which are useful as a 
backup to the normal mechanism. The points made in the chapter are 
summarised in section 8.5. 
8.1 Shallow processing, world knowledge and inference 
The main aim of the work reported in this thesis is to test the version of the 
shallow processing hypothesis stated in chapter 1 as follows. 
A story processing system which exploits linguistic knowledge 
particularly knowledge about focussing, as heavily as possible , and 
has access only to limited quantities of world knowledge , which it 
invokes only when absolutely necessary, can usually choose an 
appropriate antecedent for an anaphor even in cases where the 
inference mechanism by itself cannot do so . 
In order to motivate the design of SPAR's inference mechanism, we need to 
characterise more exactly the nature and extent of the "limited quantities of 
world knowledge" with which the system may legitimately be provided, and to 
outline the imp_lications this characterisation has for the design of the 
inferencer. 
The major reason why full, unrestricted CSI is still beyond the state of the art 
is that it requires vast amounts of complex world knowledge . In contrast, the 
amount of linguistic knowledge required for a language processor to give 
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reasonably accurate performance on a task that does not require significant 
world knowledge is far smaller, and many quite reliable techniques exist for 
exploiting linguistic knowledge. Some of those techniques are adopted in 
SPAR. It therefore seems plausible that as long as the amount and complexity 
of the available world knowledge do not greatly exceed those of the available 
linguistic knowledge, then it should be possible to apply that world knowledge 
robustly and reliably whenever the available knowledge is in principle 
sufficient to solve the problem at hand. Of course, in cases which require 
knowledge that the system does not have, the inference mechanism cannot be 
expected to reach the right conclusions, no matter how robust and reliable it 
is as a mechanism; in such cases, it is up to the other, linguistic components 
of the system to try to compensate for the lack and guide the system towards 
the right decisions. Such compensation should normally be successful if, as 
the shallow· processing hypothesis assumes, texts tend to be constructed 
considerately, so that constraints on interpretation derived from different 
knowledge sources confirm rather than conflict with one another. 
Given the approximate constraint that the system's world knowledge should 
not greatly exceed its linguistic knowledge in amount and complexity, what 
guidelines should we follow in deciding exactly what world knowledge the 
system is to have? Clearly, we should try to make every piece of knowledge 
"pay its way" in terms of usefulness as far as possible. This means that a 
piece of knowledge (e.g. an inference rule) (1) should be as widely applicable 
as possible, and (2) should be represented as simply, and therefore as 
compactly, as possible. More specifically: 
( 1) A given piece of knowledge should be as general as possible; lhc.t 
is, it should be relevant to a wide range of situations. This principle 
has at least three applications. Firstly, to the extent that it is 
possible to decide what concepts are more common than others in 
non-specialised texts, we should aim lo provide more knowledge 
about common concepts than about uncommon ones . Secondly, when 
deciding what knowledge to provide about a given concept, we should 
not aim for completeness but should ask ourselves what information 
is most often likely to be useful. Thirdly, we should not provide 
specific information which could be inferred from more general. For 
example, if the system knows that people often pay for things they 
are given, it may be able to resolve the ambiguities in a story about a 
restaurant visit without being told specifically that paying is a normal 
part of visiting a restaurant. 
(2) Knowledge should be encoded as simply and succinctly as is 
consistent with reasonably reliable application. This has two 
implications. Firstly, we should not aim to specify completely the 
conditions under which a piece of knowledge is applicable . For 
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example, we might tell the system that if someone makes a promise, 
he can be expected to try to fulfil it. Clearly, there are situations 
where this inference is unlikely to be valid: if the person is 
untrustworthy, or if something more urgent comes up. However, as 
long as such situations do not make the exception more likely than 
the rule, we should not attempt to encode them. Secondly, we should 
not aim for completeness in specifying causal relationships . The 
causal link between making a promise and trying to fulfil it is 
arguably mediated by goals such as those of adhering to moral 
principles or maintaining one's reputation; however, if knowledge of 
these intermediate stages is not normally required to resolve 
ambiguities in stories about promising, then it should be left out. 
The need for world knowledge to be represented simply and succinctly, and the 
fact that SPAR is intended to process non-specialised texts, have important 
implications for the kind of inference mechanism that is appropriate. 
Our discussion of the progress of research into story understanding led us to 
conclude that a uniform approach to inference - one in which many varieties 
of world knowledge are represented and in the same way - is the most 
promising one for our purposes. A specialised approach, in which only a few 
types of world knowledge are considered , is unlikely to be adequate; 2.nd a 
heterogeneous approach, such as that adopted in BORIS, is likely to prove too 
complex to perform robustly on stories on a variety of topics. 
The (single) processing mechanism used by a uniform system would, in order 
to achieve generality over types of world knowledge, have to be fairly simple. 
This requirement dovetails well with our requirement (2) above, that world 
knowledge should be represented simply and succinctly. 
However, if, in accordance with (2), only the bare essentials of each piece of 
world knowledge are represented, then wrong inferences will quite often be 
made . The inference mechanism must therefore be able to hypothesise 
alternative lines _of reasoning, rather than merely to follow a single one in 
which it has full confidence; and it must be able to choose between 
alternatives when they are inconsistent. 
For these reasons, the model of inference embodied in Wilks' PS system seems 
a very promising basis for our inference component. Wilks' CSI rules were, in 
PS, represented simply as pairs of template patterns; and discrimination 
between alternative inference chains on the basis of chain length was central 
to the theory. However, the world knowledge used by PS was mostly 
straightforwardly causal and not very abstract; it has therefore been 
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necessary, in SPAR, to incorporate a wider range of knowledge types, for 
example a certain amount of knowledge about stereotyped situations, without 
making the mechanism too complex or heterogeneous. 
8.2 The basic CSI mechanism 
In this section I will set out the way Wilks' basic mechanism of applying 
inference rules to build chains is implemented in SPAR and adapted to SPAR's 
representation which, as we have seen, differs in many ways from Wilks' . 
Having seen how and when extractions (analytic inferences) and common 
sense inferences are made, we will look at the circumstances under which a 
match between two inferences (either confirmatory or contradictory) 
warrants the formation of a chain. At several points, I will suggest solutions to 
some important problems not discussed by Wilks . Implementing these 
solutions does not involve making major changes to Wilks' framework; it will 
therefore become apparent that broadly speaking, Wilks' mechanism stands up 
well to closer examination. 
8.2.1 Extraction and CSI 
Just as in Wilks' PS system, the process of building inference chains in SPAR 
consists of two basic operations. The first operation is that of recursively 
making inferences from, on the one hand, story assertions involving 
undetermined anaphors, and, on the other, story assertions involving 
candidate antecedents. The second operation is that of trying to identify 
pairs of inferences so as to form chains which link assertions of the first type 
to those of the second and which thereby bind one or more anaphors to 
candidate antecedents. We will see later why it is necessary to infer both 
"backwards" from assertions involving anaphors and "forwards" from 
assertions involving candidates and combine the results to form chains, rather 
than just, say, inferring backwards from assertions involving anaphors and 
matching the results directly with assertions involving candidates. 
All the matching of rules to inferences and of inferences to one another is 
done using the structure matcher described in chapter 4. 
The following terminology, some of which has already been introduced, will be 
used to describe the inference process in both SPAR and PS. The assertions 
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from which inference begins will be called starting points; those mentioning an 
anaphor are anaphor starting points, while those mentioning a candidate are 
candidate starting points. An inference is a proposition inferred, using an 
inference rule, from a starting point or from an inference already made. 
There are two types of inference rule : analytic extraction rules and 
non-analytic common sense inference (CSI) rules. The inferences made from 
applying these rules are extractions and common sense inferences 
respectively. A sequence of inferences originating from a starting point is a 
tendril ( either an anaphor tendril or a candidate tendril depending on the 
starting point); a chain joining an anaphor starting point to a candidate one is 
constructed by successfully matching the inference at the end of an anaphor 
tendril with that at the end of a candidate tendril. (However, we will see that 
SPAR sometime-s constructs a chain from an anaphor tendril alone.) 
Completing a chain involves making one or more bindings of anaphors to 
candidates. 
In Wilks' PS, applying either an extraction rule or a CSI rule gave rise to a new 
template. The output of an extraction rule followed analytically from its 
input, so the templates output by extraction rules were as certain as their 
inputs and therefore could safely be made permanent. CSI rules, on the other 
hand, produced uncertain and therefore retractable conclusions, probably 
(see footnote 5 in 7.4.1) represented as temporary templates. PS tried first to 
construct "zero point" chains formed using only extraction rules, and if that 
was insufficient, searched for chains involving one CSI rule application, then 
two, and so on up to a preset maximum. 
However, Wilks appears not to have considered the need for extraction rules to 
be applied to the outputs of CSI rules as well as to original templates. We will 
see in this chapter that it is frequently necessary to do so. The process of 
growing tendrils therefore should, and in SPAR does, consist not of applying 
extraction rules and then CSI rules but of applying extraction rules and CSI 
rules alternately. An inference made with an extraction rule does not increase 
the "length" of a chain for the purposes of the Wilksian heuristic that shorter 
chains should be pref erred to longer; the "length" of a chain is a measure of 
its uncertainty, and extraction rules do not involve uncertainty. Chain length 
is therefore defined solely as the number of CSI rule applications involved . 
If extraction rules are applied to the uncertain conclusions of CSI rules then 
the conclusions they produce, though by analytic means, are also uncertain . 
In SPAR, the inferences 1output by both extraction rules and CSI rules are 
therefore temporary, since they may be wrong; they are analogous in form to 
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pieces of TMN. just as Wilks' CSI rules apparently output template-like forms 
analogous to the templates in the story representation prop er . When a 
sentence has been processed and all its anaphors finally resolved, any 
inferenc es made by CSI are thrown away. Inferences only help to resolve 
anaphors , and are not used to augment the TMN permanently. 
In PS, extraction rules were represented as individual procedures while CSI 
rules were pairs of template patterns which could typically be applied in either 
direction_,._ Similarly, SPAR represents extraction rules procedurally and CSI 
rules declaratively, merely because the former tend to be more idiosyncratic 
in content and fewer in number. A CSI rule in SPAR (exemplified below) 
consists of a single pattern of TMN elements, with at least one pair of entry 
and exit points. If the input to a rule matches an entry point, the output will 
be constructed around the corresponding exit point. Most CSI rules can be 
applied in either direction, so that an entry point in one direction can be an 
exit point in the other. However, extraction rules are unidirectional, and this 
is reflected in their being implemented as procedures . 
The basic inference process may be illustrated with two examples. The first 
involves only CSI rules; the second involves only extraction rules . Later we will 
see examples involving both. 
CSI example. 
When SPAR processes the text 
(8-1) [ 1] The soldiers fired at the women. 
[2] We saw several of them fall. 
inference is needed to decide whether "them" refers to the soldiers or the 
women. The chain which leads to the decision that it was the women who fell 
consists of the following inferences, each joined to the last by a CSI rule . The 
English descriplio'ns of each step (slightly modified from those produced by 
SPAR's generator - see appendix C) are as follows: 
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(1) SOME SOLDIERS FIRED AT SOME WOMEN. 
,!, 
(2) A THING STRUCK SOME WOMEN. 
,!, 
(3) SOME WOMEN WERE NOT ALRIGHT. 
matches: 
(4) ref(THEMl-1) l WERE NOT ALRIGHT. 
i 
(5) ref (THEMl-1) FELL. 
A full listing of the CSI rules SPAR uses can be found in appendix D. The CSI 
rule by which (3) is generated from (2) is : 
(STRIKHURT Name of rule (for debugging purposes only). 
((RESULT S H <>)) The result of S may be H, where ... 
(S STRI K (SUBJ P) (OBJE Q)) s represents p striking Q. 
(P :tPHYSOB) P is a physical object 
(Q :tPHYSOB) and so is Q. 
(H BE (SUBJ Q) (STATE WHOLE) (NEG NEG))) 
H represents Q being 
not whole (i.e. not alright) . 
The field (RESULT s H <>) 'relates entry point s to exit point H by saying that an 
event matching S may RESULT in one matching H. The <> indicates that the rule 
is bidirectional: i.e. that we may also use H as an entry point and S as an exit, 
to infer that something being "not whole" may be caused by its being struck. 
However, not all rules work both ways; for example, while it is reasonable to 
infer if A has promised to do X that A will then try to do X, it is not reasonable 
to ' infer, even as a CSI, that if A is trying to do X then it is because A has 
promised to to X. This means that a strategy involving inference in one 
direction only (i.e. only anaphor tendrils, or only candidate tendrils) cannot be 
adequate. Since some inferences can only be made forwards (roughly, 
inferring effects from causes - see 8 .3 below for more detail), and some only 
backwards, a mi:xed strategy involving growing both anaphor and candidate 
tendrils at the same rate is essential if all possible chains are to be found. 
Extraction example . 
Our second example is one requiring only extractions. For the text 
1THEM1-1 is the TMN node representing "them". SPAR genc:·ates the 
pseudo-english phrase ref CTHEMl-1) to avoid ambiguity. 
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(8-2) [ 1] John went to the zoo with Mary. 
[2] They gave the monkeys some bananas, which they ate. 
inference is invoked to decide whether the underlined "they" is the monkeys 
or John and Mary. SPAR assumes that the eating occurred after the giving 
(since, as indicated in chapter 1 when defining the task, all the stories 
processed describe events in chronological order). This time the steps in the 
completed chain are 
( 1) ref CTHEYl-1) GAVE SOME BANANAS TO SOME MONKEYS • 
.!, 
(2) SOME MONKEYS HAD SOME BANANAS. 
matches: 
(3) ref (THEYl-2) HAD SOME BANANAS. 
t 
(4) ref(THEYl-2) ATE SOME BANANAS. 
Extraction rules derive (2) as a necessary result of ( 1). and (3) as a necessary 
precondition of (4); (2) and (3) are then matched to complete a chain. The 
(procedural) rule used to derive (2) from ( 1) can be expressed in English 
roughly as follows : "If someone gives a physical object P to an entity E. then as 
a result, E has P" . 
Note that although the extractions themselves are analytic , the assumption 
that (2) and (3) describe the same state of affairs is not. (It is conceivable 
that the monkeys gave the bananas back, and then John and Mary ate the 
bananas). Thus, as argued initially in 6.2.3, even inference chains constructed 
from entirely analytic ' tendrils are not completely reliable, because an 
uncertain assumption is involved in the final match. 
8.2.2 Completing chains 
Clearly, therefore, we need a criterion for deciding when the two inferences 
matched to form a potential chain have enough in common for the assumption 
involved in the final match to be a safe one; mere consistency is not enough . 
For text (8-1), for example, the similarity between "ref CTHEMl-1) were not 
alright" and " so_me women were not alright" was clearly enough to justify a 
chain being formed . But if we alter the text to read 
(8-3) [ 1] The soldiers fired at the women. 
[2] They were in the street. 
then SPAR will match the inference "the women were not alright" with the 
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representation of [2], and find that the two propositions are consistent. To 
form a chain on the basis of this match would be to make an unreasonable 
assumption, because the two propositions are only distantly related: one 
describes someone's location, and the other describes someone's state . Since 
people have locations and states all the time, there is no good reason to form 
a chain from such a match. 
The heuristic SPAR uses for deciding whether two inferences are similar 
enough to justify forming a chain is that at least two of the bindings resulting 
from matching them should be non-vacuous. A binding is vacuous if the most 
specific WSN element dominating both nodes is a very common primitive such 
as BE, MOVE, or HAVE. That is, since most entities take part most of the time in 
states and events describable by such primitives, a match between two such 
states and events is wholly unremarkable. 
When applied to the matches between the be inferences in our examples (8-1) 
and (8-3), this heuristic gives us the right results : 
(8-1): the two "be-not-alright" nodes are bound, as are the nodes for 
"them" and "the w'omen". Both these bindings are non-vacuous, so 
form a chain. 
(8-3; : the two "be" nodes are bound, as are those for "them" and 
"the women". But the first of these is vacuous (the two nodes' most 
specific shared ancestor is BE), so do not form a chain. 
8.2.3 Single-tendril chains 
There are, as mentioned earlier, circumstances in which a chain can be formed 
directly from a single tendril without the need for any match with a second 
one. This occurs when an inference (or a story assertion) is of a form which 
would be far more plausible if certain elements in it cospecified than if they 
did not : either because if those elements cospecified, then the inference would 
be almost tautologous (such inferences often instantiate "themes" in the 
sense of Schank and Abelson [1977]), or because if they did not, the inference 
would be unlikely to be true . Thus 
(8-4) John promised Bill that he would mend his car. 
contains two pronouns which SPAR resolves in this way. The first is handled 
by a chain which can be described informally as follows: 
(1) People usually make promises about their own actions rather 
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representation of [2], and find that the two propositions are consistent. To 
form a chain on the basis of this match would be to make an unreasonable 
assumption, because the two propositions are only distantly related: one 
describes someone's location, and the other describes someone's state. Since 
people have locations and states all the time, there is no good reason to form 
a chain from such a match. 
The heuristic SPAR uses for deciding whether two inferences are similar 
enough to justify forming a chain is that at least two of the bindings resulting 
from matching them should be non-vacuous. A binding is vacuous if the most 
specific WSN element dominating both nodes is a very common primitive such 
as BE, MOVE, or HAVE. That is, since most entities take part most of the time in 
states and events describable by such primitives, a match between two such 
states and events is wholly unremarkable. 
When applied to the matches between the be inferences in our examples (8-1) 
and (8-3), this heuristic gives us the right results : 
(8-1) : the two "be-not-alright" nodes are bound, as are the nodes for 
"them" and "the w'omen". Both these bindings are non-vacuous, so 
form a chain. 
(8-3;: the two "be" nodes are bound, as are those for "them" and 
"the women" . But the first of these is vacuous (the two nodes' most 
specific shared ancestor is BE), so do not form a chain. 
8.2.3 Single-tendril chains 
There are, as mentioned earlier, circumstances in which a chain can be formed 
directly from a single tendril without the need for any match with a second 
one. This occurs when an inference (or a story assertion) is of a form which 
would be far more plausible if certain elements in it cospecified than if they 
did not: either because if those elements cospecified, then the inference would 
be almost tautologous (such inferences often instantiate "themes" in the 
sense of Schank and Abelson [1977]), or because if they did not, the inference 
would be unlikely to be true. Thus 
(8-4) John promised Bill that he would mend his car. 
contains two pronouns which SPAR resolves in this way. The first is handled 
by a chain which can be described informally as follows: 
(1) People usually make promises about their own actions rather 
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than other people's, so "he" is probably John. 2 
The second pronoun is resolved by a chain constructed along the following 
lines: 
(2) The use of (this sense of) "promise" implies that what is promised 
is something the recipient of the promise is likely to want; therefore 
Bill wants "he" to mend "his car"; therefore Bill wants "his car" to 
function. Since it is almost always true that people want their own 
possessions to function , but not necessarily other people's 
possessions, "his" is probably Bill. 
Inference like this is performed by SPAR using CSI rules which have entry 
points without corresponding exit points, which are unnecessary. These 
NO-EXIT CSI rules are applied like any others, by matching the input with the 
entry point. For a NO-EXIT rule , however, a successful match with an entry 
point leads not to a new inference but to a completed chain. The inference 
rule used in (1) above is 
(FF PROM 
( (NO- EXIT P NIL) 
(RESULT P W >)) 
CP PROM I SEl (SUBJ S) COBJE D)) 
CS •HUM) 
CD ACT (SUBJ S)) 
CW WANT (SUBJ S) (OBJE D))) 
Rule for "fulfilling promises· ; 
Entry point is P for NO-EXIT us e 
(Rule can also be used to infe r results) 
S promises an action D ••• 
.. . where S will perform D. 
irrelevant to NO-EXIT use . 
Wh e n this rule is matched with the "promised" assertion, the variable s is 
bound to the TMN nodes for both "John" and "he", which are therefore bound 
to one another in a chain. 
Sometimes, especially where NO-EXIT rules are involved, a chain serves not to 
bind an anaphor to a particular candidate but to restrict the range of 
plausible candidates for an anaphor . If the text (8-2) continues 
[3] They went to the restaurant. 
2Note that this is only true of deliberate actions, not of events in ge neral. The 
inference rule in·question is not applicable to 
(8-5) John promised his son that he would receive a computer for 
Christmas. 
because receiving is not a deliberate action. Receiving the bicycle is not 
something that "he" will actively bring about; rather, "he" will passive ly have 
it happen to him. Note that if "receive" is altered to "buy", the inference rule 
does become applicable, and "he" is correctly interpreted as "John" . 
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then inference is needed to decide whether John and Mary or the monkeys 
went to the restaurant. From [3] SPAR infers (using mechanisms described 
later in this chapter) that "they" went to the restaurant because they wanted 
to eat. However, this inference relies on "they" being human and not animal. 
There is a NO-EXIT rule to the effect that "X wants Y to eat or drink something" 
is highly plausible if X and Y cospecify; in other words, that the goals of eating 
and drinking can arise spontaneously without any need for further 
explanation based on the story context. The resulting chain binds "they" not 
directly to either John and Mary or the monkeys, but rather to an unidentifi e d 
human (or group o_f humans). This binding, when compared with the 
predictions of the AR rules, enables the arbitrator, the component of SPAR 
that coordinates the predictions of different knowledge sources, to rule out 
the monkeys. 
8.2.4 Negative chains 
All the inference chains we have considered up till now have been positive; 
tha t is, they result from the inference component deciding that two inferences 
confirm one another, and that therefore certain pairs of anaphors and 
antecedents should be identified. SPAR will accept these identifications unless 
they are overridden by other, stronger predictions. However, it can happen 
that two inferences at the ends of tendrils potentially contradict one another, 
or match negatively; that is, they are incompatible if corresponding elements 
in them are identified. But such matches still lead to chains, in the manner 
detailed below. Sometimes, a negative match leads to a negative chain, which, 
rather than predicting that the entities it binds should be identified with one 
another, predicts that they should not be ( or, if there is more than one pair, 
that they should not all be). At other times, a negative match leads to a 
positive chain of the kind we have discussed up till now. 
A simple case of a negative match leading to the formation of a negative chain 
is in 
(8-6) [ 1] John killed Bill. 
[2] He ran away. 
where the AR rules predict that "he" is either John or Bill , and CSI is invoked 
to choose between them. CSI infers, as an analytic consequence of (i.e. an 
extraction from) [ 1], that Bill did not subsequently perform any deliberate 
actions; this would preclude his running away. Comparing this extraction from 
[ 1] with the representation of [2] gives a negative match in which "he" is 
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bound to Bill. A negative chain bL1ding "he" to Bill is therefore returned. Its 
effect is to predict that whoever "he" refers to, it is not Bill. The arbitrator 
notices that this chain clashes with the AR rules' prediction that "he" is Bill; 
the alternative prediction, that "he" is John, is therefore accepted. 
In order to incorporate negative matches and negative chains into our 
inference mechanism, we have to decide both what constitutes '?- negative 
match, and also, it turns out, under what circumstances a negative match 
justifies forming a positive chain rather than the more obvious negative one. 
We will tackle these two problems in order. 
Under what circumstances do two inferences match negatively? One 
circumstance, as just exemplified in the match between "Bill did not perform 
any actions" and "he ran away", is where they would match positively but for 
the fact that one of them is negated. Another is where, assuming the 
appropriate bindings, they represent incompatible propositions about the 
same enlity. The range of such incompatibilities is wide; SPAR is limited to 
assuming the uniqueness at any one time of the state of an object (as 
described by its adj ectival modifiers), its location and its ownership. 
Secondly, what sort of chain (if any) should be formed when a negative match 
is found? The negative match in (8-6) resulted in a negative chain being 
constructed; however, there are situations in which the formation of a positive 
chain seems a more appropriate response to a negative match. For the text 
(8-7) [ 1] The soldiers fired at the women . 
[2] They were not hurt. 
one might reason as follows: a possible consequence of [ 1] ( expressed by a CSI) 
is that the women were hit, and a possible consequence of that is that they 
were hurt. Comparing this inference with [2] would give rise to a negative 
match in which "they" is bound to the women. However, this binding is 
(according to my-intuitions at least) the correct one. In contrast to (8-6), the 
negativity of the match indicates not that the binding is wrong but that 
sentence [2] describes an exception to the normal course of events. In other 
words, a positive and not a negative chain is appropriate here . In general, 
then, how can we_ decide when a negative match should lead to a positive chain 
rather than a negative one? 
On this problem, Wilks [1975b] wrote: 
"My speculation .. .is that there are reasonably well defined 
circumstances of match where negation is vital, and where two 
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template forms that differ by a negation element cannot possibly 
match. However, there are other circumstances ... where a template 
and its negated form can fuzzy-match, if no preferred non-negated 
form can be found. In such circumstances a negated form is a better 
relevance match than nothing ." (Wilks' italics). 
We will now attempt to delimit the "reasonably well defined circumstances" to 
which Wilks refers. 
We first observe that a negative match must indicate one of the following. 
(a) The current sentence describes an unexpected turn of events, as 
in (8-7), where we expected the women to be hurt (i.e. we inferred 
from [1] that they would be), but they were not. In such cases, what 
actually transpires is the negation of what we expect. One of our 
inferences is incorrect (i.e. its negation is true), but the bindings 
produced by the match are in fact correct, and therefore we should 
construct a positive chain to encourage SPAR to accept the bindings. 
(b) The inferences at the ends of both tendrils are correct (i.e. they 
are true of the story) so the bindings that would make them 
contradict each other cannot all be correct (as in (8-6), where "he" 
could not be Bill. because Bill was dead). Therefore we should 
construct a negative chain. 
(c) The inferences at the ends of both tendrils are correct, but the 
relevant bindings are not in fact ruled out, because the inferences 
are true at different times or in different ways, etc. That is, the 
assumption involved in completing the chain - that the two inferences 
describe the same situation - is unwarranted. Therefore we should 
not construct a chain at all. 
When faced with a negative match, which of the explanations (a), (b) and (c) 
should we prefer? Explanation (c) has already been dealt with for positive 
matches by the "non-vacuousness" criterion (section 8.2.2); there is no 
obvious reason to demand a closer negative match than we would a positive 
one . 
Assuming, then, that the non-vacuousness criterion is met, we need 'to be able 
to choose between (a) and (b). If the tendrils contain only extractions, then 
(a) is impossible, because extractions cannot be wrong. However, if CSis are 
involved, then (a) seems prderable. This may be because (a) leads to an 
interpretation that makes the current sentence both more relevant to the 
hearer's expectations (as simulated by the inference process) and more 
informative. Thus in (8-7), if we accept (a) and interpret [2] as asserting that 
the women were not hurt, then [2] is highly relevant to the expectations set 
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up by [ 1]. In contrast, if we accept (b) and interpret [2] as saying that the 
soldiers were not hurt, then [2] is irrelevant to our expectations, and indeed 
almost contentless; having read [ 1], we do not expect to hear about the 
condition of the soldiers. In other words, (a) seems preferable (when it is 
plausible at all in terms of the events described) because it leads to a more 
coherenl interpretation of the story. 
Therefore if either tendril contains a CSI, SPAR accepts (a) and creates a 
positive chain; if not, then (a) is impossible, so it accepts (b) and creates a 
negative chain. 3 
8.3 Constraining inference 
One of the most difficult problems to be overcome in a system that 
understands stories (or any other kind of text) is that of constraining the 
course of inference so as to generate, as far as possible, only inferences which 
are both plausible and relevant. This problem is especially severe in systems 
whose inference is mainly local in range. A number of partial solutions have 
been developed: creating a taxonomy of inference types to limit the kinds of 
inferences t.hat co1,1 ld be generated in particular cases and/or combined 
together (Rieger's MEMORY, Cater's AD-HAC and, on paper, Wilks' PS); interest 
and certainty rat' n"" ' Rieger and Cater); applying saliency measures to rule 
clusters (Hobbs); putting a fixed upper bound on the length of an inference 
path (Wilks); invoking inference only when a specific ambiguity needs to be 
resolved (Wilks); and using focus to constrain inference (Sidner, proposed). 
3These preferences can be influenced by adverbs and conjunctions connecting 
the two sentences (although the grammar of Boguraev's analyser, and hence SPAR. do not cover them). An adversative (Halliday and Hasan [1976]) 
connector such as "but" or "although" biases us towards explanation (a); in 
(8-8) John killed Bill, but he ran away. 
the "but" suggests that the laws of nature have momentarily been suspended, 
and that even our analytic inference (that Bill subsequently performed no 
actions) is incorrect. Conversely, a causal connector like "so" or "therefore" biases us towards (b) ; in 
(8-9) The soldiers fired at the women, so they were not hurt. 
the "so" suggests that the clause that follows it is not abnormal, so that 
"they" is :1.ot the women; we interpret the second clause as meaning that the 
soldiers were not hurt. 
Section 8 .3 179 
This section describes how inference is constrained in SPAR in order to 
enhance both accuracy (i.e. correctness) and efficiency. Accuracy is 
increased by means of a development of Wilks' (1977b] taxonomy of inference 
types, which helps to ensure that the inferences made are plausible ones, 
while efficiency is gained by adopting Sidner's proposal that focus should be 
used to limit the inference process. Using focus in this way helps to ensure 
that only relevant inferences are made: "relevant" in the sense of being likely 
to lead to undetermined anaphors being resolved. 
8.3.1 A taxonomy of inference types 
In a paper written after development of the PS system ceased, Wilks [ 1977b] 
looked at the nature of causal explanations for events, particularly the 
explanations represented by the chains which PS's CSI component 
constructed to resolve pronouns. Working from the assumption that "every 
structure we propose, and every coding of the notion of causality, must be 
related in principle to concrete needs of language analysis" (p238), Wilks 
suggested that only two types of causal connection between events (as 
compared to at least sixteen in Rieger's MEMORY) needed to be distinguished. 
When the deliberate action of an animate agent needed to be explained (to 
resolve a pronoun), an explanation in terms of the agent's goals should be 
sought; whereas for a non-deliberate event or slc,te, an explanation of cause 
(in terms of physical and not mental processes) was to be preferred. Causal 
CSI rules were to be categorised, in both directions of application, as either 
GOAL or CAUSE type. A third, non-causal type of rule, expressing ideas like "If A 
is a part of B, look for B not being a part of A", was categorised as ,IMPLIC, but 
the function of IMPLIC rules in the overall inference scheme, and their place (if 
any) in the implemented PS system, was not discussed. 
An extended version of Wilks' GOAL/CAUSE taxonomy is used in SPAR for both 
extraction rules and CSI rules, and helps to ensure that as far as possible, the 
inferences made, and hence the chains built from them, are plausible ones. 
Because Wilks' choice of names for his inference types is potentially 
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confusing, 4 we will use the terms RESULTS-FROM instead of CAUSE and MOTIVATED-BY 
instead of GOAL. These two types have inverse types RESULT and MOTIVATES 
respectively; inverses are needed because the direction of application of a 
causal rule will depend on whether we are inferring forwards in (story-world) 
time from causes to effects or backwards from effects to causes . (As we saw 
earlier, inference in only one direction is insufficient) . The 
forwards /backwards distinction is a vital one; if it is ignored, we run the risk 
of forming fallacious inference chains. For example, for 
(8-10) [ 1] John gave Bill a banana. 
[2] He ate it. 
we might reason that a precondition of [1] is that John has the banana, and a 
precondition of [2] is that "he" has "it", and then mistakenly match the two 
preconditions. 
The stories processed by SPAR are constrained to chronological order; thus if 
one event is described before another, SPAR assumes it occurred earlier. (At 
the end of this subsection we will look more closely at the implications of this 
assumption). Chronological order in stories implies that, except in certain 
quite rare cases of cataphora which SPAR ignores, candidate starting points 
are always chronologically prior to anaphor ones. SPAR therefore always 
reasons forwards in (story-world) time from candidate starting points and 
backwards from anaphor starting points . (However, some of SPAR's inference 
rules are non-temporal; such rules, which we will examine below, are applied in 
the same way in both backward and forward inference). 
The following possible inferences illustrate informally both types of inference 
(each with its inverse) that we have postulated so far. 
4Specifically: 
( 1) It is not immediately obvious from the name that a "cause inference" from 
an event or state A is a possible cause of A rather than something that A 
possibly causes. 
(2) Whereas we can explain an event with a sentence like "the cause of the 
rock falling off t.he cliff was John pushing it." , we cannot, as Wilks' choice of 
terms might imply, analogously explain an action by saying "the goal of John 
eating a sandwich was that he was hungry". 
(3) Both CAUSE and GOAL are already names of semantic primitives, the first an 
action and the second a case. 
( 4) Since both CAUSE and GOAL are types of causal inference, it is misleading to 
use the term CAUSE for only one of them. 
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"The rock fell off the cliff" 
"John pushed the rock" 
"John ate a sandwich" 
"John was hungry" 
RESULTS-FROM 
RESULT 
MOTIVATED-BY 
MOTIVATES 
"John pushed the rock". 
"The rock fell off the cliff". 
"John was hungry". 
"John ate a sandwich" . 
These inference types are exactly equivalent to Wilks' CAUSE and GOAL types, 
differing from them only in name and in making explicit the 
forwards/backwards distinction. Such a taxonomy does seem, as Wilks 
intended, to cater for those inference rules that can be used to provide causal 
explanations of events. 
However, not all inference rules useful for anaphor resolution are explanatory 
in the sense of giving a satisfactory account of why something happened. (See 
Wilensky [ 1981, l 983] for a detailed theory of explanation in story 
understanding): For the text 
( 8-11) Fred gave John a hammer. He hit Bill with it. 
the underlined pronoun can be resolved by reasoning (a) that Fred giving John 
the hammer resulted in JoLn having the hammer; (b) that whoever hit Bill with 
"it" must have had "it''; and therefore (c) it was John who hit Bill with the 
hammer. Such reasoning is sufficient to resolve the pronoun, and is in some 
broad sense causal. but it does not really explain why John hit Bill. i.e. what 
his motives were. 
The inference mechanism must not treat such broadly causal but 
non-explanatory "enablement" rules in the same way that it treats its 
RESULTS-FROM or MOTIVATED-BY rules. Whereas, according to Wilks' principle, when 
presented with a deliberate action we should ask what it is motivated by (i.e. 
apply MOTIVATED-BY rules), and when presented with a non-deliberate event or 
state we should ask what it results from, enablement inferences are 
appropriate for both categories. In (8-11), an enablement inference helped us 
to resolve a pronoun in a sentence describing a (presumably) deliberate 
action; however, a similar inference would be equally helpful in a 
non-deliberate case such as 
(8-12) Fred gave John a hammer. He dropped it on his big toe. 
We therefore extend our taxonomy to include rules of type ENABLES (temporally 
forwards) and ENABLED-BY (temporally backwards). 
One further category of rule is also necessary. As we saw earlier, SPAR 
resolves the "his" in 
Subsection 8.3.1 182 
(8-13) John promised Bill that he would mend his car. 
by reasoning that what Bill is promised is likely to be something he can be 
expected to want, and that people generally want their own possessions to be 
in working order. The first rule applied here is not causal. at least not in any 
straightforward sense; although there may be some causal relationship (in 
either direction) between John promising to mend the car and Bill wanting it 
mended, the applicability of the rule is based not on any such relationship but 
on an aspect of the meaning of the word "promise" (as opposed to , say, 
" threate n") . Such rules, which represent associative r a the r th a n 
straightforwardly causal relationships, are classified in SPAR und er Lh e 
inference type SUGGESTS; they are used in the same way in both forwa rd and 
backward reasoning . 
Figure 8 .1 summarises SPAR's inference rule taxonomy and the situations in 
which those rules are applied. The taxonomy includes not only the types 
discussed in this section, which derive one inference from another, but also 
the rather different NO-EXIT type, discussed in 8 .2 .3, which constructs a chain 
from a single tendril. 
It should be emphasised that although the taxonomy is partly motivated by 
the intuitive differences between the relationships characterised informally in 
the first column. it is justified by the differences in mode of application 
described in the others. Each type of inference rule is used differently in at 
least one of the following respects: ( 1) whether it is used to extend tendrils or 
directly to complete chains; (2) whether it is sensitive to temporal direction; 
(3) whether, in backward inference, it is applicable to actions, non-actions or 
both. Thus although SPAR's taxonomy is more complex than Wilks', it is still, 
as Wilks [ 1977b J proposed, related to the concrete needs of language analysis. 
It appears that furth er work along these lines would reveal the need for a still 
larger taxonomy, Cater [1981] argues for a taxonomy of eleven types of 
inference, each with its own inverse , largely on the grounds that different 
types are affected differently by the propositions lo which they are applied 
being negated and/or involving "ability" (i.e. the modal verb " can " ). Neither 
negation nor ability have been thoroughly investigated in the present 
research; however, Cater's experience suggests that, if they were, further 
inference type distinctions would become necessary. Thus Wilks ' argument 
that all type distinctions should correspond to processing differences, though 
convincing, does not seem to imply that the size of the taxonomy will be as 
small as Wilks concluded, or even as small as SPAR's . However, a comparison 
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Relationship Rule type for Rule type for In backwards inference, 
characterised forwards backwards applies to actions, 
inference inference non-actions or both? 
No relationship; 
plausibility of 
NO-EXIT NO-EXIT Both single pattern 
only 
Associative 
(not straight-
SUGGESTS SUGGESTS Both forwardly 
causal) 
Enablement 
(broadly 
ENABLES ENABLED-BY Both causal but not 
explanatory) 
Motivational 
(explanatory, 
MOTIVATES MOTIVATED-BY Actions only relating mental 
state to action) 
Resultative 
(explanatory, 
relating RESULT RESULTS-FROM Non-actions only non-action to 
its cause 
Figure 8.1: SPAR's taxonomy of inference rule types 
of SPAR's inference mechanism (including the extensions to be described in 
8 .4 below) with ·those of Cater [1981] and Rieger [1975] suggests that the 
ranges of inferences that each system could in principle perform are roughly 
coextensive; therefore developing SPAR's taxonomy would principally involve 
making finer distinctions between existing kinds of inference rules rather 
than introducing altogether new kinds of rules. 
We conclude our discussion of inference rule types by looking more closely at 
the chronological order restriction and arguing that although it makes the 
inference process simpler, the techniques described in this chapter would still 
be valid (though naturally less complete) if it were removed. 
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If the restriction were removed, the temporal relationship of an anaphor 
starting point and a candidate one could often be deduced from such factors 
as tense, aspect, and whether the starting points described discrete events or 
continuous states. For example, if two discrete events are described in simple 
past tense in successive sentences without temporal modifiers, chronological 
order is virtually certain. However, in cases where the temporal order was 
unclear, it would be necessary to infer in both temporal directions from both 
anaphor and candidate starting points. Even so, the forwards/backwards 
distinction would still be crucial; it would be wrong to mix forwards and 
backwards inferences in the same tendril, or to form a chain from two forward 
tendrils or from two backward ones. The inference mechanism would 
effectively have to do twice as much work (one invocation for each possible 
event ordering), and the arbitrator would have to make sure that the temporal 
relationships implicit in the chains it accepted were consistent (e.g. if one 
chain presupposed A occurring before B. and another chain presupposed the 
opposite, they should not both be accepted) . 
Thus to relax the chronological order constraint, we would need (a) to 
recognise when the temporal ordering of two starting points was potentially 
ambiguous; (b) in cases of such ambiguity, "double up" the present 
mechanism by inferring in both directions from both starting points; and (c) 
ensure · that the temporal relationships presupposed by accepted chains were 
consistent. To implement an approximation to such capabilities would not 
appear to present any overwhelming difficulties, and would in any case only 
involve augmenting the procedures described here and not replacing them. 
Therefore _while the chronological order constraint makes SPAR's task easier, 
the techniques presented here would still be valid (though more complex in 
application) if it were removed. 
8.3.2 Using focussing to constrain inference 
Having looked at SPAR's partial solution to the first aspect of the problem of 
constraining inference - that of generating only plausible inferences - we now 
address the second aspect : ensuring that the inferences made are relevant to 
anaphor resolution, i.e . are about appropriate entities. As we saw earlier, 
Sidner claimed that the predictions of her anaphor interpretation rules could 
be used to constrain inference; however, she did not specify in detail how this 
could be done for "special mode" inference (the inference required to choose 
between several almost equally focussed candidate specifications, rather than 
to assess a single one), and her claim has apparently not previously been 
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tested for such inference, at least in a story processing system. However, 
SPAR's behaviour tests, and in fact supports, Sidner's claim. 
We saw in chapter 6 that when SPAR's inference mechanism is invoked, it is 
handed a list of still-undetermined anaphors and a list of their ,candidate 
specifications as determined by the AR rules, word-sense-oriented semantic 
matching and configurational constraints. These lists of what we will call 
active anaphors and candidates are used in essentially the same way to 
achieve three different ends: to select appropriate starting points for 
inference; to "prune" tendrils to prevent them going off in directions which 
are unlikely to be fruitful; and to terminate inference if and when it has 
produced enough plausible chains. The fact that the results of focussing (and 
other processes) can be used in this way is significant not only because it 
constitutes evidence for Sidner's claim that focussing can be used to 
constrain inference, but also because it is especially important to constrain 
inference in a shallow processing environment where inference has to be as 
simple and as limited as possible. 
The three ways in which the lists of active anaphors and candidates are used 
to constrain inference will now be described. 
( 1) Selecting starting points. As was argued in 7.4.2, it is important to start 
inference only from what is actually asserted in the text: that is, from 
propositions not occurring in intensional contexts. For example, the sentence 
(8-14a) The soldiers fired at the women. 
asserts that a firing took place; but 
(8-14b) The officer ordered the soldiers to fire at the women 
does not, since the soldiers might not have obeyed . In the latter case, we may 
still want to make inferences about the possible effects of the soldiers firing, 
but such inferences must be based on the assumption (itself a CSI) that the 
soldiers obeyed the order; i.e. the firing action is not a valid starting point for 
inference, but should be inferred from such a starting point, thus increasing 
by one the length of any resulting tendrils. 
In general, even if non-assertions are ruled out, we may still have a large 
number of potential starling points for inference, because any of the 
information asserted in a text may be relevant to making inferences useful for 
anaphor resolution. However, this is not true in the specific case of Wilksian 
inference. Because a Wilksian extraction rule or CSI rule is local, its output 
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cannot mention any TMN element - and a fortiori any active anaphor or 
candidate - which is not also mentioned in its input. Since inferences not 
mentioning active anaphors and candidates cannot give rise to useful chains 
(i.e. chains which bind at least one active anaphor to an active candidate) 
there is no reason to take as a starting point any assertion not involving an 
active entity. (Hobbs [ 1976], in his semantic approach to pronoun resolution, 
used the suggestions of his syntactic algorithm similarly to select starting 
points). 
Given these two constraints (the elimination both of non-assertions and of 
assertions not involving active entities), selecting the set of anaphor starting 
points is straightforward, since the single current sentence in which the 
anaphors occur will contain only a few assertions. Any of these assertions 
which involve an active anaphor therefore qualify as starting points . On the 
other hand, there are potentially many candidate starting points in the 
context, even when the two constraints are applied to these, because an active 
candidate may have been involved in many previous asserlions. SPAR 
therefore selects a handful (typically three to five) of assertions representing 
either states (which may still hold) or recent events (which , although finished, 
may be:: relevant to what is described in the current sentence). Because only a 
few of the assertions in the context are selected, the amount of inference 
done is much reduced. The exact heuristics for selecting candidate starting 
points were arrived at on a trial and error basis, and their specific detail is of 
no special importance; however, they normally succeed in picking out all the 
assertions necessary for inference and not too many irrelevant ones . When 
they fail to do this, or indeed when an error of any other kind is made during 
inference, incorrect chains may be constructed or correct ones may be 
missed; but in such cases, as we saw in 6.4.2, other components of the system 
usually produce enough correct predictions to ensure that anaphors are 
eventually resolved correctly. 
(2) Constraining the course of infe rence . Just as all anaphor and candidate 
slarting points are assertions mentioning active anaphors and candidate s, so 
SPAR only retains an inference if that inference mentions an active entity. If 
it does not, then it cannot lead to any useful chains; and, because of the 
slrictly local nature of the inference rule s, neither can any further infe r e nces 
derived from it. For example, in the third sentence of the story beginning 
(8-15) [ 1] John promised Bill that he would mend his car. 
[2] He took it to his friend's garage. 
[3] He tried to persuade his friend that he should lend him 
some tools. 
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the AR rules determine that possible specifications (i.e. active candidates) for 
both of the underlined pronouns are John and John's friend, but not Bill (who 
has drifted out of focus). The inference mechanism is then invoked to resolve 
these pronouns. During forward inference, SPAR infers from [ 1] that Bill 
wants John to mend the car, and then that Bill wants the car to function (a 
consequence of mending it). However, since this second inference does not 
mention either of the active candidates (John and John's friend) it is thrown 
away as soon as it is made, because it cannot contribute to any useful chain. 
(3) Terminating inference. The sets of active anaphors and candidates can be 
used to constrain not only the starling points and course d inference but also 
its conclusions. We have seen that Wilks envisaged inference terminating when 
all "problem pronouns" (in our terms, "active anaphors") had been bound by 
a completed chain, or when all possible inferences up to a preset maximum 
length had been made, whichever occurred sooner. 
A modification to this principle is required (though only approximately 
implemented, as described below) in SPAR. Because of the way completed 
chains are incorporated into the overall anaphor resolution process, there will 
be occasions on which inference can be stopped before every active anaphor 
has been bound by r:1. chain; and there will be other occasions when inference 
should riot be stopped even though every active anaphor has been bound. 
A possible occasion of the first type is as follows. In 
(8-16) [1] John was in a foul mood. 
[2] He saw Bill. 
[3] He shouted at him. 
inference will be required for [3], with active anaphors "he" and "him" and 
active candidates John and Bill. If SPAR had a CSI rule to the effect that a 
possible reason for shouting is being in a bad mood, it would be able to form a 
chain binding "he" -to John. Although the chain would not bind "him", it would 
in fact enable the arbitrator to resolve both anaphors , because the MGC 
constraint would prevent "he" and "him" cospecifying. 
Conversely, binding every active anaphor is not always sufficient grounds for 
terminating inference, since the arbitrator may later reject some of the 
chains involved as incompatible with the predictions of the AR rules, with 
configuralional constraints, or with shorter chains. If this happens, any 
anaphors which could have been resolved by further inference will not be. 
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the AR rules determine that possible specifications (i.e. active candidates) for 
both of the underlined pronouns are John and John's friend, but not Bill (who 
has drifted out of focus) . The inference mechanism is then invoked to resolve 
these pronouns. During forward inference, SPAR infers from [1] that Bill 
wants John to mend the car, and then that Bill wants the car to function (a 
consequence of mending it). However, since this second inference does not 
mention either of the active candidates (John and John's friend) it is thrown 
away as soon as it is made, because it cannot contribute to any useful chain. 
(3) Terminating inference. The sets of active anaphors and candidates can be 
used to constrain not only the starting points and course d inference but also 
its conclusions. We have seen that Wilks envisaged inference terminating when 
all "problem pronouns" (in our terms, "active anaphors") had been bound by 
a completed chain, or when all possible inferences up to a preset maximum 
length had been made, whichever occurred sooner. 
A modification to this principle is required (though only approximately 
implemented, as described below) in SPAR. Because of the way completed 
chains are incorporated into the overall anaphor resolution process, there will 
be occasions on which inference can be stopped before every active anaphor 
has been bound by n chain; and there will be other occasions when inference 
should not be stopped even though every active anaphor has been bound. 
A possible occasion of the first type is as follows. In 
(8-16) [ 1 J John was in a foul mood. 
[2] He saw Bill. 
[3] He shouted at him. 
inference will be required for [3], with active anaphors "he" and "him" and 
active candidates John and Bill. If SPAR had a CSI rule to the effect that a 
possible reason for shouting is being in a bad mood, it would be able to form a 
chain binding "he'. ' to John. Although the chain would not bind "him", it would 
in fact enable the arbitrator to resolve both anaphors, because the MGC 
constraint would prevent "he" and "him" cospecifying . 
Conversely, binding every active anaphor is not always sufficient grounds for 
terminating inference, since the arbitrator may later reject some of the 
chains involved as incompatible with the predictions of the AR rules, with 
configurational constraints, or with shorter chains. If this happens, any 
anaphors which could have been resolved by further inference will not be. 
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These two situations can only be reliably recognised by the arbitrator. The 
most efficient way to proceed would therefore be to make the inference 
mechanism suspend (not terminate) whenever a chain (or chains) was formed 
which was not obviously implausible (for example by breaking a 
configurational constraint or binding an active anaphor to an inactive 
candidate) . If the arbitrator then concluded that all anaphors were finally 
resolved, no more inference would be needed; if it did not, inferenc~ would be 
restarted, looking for chains one step longer. 
SPAR implements an approximation to this behaviour by rejecting chains 
which break a configurational constraint or which conflict with the AR rules by 
binding an active anaphor to an inactive candidate. It also rejects as useless 
chains which do not bind active anaphors at all. As we saw earlier, inference 
terminates as soon as every anaphor is bound by an unrejected chain or when 
the maximum chain length has been reached. In practice this usually means 
that the right amount of inference is done. 
8.4 Extending the basic mechanism 
In this chapter, we have until now accepted Wilks' inference ideas fairly 
uncritically. We have concentrated on fleshing them out and on making the 
minimum of alterations necessitated by the differences between PS and SPAR 
in areas such as representation and the role of focus. However, one possible 
objection to Wilks' model of inference is that, like Rieger's and Charniak's early 
theories, its restriction to only local inference and mainly causal knowledge 
seriously limits the kind of reasoning we can expect it to perform. In this 
section we will see how three further kinds of reasoning are built into SPAR's 
inference mechanism. These additions significantly extend the mechanism 
described so far but retain the concepts and apparatus that make Wilks' 
theory of inference attractive. The additions involve exploiting, respectively, 
( 1) knowledge about the stereotyped behaviours associated with specific 
objects and places, which has often been represented using scripts; (2) 
knowledge about how the goals of an actor relate to his actions and to one 
another; and (3) ·very weak rules which can act as a backup when the normal 
rules fail, as they often will in a shallow processing framework, to bind all the 
unresolved anaphors. 
The use of these kinds of inference in SPAR. integrated with the inference 
methods discussed up till now, suggests that a chain-based mechanism such as 
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Wilks' may be capable of detecting a rather wider variety of connections 
between events than those detected by Wilks' PS system. However, in 
accordance with the shallow processing approach, none of the three 
extensions requires significant extra knowledge to be added to the system. 
They are integrated with the rest of the inference process in such a way as not 
to alter its essentially uniform (as opposed to heterogenous) character. In 
particular, the extensions are orthogonal to the taxonomy of inference types 
developed earlier, in that they provide new ways of making inferences of those 
types, rather than adding to the number of types. 
8.4.1 Object-oriented inference 
In order to perform the kind of object-related, stereotyped inference often 
achieved by means of scripts ( e .g. Cullingford [ 1978]) or frames (Charniak 
[1978]), SPAR accesses the information in formulas for noun senses to reason 
about possible events connected with objects described by those noun senses . 
Such object-related knowledge is normally present only in these formulas, 
since little detailed world knowledge is available to a shallow processing 
system. Of course, the knowledge available in a formula will typically be far 
less extensive than that in a script; for example, while a script in SAM could 
contain over a hundred event patterns (Cullingford [ 1981]), a formula in SPAR 
normally mentions at most only the most central action or two associated with 
a noun sense. Nevertheless, this central information is often all that is 
required for our purposes. 
SPAR exploits object-related knowledge by means of a special mechanism 
which, like a CSI rule, generates a new inference from an old one. Once 
generated, the new inference is treated just like any other; it becomes part of 
a tendril, and may form part of a completed chain. Thus whereas some story 
or text understanding systems that have used scripts (or other knowledge 
structures linking · sets of events together) have not made significant use of 
other inference methods (e.g. SAM. FRUMP (DeJong [ 1979]) , IPP (Lebowitz 
[1980]); but contrast BORIS (Dyer [1982])), in SPAR object-oriented inference 
is fully integrated into the overall inference engine, and can be freely mixed 
with other kinds -0f inference. 
The main idea behind SPAR's object-oriented inference can be stated as 
follows: 
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If an object O has a formula which defines it in terms of a generic 
event or action E which has precondition P involving 0, then it is 
sensible to infer E from P as a common sense inference (of type 
ENABLES). 
That is, if a precondition for an event associated with an object is satisfied, it 
is sensible to infer that the event will occur. For example, if "restaurant" is 
defined (using the intermediate-style formula for clarity) by 
RESTAURANTl: (PLACE2 (0) 
(WHICH 
CEATl (1) 
(TYPE (GEN)) 
(SUBJ (MAN (2))) 
(IN (PLACE2 (0)))))) 
("a place in which people GENerically (i.e. habitually) eat") then SPAR can 
establish by extraction that a precondition of the EAT! action taking place is 
that the MAN should be located IN the restaurant. This relationship intuitively 
seems r eversible: if it is asserted or inferred that a particular person is in a 
restaurant, we may want to infer that that person will eat there. Similarly, if a 
tool is defined as an instrument with which people mend things, and if we are 
told that someone has some tools (a precondition for using them to mend 
something), we may want to infer that they will mend something with those 
tools . 
This form of inference is implemented in SPAR using the extraction rules 
which are part of the normal inference process to establish the appropriate 
preconditions. It works as follows. 
Suppose that, during forward inference (i.e. inference from candidate starting 
points) SPAR comes across an inference involving a RESTAURANTl: for example (in 
simplified notation) 
(8-17) (BE (SUBJ JOHNl-1) (IN RESTAURANTl-1)) 
(i.e . John is in a particular restaurant) . It looks for any action or event 
subformulas in the formula for RESTAURANTl (as represented in the word sense 
network) and finds the one headed EATl. It then constructs, from the EATl 
subformula, a provisional inference representing the supposition that some 
person eats in the restaurant: say 
(8-18) CEATl (SUBJ MAN-23) (IN RESTAURANTl-1)) 
where MAN-23 is a newly-generated token. SPAR then applies backward 
extraction rules to this provisional inference to find out what the 
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preconditions of such an eating event would be. If any of the resulting 
extractions matches the original inference involving the RESTAURANT!, SPAR adds 
the EATl inference (with suitable substitvtions), as a CSI, to the tendril 
containing the original inference. One backward extraction from (8-18) is 
(8-19) CBE (SUBJ MAN-23) (IN RESTAURANTl-1)) 
The match with the original inference (8-17) succeeds, giving a single binding 
MAN-23=JOHN1-1. This binding is substituted into the provisional inference (8-18) 
to give the common sense inference 
(8-20) (EATl (SUBJ JOHNl-1) (IN RESTAURANTl-1)) 
which is added to the tendril headed by (8-17) just as if it had been derived by 
a straightforward CSI rule. 
One problem encountered by script-based story understanders is that of when 
a script should be invoked. While it might be sensible to invoke a 
"restaurant-meal" script on hearing that "John went to the restaurant", it 
would not be sensible to do so on hearing "John drove past a restaurant". As 
just described, SPAR tackles this problem by only making an object-oriented 
inference when there is a match with an extraction. Thus while "John went to 
the restaurant" will give rise to a RESULT extraction "John was at the 
restaurant" which in turn will generate an object-oriented inference "John will 
eat in the restaurant" in the way described above, nothing comparable will be 
derived from an event like "John drove past a restaurant", because that event 
does not in any simple way imply that anyone in particular was in the 
restaurant. 
The analogy between SPAR's object-oriented inference and script-based story 
understanding yields a further interesting perspective on the problems of 
script activation and _interaction. If Wilks' heuristic of pref erring shorter 
chains to longer is reliable (and of course this remains unproven), then there 
is no need to decide separately when a "script" should be activated (i.e. 
whether an object-oriented inference should be made), or to worry about 
competition between scripts. This is because tendrils which do not lead to 
completed chains have no effect on subsequent processing, so a script will 
effectively only turn out to be "active" if it contributes to a tendril which 
enables a chain to be constructed; and competition between two scripts which 
contribute to different chains will be resolved by preferring the shorter chain. 
Thus making an object-oriented inference does not in itself constitute 
activating a script. 
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The mechanism could be further prevented from occasionally making 
implausible inferences by ruling that the elements substituted into an 
object-oriented inference (in our example, JOHNl-1) must not have any close 
prior connection to the object giving rise to the inference. Whereas it is 
plausible to infer from "John went to the restaurant" that John will eat. there, 
it. is much less plausible to infer from "The waiter went to the restaurant." that. 
the waiter will eat. there, because a wait.er has a special relationship to a 
restaurant which does not involve eating. Alt.hough this constraint of not 
making object-oriented inferences in the presence of such special 
relationships is not yet implemented in SPAR, there seems no reason why it 
should not be. 
The most obvious limitation of SPAR's object-oriented reasoning capability is 
that, because of its shallow processing approach, it has access to far less 
information than a script. applier such as SAM. Whereas, say, a SAM-style 
restaurant. script. will mention many events, such as entering, sit.ting, ordering, 
eating, paying and leaving, a formula for a noun like "restaurant." will 
normally only mention the most. central event.: in this case, eating. However, 
the gaps can sometimes be filled by rule-based CSI; for example, if there is a 
CSI rule which says that people often pay for things they are given, there may 
be no need to specify separately that paying is something done by the 
customer in a restaurant, but not by the waiter or the cook. 
8.4.2 Goal-oriented inference 
Like object-oriented inference, goal-oriented inference in SPAR is based on a 
simple observation and a consequent extension of the inference mechanism 
which allows a certain kind of reasoning to be incorporated. For goal-oriented 
inference, the observation (which in it.self is far from original, but which allows 
a novel extension to SPAR's reasoning and turns out to be surprisingly 
productive) is as follows : people's goals can be explained by modelling the 
inferences they make about the consequences of actions and events in the 
world. Goal-oriented inference can therefore be viewed as the dual of normal, 
"event-oriented" inference in the sense that if we want t.o explain (by 
backwards inference) why someone has the goal that a p a rticular event should 
occur, we should simulate (by forward inference) that person's reasoning 
about what the consequences of that event might. be. 
Such simulation can lead to the resolution of pronouns. In 8.2.2, whe n we 
looked at the inference SPAR performs to resolve the pronouns in 
Subsection 8 .4 .2 193 
(8-21) John promised Bill that he would mend his car. 
we in fact glossed over a goal-oriented inference: the inference that if Bill 
wants "he" to mend "his car" then "Bill" wants "his car" to function. 
Specifically, the reasoning involved is as follows . 
When applied to the representation of (8-21) during backwards inference , a 
rule of type SUGGESTS gives the following inference (in simplified form) : 
(WANT 
(SUBJ BILLl-1) 
(OBJE 
(MENDl 
(SUBJ HEl-1) 
(OBJE (CARl-1 
(POSS HISl-1)))))) 
(Bill wanted "he" to mend "his car") . When SPAR tries to make further 
backward inferences from this one, it sees that the head primitive is WANT; i.e. 
that the inference describes someone's goal. It therefore applies forward 
inference rules to the embedded MENDl structure. Because MENDl is defined in 
the word sense network as "CAUSE to FUNCtion", the inference (in fact an 
extraction) is made that the MENDing will result in the car functioning. This 
inference is made in the same context that contained the MEND! pattern; thus 
SPAR derives the backward inference 
(WANT 
(SUBJ BILLl-1) 
(OBJE 
(FUNC 
(SUBJ (CARl-1 
(POSS HISl-1)))))) 
(Bill wanted "'his car" to function) which, when subsequently hand e d to a NO-EXIT 
rule, allows HISl-1 to be identified with BILLl-1. 
In m a king this goal-oriented inference , SPAR effectively assumes that Bill is a 
rational person, and infers that if he wants some event to occur, then he will a lso 
want the predictable consequences of that event. 
This simple device makes whatever knowledge SPAR has about the way events 
proceed in the world applicable also to reasoning about an actor's goals . No special 
infere nce rules applying exclusively to goals (and not to actual story events) are 
are required, although of course there are some rules that relate events lo the 
goals that they result from and give rise to. This feature of SPAR contrasts with 
PAM (Wilensky [1981]) whose rule base explicitly contained, for example, the 
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information that the goal of satisfying one's hunger might give rise to the plan of 
eating at a restaurant. Using a mechanism such as SPAR's, such a relationship 
could be inferred from the straightforwardly causal knowledge, which would 
presumably be required anyway, that eating (in a restaurant or elsewhere) 
normally results in one's hunger disappearing. 
The use of the same inference rules for both goal-oriented and "event-oriented" (i.e. top level in the story world) inference relies on several assumptions which, 
while not always true, are arguably sufficiently reliable to be be justified in a 
shallow processing system. The main such assumptions are: 
( 1) that the actor 's inference processes are similar to SPAR's, and that therefore SPAR can "model" those processes by putting itself in his position. This assumption is unlikely to be completely right, because of the severe limitations of SPAR's reasoning processes 
compared to those of people, and because people do not always think 
rationally. However, there is no reason why the errors resulting from 
such discrepancies should be any worse than those occurring during 
ordinary event-oriented inference. 
(2) that the actor's knowledge and beliefs about the world of the 
story are the same as SPAR's. This assumption too is clearly not 
always true, but arguably is true often enough to justify performing goal-oriented inference in this way in a shallow processing framework. Reasoning about situations where an actor 's picture of the world differs from the truth is a very hard problem. 
Thus there is no reason to suppose the goal-oriented inference SPAR performs 
is any less accurate than event-oriented inference. While there is clearly far 
more to reasoning about goals and plans than is covered by SPAR, the 
mechanism described is surprisingly useful, accurate and flexible. 
8.4.3 Weak inference rules 
So far in this section we have seen how SPAR's Wilksian inference mechanism 
is extended to perform object-oriented and goal-oriented reasoning . Both of 
these types of reasoning are fully integrated into the tendril-growing and 
chain-forming process. We now examine a third extension to the mechanism 
which, rather than augmenting it in the way the other two do, provides an 
alternative backup procedure for use when the main mechanism fails to bind 
all the undetermined anaphors. In a shallow processing system, such failures 
can be expected to occur quite often. 
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When the inference methods described so far can find no chain connecting an 
anaphor starting point to a candidate one, SPAR applies a number of weak 
inference rules to bind anaphors to candidates. These rules are also used to 
form chains, but in order to be able to "trap" situations where normal CSI 
rules are inapplicable, they have to be widely applicable and therefore 
extremely general in content. Their weakness is a consequence of their 
generality; while they are hopefully true more often than not, they apply to 
such a wide variety of situations that they tend to be less reliable than 
ordinary inference chains, even those of maximum length. Another 
consequence of the weak inference rules' generality is that there is no point in 
combining them to form chains, either with each other or with extraction and 
CSI rules; if this were done, every active anaphor would be bound to virtually 
every active candidate, and the results would be of little use. Weak rules 
therefore either bind anaphors to candidates by directly comparing an 
anaphor starting point with a candidate one, or by examining an anaphor 
starting point only (in the same way as a NO-EXIT rule). 
SPAR uses a weak inference rule to resolve the underlined pronoun in the 
following story fragment. 
(8-22) [ 1] Mary wanted to buy Susan a present. 
[2] She thought that she would like a computer. 
[3] She went to the shop which sold them. 
A more powerful story understander such as PAM might resolve the underlined 
"she" as "Mary" by reasoning that Mary is carrying out actions to fulfil her 
plan of getting a computer to give to Susan as a present. However, SPAR's 
inference engine resolves the pronoun by means of a weak inference rule, by 
reasoning that sentence [2] (and indeed [ 1]) mentions only Mary and not 
Susan at "top level" outside an intensional context, since Susan participates 
in the story only in the context of Mary's thoughts. (We assume that the 
pronouns in [2] have been resolved as "Mary" and "Susan" respectively). It is 
therefore likely that the top level "she" in [3] refers to Mary rather than 
Susan, because Susan is in some sense not present in the scene set up by [ 1] 
and [2], while the referent of "she" in [3] is present in this scene. This 
inference uses only linguistic information that SPAR already has (since the 
"context of identity" of each node has been calculated) . 
SPAR's weak inference mechanism is comparatively undeveloped (in fact only 
three weak rules are implemented), so no very specific claims can be made for 
it. However, something along these lines is needed to rectify the inevitable 
failings of the inference mechanism of a shallow processing system. 
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8.5 Summary and evaluation 
We began this chapter by looking in some detail at the kind of world knowledge 
that should be encoded in a shallow processing system. It was argued that the 
total amount of world knowledge in the system should not greatly exceed the 
amount of linguistic knowledge. As a consequence of this, the knowledge 
encoded should have two main characteristics. It should be as general as 
possible (i.e. applicable to a wide range of situations); and it should be as brief 
and succinct as possible, with only the essentials of each fact being 
represented. The inference component that exploited this knowledge should 
be a simple, uniform one, but should be able to discriminate between the 
contradictory chains of reasoning that would inevitably arise. Wilks' model of 
inference seemed a promising basis for such a mechanism. 
Each of the next three sections of the chapter described some aspect of 
SPAR's inference mechanism and attempted to answer a question about 
Wilksian inference in a Sidnerian, shallow-processing environment. The three 
questions, and the answers suggested, were as follows. 
( 1) Do Wilks' basic ideas on inference seem plausible under closer examination 
and more thorough testing? 
In section 8 .2 we looked at how SPAR grows tendrils and joins them 
together to form anaphor-binding chains. We found that although 
Wilks' techniques did not appear to need major modification, some 
alterations were necessary. Firstly, extraction has to be interleaved 
with CSI rather than just preceding it. Secondly, not all matches 
between inferences justify forming a chain; we had to develop a 
heuristic for deciding when a match was close enough for a chain to 
be formed. Thirdly, a single tendril can sometimes appropriately be 
used to form a chain by means of a NO-EXIT rule. Fourthly, we looked 
at the problem of negative or contradictory matches, and formulated 
a rule for deciding whether the resulting chain (if any) should be 
positive or negative. The answer to question ( 1) is therefore a 
qualified "yes". 
(2) Does Sidner's framework significantly reduce the difficulty and amount of 
CSI needed for - anaphor resolution, as she claims? If so, how? In what 
additional ways can Wilksian inference be controlled so as to maintain 
accuracy and efficiency? 
In section 8.3 we distinguished two aspects of the problem of 
controlling inference: ensuring that its content was plausible, and 
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ensuring that the right entities were inferred about. We tackled the 
first aspect by extending Wilks' taxonomy of causal explanations to 
include non-explanatory and non-causal inference rules and to make 
explicit the distinction between temporally forward and backward 
inference. We saw how SPAR uses this extended taxonomy in an 
attempt to ensure that the right inferences are made at the right 
times, so as to maintain the accuracy of the inference process. 
We tackled the second aspect of the control problem by using the 
predictions of the AR rules to constrain the way in which inference 
was begun, carried forward and terminated. All starting points, 
inferences and chains had to involve active anaphors and candidates . 
This procedure made explicit the means by which, as Sidner 
suggested, focus can be used to constrain inference. 
Thus inference should be (and is, in SPAR) controlled both in the 
focus-based way Sidner suggests and by enforcing constraints based 
on an inference rule taxonomy. 
(3) How can a Wilksian inference mechanism be extended to make best use of 
the limited amounts of general world knowledge that are available to it in a 
shallow processing system? How can it take maximum advantage of the 
available linguistic knowledge, especially that provided by word sense 
formulas? In terms of the classification of inference mechanisms given in 
chapter 7, does extending the mechanism in these two ways make it 
specialised, heterogeneous or uniform? 
In section 8.4 we saw how SPAR's inference mechanism extends Wilks' 
framework in three ways . Firstly, in accordance with the shallow 
processing requirement that linguistic knowledge should be used as 
fully as possible, information in the formulas for noun senses is used 
to make the kind of stereotyped, "object-oriented" inferences that 
some systems have made using scripts or similar structures. 
Secondly, SPAR reasons about an actor's goals by simulating, in a 
limited way, the actor's own inference processes; this makes all the 
inference rules used for story-level inference available to 
goal-oriented inference . Thirdly, if the normal inference mechanism 
does not bind all active anaphors, a backup mechanism using very 
general, very weak rules is invoked. This mechanism has not been 
thoroughly tested, but constitutes some indication of what can be 
done to compensate for the lack of extensive detailed world 
knowledge. 
The first two of these extensions are thoroughly integrated into the 
basic tendril-growing mechanism; the third is not, but instead stands 
ready to step in when the basic mechanism fails. Thus SPAR's 
inference component deals with several different types of world 
knowledge using relatively little special machinery, and therefore 
qualifies as a nearly uniform system. 
Section 8.5 198 
, II 
Appendix C consists of SPAR's own commentary on its anaphor resolution 
process. The commentary shows the inference chains that are made in several 
stories, including some of those used as examples in this chapter. Appendix C, 
together with appendices A and B, aim to show how far SPAR's inference 
mechanism and rules are robust enough to work successfully on a range of 
stories . Some of the stories are fairly similar as wholes, but have specific 
differences of anaphor resolution; these are intended to demonstrate that the 
inference mechanism, in tandem with other parts of the system, is sensitive 
enough to make the right inferences at the right times. Other stories are very 
different in content, and show how SPAR. unlike some earlier systems, is not 
restricted to processing stories of a particular type. 
The problem of inference is a very complex one, and it cannot be maintained 
that anything approximating to a complete solution to it has been presented 
here. Instead, we have attempted to show that a system which lacks extensive 
detailed and specialised world knowledge can still exhibit flexible and 
surprisingly powerful inference behaviour which can make an important 
contribution to resolving anaphors. Whether this behaviour is flexible and 
powerful enough to be useful in a "real" text processing system of some kind 
remains to be seen; however, the evidence presented in this chapter gives 
some modest grounds for optimism. 
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9. Paraphrase generation in SPAR 
This chapter describes SPAR's English generator, which provides sentence by 
sentence paraphrases of the stories SPAR processes. Such paraphrases 
enable the reader to determine what interpretation has been assigned to each 
linguistic ambiguity in the input. A paraphrase of each input sentence is 
generated immediately after the sentence has been interpreted by SPAR. 
rather than after the whole text has been processed, to ensure that 
information from later sentences is not used in the paraphrase; such 
information is not available when making the interpretation decisions that the 
paraphrase is intended to reflect, and so it would be inappropriate to include 
it in the paraphrase. 
To build a suitable generator, we must answer two questions: 
( 1) what sort of paraphrases do we want? and 
(2) what techniques should we use to derive those paraphrases from 
pieces of SPAR's meaning representation? 
The answers to these questions are interdependent: obviously, we need to 
know what we are trying to achieve before we can design the generator; on the 
other hand, and less obviously, the detailed nature of the desired paraphrases 
is more usefully specified in terms of the structure of the generator than in 
purely linguistic terms. In this chapter, we therefore progress from the 
general to the specific, addressing questions ( 1) and then (2) in turn at each 
level of generality. 
Thus sections 9.1 and 9.2 present some general answers to ( 1) and (2) 
respectively. In 9.1 we look at the properties SPAR's paraphrases must have if 
they are to provide support for the claims made in this thesis, and we 
conclude that, first and foremost, the paraphrases must show what choices 
have been made in resolving ambiguities: chiefly the anaphoric ambiguities 
that SPAR is primarily intended to resolve, but also the lexical and structural 
ones that Boguraev's analyser cannot resolve in isolation. 
In the light of this conclusion, in section 9.2 we answer question (2) also in 
general terms. This is done in two stages. Firstly, we review relevant previous 
work in generation, especially that of Tait (Tait and Sparck Jones [ 1983]) and 
that of McDonald [1981]. Secondly, we propose that SPAR's generator should 
have the following components: 
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(a) A strategic component which decides what information should be 
expressed in the paraphrase of the current sentence. This 
component takes the TMN (text model network) node representing 
the main event described by the current sentence and derives from it 
a Boguraev-style dependency structure containing all and only the 
required information. 
(b) A tactical component which decides how this information should 
be expressed. This component, which is based on Tait's generator, 
turns the dependency structure into a surface syntactic tree and 
then into an English sentence. 
Having established our general framework, in sections 9 .3 and 9.4 we move on 
to specifics. In 9.3 we return to question (1); we develop some specific 
linguistic rules for ensuring as far as possible that the paraphrases satisfy the 
requirement established in 9 .1 (that the paraphrases should make clear 
ambiguity resolutions) in the areas of lexical, structural and anaphoric 
ambiguity. These rules are expressed in terms of the generator structure 
outlined in 9 .2. We then, in section 9 .4, revert to question (2) and answer it in 
detail; thus we show how the specific rules established in 9.3 are embodied in 
SPAR's generator, illustrating the generator's operation with examples. 
Finally in section 9 .5 we summarise and evaluate the generator. 
9.1 What should a paraphrase achieve? 
In chapter 4, SPAR's meaning representation was justified not on independent 
grounds but by assuming the general validity of Wilks' and Boguraev's 
arguments for their respective representations, adapting those arguments as 
r e quired . In the same way, we will begin this section by summarising 
Boguraev's approach to paraphrase generation, set out in detail in Boguraev 
[ 1979]. Having summarised Boguraev's approach, we will show how it is 
applicable, with certain important modifications, to our concerns. 
Boguraev's approach is highly relevant because he was concerned, as I am, 
with demonstra~ing ambiguity resolution by means of paraphrase; other 
language processing systems that produce paraphrases, e .g . cooperative 
systems , have tend to use paraphrase as a means to an end such as query 
clarification or verification rather than as the final output of the system. 
Also, as chapter 4 showed, SPAR's representation is in many ways sirr:ilar to 
Boguraev's, from which it is derived. 
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We will not try to formulate a precise definition the notion of paraphrase; as 
Boguraev observes, "there is no strict definition of what should be accepted as 
a good paraphrase of a sentence ... One man's paraphrase is another man's 
corruption of meaning" . According to Smith and Wilson [1979], ··a sentence 
which expresses the same proposition (has the same meaning) as another 
sentence is a paraphrase of that sentence ... Paraphrase is to sentences as 
synonymy is to lexical items". However, just as exact synonymy between 
lexical items is very rare, so adopting a definition such as Smith and Wilson's 
will not allow us to generate a range of paraphrases wide enough lo provide 
convincing evidence of the system's capabilities. We will therefore operate 
with a relatively informal notion of paraphrase, and aim to produce 
paraphrases which, while they may not always have exactly the same meaning 
as the input, are related to it in such a way as to demonstrate that 
appropriate interpretation decisions have been made. 
9.1.1 Boguraev's view of paraphrase 
Boguraev intended the · paraphrases his generator produced to achieve two 
main purposes: firstly, to allow a more reliable evaluation of the meaning 
structures produced by the analyser than inspecting them directly would 
provide, and secondly, to demonstrate that the structures possessed three 
properties, which we will label (Bl)-(B3) for future reference: 
(B 1) they represented correct interpretations; 
(B2) they were sufficiently coherent and informative for a generator 
to produce paraphrases from them without access to the original 
input sentence; and 
(B3) they were far enough removed from the input sentence to 
achieve a degree of normalisation that enabled paraphrases with a 
variety of word orders to be generated. 
In order to achieve these aims, a paraphrase should be a grammatical 
sentence that reflects the nature of the dependency structure from which it 
was derived; however, it must differ from the input sentence enough to show 
what choices had been made in resolving lexical and structural ambiguities 
and also to demonstrate that the representalion is not too dependent on the 
input sentence's word order. Boguraev notes that "paraphrasing a sentence 
by itself, however genuine the processing involved, is not very convincing" . 
(SPAR's generator does sometimes produce a paraphrase identical to the input 
sentence, but only when the input contains no ambiguities, i.e. when SPAR's 
interpretative task is comparatively trivial. In such cases, the interesling 
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ambiguity problems are elsewhere in the text.) 
A paraphrase can differ from the original sentence in many ways, ranging from 
simple word replacement: 
"John struck Mary"--+ "John hit Mary" 
to extensive reformulation involving explicit and perhaps complex inference or 
summarising: 
" The President declared that he could not commit himself to 
endorsing ... " --+ "The President refused to endorse .. . " 
Boguraev argued that while, for his purposes, explicit inference was 
unnecessary, simple word replacement was insufficient. He argued that his 
generator must be capable of synonym substitution (both of words and of 
phrases, treated as unanalysed units) and of constituent manipulation (both 
reordering and internal restructuring). 
9.1.2 Applying Boguraev's argument to SPAR 
How far does Boguraev's argument also apply to SPAR? Since, like Boguraev's 
system, SPAR sets out to resolve ambiguities, its paraphrases must be 
different enough from the input to show what ambiguity resolution decisions 
have been made; and producing such paraphrases will involve synonym 
substitution and constituent manipulation. However, SPAR differs from 
Boguraev's system in two important respects: in addressing primarily 
anaphoric rather than lexical and structural ambiguity, and in processing 
multi-sentence texts rather than isolated sentences. Moreover, SPAR begins 
with Boguraev's analyser structures, which we will assume possess the 
properties that Boguraev needed to show they have. Paraphrase generation 
for SPAR is therefore rather different from paraphrase generation for 
Boguraev. It is a more extensive task (it involves deciding what to say as well 
as how to say it); but in some ways it is easier, since it is easier to ensure that 
paraphrases differ interestingly from the input. 
( 1) SPAR primarily addresses anaphoric ambiguity rather than lexical and 
structural ambiguity. This means that operations like synonym selection and 
constituent reshuffling, while sometimes necessary, are less important than 
ensuring that anaphors are paraphrased in such a way as to express their 
specifications as clearly and unambiguously as possible. This will involve 
including enough information to distinguish the specification of the anaphor 
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from every other element in the TMN; in other words, before deciding (as 
Boguraev's generator did) how to express something in English, we have to 
decide exactly what information needs to be expressed. SPAR's generator will 
therefore need a strategic component. to decide what to say, as well as a 
tactical one, to decide how to say it. (As the chapter proceeds, we will specify 
in more detail what lies behind these rather crude characterisations of the 
strategic and tactical aspects of the task. Various complex rhetorical issues 
which are often important in generation, such as those discussed by McKeown 
[1985], may safely be ignored because of the generator's specialised goals .) 
Although the current TMN fragment has already been integrated into its 
context by the time the generator is invoked, a pointer is kept to the TMN 
node derived from the main clause of the current sentence. When this node is 
handed to the generator, it is quite easy, because of the close resemblance 
between the TMN and the dependency structures that gave rise to it, for the 
generator to distinguish the content of the current sentence (which it needs 
to paraphrase) from the rest of the TMN. The problem of deciding "what to 
say" is therefore essentially one of deciding how much (and what) detail to 
include when indicating the specifications of resolved anaphors. 
(2) SPAR processes multi-sentence texts. A text that is acceptable as a 
paraphrase of another need not correspond to it sentence-for-sentence. That 
is, if S 1 ' ... Sn' is to qualify as a paraphrase of S 1 ... Sm, it does not follow that 
every Si' is a paraphrase of Si, even in context. This gives us a whole range of 
options for generating paraphrases not available to Boguraev. However, as 
stated at the beginning of this chapter, if SPAR did not paraphrase texts 
sentence by sentence, it would be much harder for the reader to see what 
resolution had been made for a given ambiguity in the input. 
But even though we restrict ourselves to sentence-by-sentence paraphrase, a 
multi-sentence text representation gives us more options that an 
isolated-sentence one, since it allows us to generate sentences that are only 
paraphrases of the original in context. For example, while "John opened the 
car's door" does not qualify as a paraphrase of "He opened the door" in 
isolation, it does qualify in the context provided by the initial sentence "John 
walked over to his car". Thus at least in the case of sentences that contain 
anaphors with contextual (rather than intra-sentential) antecedents, we can 
be fairly sure that the paraphrase will differ significantly from the original as 
long as we follow the practice established in (1) above of expressing the 
specifications of anaphors as clearly as possible , since doing so will include 
contextual information in the paraphrase. 
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(3) SPAR accepts Boguraev's structures as input. Although SPAR does in fact 
have access to the original word string, and attaches it to some TMN nodes, 
this information is used only for debugging and clarificatory purposes and not 
to aid processing. The only exception to this is that it is used during 
resolution to establish the surface ordering of anaphors; however, this 
ordering information is in turn only used in a fairly minor way (see 6.3 .1), and 
is in no sense part of the representation of the events described by the story. 
This means that SPAR's representation must, a fortiori, be at least as 
normalised (i .e. independent of the form of the surf ace text) as Boguraev's, 
from which it is constructed. Therefore if we accept Boguraev's evidence for 
his point (B3), namely that his structures are sufficiently far removed from 
the input that the word ordering of paraphrases is not unnecessarily 
constrained, then there is no need to re-prove this point for SPAR by heavy 
use of transformations such as constituent reshuffling. Such transformations 
will only be needed to the extent required for clarifying ambiguity resolutions . 
In conclusion, then, SPAR's generator will need to provide evidence that 
SPAR's representation has properties (Bl) and (B2); (B3) is deemed already 
established. (B2) will be established by the successful production of 
grammatical sentences acceptable as paraphrases, while (Bl) will be 
established by using synonyms to show what word senses have been selected, 
by such reshuffling of cons tituents as is needed to show what structural 
attachments have been made, and, most importantly, by paraphrasing 
anaphors in sufficient detail. The last of these actions alone will usually make 
the paraphrase different enough from its input to be convincing. Our aim, 
which will serve as the basis of the rest of the chapter, is therefore solely: 
to produce, for each input sentence in the story, an output sentence 
which is intuitively acceptable in the context as a paraphrase, and 
which shows what decisions SPAR has made in resolving ambiguities, 
especially anaphoric ones. 
An important consequence of this is that the paraphrases produced are often 
rather verbose and not very readable. In particular, pronouns, being 
maximally ambiguous, are never used. Dale [1985] argues that normally in 
text generation, referring expressions should be both referentially adequ a te -
they should con.lain sufficient information for the hearer to distinguish the 
referent from other potential referents - and efficient - they should contain 
no more information than is necessary for lhe purpose at hand. The s e lwo 
requirements pull against each other, ideally leading to expressions that are 
both unambiguous (in context) and succinct. 
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However, in SPAR's case, a stronger notion of referential adequacy is needed. 
We must aim to include enough information not just to enable the reader to 
pick out the intended referent, perhaps applying various kinds of knowledge to 
recover implicit information; rather, our description must be informative 
enough to explicitly distinguish the intended referent from all other 
possibilities. Only this will demonstrate that SPAR has indeed made the 
correct resolution. 
Even so, the requirement of efficiency must still be applied if the paraphrases 
are not to become excessively clumsy. We will see in section 9.4 that this has 
far-reaching implications for the generator's control structure. 
9.2 The general organisation of the generator 
Having decided roughly what characteristics the paraphrases produced by 
SPAR should have, we now turn our attention to the problem of how such 
paraphrases can be generated. We will first survey relevant previous work in 
generation, and then build on that work to propose an overall organisation for 
SPAR's generator. This will complete our general analysis of the problems of 
paraphrase generation, and enable us, in the rest of the chapter, to 
characterise the generator more specifically. 
9 .2.1 Some previous work on generation 
Two pieces of research into generation are particularly relevant to our 
concerns . Firstly, McDonald's [1981] research, which covers both the strategic 
and the tactical aspects of the task, is among the most important yet carried 
out in the area of generation; SPAR's generator in many ways resembles 
McDonald's MUMBLE, although the latter is far more complex and 
sophisticated. Secondly, Tait's English generator (Tait and Spa'rck Jones 
[ 1983]), which accepts Boguraev's dependency structures as input, is the basis 
of the tactical component of SPAR's generator. 
Two further pieces of work are of secondary relevance. They are the French 
generator (Herskovits [1973]) used by Wilks' PS system (which was, as we have 
seen, was one of the main inspirations for SPAR); and Boguraev's [1979] 
generator which, like Tait's, constructed English sentences from Boguraev's 
dependency structures . 
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II 
1' J 
Although much more research has been done in the area of generation, it will 
not be reviewed here because it did not influence the design of SPAR's rather 
special-purpose generator, and because we are iaterested in generation not as 
a topic in its own right but as a means to evaluating the performance of the 
rest of the system. (However, as I will make clear at the end of the chapter, 
this does not mean that the generator is without interest as an independent 
piece of work). 
McDonald's work will be described first, so that the other three systems can be 
discussed in the light of the comprehensive framework he provides. The other 
three systems will then be examined in chronological order. 
( 1) McDonald set out to address what he regarded as the central problem of 
generation: that of discovering "how specific utterances arise from specific 
communicative goals in a specific discourse context". His overall model, 
shown schematically in figure 9.1, consisted of an expert program, whose 
existence he assumed, and a generator such as his implemented MUMBLE 
system. We will look mainly at the model rather than the system, and will 
largely ignore issues of domain dependence and independence because, 
although McDonald stressed them, they are not of direct relevance to Sl~AR's 
generator. 
The expert program would be capable of reasoning about a specific domain 
such as petroleum geology, but had no linguistic knowledge of its own; it was 
therefore entirely the job of the generator to communicate the expert 
program's conclusions, explanations, questions and so on to the user. The 
generator consisted of a strategic speaker and a tactical linguistic component.,_ 
The speaker possessed discourse capabilities such as the ability to decide 
what information to include in an utterance and what level of abstraction was 
appropriate for an explanation. It would hand to the linguistic component 
messages describing the goals it wished to achieve with its utterance. 
The linguistic component consisted of two cascaded transducers under the 
command of a single, data-directed controller. The first transducer would, 
when invoked by the controller, convert a part of the message into a piece of 
surf ace structure, from which the second transducer would derive a natural 
language utterance . Such a two-stage approach to the tactical aspec t of 
generation is fairly common, partly because a number of operations. such as 
enforcing number agreement between subject and verb, are most easily 
carried out on the intermediate surf ace structure. 
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Figure 9.1: McDonald's generation model 
However, the transducers were not simply applied in series; that is, it was not 
the case that the first transducer converted the whole message to surface 
structure and then went to sleep while the second transducer converted the 
surface structure to an output string. Instead, both were invoked 
incrementally by the controller. Initially, the message was made the topmost 
node of the surface structure tree; the controller passed through this tree 
deterministically, depth-first and left to right. When the controller 
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encountered a message element, it would call the first transducer to convert it 
to surface structure (perhaps with other message elements as terminals); this 
might involve consulting the speaker to extend the message . When the 
controller encountered a piece of bona fide surf ace structure, it handed it to 
the second transducer for grammatical operations, or, in the case of a 
terminal node, printed it after appropriate morphological conversion. 
Thus McDonald's model of generation was need-driven in the sense that work 
at each stage, whether by the speaker or one of the transduce rs, was 
postponed as long as possible; and when the need to generate further words 
forced one or more components to do some work, they did the minimum 
necessary. This was because, for reasons of efficiency and psychological 
plausibility, McDonald wanted to avoid backtracking at any stage. If any stage 
of the realisation process for one element might impose a constraint on some 
stage of the realisation of a later one (for example, if they represented an 
initial and subsequent reference to the same entity), it was desirable for the 
earlier element to be completely processed before processing started on the 
later one. We will see in section 9 .4 that SPAR's generator is need-driven in 
the same way, and for similar reasons . 
McDonald's MUMBLE system, which was essentially an implementation of the 
linguistic component of this model, generated impressive output from the 
messages supplied to it by a number (six, in McDonald [1981)) of notional 
"speakers" for different domains and representations. This suggests that the 
model is also likely to be applicable to SPAR's requirements . 
The other three generators we will look at, selected because of their particular 
relevance to SPAR, are all essentially tactical ones; that is, they are analogous 
to the linguistic component in McDonald's model rather than to the whole 
generator. The messages they are to convey, and the order in which to convey 
them, are given by ?ther systems or system components rather than needing 
to be calculated dynamically. 
(2) Herskovits' generator derived French output from the template-based 
semantic blocks with which Wilks' PS system represented texts. Each word 
sense formula ahd (preposition-defining) paraplate in PS's English dictionary 
had attached to it one or more alternative "stereotypes": context-sensitive 
patterns which specified how to express that word sense in French. The 
generator treated the semantic block as a transition network, traversing it 
and evaluating the stereotypes it encountered . Evaluating a stereotype might 
involve recursively evaluating other, dependent ones. The result would be 
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either a French string, which would be added to the text being constructed, or 
a failure, which would cause the generator to back up and try an alternative 
stereotype. Thus Herskovits' generator differed from McDonald's linguistic 
component in two important ways: it was non-deterministic, and (like the 
analyser at the other end of PS) it made no use of an intermediate syntactic 
representation. 
(3) Boguraev's generator was designed in accordance with his view of 
paraphrase summarised in 9.1.1 above, and performed operations such as 
synonym selection and constituent reshuffling . It needed no strategic 
component because the appropriate answer to the question "what to say" was 
always the trivial one: "all of, and only, the dependency structure in question". 
Just as McDonald's linguistic component contained two transducers linked by 
an intermediate surface structure representation, so Boguraev's generator 
constructed a sentence in two stages . The first stage selected a contextually 
appropriate verb lo express the main verb sense of the dependency .structure, 
and using semantic and syntactic information associated with that verb 
constructed a linearly ordered, hierarchical, syntaclico-semanlic 
environment network. This network contained semantic case primitives such 
as AGENT and DESTINATION, syntactic categories such as PREP-PHRASE and NOUN, and 
English words and phrases. Boguraev defended this heterogeneous 
representation by arguing that semantic as well as syntactic information was 
necessary for certain aspects of the second stage of generation : that of 
traversing the environment network left-lo-right, outputting the words in it 
after operations f'Uch as subject deletion in some embedded clauses and verb 
and noun morphology. 
(4) Tail's generator, which also look Boguraev's dependency structures as 
input, was developed as part of a document retrieval project to facilitate the 
generation of alternative text forms (either whole sentences or constituents) 
for underlying dependency structure representations of concepts. Unlike 
Boguraev's generator, which produced only one sentence per dependency 
structure, Tait's generates as many alternative paraphrases per structure as 
possible in order to maximise the chance of the retrieval search succeeding; 
however, it is also capable of operating in single-paraphrase mode. 
Tait's generator, like Boguraev's and like McDonald's linguistic component, is a 
two-stage one; the intermediate representation is a broad, flat surface 
syntactic phrase structure tree in the style of Winograd [ 1972] . Both stage s of 
generation are data-driven, depth-first and left-to-right; however, the first 
stage is completed before the second is begun, so, like Boguraev's, the 
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generator is not need-driven (and indeed there was no reason for either 
generator to be so). 
An important feature of Herskovits', Boguraev's and Tait's generators, and 
indeed of SPAR's, was their use of alternative, context-sensitive rules to 
express a given word sense. The words and constructions generated were not 
derived by a global examination of the sentence representation, as they were 
in, say, Goldman's [1975] BABEL (the generator for the CD-based MARGIE 
system); instead, output patterns were associated in the dictionary with input 
word senses and preserved throughout processing . Boguraev stresses that 
driving his generator by means of word senses is purely a matter of 
convenience; it would still be possible, much as in BABEL, to arrive at an 
appropriate choice of words if only formulas (and not word senses themselves) 
were present in dependency structures . However, this is emphatically not the 
case in SPAR, because the use of the THIS primitive to indicate missing 
information (see 4.2.1) means that two very different word senses can have 
the same formula: e .g. both ELEPHANTl and SHEEPl are defined as (THIS BEAST). 
Therefore, in accordance with the lack of any important distinction between 
primitives and word senses in SPAR's representational formalism, SPAR's 
generator is unavoidably word sense based in a way that BABEL, and in 
principle Boguraev's generator, were not. 
9.2.2 The components of SPAR's generator 
We have seen that SPAR's generator must produce a paraphrase of each 
sentence which makes all resolution decisions as clear as possible. In order to 
take advantage of contextual information (i.e. information derived from 
earlier sentences), the generator is invoked after a sentence has been fully 
processed ; that is, after all its anaphors have been resolved and the current 
fragment has been merged into the context. A paraphrase of the sentence can 
then be produced by expressing in English the event represented by the TMN 
node corresponding to the main clause of the sentence, which will of course 
have subsidiary clause information (if any) associated with it. 
SPAR's generator has a strategic and a tactical component. The strategic 
component decides what to say, i.e. what part of the information in the TMN to 
express, and packages that information as a message using a suitable 
representation; the tactical component then converts the message into 
English. 
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The representation used for such messages is that of Boguraev's dependency 
structures. This representation was selected because: 
( 1) It is a tried and tested one, and has been successfully used for a 
number of applications, including paraphrase generation. 
(2) SPAR's TMN was originally derived from Boguraev's structures, to 
which, as we saw in chapter 4, it has many similarities, so the inverse 
transformation should be comparatively straightforward. 
(3) If the strategic component of the generator were to output 
Boguraev-style messages, considerable effort could be saved by using 
either Boguraev's or Tail's generator (both of which were availabl e ) 
as the basis of the tactical component. 
Tait's generator, rather than Boguraev's, was . selected for the tactical 
component for the following theoretical and practical reasons. 
( 1) Its intermediate representation (straightforward phrase 
structure trees) is rather more conventional and well-defined than 
Boguraev's mixed syntactic and semantic environment network. In 
particular, certain syntactic transformations which we will see later 
are desirable are more easily expressed in terms of phrase structure 
than in terms of environment networks . 
(2) As Sparck Jones and Tait point out, Boguraev's generator 
accepted the original [ 1979] version of his representation language; 
since then the representation has undergone a number of changes . 
Tait's generator, · however, accepts the more recent version of the 
representation now produced by the analyser and accepted by SPAR. 
(3) The data-driven style in which Tait's generator is written makes it 
easy to understand and modify. 
The components of SPAR's generator, and the representations they accept as 
input and produce as output, are therefore essentially as shown in figure 9.2. 
The approximately corresponding parts of McDonald's framework are given for 
comparison. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will fill out the details of this figure, and 
in particular show how and why the whole process is controlled in a 
need-driven way. 
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9.3 Some guidelines for generating suitable paraphrases 
So far in this chapter, we have set out the general goals we are trying to 
achieve with our paraphrases and the general structure of the generator 
which will construct those paraphrases. From now on, we will be more specific. 
In this section, we take the problem of defining the kinds of paraphrases we 
want, and establish some specific linguistic guidelines or heuristics for 
ensuring, as far as possible, that the interpretations assigned to our three 
kinds of ambiguity (word-sense, structural and anaphoric) are clearly 
expressed . These guidelines will be specified in terms of the three successive 
representations · used by the generator (the initial TMN, Boguraev's 
dependency structures and subsequently Tait's surface syntactic phrase 
structures). 
The task of expressing clearly the interpretations of anaphoric ambiguities 
falls mainly to the strategic component of the generator, which must ensure 
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that the messages it hands to the tactical component are sufficiently 
informative . The paraphrase of an anaphor must describe the anaphor's 
spe cification unambiguously: that is , it must make clear what the anaphor's 
ante cedent is and how it relates to that antecedent. For example, for the text 
(9-1) [ 1] John sold his old car 
[2] He bought a new one. 
[3] It broke down within a week. 
the paraphrase "The car broke down within a week" for [3] would not show 
what specification had been chosen for "it"; to avoid ambiguity, we would need 
to say that it was "the new car" or "the car that John bought" that broke 
down . 
On the other hand, the task of expressing the resolutions of lexical and 
structural ambiguities falls mainly to the tactical component of the generator, 
which must word the information handed to it so as to avoid, if possible, the 
ambiguities in the original input sentence . This will involve actions such as 
selecting synonyms and moving constituents. 
Because the strategic aspect of generation is, at least at the level of 
sophistication of SPAR's generator , 1 logically prior to the tactical one, we will 
first consider what the strategic component must do to show the results of 
resolving anaphoric ambiguity. We will then look at what the tactical 
component must do to avoid the lexical and structural ambiguities in the 
input. 
9.3.1 The strategic component: avoiding anaphoric ambiguity 
As we have seen, the strategic component of SPAR's generator takes as input 
the TMN node derived from the main clause of the current sentence , and gives 
as output a dependency structure which it hands to the tactical component. 
To construct such a dependency structure, the strategic component must 
therefore 
1Da nlos [1984] shows that imposing a fixed order on decisions (e .g. conceptual 
before lex ical) may remove some or even all of the options avail a ble for late r 
decisions, a nd that therefore flexible control structure, based on interactions 
between decisions , is needed. To overcome such problems were they to arise , 
SPAR's generator could perhaps be made non-deterministic: if an earlier 
decision resulted in no realisation being possible, an alternative could be 
tried . 
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( 1) decide what set of TMN nodes and links (Corresponds: assertions) 
should be exploited, and 
(2) turn those nodes and links into a dependency structure. 
Because of the similarities between the TMN representation and Boguraev's, 
subtask (2) is not very difficult, and will not be discussed in detail. Essentially 
all that is required is the inverse of the process of constructing a "skeleton 
fragment" from a dependency structure, as described earlier in 4.3 .3. 
The substantive part of the strategic component's task is therefore subtask 
( 1 ) : deciding what set of TMN nodes and links to exploit, or, in more abstract 
terms, deciding what objects, events and actions to mention. Such decisions 
are crucial if the paraphrase is to convey all the conceptual content of the 
input with as little redundancy as is consistent with making resolution 
decisions clear, and in particular if its component noun phrases are to be 
referentially adequate (in the strong sense given in 9.1.2) but still as efficient 
as possible. 
Subtask ( 1) is a recursive one. Given a TMN node, the generator must decide 
what neighbouring nodes must also be included as a direct consequence; and 
the same decision must be made for each of these further nodes. Thus the 
following decisions should be made when, after anaphor resolution, the 
generator is handed the TMN node for the main clause of [2] in our example 
(repeated from chapter 4) 
(9-2) [ 1] John was angry. 
[2] He wanted to break a window. 
The generator should decide that the TMN nodes representing both the agent 
of wanting (John) and the object (the breaking action) should also be 
expressed. Expressing the latter will in turn involve expressing its agent and 
object (although the agent, which is also the ''John" node, may in fact 
eventually be realised as the null string). 
Thus to accomplish subtask (1), we need to formulate rules for deciding what 
extra TMN nodes must be included to express adequately a given TMN node; 
these rules will t_hen be recursively applied to the extra nodes. We will now set 
out the rules SPAR's generator uses, first those for nodes that represent 
non-anaphors (or anaphors that SPAR has failed to resolve) and then for 
those that represent resolved anaphors. 
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When a node not representing a resolved anaphor is encountered, the 
generator mostly aims to mirror the organisation of the input dependency 
structure; this is possible because of the close resemblance between input 
structures and the TMN, and in particular because of the existence of the E 
("essential") flags on Corresponds: assertions (see 4.3 .2) . Thus only explicit 
nodes (i.e. nodes derived directly from input phrases) connected to the 
current one by "essential" Corresponds: assertions, and therefore representing 
restrictive modifiers or dependents, will be included. This ensures that, 
except where anaphors are concerned (see below), each phrase in the the 
input sentence corresponds to something in the paraphrase and vice versa , 
thus making comparison and evaluation easier (but not, as we will see, 
preventing the construction of interesting paraphrases) . 
In order to clarify certain ambiguity resolutions, non-restrictive modifiers, 
which in fact are always relative clauses, are conjoined to the main clause in 
the paraphrase; thus "I stretched out my hand to the monkey who bit it" 
would receive a paraphrase such as "I stretched out my hand to the monkey 
and the monkey bit my hand" if (and only if) SPAR had concluded that the 
relative clause was non-restrictive. 
Noun phrases not resolved as anaphors of any kind are always given an 
indefinite article ("a(n)" or " some") even if the original noun phrase was 
definite. Thus if a story begins '"John went to the zoo", the paraphrase will be 
"John went to a zoo" because (not surprisingly) no pre-existing zoo has been 
found in the TMN. Although "a zoo" is arguably not an exact paraphrase of 
"the zoo" here, the use of definite articles only for resolved anaphors means 
that the reader of a paraphrase can tell at a glance whether or not an input 
noun phrase has in fact been resolved. (I emphasise this point to avoid 
misunders tanding of SPAR's output). 
We will now look at the task of paraphrasing resolved anaphors, beginning with 
the case of an anaphor which has been recognised as specifying an explicit 
contextual node (i .e . a node derived directly from an earlier input phrase). 
Since such a node will already have been mentioned in an earlier paraphrase. 
what we need to do is to include enough information to distinguish , that node 
from all other explicit ones . For sentence [2] of (9-2), '"he" (=John) can be 
expressed by "John" alone, while in our earlier example (9-1), the ' "it" in 
s e ntence [3] can be expressed by phrases like "the new car" or '"the car that 
John bought" to distinguish it from the old car mentioned in [1]. 
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This degree of explicitness is not always necessary to ensure that the 
paraphrase is unambiguous; for (9-2), the " he" in [2] could unambiguously be 
"paraphrased" by "he", since only one male human has bee n mentioned . 
However, using "he" would hardly be convincing evidence that SPAR had 
resolved the pronoun. Similarly, in (9-1), the paraphrase "the car" for "it" 
would be unambiguous to the reader because the new car is more, focussed, 
but again such a paraphrase would not reflect SPAR's selection of antecedent. 
It is therefore necessary to incorporate at least enough information to 
distinguish the specification from all other explicit nodes; but a pronoun 
should not be used, even if adequate in this respect, because it provides no 
direct evidence for our demonstration purposes that the original anaphor has 
been resolved at all. 
A consequence of not using pronouns is that paraphrases will often break the 
c-command rule and therefore might be thought ungrammatical or misleading . 
If we paraphrase 
(9-3a) John promised Bill that he would arrive soon. 
by 
(9-3b) John promised Bill that John would arrive soon. 
then the second "John" in (9-3b) is c-commanded by the first and, according 
to Reinhart's original [1976] theory, cannot corefer with it. This objection can 
be counte red by appealing to Reinhart's more recent [ 1983] theory, in which 
c-commanding implies non-coreference only if, in the hearer's view, the 
sp eaker has no reasons to avoid using bound-variable ( =pronomina l) 
anaphora . But, as we have seen, SPAR's generator does have such reasons, 
which must be kept in mind when reading the paraphrases. 
We saw above that when paraphrasing sentence [3] of (9-1), a modifier such as 
"new" or "that John bought" was necessary to identify the correct car. This 
raises the question of how modifiers should be selected from among those 
available. In order to find (an approximation to) the shortest possible 
modifier, SPAR examines modifiers likely to be realizable as adjectives, 
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prepositional phrases, simple relative clauses and complex relative clauses, 2 
in that order, and accepts the first one that distinguishes the node in question 
from all others. Thus whereas in (9-1), the adjectival modifier "new" 
distinguishes one car from the other, in a text like 
(9-4) [ 1] Bill bought a new car. 
[2] John bought a new car too. 
[3] It broke down within a week. 
the modifier "new" would be insufficient, and something like '"that John 
bought" would be used instead. (Although the possessive relationship between 
John and the car is not explicitly present in the TMN, the generator could in 
principle be extended to infer it, thus allowing the modifier "John's". However, 
such inference might sometimes detract from referential adequacy; it is 
clearer to identify the car by means of a relationship that has already been 
explicitly stated). 
However, if the node in question has already been paraphrased in the current 
sentence, no modifiers are sought; a simple noun phrase of the form "that X" 
or "those Xs" is virtually always adequate to identify the correct 
specification.3 The use. of simple noun phrases on second and subsequent 
occasions of mention in a sentence is essential if paraphrases are not to 
become too repetitive. Evidence for this will be given at the end of the 
chapter. 
Having looked at the treatment of non-anaphors and of anaphors directly 
cospecifying with their antecedents, we now consider anaphors related to 
2By a "simple" relative clause I mean one like 
the car that John bought. 
where the head noun phrase is a direct case filler of the main verb of the 
relative clause. -A "complex" relative clause would be one like 
the car that John wishes Bill had not persuaded him to buy 
where "the car" is a case filler not of "wishes" but of "buy". (In fact the 
generator cannot at present properly express complex relative clauses, as 
example B9 in appendix B shows). 
3The determiners "that" and "those" are preferable to "the" because they do 
not allow implicit cospecification. That is, whereas "a zoo ... the monkeys" is 
acceptable, "a zoo ... those monkeys" is awkward unless the monkeys have 
already been explicitly mentioned. The use of "that" or "those" the ref ore 
restricts the interpretation options and minimises the risk of ambiguity in the 
output. 
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their antecedents indirectly, by associated or inferred specification. In such 
cases, it is desirable to state explicitly the relationship between anaphor and 
antecedent. For example, in 
(9-5) [ 1] The heiress lived as a recluse. 
[2] She died under mysterious circumstances. 
[3] The murderer was not found. 
we want to generate a phrase like "the murderer who killed the heiress", or, to 
avoid tautology, "the person who killed the heiress" . (A briefer description 
such as "the heiress's murderer" is less referentially adequate because it does 
not make clear the exact nature of the ambiguity resolution; for example, it 
would be consistent with SPAR having erroneously decided that the murderer 
was employed by the heiress as a hired killer) . 
When faced with a node representing an indirect anaphor such as "the 
murderer" above, SPAR looks for the shortest route in the TMN to an 
already-paraphrased node, and makes that route into a modifier. In (9-5), 
when a paraphrase for "the murderer" is sought, the shortest such route is 
that via the implicit "kill" node (derived from the "murderer" formula) to the 
already-paraphrased "heiress" node. Having found such a modifier, SPAR 
finds that, according to information in the WSN, the "kill" modifier exhausts 
the distinction between MURDERER! and the immediately dominating MAN node in 
the WSN Specialisation: hierarchy. It therefore inserts MAN (which is eventually 
expressed as "person") rather than MURDERER! into the dependency structure to 
avoid redundancy. 
9.3.2 The tactical component: avoiding lexical and structural ambiguity 
Once the strategic component of the generator has built a dependency 
structure, it is the job of the tactical component to express it in English as 
clearly and unambiguously as possible. Like Boguraev's generator, it does this 
by choosing suitable synonyms for ambiguous words (because of lexical 
ambiguity) and by ordering and transforming constituents (because of 
structural ambiguity). 
SPAR's synonym selection is fairly rudimentary. Each word sense has 
associated with it, in a synonym dictionary, zero or more roughly synonymous 
senses. A number of case name transformations may be associated with a 
synonym; for example, using the synonym SELL! for BUY1 entails transforming 
the AGENT to the RECIPIENT and the ABSTRACT-SOURCE to the AGENT. Only if the 
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strategic component has provided both an AGENT and an ABSTRACT-SOURCE will the 
synonym be acceptable. The first acceptable synonym is used; if there are 
none, no substitution is made. (Of course, the word selected as a synonym 
may on its own be just as potentially ambiguous as the original; however, this 
ambiguity should disappear if the paraphrase is read with the original in 
mind) . 
Each word sense covered by the analyser also has an an entry in the 
dictionary used by Tait's generator (or if it does not, SPAR constructs one 
dynamically, and usually fairly reliably, using analyser dictionary information). 
An entry specifies one or more ways in which a structure headed by that word 
sense may be realised, giving details of syntactic category, root form, and 
morphological and syntactic irregularities. Thus SPAR, like Herskovits ' and 
Boguraev's generators, embodies a "fanning out" mechanism where each word 
has several senses and each word sense may be expressed in several ways. As 
we observed earlier, word senses are essential to generation because the THIS 
mechanism prevents senses, and therefore appropriate synonyms, being 
deduced from formulas alone, as they could in principle have been in 
Boguraev's system. 
We now turn our attention from lexical to structural ambiguity. Virtually all of 
the structural ambiguities in the stories SPAR has processed concern 
prepositional phrase (PP) attachment. Structures likely to be realised as PPs 
are therefore subjected to two types of transformation. 
The first type is applied to certain cases attached to noun-args (representing 
nominals) in the dependency structure; it results in relative clauses rather 
than prepositional phrases being generated . The noun-arg 
CN 
CMANl MAN 
(@@ LOCATION PARKl-1)4 
(@@ DET (THEl ONE)))) 
which would be realised as "the man in the park", is transformed to 
4 The underlined item PARKl-1 is a TMN node which has not at this stage be en 
converted to a noun-arg of the form CN CPARKl ••. ) ) . This is because of the 
adoption of the incremental, need-driven approach which will be discussed 
fully in the nex t section. 
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((TRACE (CLAUSE V AGENT)) 
(CLAUSE 
(TYPE REL) 
(TNS PAST) 
(V 
CBE1 BE 
(@@ AGENT (N (MAN1 MAN (@@ DET (THE1 ONE))))) 
(@@ LOCATION PARKl-1))))) 
which is realised as "the man who was in the park". Thus if SPAR decides that 
in a certain story context, the structurally ambiguous sentence "I saw the 
man in the park", "in the park" attaches to "man" rather than "park", the 
paraphrase produced is "I saw the man who was in the park", in which the 
ambiguity is not present. 
The second type of transformation is applied at a later stage, when the 
dependency structure has been turned into a surface syntactic tree. At this 
stage, in order to avoid potential attachment ambiguity in the output 
paraphrase, a PP structure in a finite clause is preposed if it is preceded 
either by a noun phrase or by another PP structure. The transformation 
effects changes such as these: 
I saw the man in the park --+ In the park, I saw the man. 
I rode towards the man on the horse --+ 
On the horse, I rode towards the man. 
Together, the two transformations (PP relativisation and preposing) separate 
out the five readings delivered by the analyser for the sentence "I saw the 
man in with park with the telescope". Like Boguraev's generator, the tactical 
component of SPAR's generator, when applied to each of the five structures 
built by the analyser,5 gives: 
I SAW THE MAN WHO WAS IN THE PARK WHICH ILA.D THE TELESCOPE. 
I SAW THE MAN WHO WAS IN THE PARK AND WHO HAD THE TELESCOPE. 
WITH THE TELESCOPE, I SAW THE MAN WHO WAS IN THE PARK. 
IN THE PARK WHICH HAD THE TELESCOPE, I SAW THE MAN. 
IN THE PARK, AND WITH THE TELESCOPE, I SAW THE MAN. 
5 The tactical component of the generator can, for testing and demonstration 
purposes, accept input directly from the analyser as well as from the strategic 
component. It is able to deal with embedded TMN nodes, but does not demand 
their presence. 
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although of course only one of these will be generated in any given context , 
depending on the context-determined choice SPAR has made. 
9.4 The detailed organisation of the generator 
In this section, we will conclude the detailed discussion of the generator by 
showing why a need-driven approach is necessary and, by means of a simple 
example, how it is implemented. We will then look in detail at a more complex 
example which brings together many of the points we have covered in the 
chapter. 
9 .4.1 A "need-driven" control structure 
So far, we have seen that SPAR's generator has a strategic and a tactical 
component. The strategic component builds a dependency structure from a 
TMN node and its environment in the TMN; it is responsible for ensuring that 
enough information is included to make clear the specifications of anaphors . 
The tactical component is an augmented version of Tait's two-stage English 
generator, which turns a dependency structure into an English sentence by 
way of a surface syntactic phrase structure. SPAR extends Tait 's generator 
partly by improving its treatment of morphology and its range of syntactic 
constructs, but more importantly by adding components that transform the 
intermediate dependency and phrase structures in order to clarify the 
resolution of lexical and structural ambiguity. The full set of processing steps 
is as shown in figure 9.3 . 
Althoug h figure 9 .3 applies locally, in the sense that every piece of information 
expresse d will pass through all the stage s in the order given , clos er 
examination of -the manipulations performed at each stage reveals that the 
process cannot be a simply linear one; that is, we cannot just apply each 
process in turn to all the information involve d . We saw in 9 .3 .1 that when the 
strategic component is generating a piece of dependency structure from a 
nominal TMN node, it must take account of whether that node has be e n 
m entioned earlier in the current sentence; if so, a structure which will 
eventuall y be r ealise d as "that X" will be sufficient, and indee d the detail e d 
description necessary for the earlier mention (e.g . "the X which John .. . ") will 
b e far too verbose. However, if the generation process is purely linear, the 
strategic component will not know which occurrence of a TMN node will be 
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TMN node in its environment 
Strategic component 
Dependency structure 
i 
Tait stage 1: generate surface syntax 
Phrase structure 
Structural transformations (PP preposing) 
Phrase structure 
Tait stage 2: generate English sentence 
English sentence 
Tactical 
component 
Figure 9.3: Stages in SPAR's generation process 
realised first, because word order is largely decided by the tactical component 
which will not yet have been invoked . 
To solve this problem, a more sophisticated, need-driven control structure is 
adopted, in which the components of the generator communicate wilh one 
another in both directions. This control structure resembles that proposed by 
McDonald. 
When the strategic component is handed a TMN node, it produces a piece of 
d ependency structure for that node, but does not recursively call itself on 
neighbouring nodes. Thus when SPAR processes a story beginning "John went 
to the zoo", it constructs a TMN node GOl-1 to represent the "went" action. 
When the sentence has been fully processed by SPAR, this node is handed to 
the generator's strategic component, which, rather than passing a complete 
dependency structure on to the tactical component, passes on the hybrid 
structure 
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(CLAUSE 
(TYPE DCL) 
(TNS PAST) 
(V 
(G01 MOVE 
(@@ AGENT JOHNl-1) 
(@@ DESTINATION 2001-1)))) 
where the underlined objects are TMN nodes . These TMN nodes are carried 
forward in the tactical component ! mtil the word order of ( this level of) the 
sentence has been finally decided, i.e. until after any PP-preposing 
transformations (there are none in this case) have been applied to the phrase 
structure . The second stage of the tactical component, which walks over a 
phrase structure depth-first and left-to-right to derive an English string, 
reinvokes the whole generator recursively on any TMN node it comes across, 
expecting it to return an English string. In our example, the phrase structure 
(in a simplified form) is 
(INTRANSITIVE-CLAUSE-PATTERN 
JOHNl-1 
"WENT" 
(PREP-PHRASE "TO" . 2001-1)) 
When the second stage of the tactical component is applied to this structure , 
it first causes the generator to be applied recursively to the TMN node JOHNl-1; 
this ultimately produces (via simple dependency and surface structures) the 
single-word string "JOHN", which is output , and is followed by the words "WENT" 
and "TO". taken directly from the top-level phrase structure. The generator is 
then invoked again, this time on the TMN node 2001-1; the string "A ZOO", is 
returned and output. Thus the generation of "JOHN" is completed before the 
generation of "A ZOO" is begun. 
In fact the whole sentence generation process is almost entirely left-to-right. 
For any two clauses or noun phrases in a sentence, the phrase to the left is 
fully generated before the generator is first applied to the one lo the right 
except in the case that one of the phrases includes the other. In particular, if 
a sentence contains multiple references to the same entity, each reference 
will have been fully generated by the time the next is begun. The generator 
keeps a record of what TMN nodes have been expressed so far in the current 
sentence; this allows it to make second and subsequent references of the form 
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"that X" or "those Xs" in order to satisfy the efficiency requirement.6 
9.4.2 A detailed example 
To illustrate the generation process as a whole, and the need for a 
need-driven approach in particular, we will now look at the process of 
generating paraphrases for the second sentence of the text 
(9-6) [1) John went to the zoo. 
[2] He saw the elephants wa ving their trunks . 
The paraphrase SPAR produces for this text, the first sentence of which we 
have already seen, is 
(9-7) [ 1 '] John went lo a zoo. 
[2'] While the elephants which were among the animals which 
were at the zoo waved those elephants' probosces, John saw 
those elephants. 
Paraphrase [2'] is necessarily long-winded because it has to express five 
ambiguity resolutions: the decisions that 
(1) "he" is John; 
(2) "the elephants" are the ones associated with the zoo; 
(3) "waving their trunks" is not a restrictive modifier; i.e . it tells us 
what the elephants were doing when John saw them, rather than 
distinguishing between some elephants who were waving their trunks 
and some who weren't; 
( 4) "their" is the elephants; 
(5) " trunks" is used in the sense of probosces, and not luggage or 
swimming trunks. 
6Indeed, because the "expressed so far" record is updated just before the 
generator starts work on a node, rather than just after it finishes, it can deal 
correctly with the case when a noun phrase cospecifies with another 
embedded in it. For example, "a country which exports petrol to its 
neighbours" could, under the relevant interpretation, be paraphrased 
correctly as "a country which exports petrol to that country's neighbours" 
because the generation of the outer reference (the entire NP) would have 
begun (though obviously not ended) before that of the inner (possessive) one; 
the TMN node would therefore be flagged "expressed" by the time the inner 
reference was begun. This process would only fail to give appropriate results 
if the embedded reference occurred before the matrix (head) NP, which 
seldom if ever occurs in English. 
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An important point to note about [2 ' ] in the output paraphrase is that, 
because of the need-driven nature of the generation process, the elephants 
are only described in full the first time they are mentioned; on the two 
subsequent occasions they are referred to as "those elephants". This is 
n ecessary to avoid the excessive repetitiveness and opacity of 
[2"] ?? While the elephants which were among the animals which were 
at the zoo waved the probosces of the elephants which were among 
the animals which were at the zoo, John saw lhe elephants which were 
among the animals which were at the zoo . 
A need-driven approach is required because the strategic component of lhe 
generator must provide a full description of the elephants only on the first 
occasion that they are mentioned, and not on the second and third occasions . 
For this to be possible, the tactical component must already have decided 
much of the word order of the sentence, and in particular, which mention of 
the elephants is to come first. 
The production of the paraphrase [2') occurs as follows. The strategic 
component derives from the TMN node SEEl-1, which represents the "seeing" 
event described by (2), the dependency structure 
(CLAUSE 
(TYPE DCL) 
(TNS PAST) 
CV CSEEl SENSE 
(@@ AGENT JOHNl-1) 
(@@ OBJECT ELEPHANTl-1) 
(@@ TIME-SPAN WAVE2-1)))) 
Next, the surface structure 
(TRANSITIVE-CLAUSE-PATTERN 
JOHNl-1 
"SAW" 
ELEPHANTl-1 
(PREP-PHRASE-PATTERN "WHILE" WAVE2-1)) 
is derived by the first stage of the tactical component. To avoid possible 
structural ambiguity, the prepositional phrase is then preposed to give 
(PREPOSED-PATTERN 
(PREP-PHRASE-PATTERN "WHILE" WAVE2-1) 
(TRANSITIVE-CLAUSE-PATTERN 
JOHNl-1 
"SAW" 
ELEPHANTl-1) 
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This is handed to the second tactical stage, which attempts to read off an 
English string from it. The word "WHILE" is output, and then the generator is 
invoked recursively on the TMN node WAVE2-1. This produces a dependency 
structure which is transformed to the surface structure 
(TRANSITIVE-CLAUSE-PATTERN 
ELEPHANTl-1 
"WAVED" 
TRUNKl-1) 
The attempt to read off an English string from this triggers yet another 
invocation of the generator, this time on the node ELEPHANTl-1. The strategic 
component discovers that this is the first time the elephants have been 
mentioned, and attempts to describe them in terms of some 
previously-described object or event. It discovers that they are quite closely 
related to the zoo, and produces a large dependency structure which is 
eventually realised as "THE ELEPHANTS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS WHICH WERE AT THE 
ZOO". This string is output, followed (from the next level up) by "WAVED". 
The generator now tri.es to express TRUNKl-1, which in turn (the strategic 
component decides) involves mentioning the elephants. This time, because 
they have already been mentioned in the current sentence, the strategic 
component produces a much smaller dependency structure which is 
eventually realised as "THOSE ELEPHANTS" . The synonym PROBOSCISl is selected for 
the sense TRUNKl to show that the word sense ambiguity (between elephants' 
trunks, luggage and swimming trunks) has been resolved. 
On the third occasion that the elephants are mentioned, after the words "JOHN 
SAW" are output, the words "THOSE ELEPHANTS" are once more produced, again 
because of the earlier mention. The final paraphrase, repeated here with the 
references to the elephants underlined for comparison, is therefore 
[2'] While the elephants which were among the animals which were at 
the zoo waved those elephants' probosces, John saw those elephants. 
9.5 Summary and evaluation 
At the beginning of this chapter, we posed two questions for which answe rs 
had to be found in order to provide SPAR with a generator which would enable 
its performance in ambiguity resolution to be evaluated. The questions were : 
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( 1) What sort of paraphrases should the generator produce? and 
(2) How can the generator derive such paraphrases from SPAR's 
meaning representation? 
Our answers to these questions , first in general and then in specific terms, 
were as follows. 
To deal with (1) , we examined the arguments Boguraev [1979) used in 
designing a paraphrase generator for his analyser. We found we had to adapt 
the requirements that Boguraev placed on his generator, and the kinds of 
operations he believed were necessary to satisfy those requirements , to the 
case of SPAR. Thus we concluded that the task of SPAR's generator was : 
to produce, for each input sentence in the story, an output sentence 
which is ir:Luitively acceptable in the context as a paraphrase, and 
which shows what decisions SPAR has made in resolving ambiguities, 
especially anaphoric ones. 
To deal with question (2), we exploited McDonald's comprehensive need-driven 
model of the generation process, and Tait's two-stage tactical generator for 
Boguraev's dependency structures. Thus using McDonald's framework, we 
decided that SPAR's generator should have a strategic component which 
derived a dependency structure from a region of the TMN, and a tactical 
component, based on Tait's generator, which turned the dependency structure 
into an English sentence. 
More specifically, for question (1), we developed a set of guidelines for the 
strategic component to follow to ensure as far as possible that each 
paraphrase would contain enough information to avoid any possible ambiguity, 
but not so much as to be tautologous or absurdly repetitive . For the tactical 
component, we outlined some proce dures for synor:ym substitution a nd 
structural transformation which would help to remove lexical and structural 
ambiguity respectively. 
For question (2) in turn , we asked ourselves how the generator could carry out 
the operations we had just decided were necessary. We saw that we require d a 
need-driven control structure, in which work was postponed until the need to 
output a word demanded it. Under such a control structure, earlier parts of a 
paraphrase are fully generated before later ones are begun. 
Like the other parts of the system, SPAR's generator is best assessed on its 
performance. To facilitate this, the results it produces for a selection of texts 
Section 9.5 228 
------------, 
' 
are shown in appendices A and B. These results suggests that the generator 
achieves its goal of producing paraphrases which show what ambiguity 
resolutions have been made. The paraphrases are, by and large, not easy to 
read on their own, but ease of reading was not one of our requirements; we 
merely required them to be grammatical and comprehensible. 
The originality of the work discussed in this chapter lies mainly not in the 
individual ideas discussed, many of which are drawn from others' work (in 
particular, that of McDonald, Boguraev and Tait), but in the way those ideas 
are combined to create a "full" (i.e. both strategic and tactical) generator 
which differs in its aims from most of those written to date. Most language 
processing applications involving the production of text require that that text 
normally be as easy to read and "user-friendly" as possible, but for SPAR. ease 
of reading is secondary to elimination of ambiguity. The techniques developed 
here therefore may not be applicable to what most applications need most of 
the time. However, there are many applications for which paraphrases of the 
type SPAR produces would sometimes be very useful. For example, if an 
interactive machine translation or database query system is unable to resolve 
some ambiguity in its input, it may be desirable to present the options to the 
user in natural language form and ask for the correct one to be indicated. A 
generator such as the one presented here would be able to make the 
differences between the various options clear, whether those differences were 
caused by lexical, structural or anaphoric ambiguity. 
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10. Conclusions 
In previous chapters, we looked at some of the problems of anaphor 
resolution, and saw in detail how SPAR tackles those problems in a shallow 
processing framework based on the theories of Wilks and Sidner. This last 
chapter takes a more global view. First, the goals of the work are restated, 
and the SPAR system is summarised as an attempt to achieve those goals. 
Next, the major components of the system are assessed, not so much in terms 
of their intrinsic theoretical content, which was evaluated at the ends of 
earlier chapters, but rather in terms of their contributions to the overall 
system performance and also in terms of more practical considerations such 
as simplicity, reliability and extensibility. This assessment leads on naturally 
to a more general discussion of the viability of doing anaphor resolution by 
shallow processing. Finally, the possibilities for improving and extending the 
system in various ways are discussed. 
10 .1 System review 
This thesis began with a statement of four interrelated goals. 
The first goal was to develop a system which would resolve ambiguities, 
especially anaphoric ones, in simple stories, and generate paraphrases to show 
what resolution decisions had been made. 
The exploitation of world knowledge by inferential processing has a place in 
achieving this first goal. However, systems capable of powerful, flexible and 
reliable inference about non-specialised domains are still beyond the state of 
the art. The second goal, therefore, was to investigate the possibility that the 
first goal might instead be achieved by a shallow processing approach. In such 
an approach, linguistic knowledge is used as much as possible; the inference 
component is invoked as little as possible, and has access only to limited 
quantities of explicit world knowledge. 
Wilks' theory of preference semantics was selected as a suitable basis for the 
system's inference component and word-sense-level semantics. Because a 
system that resolves anaphors must be able to keep track of focus, especially 
local focus, Sidner's theory of local focussing was also introduced. The third 
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goal of this work was to adapt, test and develop Wilks' and Sidner's theories, 
both of which seemed very promising but somewhat undertested. 
The fourth goal was to find a way of coordinating the focussing, inference, and 
other components of the system so as to maximise accuracy while minimising 
the amount and complexity of processing. Such coordination is crucially 
important if the inevitable failings of inference in a shallow processing 
framework are to not to mislead the system as a whole into making wrong 
decisions . 
Together, these four goals constitute an attempt to substantiate the major 
theoretical claim of the thesis: a particular form of "shallow processing 
hypothesis", to the effect that 
a story processing system which exploits linguistic knowledge, 
particularly knowledge about focussing, as heavily as possible, and 
has access only to limited quantities of world knowledge, which it 
invokes only when absolutely necessary, can usually choose an 
appropriate antecedent for an anaphor even in cases where the 
inference mechanism by itself cannot do so. 
SPAR represents an attempt to achieve the goals stated above and to test the 
shallow processing hypothesis . It accepts input from Boguraev's analyser, 
converts it to a text model form based largely on a developed version of 
Wilksian word-sense semantics, and resolves anaphors using a Sidnerian 
framework significantly extended to deal with intrasentential antecedents, 
multiple anaphors in the same sentence, and indefinite as well as definite 
anaphors. 
Components exploiting syntax, semantics, local focussing and world knowledge 
are all coordinated in the effort to resolve anaphors. Their predictions are 
reconciled by an arbitration mechanism which recognises that some 
knowledge sources are more reliable than others. Such a mechanism is 
essential in a shallow processing system where the results of inference will 
often be incomplete and/or unreliable. 
The inference component is based on Wilks' ideas but goes significantly beyond 
them in several ways, for example to include object-oriented and goal-oriented 
reasoning. It is applied only when necessary, and then as late as possible. If 
the arbitrator cannot reach a firm decision even after taking inference into 
account, some further "collective" heuristics are applied; these heuristics 
guide the system to the right resolutions in most of the texts processed. 
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i f Boguraev's analyser is unable lo resolve all the word-sense and structural 
ambiguities in a sentence, it produces several alternative interpretations . 
When this happens, SPAR processes each interpretation as just described. A 
score is calculated for each interpretation, based on its semantic density (as 
determined by detailed comparison with the relevant word sense definitions) 
and the ease with which anaphors can be resolved. The highest-scoring 
reading is accepted. 
When all the ambiguities in a sentence have been resolved , it is merge d into 
the context and a paraphrase of it is produced which shows what resolution 
decisions have been made. The generator which produces the paraphrase 
makes both strategic and tactical decisions; it operates on a need-driven, 
left-to-right basis to ensure that appropriate descriptions are generated at 
each point in the sentence. 
10.2 Assessment of the system components 
This technical assessment of the major components of SPAR has a practical 
emphasis, and is based on the experience of implementing, developing and 
testing the ideas reported. Nevertheless, it also has theoretical implications, 
because computational theories of (a given aspect of) language processing are 
to be judged largely by the ease with which they can be implemented and made 
of 
lo contribute lo the reliable performance" a reasonably complete language 
processing system. 
We will therefore concentrate on assessing the contribution made by each 
component lo the overall system performance. For example, we will not ask 
whether the inference component is in general able to form chains that 
correctly represent the causal relationships between events in the text; 
rather, we are interested in the extent to which the predictions made by the 
inference component guide the system towards correct choices of 
specifications for anaphors. 
The components- of the system, namely the structure matcher, the AR rules, 
the inference mechanism and the generator, and also Boguraev's analyser, will 
be discussed in the approximate order in which they are applied. 
(1) Boguraev's analyser usually performs quite reliably on the range of 
sentences with which it is equipped to deal; inappropriate choices of word 
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sense or structure are fairly rare, except sometimes where pronouns are 
concerned . This is because pronouns cliff er from other noun phrases both 
semantically (in having very general meanings) and syntactically (for example, 
definite pronouns do not usually accept poslmodification), and not all such 
differences were taken into account when the analyser was built. The working 
of the analyser's semantic routines is too complex to allow all the relevant 
problems to be removed without significant effort. As explained in 4 .3.3, a few 
readings that are obviously incorrect therefore have to be removed or altered 
by hand before being input to SPAR; however, no theoretical problems of any 
relevance to anaphor resolution are sidestepped in so doing. 
The inability of the analyser to deal properly with conjunctions means that the 
behaviour of anaphors in sentences involving conjunctions has not been 
investigated. In SPAR. all anaphors in a sentence are firmly resolved, and the 
focus registers updated, before the next sentence is considered; it would be 
interesting to see how this behaviour had to be modified in the presence of 
conjoined constituents of various kinds. 
Finally, the lack of a completely reliable mapping between the case names 
used in dependency structures (AGENT, RECIPIENT etc.) and those in word-sense 
formulas (SUBJ, FOR etc.) makes the construction of text model current 
fragments rather more complex than it would otherwise be. This problem is 
worsened by the fact that the analyser assumes that the semantic preference 
restrictions on particular syntactic roles are to be found in particular 
semantic cases in formulas; thus the restriction on the direct object in an 
active sentence is taken as the filler of the OBJE role in the relevant formula 
even for a verb whose direct object plays some other semantic role. 
However, apart from the problems listed here, the analyser generally worked 
reliably and presented few difficulties. 
(2) SPAR's text representation and the corresponding structure matching 
apparatus allow anaphors and candidates to be compared moderately easily, 
with or without the information constraint in operation . However, the 
representation suffers from a lack of canonicality, which makes structure 
matching more difficult and time-consuming both for candidate assessment 
and for inference. This can largely be traced to the use, referred to above, of 
cases in formulas to represent syntactic as well as semantic information. But 
problems also arise when an entity is introduced in one way and then referred 
to in another, as in 
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(10-1) John let Bill borrow his car. Bill was grateful for the favour. 
What appears to be needed here is not so much a canonical representation as 
a means to compare descriptions which describe an entity at different levels 
or from different perspectives. This requires a richer representation, perhaps 
involving a multiple-perspective device such as that of KRL rather than a 
single conceptual hierarchy. However, to construct such a representation 
might involve more inference than a shallow processing system could be 
expected to perform. 
The separate and parallel treatment of each reading delivered by the analyser 
causes some inefficiency; pairs of readings often differ only slightly and/or in 
ways irrelevant to anaphor resolution, so that a great deal of processing is 
duplicated. However, an alternative approach, perhaps allowing uncertainty in 
the representation (so that a TMN node might be a Specialisation: of several 
alternative word senses, for example) would involve a large increase in the 
complexity of almost every part of the system. A still more radical (and more 
complex) alternative would be to integrate anaphor resolution with the 
operation of the analyser, resolving at least some anaphors fully or partially 
before parsing is complete. The extra semantic information provided by such 
resolution would enable some incorrect analysis paths to be pruned earlier 
than is currently the case. However, because, as I have argued, anaphor 
resolution is a largely collective process, and depends on the context provided 
by the whole sentence, the number of reliable early resolutions would probably 
not be very great; and in any case, the analyser's use of available semantic 
information at noun phrase and clause boundaries means that the parsing 
process is already reasonably efficient. 
In the area of SPAR's word sense representation, the use of the THIS primitive 
and of senses as well as primitives in formulas makes it quite easy lo define 
n ew senses economically and consistently when extending the lexicon. What 
consistency problems do arise are largely due to the use (forced by the 
analyser) of Wilks' syntax for formulas, rather than the "intermediate form" 
introduced in chapter 4. As was argued there, Wilks' syntax encourages 
considerable vagueness and implicitness which often conflicts with accuracy. 
Thus the main drawback of the representational formalism is its 
non-canonicality. Otherwise it appears quite well suited lo anaphor 
resolution. 
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(3) The Sidnerian anaphor resolution rules, modified and extended to cater for 
intrasentential candidates and to include the arbitrator and, where necessary, 
the post-inference collective heuristics, for the most part work reliably and 
efficiently. The order in which the AR rules suggest candidates is usually 
intuitively sensible. However, their use of different candidate orderings for 
agent and non-agent animate pronouns is counterintuitive, and sometimes 
causes problems. It also made the extension of the rules to incorporate 
intrasentential candidates a little awkward . 
Further, the distinction between candidate plausibility and implausibility is 
not always as cut and dried as the form of the AR rules presupposes. For 
example, in 
(10-2) John walked over to the trees. He began to speak to them. 
the preference of "speak" for an animate recipient would cause SPAR to reject 
the trees as referent of "them", and in the majority of cases it would be right 
to do so. Here, however, no other referent is available, so the plausibility 
requirement should be relaxed to allow the preference-breaking candidate to 
succeed. 
(4) The inference mechanism is, when invoked, the most computationally 
expensive part of the system, and the one that least often produces useful 
predictions. The lack of predictions is largely due to the fairly small amount 
of world knowledge (only twenty or so inference rules) that are available. 
However, when predictions are made and are subsequently accepted by the 
arbitrator, they are almost always correct ones; thus the inference mechanism 
is a reasonably reliable part of the system. But its contribution to the 
system's performance is comparatively small: for example, inference chains 
were used to determine the resolution of only 12% of the pronouns in the 
stories in appendix B. (A large number of other chains were formed but either 
only confirmed resolution decisions already made or were rejected as 
incompatible with the predictions of other components of the system). 
The reason that such a small number of rules have been provided is threefold . 
Firstly, the system is usually able, on the stories tested, to arrive at correct 
decisions even when the inference mechanism does not have Lhe necessary 
world knowledge to construct chains. Secondly, there is a gratifying tendency 
for exisling rules to give rise to correct chains for texts other than the one 
for which they were originally constructed. Thus, for example, several 
inference rules contain knowledge about making promises, and these rules 
formed useful chains in several stories involving promises. Thirdly, many 
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useful inferences are object-oriented (see 8.4.1), only making use of linguistic 
information in the WSN and not of explicit inference rules. 
All three of these tendencies provide some support for a shallow processing 
approach. They suggest that on many occasions, anaphors can be resolved 
without inference; that when inference is needed, a limited amount of 
knowledge about a concept can be useful in many different situations; and 
that linguistic knowledge as well as world knowledge can be very useful. 
However, the number and complexity of the texts processed are too small for 
these conclusions to be other than very tentative. 
(5) The basic structure of the generator proves to be appropriate for 
producing paraphrases that satisfy the criteria given at the beginning of 
chapter 9 . Sensible decisions are usually made about what information to 
include and how to order it. However, some problems are encountered at a 
more local level; for example, the selection of appropriate determiners and 
tenses is somewhat ad-hoe, making use of the "linguistic features" attached to 
TMN nodes . In chapter 4 it was noted that many of these features are 
themselves rather ad-hoe and would ideally be replaced in a cleaner version of 
the representation. 
10 .3 Shallow processing for anaphor resolution 
Given this assessment of SPAR's components, we can now ask more generally 
what evidence the system's performance provides for the feasibility of a 
shallow processing approach to resolving anaphors for various tasks and in 
various types of text. 
The texts SPAR has processed fall into two classes. The first class, shown in 
appendix A, consists of forty short texts of one to three sentences which I 
have written to test or illustrate specific aspects of SPAR's processing; all the 
anaphors in them are resolved correctly. These texts give an indication of the 
range of phenomena that the system can handle . However, because they are 
specially constructed, they do not constitute direct evidence for the shallow 
processing hypothesis . They perhaps provide some indirect support for a 
shallow processing approach in the sense that they show that a shallow 
processing system can, with the limited amount of effort available in a project 
of this type , be made to cover quite a wide spectrum of phenomena. 
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The second class, shown in appendix B, consists of twenty-three texts written 
by people with little or no knowledge of SPAR's processing strategy; many were 
originally written for other language-processing systems. Some were written 
to fall within the analyser's grammatical coverage; some were not, but were 
edited to make them do so . These stories are on average nine sentences long; 
the longest has twenty-three sentences. Of the 242 pronouns in them, about 1 
226 (93%) are resolved correctly; of the 80 non-pronominal anaphors, 66 (82%) 
are resolved correctly. The figure for pronouns could almost certainly be be 
increased to 232 (96%) by the implementation of the error recovery 
procedures described below. 
These figures are obviously of limited significance because of the simplicity of 
the texts processed compared to "real" texts, and because it was often 
necessary, in order to keep the complexity of incidental problems within 
reasonable bounds, to define new word senses with only the minimum of detail. 
However, it was encouraging to note that once the components of the system 
had been developed to the stage reported in this thesis, new stories did not 
often show up serious inadequacies in the program, and it was hardly ever 
necessary to extend existing word sense formulas to process new stories. In 
other words, the heavy use of word sense information by all parts of the 
system, including the inference component, did not lead to inappropriately 
large numbers of facts being stored as definitional (lexical) knowledge. 
Some attempt was made to test the system's robustness with variations on a 
single text by replacing one or more events with subtly but crucially different 
ones involving the same concepts: see e .g . texts A24-26, A37-40 and B 1 and B9 
in appendices A and B. Even so, there is no doubt that SPAR would make 
wrong decisions on some variations of many of the correctly-processed texts 
shown in appendix B. But tests of this type would not necessarily prove 
anything very interesting. The assumption behind the shallow processing 
hypothesis is that speakers or writers construct texts considerately; that is, 
they choose their words so that the applications of different types of 
knowledge by the reader tend to confirm rather than contradict one another. 
1These figures are only approximate because it is not always possible to 
decide unequivocally whether a particular phrase is anaphoric or not and, if it 
· is, whether the specification selected for it is correct. However, the 
inaccuracies are unlikely to be more than one or two per cent. 
The figures do not include the anaphors in text B23, which is significantly 
different from B22 only where generation, and not interpretation , is 
concerned. 
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It is arguable that many of the variations that would cause SPAR (but not 
people) to misinterpret anaphors would do so precisely because they are less 
considerate than the original texts . 
The pattern of the errors that SPAR did make when all the components were 
functioning as intended was interesting: few of the errors misled the system 
sufficiently to cause further misresolutions in subsequent sentences. Some 
possibilities for eliminating such "knock-on" effects as do occur are discussed 
below. 
What evidence is there, then, that a shallow processing approach might be 
applicable to more than the particular text type (simple stories) and task 
(paraphrase) for which SPAR is designed? 
Although SPAR was designed to process stories describing sequences of events, 
it also proved able to handle, with only trivial extensions, some texts of other 
types which had been written to test other text processing systems; see for 
example texts B21 and B22 in appendix B. 2 Indeed, the only part of the system 
that is specific to stories is the inference component. For non-story texts, the 
inference component might be generalised to look for coherence relations 
rather than causal chains, perhaps making use of the insights of Hobbs [ 1979] 
(see 5.2.2). 
Shallow processing using the techniques described in this thesis might be a 
promising basis for anaphor resolution in interactive tasks such as natural 
language database query. When SPAR does make wrong decisions, they are 
usually the result of predictions made by the less reliable post-inference 
components of the system. In such cases, instead of applying these 
components, the system could ask the user to indicate the correct decision; 
hopefully this would not occur so often as to degrade the system's usefulness. 
Furthermore, anaphor resolution by shallow processing methods is an 
attractive possibility for machine translation applications where only a rough 
translation is required or where post-editing is performed. Here again, 
doubtful resolutions could be indicated if desired. 
2For B21 , the system only needed to be extended to handle FDNP anaphors 
that specified sets of entities not previously specified by a single phrase. The 
analogous capability for pronouns was already present. For B22, no 
extensions were needed. 
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Perhaps the most serious limitation of the significance of the work presented 
here is that it is inevitably concerned with texts that are far simple r than 
those occurring in "real" applications. However, this criticism can be levelled 
at much research in natural language processing, and there is reason to be 
comparatively optimistic about the possibilities of "scaling up" the techniques 
presented here , because of their reliance on linguistic rather than world 
knowle dge. In the next few years, reasonably comprehensive computational 
grammars of English should become available; and on the semantic front, the 
exis tence of on-line dictionaries means that the required information about 
word m e anings is potentially available . Research such as that of Alshawi 
[ 1985] offers the hope that this semantic information can be converted into a 
computationally exploitable form that could play an analogous role in anaphor 
resolution to the role played in SPAR by Wilksian word-sense formulas. 
10.4 Directions for further work 
This final section contains suggestions for extending the SPAR system and the 
ideas it is based on. Perhaps the most serious gaps in SPAR as it stands are 
the lack of any treatment of quantifier scope and of any mechanism for 
recovering from the errors that a shallow processing system will inevitably 
make. Some possible ways of filling these gaps are therefore discussed here . 
We will then look at the possibility of extending SPAR's coverage to other types 
of anaphoric and non-anaphoric ambiguities, and will conclude the thesis with 
some speculations on the longer-term future of a shallow processing approach 
to ambiguity resolution. 
10.4.1 Intensional contexts and quantifier scope 
In chapter 4 it was claimed that the "context of identity" information 
attached lo TMN nodes could be extended to make SPAR sensitive to quantifier 
scope as well as intensional contexts. This might be done as follows . · 
The sentence 
( 10-3) Bill wants to break a window. 
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is ambiguous between readings which might be represented semi-formally3 as 
(L10-3a) 3x:window [ wants(Bill,break(Bill,x)) ] 
("there is a specific window, and Bill wants to break it") and 
(L10-3b) wants(Bill, 3x:window [ break(Bill,x) ] ) 
("Bill wants to break some window - any window will do"). Reading (Ll0-3b) is 
more plausible in a neutral cont.ext. 
In SPAR's represent.at.ion of ( 10-3), the TMN node for "window" would have a 
cont.ext. of identity such as CWANTl-1), showing that. the window probably only 
has a specific identity in the cont.ext of Bill's desires (thus favouring (L10-3b)). 
Similar ambiguities can be caused by certain quantifiers. For example 
( 10-4) Every farmer owns a donkey. 
may in principle be interpreted either as 
(L10-4a) 3d:donkey [ Vf:farmer [ owns(f ,d) ] ] 
or as 
(L10-4b) Vf:farmer [ 3d:donkey [ owns(f,d) ] ] 
(although the semantics of ownership in fact. makes (L10-4b) more likely in the 
null context.). Thus, by analogy with ( 10-3), it would seem sensible to give the 
TMN node for "a donkey" the context. of identity CFARMERl-1) : the donkey only 
has a specific identity once the choice of farmer is made. 
Resolution of anaphors in subsequent sentences would both be constrained by 
contexts of identity and would help to determine them more fully. Thus in 
( 10-5) [ 1] Every farmer owns a donkey. 
[2] He 1?eat.s it. 
3Because of its familiarity, predicate logic will be used to express semantic 
distinct.ions in this section. However, the not.ion of ·· cont.ext. of identity" is 
perhaps more closely related to Kamp's concept. of a discourse representation 
than to anything in predicate logic. Furthermore, we saw in chapter 2 that 
Kamp's formalism is able to deal naturally with some phenomena that are 
problematical to a predicate logical approach. Any development of SPAR to 
deal with quantifier scope would therefore probably use Kamp's framework 
rather than standard logic. The two frameworks are effectively isomorphic as 
far as the examples used here are concerned. 
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the pronouns would force [2] to be interpreted within the CFARMERl-1) context 
of identity and confirm the dependence of DONKEYl-1 on FARMERl-1 for its 
identity. On the other hand the resolution of the underlined pronoun in the 
(somewhat forced) text 
( 10-6) [1] Every farmer owns a donkey. 
[2] Every factory worker owns it too. 
[3] That's one of the advantages of collectivisation. 
would cause [2] to be interpreted in the null context of identity, and rule out 
the dependence of DONKEYl-1 on FARMERl-1. Similarly, one can imagine 
continuations to ( 10-3) which would either confirm or rule out the dependence 
of WINDOWl-1 on WANTl-1. 
Such a treatment of intensional contexts and quantifier scope would have the 
advantage of allowing logically distinct readings to be represented by the same 
structure and only resolved later when necessary (and possible). Hobbs 
[ 1983] argues that since many quite comprehensible sentences have a large 
number of different scopings, a "scope-neutral" representation is desirable; 
and VanLehn [1978] maintains that people normally do not disambiguate 
quantifier scope when they understand sentences. In addition, VanLehn shows 
that the determination of quantifier scope (when it is carried out) is a 
complex process depending on syntactic, semantic and pragmatic factors. 
There therefore seems no reason to attempt it in a shallow processing system 
before enough information is available to force a decision. 
The ideas presented in this brief outline are necessarily simplified, and it 
should not be imagined that the interactions between contexts of identity and 
anaphor resolution would in practice be at all straightforward . Indeed the 
process would in general appear to be a collective one involving the 
satisfadion of as many preferential constraints as possible. Specifying the 
nature and strength of these constraints would be a complex task. 
10.4.2 Recovering from errors 
A shallow processing system such as SPAR can be expected to make a certain 
proportion of errors in resolving anaphors, especially where decisions are 
uncertain, i.e. determined by the results of inference, by subsequently-applied 
collective heuristics, or (especially) by the weak preferences of the AR rules . 
In addition, and independent of shallow processing considerations, Mellish 
[ 1982] argues that there is no arbitrary point ( end of noun phrase, end of 
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sentence, etc.) at which enough information will necessarily have accumulated 
to resolve anaphors reliably. At present, however, SPAR always resolves 
anaphors sentence by sentence , and has no means of detecting or correcting 
any incorrect resolutions it makes. 
Thus some of SPAR's errors are due to its being a shallow processing system, 
and some are due to its resolving all ambiguities irrevocably at the end of each 
sentence. We will now see how some errors of the second type might be 
eliminated. 
Two approaches to the problem are conceivable : a breadth-first approach and 
a depth-first, backtracking approach. In a breadth-first approach, uncertain 
decisions would be postponed, and alternative versions of context carried 
along in the hope that later processing would reveal one version, and 
therefore one choice of referent (or indeed sense or structure), as preferable . 
For example, just as in 6 .1 we saw how SPAR sometimes prefers one reading of 
a sentence to another on the grounds that it requires fewer AR rule 
applications, so a version of context that allowed anaphors to be resolved 
more easily would also be pref erred. 
However, since many of SPAR's decisions are uncertain , a breadth-first 
approach would explode quite rapidly as more sentences were processed . It 
would therefore probably only be fe asible to postpone uncertain decisions in 
this way for a s e ntence or two at most. Thereafter, a backtracking approach, 
in which the system recognises that an error has occurred and goes back to 
repair it, would be necessary, either on its own or in addition to limited 
breadth-first processing. This raises the question of how the system could (a) 
recognise that an erroneous decision has been made and (b) identify which 
decision of the many that have been made is the culprit. 
Misresolutions of anaphors can be expected sometimes to give rise to 
apparent violations of the requirements of referential adequacy and efficiency 
(see 9 .1.2) which the writer of the text is assumed to observe. These apparent 
violations could be used to identify and correct earlier errors. 
The requirement of referential adequacy will appear to be broken if the only 
referent(s) that the AR rules can suggest for a pronoun are ruled out by 
configurational constraints . When this occurs, the pronoun will appear to the 
program to be referentially inadequate because it fails to identify a referent. 
For example, if SPAR decided (incorrectly) when processing 
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(10-7) [ 1] Mary wanted to give Susan a present. 
[2] She went to a shop which sold computers. 
[3] She walked over to one. 
[ 4] She decided that it would be a good present for Susan. 
that the "she" in [2] was Susan and not Mary, then Susan would become 
discourse focus and be selected as referent of "she" in [3] as well. However, in 
[ 4], problems would arise because "she" c-commands "Susan" and therefore 
cannot corefer with it. Mary is by now not in focus at all and will never be 
suggested by the AR rules . 
The correct action here would be to search backwards through a record of the 
anaphor resolution decisions made earlier, and provisionally alter the most 
recent uncertain decision in which the referent involved in the c-command 
clash (here, Susan) was pref erred. In this case, the most recent such decision 
is the choice of Susan rather than Mary as referent of "she" in [2]. If this 
decision is reversed and the story is re-processed from that point on, Mary will 
become discourse focus and no problems will arise . 
In cases where backtracking of this type fails to resolve the problem, the AR 
rules could be forced to look outside the focus registers for specifications for 
pronouns, using simple recency criteria to decide between candidates. 
If these ideas were implemented in SPAR. the system would correctly process 
both of the texts in appendix B (B6 and BlO) where it currently ignores a 
sentence because of an "unresolvable" pronoun. This would raise the 
proportion of correctly resolved pronouns in appendix B to about 96%. 
An apparent violation of the requirement of referential efficiency - for 
example, if a FDNP is used where a pronoun would be unambiguous - can also 
signal an earlier wrong decision. Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein's cenlering rule 
(see 5.4.4) could perhaps be used lo detect such violations. The appropriate 
action here is similar to the referential inadequacy case: backtrack to the 
most recent uncertain decision in favour of the referent in question, and 
reverse it. Suppose, for example, that in 
(10-8) [ 1] Mary wanted to give Susan a present. 
[2] She went to a shop which sold computers. 
[3] She bought one. 
[ 4] Susan loved it. 
the "she" in [2] is again misresolved as Susan, so that Susan is also chosen as 
referent 0f "she" (and therefore as discourse focus) in [3]. The use of 
"Susan" in [ 4] will then appear to be referentially inefficient; "she" would 
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have identified Susan just as well. If the system backtracks to the most recent 
uncertain decision in favour of Susan, i.e. that in [2]. and reverses it, then 
Mary will be discourse focus when [ 4] is encountered and all will be well. 
Errors in infe rence could sometimes be detected and corrected by applying 
Granger's [1980] principle that " the best context inference is the one which 
accounts for the most actions of a story character" . Gra nger's system 
ARTHUR applied this principle to understand texts where an initially plausible 
explanation later turns out to be wrong. In 
( 10-9) [ 1] Mary picked up a magazine. 
[2] She swatted a fly . 
the initial inference that Mary planned to read the magazine was replaced, 
when [2] was read, by the inference that she picked up the magazine to use it 
as a weapon. 
In SPAR, the equivalent of Granger's principle would be that single-tendril 
inference chains that explain a single assertion should be replaced by chains 
connecting one assertion to another . Thus in 
(10-10) [1] John wanted Bill to mend his car. 
[2] Bill had promised to lend it to him. 
an initial single-tendril chain, to the effect that the car is John 's because John 
is likely to want his own possessions to work, would be overturned, when [2] is 
processed, by the more complex but more explanatory chain saying that John 
wanted Bill's car mended because he was going to borrow it. 
10.4.3 Extending SPAR's linguistic coverage 
At present, the range of linguistic ambiguities that SPAR is equipped to deal 
with thoroughly is fairly limited. Lexical and structural ambiguities are only 
properly tackled when they interact with anaphora as described in 6 . 1; and a 
cursory glance at Halliday and Hasan [ 1976] will reveal many kinds of 
anaphora that SPAR does not handle, perhaps the most notable being ellipsis 
and "do so" anaphors . 
The "marker passing" approach to lexical ambiguity resolution is consistent 
with the shallow processing emphasis on linguistic knowledge . Marker passing 
was originally proposed by Quillian [ 1968], and has been used for word-sense 
disambiguation by Alshawi [1983] and Hirst [1983] among others. In such 
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approaches, the use of a word sense effectively increases the activation level 
of semantically related senses, and readings containing more activated senses 
are preferred. Wilksian word sense formulas, when allowed to contain other 
word senses, would appear to provide a sufficiently rich network for many if 
not most lexical ambiguities to be resolved by marker passing. 
Any practically useful system that resolved anaphors by shallow processing 
means would clearly have to have wider coverage of types of anaphora than 
SPAR does. To give SPAR a wider coverage, developments in various parts of 
the system, most notably the meaning representation and the AR rules, would 
be required. Such extensions would provide further evidence of the 
usefulness of some of the techniques used and developed in this thesis, but 
would not on their own necessarily cast any more light on the feasibility of a 
shallow processing approach to anaphora. For example, there is no obvious 
reason why shallow processing should be suitable for definite pronouns but 
not for "do so" anaphors. Thus to extend SPAR to process "do so" anaphors, 
but only in texts of the same complexity as those currently handled, would be 
far less impressive than to extend it to deal with more realistically complex 
texts, even if those texts were restricted to containing only nominal anaphors . 
Rather, what is needed in the long term is extensions of the system along 
many different dimensions together to enable it to deal with more complex 
texts. Work along these lines would encounter many of the unsolved problems 
of natural language processing; however, it is to be hoped that other unsolved 
problems, notably those of complex inference, would not be so severe in a 
shallow processing context. If so, then at least for some language-oriented 
tasks such as translation, the goal of genuinely useful automatic processing of 
non-specialised natural language texts will be that much easier to ac,hieve . 
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Appendix A: Short example texts and paraphrases 
The texts in this appendix test and illustrate particular aspects of SPAR's 
processing. Except where otherwise stated, they were written by the present 
author. To allow easier comparison, SPAR's output for each input sentence is 
shown immediately below the input. All material in THIS FONT is system input 
and output. Bracketed section numbers show where the phenomenon 
illustrated by the example is discussed in the main body of the thesis. 
1. The "principle of anaphoric success" (6.1.1, 6.1.3). 
Structural ambiguity can be resolved by considering what entities are 
available in context. Compare the interpretation of [3] in Al and A2 below. 
(The often inaccurate use of HEAR to express all kinds of spatial relationship is 
due to the analyser's treatment of all locative prepositions with the same 
LOCATION case) . 
Al [1]. JOHN PUT A BOWL ON THE FLOOR. 
NEAR A FLOOR, JOHN PUT A BOWL. 
[2]. HE PICKED UP SOME BISCUITS. 
JOHN PICKED UP SOME BISCUITS. 
[3]. HE PUT THE BISCUITS IN THE BOWL ON THE FLOOR. 
NEAR THE BOWL, JOHN PUT THE BISCUITS. 
A2 [1]. JOHN PICKED UP SOME BISCUITS. 
JOHN PICKED UP SOME BISCUITS. 
[2]. HE PUT THEM IN A BOWL. 
NEAR A BOWL, JOHN PUT THE BISCUITS. 
[3]. :!E PUT THE BISCUITS IN THE BOWL ON THE FLOOR. 
NEAR A FLOOR, JOHN PUT THE BISCUITS. 
Word sense ambiguity can also be resolved by accepting the more focussed 
option. 
A3 [1]. JOHN PUT THE CARDS ON THE TABLE. 
NEAR A DINING TABLE, JOHN PUT SOME CARDS. 
[2]. HE PUT THE TOOLS ON THE FLOOR. 
NEAR A FLOOR, JOHN PUT SOME REPAIR IMPLEMENTS. 
[3] . HE PICKED UP THE JACK. 
JOHN PICKED UP THE LIFTING DEVICE WHICH WAS AMONG THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS 
WHICH JOHN PUT NEAR THE FLOOR. 
A4 [1]. JOHN PUT THE DOG ON THE TABLE. 
NEAR A DINING TABLE, JOHN PUT A DOG. 
[2]. HE EXAMINED ITS LEGS . 
JOHN EXAMINED THE DOG'S LIMBS. 
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2. FDNP resolution (6 .2 .1) . 
A5 illustrates cospecification [2] and associated specification [3] . 
A5 [1]. JOHN HAS BOUGHT A NEW JAGUAR. 
JOHN HAS PURCHASED A NEW JAGUAR. 
[2] . THE CAR IS ULTRA-MODERN IN EVERY RESPECT. 
THE JAGUAR IS ULTRA-MODERN IN EVERY RESPECT. 
[3]. THE INDICATORS ARE CONTROLLED BY A MICROPROCESSOR. 
THE JAGUAR'S INDICATORS ARE CONTROLLED BY A MICROPROCESSOR. 
The establishment of cospecification may use information from the sentential 
context of the antecedent as well as the antecedent itself. In A6, but not in 
A7, "'his assailant" is identified with the "man". 
A6 [1]. A MAN ATTACKED JOHN IN THE PARK. 
AT A PARK, A MAN ATTACKED JOHN. 
[2] . HE RAN AWAY FROM HIS ASSAILANT. 
JOHN FLED FROM THE MAN. 
A7 [l]. A MAN APPROACHED JOHN IN THE PARK. 
AT A PARK, A MAN APPROACHED JOHN. 
[2]. HE RAN AWAY FROM HIS ASSAILANT. 
THE MAN FLED . FROM THAT MAN'S ASSAILANT. 
The final sentences in AS and A9 illustrate inferred specification (i.e . relaxing 
the information constraint). 
AS [l]. JOHN WAS DRIVING ALONG THE MOTORWAY. 
JOHN WAS DRIVING NEAR A MOTORWAY. 
[2]. HIS JAGUAR BROKE DOWN. 
JOHN'S JAGUAR WHICH JOHN WAS DRIVING NEAR THE MOTORWAY IN STOPPED 
WORKING. 
A9 [ll. THE HEIRESS LIVED AS A RECLUSE. 
AN HEI~ESS RESIDED LIKE A RECLUSE. 
[2] . SHE DIED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. 
THE HEIRESS DIED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. 
[3] . THE MURDERER WAS NOT FOUND. 
THE PERSON WHO KILLED THE HEIRESS WAS NOT FOUND. 
The information constraint may be broken, in direct cospecification, by 
modifiers (AlO) but not by head nouns (All). 
AlO [11 . THE HEIRESS LIVED AS A RECLUSE. 
AN HEIRESS RESIDED LIKE A RECLUSE. 
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[2]. NOBODY SAW THE OLD WOMAN. 
NOBODY SAW THE HEIRESS. 
All [1]. THE OLD WOMAN LIVED AS A RECLUSE. 
AN OLD WOMAN RESIDED LIKE A RECLUSE. 
[2]. NOBODY SAW THE HEIRESS. 
NOBODY SAW AN HEIRESS. 
Indefinite as well as definite noun phrases may by resolved as anaphors. 
Al2 [1]. JOHN ENTERED A RESTAURANT. 
JOHN ENTERED A RESTAURANT. 
[2]. A WAITER CAME TOWARDS HIM. 
A WAITER WHO WORKED AT THE RESTAURANT CAME TO JOHN. 
3. Resolving descriptional anaphors (6.2.2). 
When resolving phrases with heads "one" and " some", set membership is 
preferred where possible (A13, A14, A15); otherwise sense alone is shared 
(A16). 
A 13 [ 1] . JOHN PICKED SOME FLOWERS. 
JOHN PLUCKED SOME FLOWERS. 
[2]. MARY ASKED HIM FOR THE RED ONE. 
FROM JOHN, MARY DEMANDED THE RED FLOWER WHICH WAS AMONG THE FLOWERS 
WHICH JOHN PLUCKED. 
A14 [1] . JOHN PICKED SOME FLOWERS. 
JOHN PLUCKED SOME FLOWERS. 
[2]. MARY ASKED HIM FOR A RED ONE. 
FROM JOHN, MARY DEMANDED A RED FLOWER WHICH WAS AMONG THE FLOWERS 
WHICH JOHN PLUCKED. 
Al5 [1]. JOHN PICKED SOME FLOWERS. 
JOHN PLUCKED SOME FLOWERS. 
[2]. MARY ASKED HIM FOR ONE. 
FROM JOHN, MARY DEMANDED ONE OF THE FLOWERS WHICH JOHN PLUCKED. 
A16 [ll. JOHN LIKED BANANAS. 
JOHN LIKED BANANAS. 
[2] . HE ASKED MARY FOR ONE. 
FROM MARY, JOHN DEMANDED A BANANA. 
The "one" in [2] below is parasitic ; its resolution depends on that of " them" . 
Al 7 [1] . WENDY EXAMINED THE T-SHIRTS ON THE TABLE. 
WENDY EXAMINED THE T-SHIRTS WHICH WERE NEAR A DINING TABLE. 
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[2). SHE PICKED UP ONE OF THEM. 
WENDY PICKED UP ONE OF THE T-SHIRTS WHICH WERE NEAR THE DINING TABLE. 
4 . Plural pronoun resolution (6.2.2). 
The correct resolution of "them" in [2] below depends on the selection of a set 
of semantically similar entities, i.e . John and Mary rather than John, Mary and 
the park. 
Al8 [1]. JOHN MET MARY IN THE PARK. 
AT A PARK, JOHN MET MARY. 
[2]. A POL I CEMAN SAW THEM. 
A POLICEMAN SAW JOHN AND MARY. 
5 . "Normal mode" inference (6 .2.3) . 
Ex traction matching is inappropriate for normal mode inference (A19); 
however, semantic constraints should be applied (A20-21) . A20 is adapted 
from Wilks [ 1975a]. 
Al9 [1). BILL STAYED AT HOME. 
BILL STAYED AT HOME. 
[2]. JOHN WENT TO LONDON. 
JOHN WENT TO LONDON. 
[3]. HE TRAVELLED FROM BIRMINGHAM TO CAMBRIDGE. 
FROM BIRMINGHAM, JOHN TRAVELLED TO CAMBRIDGE. 
A20 [1) . I BOUGHT THE WINE. 
I PURCHASED SOME WINE. 
[2] . I SAT ON A ROCK. 
I SAT DOWN NEAR A ROCK. 
[3] . DRANK IT. 
IMBIBED THE WINE. 
A21 [1]. THE MONKEYS PICKED SOME BANANAS. 
SOME MONKEYS PLUCKED SOME BANANAS. 
[2]. THEY WERE RIPE. 
THE BANANAS WERE RIPE. 
[3]. THEY ATE THEM. 
THE MONKEYS DEVOURED THE BANANAS. 
6 . Augmenting the focus registers with intrasentential candidates (6 .3.3). 
An intrasentential (strict) anaphor is preferred to a potential focus (A22) ; 
however, an intrasentential cataphor is not (A23) . 
249 
A22 [1]. MARY ARRIVED AT THE CLUB WITH JOHN. 
WITH JOHN, MARY ARRIVED AT A CLUB. 
[2]. SUSAN WAS TELLING BILL'S SISTER ABOUT HIS BEHAVIOUR. 
TO BILL'S SISTER, SUSAN WAS COMMUNICATING BILL'S BEHAVIOUR. 
A23 [1] . MARY ARRIVED AT THE CLUB WITH JOHN. 
WITH JOHN, MARY ARRIVED AT A CLUB. 
[2] . SUSAN WAS TELLING HIS SISTER ABOUT BILL'S BEHAVIOUR. 
TO JOHN'S SISTER, SUSAN WAS COMMUNICATING BILL'S BEHAVIOUR. 
7 . Applying syntactic constraints (6 .4.1) . 
The timely application of configurational constraints can remove the ne e d for 
infere nce . A24 and A25 are adapted from Sidner [1979]. (A special hack was 
needed to recognize that the idiom "X bit Yin the hand/paw" means "X bit Y's 
hand/paw"). 
A24 [11. I TOOK MY DOG TO THE VET ON FRIDAY. 
TO A VET, AND ON FRIDAY, I CONVEYED MY DOG. 
[2]. HE BIT HIM IN THE HAND. 
AT THE VET'S HAND, THE DOG BIT THAT VET. 
A25 [1]. I TOOK MY DOG TO THE VET ON FRIDAY. 
TO A VET, AND ON FRIDAY, I CONVEYED MY DOG. 
[2]. HE INJECTED HIM WITH A NEW MEDICINE. 
WITH A NEW MEDICINE, THE VET INJECTED THE DOG. 
A26 [1]. I TOOK MY DOG TO THE VET ON FRIDAY. 
TO A VET, AND ON FRIDAY, I CONVEYED MY DOG. 
[2]. HE BIT HIM IN THE PAW. 
AT THE DOG'S PAW, THE VET BIT THAT DOG. 
8. The c-commanded pronoun heuristic (6 .4 .3). 
(See text Bl in the next appendix for the repetition heuristic, and B2 for focus 
retention). "John" c-cornmands "his" below, but "Bill" does not. 
A27 [1]. ON HIS ARRIVAL JOHN REALISED THAT BILL WAS DRUNK. 
JOHN REALISED ON JOHN'S ARRIVAL THAT BILL WAS DRUNK. 
9 . CSI rule application (8 .2.1). 
In A28 and A29 (adapted from Wilks [1975a] and [1975b] respective ly), "them" 
is resolved by CSI chains. (See appendix C for more detailed examples of 
inference). 
A28 [1]. THE SOLDIERS FIRED AT THE WOMEN. 
SOME SOLDIERS FIRED AT SOME WOMEN. 
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(2). WE SAW SEVERAL OF THEM FALL. 
WE SAW SEVERAL OF THE WOMEN WHO THE SOLDIERS FIRED AT FALL" 
A29 [1] . THE DOGS CHASED THE CATS. 
SOME DOGS CHASED SOME CATS. 
(2) . ONE OF THE'-1 SQUEALED IN PAIN. 
ONE OF THE CATS WHICH THE DOGS CHASED SQUEALED BECAUSE OF PAIN. 
10. Ne gative m a tches during inference 
.. . may lead to n egative (A30) or positive (A31) inference chains (8.2 .4) . 
A30 (1). JOHN KILLED BILL. 
JOHN KILLED BILL. 
(2). HE RAN AWAY. 
JOHN FLED. 
A31 (1) . THE SOLDIERS FIRED AT THE WOMEN. 
SOME SOLDIERS FIRED AT SOME WOMEN. 
[2] . THEY DID NOT FALL. 
THE WOMEN DID NOT FALL. 
11. Non-explanatory inference chains 
... can still help to resolve pronouns (8 .3 .1). 
A32 [lJ. JOHN GAVE BILL A BANANA. 
TO BILL, JOHN PRESENTED A BANANA. 
[2] . HE ATE IT. 
BILL DEVOURED THE BANANA. 
A33 [1] . FRED GAVE JOHN A HAMMER. 
TO JOHN, FRED PRESENTED A HAMMER. 
[2]. HE HIT BILL WITH IT. 
WITH THE HAMMER, JOHN HIT BILL. 
12. The generat or. 
The generator tries to select minimal modifiers to distinguish the intended 
referent from others (9.3.1) . In A34 , "new" does the job in [3]; in A35, it does 
not, and a full relative clause is needed. 
A34 [1] . JOHN SOLD HIS OLD CAR. 
JOHN SOLD JOHN ' S OLD CAR. 
[2] . HE BOUGHT A NEW ONE. 
JOHN PURCHASED A NEW CAR. 
[3] . IT BROKE DOWN. 
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THE NEW CAR STOPPED WORKING. 
A35 [1] . BILL BOUGHT A NEW CAR. 
BILL PURCHASED A NEW CAR. 
[2]. JOHN BOUGHT A NEW CAR. 
JOHN PURCHASED A NEW CAR. 
[3]. IT BROKE DOWN. 
THE CAR WHICH JOHN PURCHASED STOPPED WORKING. 
Sentence [2] below exercises the generator to the full (9.4 .2) . 
A36 (1). JOHN WENT TO THE ZOO. 
JOHN WENT TO A ZOO. 
[2]. HE SAW THE ELEPHANTS WAVING THEIR TRUNKS. 
WHILE THE ELEPHANTS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS WHICH WERE AT THE ZOO 
WAVED THOSE ELEPHANTS' PROBOSCES, JOHN SAW THOSE ELEPHANTS. 
13. Some variations on the theme of "promising". 
The pronouns here are resolved by a combination of CSI and semantic 
(word-sense) constraints. 
A37 [1]. JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT HE WOULD MEND HIS CAR. 
JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT JOHN WOULD REPAIR BILL'S CAR. 
A38 [1] . JOHN PROMISED HIS FATHER THAT HE WOULD DO HIS HOMEWORK. 
JOHN PROMISED JOHN'S FATHER THAT JOHN WOULD DO JOHN'S HOMEWORK. 
A39 [1]. JOHN PROMISED HIS SON THAT HE WOULD DO HIS HOMEWORK. 
JOHN PROMISED JOHN'S SON THAT JOHN WOULD DO THAT SON'S HOMEWORK. 
A40 [1] . JOHN PROMISED HIS SON THAT HE WOULD RECEIVE A COMPUTER FOR CHRISTMAS. 
JOHN PROMISED JOHN'S SON THAT BECAUSE OF CHRISTMAS, THAT SON WOULD 
RECEIVE A COMPUTER. 
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Appendix B: Longer ex ample texts and paraohrases 
The texts in this appendix were written by people with little or no knowledge of 
SPAR's processing strategies. Some were written to conform to the analyser 's 
grammatical coverage; the others were edited to make them do so. 
Aspects of the following story are discussed in 6.4.2, 6 .4.3, 8.3.2 and 8.4.2 . See 
appendix C fo r the inference involved in processing [ 1] to [3]. The repetition 
heuristic (see 6.4 .3) led to the resolution of "he" in [ 4], " he" in [5] and "his" 
in [7]. 
Ji1 [1]~ JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT HE WOULD MEND HIS CAR. 
JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT JOHN WOULD REPAIR BILL'S CAR. 
[2] . HE TOOK IT TO HIS FRIEND'S GARAGE. 
TO JOHN ' S FRIEND'S GARAGE, JOHN CONVEYED THE CAR. 
[3]. HE TRIED TO PERSUADE HIS FRIEND THAT HE SHOULD LEND HIM SOME TOOLS. 
JOHN ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE JOHN'S FRIEND THAT THAT FRIEND SHOULD LOAN 
JOHN SOME REPAIR IMPLEMENTS. 
[4]. HIS FRIEND SAID THAT HE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO LEND TOOLS. 
JOHN'S FRIEND SAID THAT THAT FRIEND WAS NOT ALLOWED TO LOAN ANY REPAIR 
IMPLEMENTS. 
[SJ. JOHN ASKED HIS FRIEND TO SUGGEST SOMEONE FROM WHOM HE COULD BORROW 
TOOLS. 
JOHN REQUESTED JOHN'S FRIEND TO RECOMMEND SOMEONE WHO JOHN COULD BORROW 
SOME REPAIR IMPLEMENTS FROM. 
[6]. HIS FRIEND DID NOT ANSWER. 
JOHN'S FRIEND DID NOT ANSWER. 
[7]. FULFILLING HIS PROMISES WAS IMPORTANT TO JOHN. 
DISCHARGING JOHN ' S PROMISES WAS URGENT TO JOHN. 
[8] . HE WAS ANGRY. 
JOHN WAS ANGRY. 
[9]. HE LEFT. 
JOHN DEPARTED. 
The focus retention heuristic is used for "he" in [5] below. 
B2 [1] . JOHN WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
JOHN WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
[2]. HE ASKED THE WAITER FOR A CURRY. 
FROM THE WAITER WHO WORKED AT THE RESTAURANT, JOHN DEMANDED A CURRY. 
[3] . HE ATE IT. 
JOHN DEVOURED THE CURRY. 
[4] . HE PAID THE CASHIER. 
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JOHN PAID A CASHIER. 
[S]. HE LEFT. 
JOHN DEPARTED. 
The following is adapted from Cater [1981]. See 8 .2 .1 and 8.2.3. 
B3 [1]. BILL WENT TO THE ZOO WITH JILL. 
WITH JILL, BILL WENT TO A ZOO. 
[2]. THEY GAVE THE MONKEYS SOME BANANAS WHICH THEY ATE. 
TO THE MONKEYS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS WHICH WERE AT THE ZOO, BILL 
AND JILL PRESENTED SOME BANANAS, AND THE MONKEYS DEVOURED THE 
BANANAS. 
[3]. THEY WENT TO THE RESTAURANT. 
BILL AND JILL WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
[ 4 l . THEY DRANK SOME TEA. 
BILL AND JILL IMBIBED SOME TEA. 
[S]. JILL TOOK BILL'S MONEY. 
JILL TOOK HOLD OF BILL'S MONEY. 
[6]. SHE GAVE IT TO THE TRAMP WHO WAS TALKING TO THEM. 
TO THE TRAMP WHO WAS TALKING WITH BILL AND JILL, JILL PRESENTED THE 
MONEY. 
In the following story, note that: 
( 1) The repetitiveness in [2] is due to the generator not recognizing that "John 
and Mary lived in the garden" means the same as "Mary lived with John in the 
garden". 
(2) The pseudo-preposition "outof" appears in the input because the 
analyser's grammar cannot deal with multiple prepositions. 
B4 [1]. MARY LIVED WITH JOHN. 
MARY RESIDED WITH JOHN. 
[2]. THEY LIVED IN THE GARDEN WHICH GOD HAD GIVEN THEM. 
JOHN AND MARY RESIDED AT THE GARDEN WHICH MARY RESIDED WITH JOHN AT AND 
WHICH GOD HAD PRESENTED TO JOHN AND MARY. 
[3]. HE APPEARED IN IT. 
GOD APPEARED AT THE GARDEN. 
[4]. HE GAVE THEM A GOLD BOX. 
TO JOHN AND MARY, GOD PRESENTED A GOLD BOX. 
[S] . HE TOLD THEM THAT THEY COULD NOT TAKE THINGS OUTOF IT. 
GOD INFORMED JOHN AND MARY THAT FROM THE BOX, JOHN AND MARY COULD NOT 
TAKE HOLD OF ANY THINGS. 
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[6]. THEY OBEYED HIS WORD FOR MANY YEARS. 
FOR MANY YEARS, JOHN AND MARY OBEYED GOD'S SPOKEN WORD. 
[7]. A HORSE APPEARED. 
A HORSE APPEARED. 
[8]. IT WAS BAD. 
THE HORSE WAS BAD. 
[9]. IT TOLD THEM TO BREAK INTO THE BOX. 
THE HORSE ORDERED JOHN AND MARY TO BURGLE THE BOX. 
[10]. THEY OBEYED IT. 
JOHN AND MARY DID AS THE HORSE WANTED. 
[11]. MONEY CAME OUTOF THE BOX. 
SOME MONEY CAME FROM THE BOX. 
[12]. NARCOTICS CAME OUTOF THE BOX. 
SOME NARCOTICS CAME FROM THE BOX. 
[13]. OTHER BAD THINGS CAME OUTOF THE BOX. 
SOME OTHER BAD THINGS CAME FROM THE BOX. 
[14] . GOD SAW THIS. 
GOD SAW THE THINGS COME FROM THE BOX. 
[1 SJ. HE THREW THEM OUTOF HIS GARDEN. 
FROM GOD'S GARDEN, GOD THREW JOHN AND MARY. 
The following text presents few problems. 
B5 [1]. MARY DECIDED TO GO TO PARIS. 
MARY RESOLVED TO GO TO PARIS. 
[2]. IT IS A BIG CITY. 
PARIS IS A BIG CITY. 
[3). SHE BELIEVED THAT THE SHOPS WOULD BE INTERESTING. 
MARY BELIEVED THAT SOME SHOPS WOULD BE INTERESTING. 
[4). THEY WOULD HAVE CHEAP THINGS FOR SALE. 
THE SHOPS WOULD INCLUDE THE CHEAP THINGS WHICH WERE FOR SALE. 
[SJ. SHE WOULD GET CLEVER BOOKS. 
MARY WOULD OBTAIN SOME WELL-ARGUED BOOKS. 
[6]. SHE WOULD BUY RED FLOWERS. 
MARY WOULD PURCHASE SOME RED FLOWERS. 
[7]. THEY WOULD BE. FUN. 
THE FLOWERS WOULD BE FUN. 
The next story also presents few problems until the final sentence, where 
"her" is unresolvable because Mary is no longer focussed enough to be 
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suggested by the AR rules (but see 10.4.2). 
B6 [1]. JOHN WENT TO THE GARDEN. 
JOHN WENT TO A GARDEN. 
[2]. THERE WERE FLOWERS IN IT. 
SOME FLOWERS EXISTED AT THE GARDEN. 
[3] . MARY SAW HIM. 
MARY SAW JOHN. 
[4]. SHE RAN AFTER HIM. 
MARY SPRINTED TO JOHN. 
CS] . HE WAS EATING BANANAS. 
JOHN WAS DEVOURING SOME BANANAS. 
[6]. SHE ASKED HIM FOR ONE. 
FROM JOHN, MARY DEMANDED ONE OF THE BANANAS WHICH JOHN WAS DEVOURING. 
[7]. HE GAVE HER ONE. 
TO MARY, JOHN PRESENTED ONE OF THE BANANAS WHICH JOHN WAS DEVOURING. 
[8] . THEY WENT TO THE FOUNTAIN. 
JOHN AND MARY WENT TO A FOUNTAIN. 
[9]. JOHN JUMPED INTO IT. 
JOHN JUMPED TO THE FOUNTAIN. 
[10]. HE FELT GLAD. 
JOHN EXPERIENCED A GLAD FEELING. 
[11]. MARY WAS GLAD TO SEE HIM PLAYING. 
MARY WAS GLAD BECAUSE WHILE JOHN GAMBOLLED, MARY SAW JOHN. 
[12]. SHE PICKED SOME FLOWERS. 
MARY PLUCKED SOME FLOWERS. 
[13]. SHE THREW THEM AT HIM. 
TO JOHN, MARY THREW THE FLOWERS WHICH MARY PLUCKED. 
[14] . HE CAUGHT THEM. 
JOHN CAUGHT THE FLOWERS WHICH MARY PLUCKED. 
[15]. HE TOLD HER THAT HE HAD LEFT SCHOOL. 
IGNORED BECAUSE OF UNRESOLVABLE PRONOUN. 
Th!=! following text is about as long as can be handled accurately without a 
global focussing mechanism. The slightly odd paraphrases of the last two 
sentences are due to SPAR not recognizing that they are generic. 
B7 [1]. THE BIG LORRY CAME TO THE ZOO. 
A BIG LORRY CAME TO A ZOO. 
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-[2]. VARIOUS ANIMALS WERE IN THEIR CAGES. 
VARIOUS ANIMALS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS WHICH WERE AT THE ZOO WERE 
AT THOSE ANIMALS ' CAGES. 
[3]. SOME CONTAINED SHEEP. 
SOME OF THE ANIMALS' CAGES CONTAINED SOME SHEEP WHICH WERE AMONG THOSE 
ANIMALS. 
[4]. SOME CONTAINED ELEPHANTS. 
SOME OF THE CAGES CONTAINED SOME ELEPHANTS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS . 
[SJ. ONE CONTAINED A TIGER. 
ONE OF THE CAGES CONTAINED A TIGER WHICH WAS AMONG THE ANIMALS. 
[6]. THE MAN JUMPED FROM THE LORRY. 
A MAN JUMPED FROM THE LORRY. 
[7]. HE HELD THE DOOR. 
THE MAN HELD THE LORRY'S DOOR. 
[8]. A MONKEY CAME OUT. 
A MONKEY CAME FORTH. 
[9]. IT HAD A SAD FACE. 
THE MONKEY POSSESSED A SAD FACE. 
[10]. THE GIRAFFE ASKED HIM THE REASON FOR THIS. 
FROM THE MONKEY, A GIRAFFE INQUIRED THE REASON THAT MONKEY POSSESSED 
THE FACE. 
[11]. HE SAID THAT HE HAD LEFT HIS FOOD AT HOME. 
THE MONKEY SAID THAT AT HOME, THAT MONKEY HAD DEPOSITED THAT MONKEY'S 
FOOD. 
[12]. HE WAS HUNGRY. 
THE MONKEY WAS HUNGRY. 
[13] , A TREE WAS OUTSIDE THE ZOO. 
A TREE WAS AT THE ZOO. 
[14) . THE GIRAFFE OFFERED HELP. 
THE GIRAFFE OFFERED HELP. 
[15) . HE GRASPED THE RIPE LEAVES WITH HIS MOUTH. 
WITH THE MOUTH WHICH WAS NEAR THE GIRAFFE, THAT GIRAFFE GRASPED SOME 
RIPE LEAVES. 
[16]. HE PULLED THE TREE OUTOF THE GROUND. 
FROM THE GROUND, THE GIRAFFE PULLED THE TREE. 
[17] . THE TREE FELL ON THE TIGER. 
THE TREE FELL NEAR THE TIGER. 
[18). THE TIGER FELL ON THE ELEPHANT. 
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THE TIGER FELL NEAR THE ELEPHANT WHICH WAS AMONG THE ANIMALS. 
(19]. THE ELEPHANT FELL ON THE HORSE. 
THE ELEPHANT WHICH THE TIGER FELL NEAR FELL NEAR THE HORSE WHICH WAS 
AMONG THE ANIMALS. 
(20]. THE ZOO KEEPER HEARD THE DISTURBANCE. 
A ZOOKEEPER HEARD THE ELEPHANT WHICH THE TIGER FELL NEAR FALL NEAR THE 
HORSE. 
(21] . HE WAS ANGRY. 
THE ZOOKEEPER WAS ANGRY. 
[22]. THE MONKEY SAID THAT HE DID NOT EAT LEAVES. 
THE MONKEY SAID THAT THAT MONKEY DID NOT DEVOUR ANY LEAVES . 
(23]. HE ATE BANANAS. 
THE MONKEY DEVOURED SOME BANANAS. 
Although the following story is shorter than the last one, the influence of 
global focus is stronger; thus SPAR inevitably makes some errors. The bizarre 
interpretation of [ 18) is however due to Sidner-based AR rules predicting both 
Joan and the attendant for "she" (an agent pronoun) but only Joan for "her" 
(a normal pronoun); inference is therefore not invoked. 
B8 [1]. JOAN PLANNED TO DRIVE TO CAMBRIDGE. 
JOAN PLANNED TO DRIVE TO CAMBRIDGE. 
[2]. SHE GOT UP AT DAWN. 
JOAN GOT UP AT DAWN. 
[3]. SHE GAVE HER FRIEND THE KEY OF HER HOUSE. 
TO JOAN'S FRIEND, JOAN PRESENTED THE SECURITY KEY WHICH WAS AT JOAN'S 
HOUSE. 
[4]. SHE PUT THE CAT IN THE CELLAR. 
NEAR THE HOUSE'S CELLAR, JOAN PUT A CAT. 
[S]. SHE GAVE HER FRIEND SOME FOOD FOR IT. 
TO JOAN'S FRIEND, JOAN PRESENTED SOME FOOD WHICH WAS FOR THE CAT. 
[6]. SHE TOLD HER THAT SHE WOULD RETURN ON FRIDAY. 
JOAN INFORMED JOAN'S FRIEND THAT JOAN WOULD RETURN ON FRIDAY. 
[7] . SHE WROTE A NOTE FOR THE MILKMAN. 
TO A MILKMAN, JOAN WROTE A NOTE. 
[8]. SHE PUT OIL IN THE ENGINE OF THE CAR. 
NEAR THE ENGINE WHICH WAS NEAR A CAR, JOAN PUT SOME OIL. 
[9]. SHE PUT HER CASE IN THE CAR. 
NEAR THE CAR, JOAN PUT JOAN'S CASE. 
[10] . SHE PUT A BOX OF APPLES IN THE CAR FOR HER SON. 
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FOR JOAN'S SON, AND NEAR THE CAR, JOAN PUT A BOX WHICH HAD SOME APPLES. 
[11). HE LIKED APPLES. 
THE SON LIKED APPLES. 
[12). SHE PUT A CAKE IN THE CAR FOR HER SON'S WIFE. 
FOR JOAN'S SON'S WIFE, AND NEAR THE CAR, JOAN PUT A CAKE. 
[13). SHE LIKED CAKE. 
JOAN LIKED CAKES. 
[14). SHE PUT A PHOTO IN THE CAR FOR HER MOTHER. 
FOR JOAN'S MOTHER, AND NEAR THE CAR, JOAN PUT A PHOTO. 
[15) . SHE LIKED PHOTOS. 
JOAN LIKED PHOTOS. 
[16). SHE DROVE TO THE GARAGE AT WHICH SHE BOUGHT SOME PETROL. 
JOAN DROVE TO THE VEHICLE REPAIR CENTRE WHICH JOAN PURCHASED SOME 
PETROL AT. 
[17). SHE ASKED THE ATTENDANT TO PUT AIR IN THE TYRES. 
JOAN REQUESTED THE ATTENDANT WHO WORKED AT THE VEHICLE REPAIR CENTRE TO 
PUT SOME AIR NEAR SOME TYRES. 
[18). SHE PAID HER. 
THE ATTENDANT PAID JOAN. 
[19). SHE DROVE AWAY. 
JOAN DROVE. 
The next example uses many of the same concepts as Bl. Note that the errors 
in [3] ("his friend " ) and [ 15) ("he") do not propagate to later sentences. 
The use of the modifier "which Sam would loan John" in [8] onwards, rather 
lhan the more precise "which John asked Sam lo loan John", is due to the 
generator's inability to express complex relative clauses (see footnote in 
9 .3 .1). 
B9 [1] . JOHN WANTED BILL TO MEND HIS CAR. 
JOHN WANTED BILL TO REPAIR JOHN'S CAR. 
[2]. HE TOOK IT TO BILL'S GARAGE. 
TO BILL ' S GARAGE, JOHN CONVEYED THE CAR. 
[3) . BILL ASKED HIS FRIEND TO LEND HIM SOME TOOLS. 
BILL REQUESTED BILL'S FRIEND TO LOAN BILL SOME REPAIR IMPLEMENTS. 
[4] . JOHN SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT BILL HAD TOOLS. 
JOHN SAID THAT JOHN BELIEVED THAT BILL POSSESSED SOME REP AIR IMPLEMENTS. 
[5) . HE PROMISED TO LEND HIM SOME. 
JOHN PROMISED THAT JOHN WOULD LOAN BILL SOME REPAIR IMPLEMENTS . 
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[6]. JOHN DID NOT HAVE THE TOOLS. 
JOHN DID NOT POSSESS THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH JOHN WOULD LOAN BILL. 
[7]. HE ASKED SAM TO LEND HIM SOME. 
JOHN REQUESTED SAM TO LOAN JOHN SOME REPAIR IMPLEMENTS. 
[8]. HE PROMISED TO RETURN THEM BY FRIDAY. 
JOHN PROMISED THAT BEFORE FRIDAY, JOHN WOULD GIVE BACK THE REPAIR 
IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM WOULD LOAN JOHN. 
[9]. HE GAVE THEM TO BILL. 
TO BILL, JOHN PRESENTED THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM WOULD LOAN JOHN. 
[10]. BILL MENDED THE CAR. 
BILL REPAIRED THE CAR. 
[11]. HE GAVE JOHN HIS TOOLS. 
TO JOHN, BILL PRESENTED THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM WOULD LOAN 
JOHN. 
[12] . JOHN FORGOT TO RETURN THEM TO Sfu~. 
JOHN FORGOT TO GIVE BACK THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM WOULD LOAN 
JOHN TO SAM. 
[13]. SAM ASKED HIM FOR THEM. 
FROM JOHN, SAM DEMANDED THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM WOULD LOAN 
JOHN. 
[14] . SAM SAID THAT HE HAD PROMISED TO RETURN THEM BY FRIDAY. 
SAM SAID THAT JOHN HAD PROMISED THAT BEFORE FRIDAY, JOHN WOULD GIVE 
BACK THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM WOULD LOAN JOHN. 
[15]. HE NEEDED THEM. 
JOHN NEEDED THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM WOULD LOAN JOHN. 
[16]. JOHN REMEMBERED HIS PROMISE. 
JOHN REMEMBERED THAT JOHN HAD PROMISED THAT BEFORE FRIDAY, JOHN WOULD 
GIVE BACK THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM WOULD LOAN JOHN. 
[17]. HE GOT THE TOOLS. 
JOHN OBTAINED THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH Sfu~ WOULD LOAN JOHN. 
[18]. HE GAVE THEM TO SAM WITH THANKS. 
TO SAM, AND WITH THANKS, JOHN PRESENTED THE REPAIR IMPLEMENTS WHICH SAM 
WOULD LOAN JOHN. 
In the following, the rnisresolution in [ 4] leads to only John being in focus when 
the (non-coreferential) pronouns in [5] are resolved. The way such problems 
could be diagnosed and repaired is discussed in 10.4.2. 
BlO [1]. JOHN WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
JOHN WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
[2] . HE ASKED FOR A STEAK. 
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JOHN DEMANDED A STEAK. 
[3]. AFTER EATING IT HE TOLD THE WAITER THAT HE HAD NO MONEY. 
AFTER JOHN DEVOURED THE STEAK, JOHN INFORMED A WAITER THAT JOHN 
POSSESSED NO MONEY. 
[4]. HE WAS FURIOUS. 
JOHN WAS FURIOUS. 
[Sl. HE MADE HIM WASH DISHES. 
IGNORED BECAUSE OF UNRESOLVABLE PRONOUN. 
In the next two texts, adapted from Wilks [ 1975b], Sidner 's rules settle firmly 
on the whisky for "it" in Bll, but demand special mode inference for the "it" 
in Bl2. 
Bll [1]. JOHN DRANK THE WHISKY FROM A GLASS. 
FROM A GLASS, JOHN IMBIBED SOME WHISKY. 
[2]. IT FELT WARM IN HIS STOMACH. 
THE WHISKY SEEMED WARM AT JOHN'S STOMACH. 
B12 [1]. JOHN LEFT THE WINDOW. 
JOHN DEPARTED FROM A WINDOW. 
[2]. HE DRANK THE WINE ON THE TABLE. 
JOHN IMBIBED THE WINE WHICH WAS NEAR A DINING TABLE. 
[3]. IT WAS GOOD. 
THE WINE WAS GOOD. 
Texts B13 to B20 are adapted from appendix A of Tait [1982]. They were 
originally designed to test the script application capabilities of Tait's system; 
however, if what is required is straight paraphrase rather than the more 
complex summarising performed by Tait's system, then shallow processing is 
(mostly) sufficient. (Although performance for full noun phrases is not as 
good as for pronouns). 
Tait's version of B13 ends " ... and took it away with her". In my version, the 
idiomatic "with her" , which appears to violate the c-command restriction, was 
removed, although SPAR could be extended to recognize it. Also, "it" and 
"away" were transposed because the analyser cannot deal with "she took it 
away'' . 
Note that "them" in [3] is a descriptional anaphor, not a definite one; and that 
the resolution of "she" in [3] to Mary and not Susan is accomplished by a weak 
inference rule (see 8.4.3) . 
B13 [1]. MARY WANTED TO GIVE SUSAN A PRESENT. 
MARY WANTED TO PRESENT A GIFT TO SUSAN. 
[2]. SHE THOUGHT THAT SHE WOULD LI KE A COMPUTER. 
MARY BELIEVED THAT SUSAN WOULD LIKE A COMPUTER. 
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[3] . SHE WENT TO THE SHOP WHICH SOLD THEM. 
MARY WENT TO THE SHOP WHICH SOLD SOME COMPUTERS. 
[4]. THEY LOOKED EXCITING. 
THE COMPUTERS WHICH THE SHOP SOLD LOOKED EXCITING. 
[S]. SHE WALKED OVER TO ONE. 
MARY WALKED TO ONE OF THE COMPUTERS WHICH THE SHOP SOLD. 
[6]. SHE TRIED IT BY WRITING A LITTLE PROGRAM. 
BY WRITING A LITTLE PROGRAM WHICH THE COMPUTERS WHICH THE SHOP SOLD 
OBEYED, MARY TESTED THE COMPUTER WHICH MARY WALKED TO. 
[7]. SHE ENJOYED IT. 
MARY ENJOYED TESTING THE COMPUTER WHICH MARY WALKED TO BY WRITING THE 
PROGRAM. 
[8]. SHE DECIDED THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRESENT FOR SUSAN. 
[9]. 
[10]. 
[ 1) • 
[2] . 
[3]. 
MARY CONCLUDED THAT THE COMPUTER WHICH MARY WALKED TO WOULD BE A GOOD 
GIFT WHICH WAS FOR SUSAN. 
SHE PAID FOR IT. 
MARY PAID FOR THE COMPUTER WHICH MARY WALKED TO. 
SHE TOOK AWAY IT. 
MARY TOOK AWAY THE COMPUTER WHICH MARY WALKED TO. 
JOHN WAS HUNGRY. 
JOHN WAS HUNGRY. 
HE SENT MARY TO THE KITCHEN. 
TO A KITCHEN, JOHN SENT MARY. 
SHE GOT SOME STEAK FROM THE FRIDGE. 
FROM A FRIDGE, MARY OBTAINED SOME STEAK. 
[4]. SHE MADE A PIE. 
MARY ASSEMBLED A PIE WHICH WAS AMONG THE FOOD WHICH WAS NEAR THE FRIDGE. 
[S]. JOHN LOVED IT. 
JOHN LOVED THE PIE. 
B15 [1] . JOHN PICKED A CAN OF TUNA OFF THE SHELF. 
FROM A SHELF, JOHN SELECTED A CAN WHICH HAD TUNA. 
[2] . HE PUT IT IN HIS BASKET. 
NEAR JOHN'S BASKET, JOHN PUT THE CAN. 
[3]. HE PAID FOR IT. 
JOHN PAID FOR THE CAN. 
[ 4 l . HE WENT HOME. 
JOHN WENT HOME. 
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Errors in processing can sometimes lead to bizarre but essentially coherent 
interpretations of a story. An example is SPAR's failure to recognize that the 
"present" is the "zebra" in [ 4] below. More sophisticated inference would be 
needed to verify that this identity does not break the information constraint. 
However, the knowledge needed for such verification is in fact already present 
in the representation. 
Bl6 [1]. SPUD WENT TO A SHOP. 
SPUD WENT TO A SHOP. 
[2]. HE DECIDED THAT A ZEBRA WOULD BE A GOOD PRESENT FOR MURIEL. 
SPUD CONCLUDED THAT A ZEBRA WOULD BE A GOOD GIFT WHICH WAS FOR MURIEL. 
[3]. HE BOUGHT ONE. 
SPUD BOUGHT A ZEBRA. 
[4]. HE GAVE HER HIS PRESENT. 
TO THE ZEBRA WHICH SPUD BOUGHT, SPUD PRESENTED SPUD'S GIFT. 
[5]. SHE LOVED HIM. 
THE ZEBRA WHICH SPUD BOUGHT LOVED SPUD. 
The wrong interpretation in [7] below (and in [ 4] above) could perhaps be 
avoided by depreferring an (initial) "he" or "she" reference to an animal if a 
human referent is available . However this error does not propagate lo [8]. 
B 1 7 [1]. JOHN WENT TO THE ZOO. 
JOHN WENT TO A ZOO. 
[2]. HE SAW THE LIONS. 
JOHN SAW THE LIONS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS WHICH WERE AT THE ZOO. 
[3]. HE WANTED TO GIVE MURIEL A PRESENT. 
JOHN WANTED TO PRESENT A GIFT TO MURIEL. 
[4]. HE THOUGHT THAT SHE WOULD LIKE A TIGER. 
JOHN BELIEVED THAT MURIEL WOULD LIKE A TIGER. 
[5]. HE WENT TO A SHOP WHICH SOLD THEM. 
JOHN WENT TO A SHOP AND THE SHOP SOLD SOME TIGERS. 
[6]. HE GOT .ONE. 
JOHN ACQUIRED ONE OF THE TI GERS WHICH THE SHOP SOLD. 
[7]. SHE LOVED IT. 
THE TIGER WHICH JOHN ACQUIRED LOVED JOHN ACQUIRING THAT TIGER. 
[8]. IT ATE -HER. 
THE TIGER WHICH JOHN ACQUIRED DEVOURED MURIEL. 
SPAR's processing of the next three stories exhibits few phenomena not seen 
in the examples so far . However, the AR rules are able to deal correctly with a 
number of potentially difficult "lhey"s_ Nole in particular [ 4] in Bl8, [6] in 
Bl9, and [ 4] in B20, where established referent sets not mentioned in the 
previous sentence are correctly preferred over new sets constructed from 
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entities mentioned in the previous :,cntence. 
B18 [1]. MIKE WENT TO THE ZOO WITH MARY. 
B19 
WITH MARY, MIKE WENT TO A ZOO. 
[2] . THEY SAW THE ZEBRAS. 
MARY AND MIKE SAW THE ZEBRAS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS WHI CH WERE AT 
THE ZOO. 
[3] . MI KE FED THE ELEPHANT. 
MIKE FED THE ELEPHANT WHICH WAS AMONG THE ANIMALS. 
[4]. THEY SAW THE MONKEYS. 
MARY AND MIKE SAW THE MONKEYS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS. 
[S] . THEY WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
MARY AND MIKE WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
[6] . THEY ASKED FOR STEAKS. 
MARY AND MIKE DEMANDED SOME STEAKS. 
[7]. THEY ATE THEM. 
MARY AND MIKE DEVOURED THE STEAKS. 
[8]. THEY TOLD THE WAITER THAT THEY HAD NO MONEY. 
[9]. 
[10). 
[1]. 
[2] . 
MARY AND MIKE INFORMED A WAITER THAT MARY AND MIKE POSSESSED NO MONEY. 
THE WAITER WAS FURIOUS. 
THE WAITER WAS FURIOUS. 
THEY RAN AWAY. 
MARY AND MIKE FLED. 
MARY WENT TO THE ZOO WITH JOHN. 
WITH JOHN, MARY WENT TO A ZOO. 
THEY FED THE MONKEYS SOME PEANUTS. 
JOHN AND MARY FED THE MONKEYS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS WHICH WERE 
AT THE ZOO SOME PEANUTS. 
[3]. THEY SAW THE ZEBRA. 
JOHN AND MARY SAW THE ZEBRA WHICH WAS AMONG THE ANIMALS. 
[4]. THEY WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
JOHN AND MARY WENT TO A RESTAURANT. 
[S] . JOHN TOLD THE WAITER THAT HE WANTED A STEAK. 
JOHN INFORMED THE WAITER WHO WORKED AT THE RESTAURANT THAT JOHN WANTED 
TO HAVE A STEAK. 
[6] . THEY DID NOT HAVE ANY MONEY. 
JOHN AND MARY DID NOT POSSESS ANY MONEY. 
[7]. THE WAITER WAS ANGRY. 
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THE WAITER WAS ANGRY. 
[8). THEY RAN AWAY. 
JOHN AND MARY FLED. 
B20 [1]. MARY WENT TO THE ZOO WITH JOHN. 
WITH JOHN, MARY WENT TO A ZOO. 
[2]. THEY SAW THE MONKEYS. 
JOHN AND MARY SAW THE MONKEYS WHICH WERE AMONG THE ANIMALS WHICH WERE 
AT THE ZOO. 
[3]. JOHN FED THE ELEPHANT A BANANA. 
JOHN FED THE ELEPHANT WHICH WAS AMONG THE ANIMALS A BANANA. 
[4]. THEY WENT HOME. 
JOHN AND MARY WENT HOME. 
Our final three texts show something of SPAR's flexibility, since they represent 
different domains from the one SPAR is designed for. B21 is from Alshawi 
[1983]; B22, whose main focus of interest is the Bach-Peters sentence [7], is 
from Weyters [ 1985]. B23 is equivalent to B22 as far as anaphor resolution is 
concerned, but the names given to the characters enable the generator to 
express the resolution decisions more clearly. 
B21 [1). THE CONDITION OF P971 IS GOOD. 
P971'S CONDITION IS GOOD. 
[2). HADDON COLLECTED IT. 
HADDON COLLECTED P971. 
[3). HE WAS A BRITISH ACADEMIC. 
HADDON WAS A BRITISH ACADEMIC. 
[4). BEVAN WAS A BRITISH MUSEUM-KEEPER. 
BEVAN WAS A BRIT! SH MUSEUM-KEEPER. 
[SJ. HE COLLECTED P956. 
BEVAN COLLECTED P956. 
[6]. THE CONDITION OF THIS ONE IS FAIR. 
P956'S CONDITION IS FAIR. 
[7). BOTH ARTIFACTS ARE SPEARS. 
P956 AND P971 ARE SOME SPEARS. 
[BJ. SMITH WHO WAS A GERMAN TRADER COLLECTED P316 WHICH IS AN ARROW. 
SMITH WAS A GERMAN TRADER AND P316 IS AN ARROW AND SMITH COLLECTED P316. 
[9]. HE COLLECTED P612 FROM WOODLARK. 
FROM WOODLARK, SMITH COLLECTED P612. 
[10). THIS ARTIFACT IS A NECKLACE. 
P612 IS A NECKLACE. 
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(11]. THE THREE WEAPONS COME FROM DAU!. 
P316, P956 AND P971 COME FROM DAU!. 
(1 2] . THE CONDITION OF THE ARROW IS GOOD. 
P316'S CONDITION IS GOOD. 
[ 13] . THE ORNAMENT IS POOR. 
P612 IS POOR. 
B22 [1]. THERE WAS A MAN. 
A MAN EXISTED. 
[2]. THERE WAS A WOMAN. 
A WOMAN EXISTED. 
[3]. THE WOMAN LOVED THE MAN. 
THE WOMAN LOVED THE MAN. 
[4]. THERE WAS ANOTHER WOMAN. 
ANOTHER WOMAN EXISTED. 
[S]. THE MAN HATED THE WOMAN WHO LOVED HIM. 
THE MAN HATED THE WOMAN WHO LOVED THAT MAN. 
[6]. THERE WAS ANOTHER MAN. 
ANOTHER MAN EXISTED. 
[7]. THE WOMAN WHO LOVED HIM MARRIED THE MAN WHO HATED HER. 
THE WOMAN WHO LOVED THE MAN WHO HATED THAT WOMAN MARRIED THAT MAN. ; 11 
[7]. THE WOMAN WHO LOVED HIM MARRIED THE MAN WHO HATED HER. 
BARBARA MARRIED ARTHUR. 
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Appendix C: The inference component in action 
All the text in this appendix in This Font was generated directly by SPAR. For 
the sake of readability, some output has been deleted, and some of what 
remains has been repositioned on the page. 
For each sentence in each example, the output consists of : 
( 1) The input sentence, with TMN element names shown in square brackets. 
(2) The results of P .I. rule (=AR rule) application. 
(3) The chains returned by the inference component. 
The contributions of other knowledge sources (e.g. configurational 
constraints) are also shown where relevant. 
Example 1: sentences 2-3 of text B3 
{Sentence 1 was "Bill went to the zoo with Jill") . 
[2] THEY [THEYl-1] GAVE [GIVEl-1] THE MONKEYS [MONKEYl-1] SOME BANANAS 
[BANANAl-1] WHICH THEY [THEYl-2] ATE [EATl - 7] 
After P. I. rule application, options are: 
THEYl-1 
THEYl-2 
BILL AND JILL 
SOME MONKEYS or BILL AND JILL 
Returning these chains: 
Chain number 1: 
THEYl-2 = SOME MONKEYS from positive chain derived as follows : 
Candidate starting point: 
Extraction gives: 
Anaphor starting point: 
Extraction gives: 
Matching gives THEYl-2 
ref(THEYl-1) GAVE SOME BANANAS TO SOME MONKEYS 
SOME MONKEYS HAD SOME BANANAS 
ref(THEYl-2) ATE SOME BANANAS 
ref(THEYl-2) HAD SOME BANANAS 
SOME MONKEYS 
[3] THEY [THEYl-1] WENT [GOl-7] TO THE RESTAURANT [RESTAURANTl-4] 
After P. I. rule application, options are: 
THEYl-1 = BILL AND JILL or THE MONKEYS WHICH WERE AMONG SOME ANIMALS 
Returning these chains: 
Chain number 1: 
THEYl-1 must be a MAN from positive chain derived as follows : 
Anaphor starting point: 
CS! rule DOWANT gives: 
ref(THEYl-1) WENT TO A RESTAURANT 
ref(THEYl-1) WANTED TO GO TO A RESTAURANT 
Extraction gi ves : ref(THEYl-1) WANTED TO BE AT A RESTAURANT 
Object- related inference on RESTAURANT! gives: 
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ref(THEYl-1) WANTED TO EAT AT A RESTAURANT 
Matching with no-exit rule WANTEAT gives: 
THEYl-1 must be MAN 
For THEYl-1: preferring BILL AND JILL over THE MONKEYS WHICH WERE AMONG SOME 
ANIMALS 
Example 2: sentences 1-3 of text B 1 
[1] JOHN [JOHNl-6] PROMISED [PROMISEl-43] BILL [BILLl-3] THAT HE [HEl-1) WOULD 
MEND [MENDl-8] HIS [HISl-1] CAR [CARl-2] 
After P. I. rule application, options are: 
HEl-1 
HISl-1 = 
JOHN or BILL 
JOHN or BILL 
Returning these chains: 
Chain number 1: 
HEl-1 JOHN from positive chain derived as follows: 
Anaphor starting point: JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT ref(HEl-1) WOULD MEND 
ref CHISl-1) 'S CAR 
Matching with no-exit rule FFPROM gives: 
HEl-1 = JOHN 
Chain number 2: 
HISl-1 = B1LL from positive chain derived as follows: 
Anaphor starting point: 
CSI rule PROMB gives: 
JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT ref(HEl-1) WOULD MEND 
ref(HISl-1) 'SCAR 
BILL WANTED ref(HEl-1) TO MEND ref(HISl-1) ·s 
CAR 
Extraction gives: BILL WANTED ref(HISl-1) 'SCAR TO FUNCTION 
Matching with no-exit rule WP gives: 
HISl-1 = BILL 
[2] HE [HEl-1] TOOK [TAKES-1] IT [IT0-1] TO HIS [HISl-1] FRIEND [FRIENDl-1] 
POSS GARAGE [GARAGEl-1] 
After P. I. rule application, options are: 
HEl-1 
IT0-1 
HISl-1 = 
JOHN or BILL 
BILL'S CAR 
JOHN 
Returning these chains: 
Chain number 1: 
IT0-1 = BILL'S CAR and HEl-1 JOHN from positive chain derived as follows : 
Candidate starting point: JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT JOHN WOULD MEND BILL ' S 
CAR 
CSI rule FFPROM gives: JOHN WANTED TO MEND BILL'S CAR 
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Anaphor starting point: 
Extraction gives: 
ref(HE1-1) TOOK ref(IT0-1) TO ref(HIS1-1) 'S 
FRIEND'S GARAGE 
ref(HE1-1) WANTED ref(IT0-1) TO BE AT 
ref(HIS1-1) 'S FRIEND'S GARAGE 
Object-related inference on GARAGE! gives: 
ref(HE1-1) WANTED PERSONS TO MEND ref(IT0-1) AT 
ref(HIS1-1) 'S FRIEND'S GARAGE 
Matching gives IT0-1 BILL'S CAR and HE1-1 = JOHN 
Chain number 2: 
IT0-1 = BILL'S CAR and HE1-1 BILL from positive chain derived as follows: 
Candidate starting point: JOHN PROMISED BILL THAT JOHN WOULD MEND BILL'S 
CAR 
CSI rule PROMB gives: 
Anaphor starting point: 
Extraction gives: 
BILL WANTED JOHN TO MEN D BILL' S CAR 
refCHE1-1) TOOK ref(IT0-1) TO ref(HIS1-l)'S 
FRIEND'S GARAGE 
ref(HE1-1) WANTED ref(IT0-1) TO BE AT 
ref(HISl-1) 'S FRIEND'S GARAGE 
Object-related inference on GARAGEl gives: 
ref(HE1-1) WANTED PERSONS TO MEND ref(IT0-1) AT 
ref(HIS1-1) 'S FRIEND'S GARAGE 
Matching gives IT0-1 = BILL'S CAR and HEl-1 = BILL 
Applying CCP criterion 
For HEl-1: preferring JOHN over BILL 
[3) HE [HEl-2) TRIED [TRY1-1) TO PERSUADE [PERSUADE1-1J HIS [HISl-1) FRIEND 
[FRIENDl-5] THAT HE [HEl-3] SHOULD LEND [LEND1-ll HIM [HIMl-1] SOME TOOLS 
[TOOL1-1) 
After P. I. rule application, options are: 
HE1-2 
HIS1-1 = 
HEl-3 = 
HIM1-1 = 
JOHN or JOHN'S FRIEND 
JOHN 
JOHN or JOHN'S FRIEND 
JOHN'S FRIEND or JOHN 
After applying configurational constraints, options are: 
HEl-2 
HIS1-1 = 
HEl-3 = 
HIMl-1 = 
JOHN 
JOHN 
JOHN or JOHN'S FRIEND 
JOHN'S FRIEND or JOHN 
Returning these chains: 
Chain number 1: 
HIM1-1 = ref(HE1-2) from positive chain derived as follows: 
Anaphor starting point: ref(HEl-2) TRIED TO PERSUADE ref(HISl-1) 'S 
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Extraction gives: 
FRIEND THAT ref(HEl-3) SHOULDED LEND 
ref(HIMl-1) SOME TOOLS 
ref(HEl-2) WANTED ref(HIMl-1) TO HAVE SOME 
TOOLS 
Matching with no-exit rule WANTHAVE gives: 
HIMl-1 = ref(HEl-2) 
For HEl-3: preferring JOHN'S FRIEND over JOHN 
For HIMl-1: preferring JOHN over JOHN'S FRIEND 
Example 3 : sentences 2-3 of text B 13 
(Sentence 1 was "Mary wanted to give Susan a present"). 
[2] SHE [SHEl-1] THOUGHT [THINKl-13] THAT SHE [SHEl-2] WOULD LIKE [LIKEl-ll A 
COMPUTER [COMPUTERl-1] 
After P. I. rule appl !cation, options are: 
SHEl-1 
SHEl-2 
MARY or SUSAN 
MARY or SUSAN 
Returning these chains: 
Chain number 1: 
SHEl-1 = MARY and SHEl-2 = SUSAN from positive chain derived as follows : 
Candidate starting point: 
Anaphor starting point: 
CSI rule GIVETOPLEASE gives: 
MARY WANTED TO GIVE A PRESENT TO SUSAN 
ref(SHEl-1) THOUGHT THAT ref(SHEl-2) WOULD 
LIKE A COMPUTER 
ref(SHEl-1) WANTED TO GIVE A COMPUTER TO 
ref (SHEl-2) 
Matching gives SHEl-1 = MARY and SHEl-2 = SUSAN 
[3] SHE [SHEl-3] WENT [GOl-5] TO THE SHOP [SHOP2-4] WHICH SOLD [SELLl-2] THEM 
[THEM2-1] 
After P. I. rule application, options are: 
SHEl-3 = MARY or SUSAN 
Returning these chains: 
(Chains 1 and Z arise from object-oriented inferences on SHOP2, and merely 
verify (unhelpfully but correctly) that SHEl-3 must be a MAN and not a BEAST.} 
Chain number 3: 
SHEl-3 = MARY from positive chain derived as follows: 
Weak CSI matching using rule ON-STAGE-RULE gives: 
SHEl-3 = MARY 
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Example 4: sentence 2 of text A31 
(Sentence 1 was "The soldiers fired at the women"). 
[2] THEY [THEYl-1] DID NOT FALL [FALLl - 5] 
After P. I. rule application, options are: 
THEYl-1 = SOME SOLDIERS or SOME WOMEN 
Returning these chains: 
THEYl-1 = SOME WOMEN from positive chain derived as follows: 
Candidate starting point: 
CSI rule FFGOAL gives: 
CS! rule STRIKHURT gives: 
CS! rule HURTFALL gives: 
Anaphor starting point: 
SOME SOLDIERS FIRED AT SOME WOMEN 
A THING STRIKKED (i .e. struck!) THE WOMEN 
WHO THAT THING MOVED TO 
SOME WOMEN WERE NOT WHOLE 
SOME WOMEN FELL 
ref(THEYl-1) DID NOT FALL 
Matching gives THEYl-1 = SOME WOMEN 
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Appendix D: SPAR's CSI rules. 
This appendix contains SPAR's complete database of CSI rules. See 8 .2.1 for 
details of the interpretation of the various fields. 
(ASKTELL C (MOTIVATES A TE <>)) 
(A ASK (FOR S)) 
CS •HUM) 
(TE TELL (SUBJ S))) 
CCATCHHURT ((RESULT CH>)) 
(C CATCH1 (OBJE A)) 
CA •HUM) 
CH BE (SUBJ A) (STATE WHOLE) (NEG NEG))) 
CDOWANT ( (MOTIVATES W D <>)) 
CW WANT (SUBJ A) (OBJE D)) 
(A MAN) 
(D ACT (SUBJ A))) 
CFFGOAL ((RESULT D G >)) 
CD * DO (GOAL G) ) 
(G •DO)) 
(FFPROM ((NO-EXIT P NIL) (RESULT PW >)) 
(P PROMISE! (SUBJ S) (OBJE D)) 
CS •HUM) 
CD ACT (SUBJ S)) 
CW WANT (SUBJ S) (OBJE D))) 
(GIVETOPLEASE ((SUGGESTS H W <>)) 
CH THINK (SUBJ A) (OBJE L)) 
CL LI KE1 CSUBJ C) (FOR B)) 
CW WANT (SUBJ A) (OBJE G)) 
(G GIVE1 (SUBJ A) (OBJE B) (FOR C)) 
CA •HUM) 
CB •PHYSOB) 
CC •HUM)) 
CHAVUSE ((ENABLES HU>)) 
CH HAVE (SUBJ P) (OBJE Q)) 
CU USE CSUBJ P) (OBJE Q)) 
CF •HUM) 
(Q * INAN)) 
(HURTFALL ((RESULT HF<>)) 
CH BE (SUBJ P) (STATE WHOLE) (NEG NEG)) 
CF • PHYSOB) 
CF FALL1 (SUBJ P))) 
CHURTSQUEAL C (MOTIVATES H S <)) 
CH BE (SUBJ A) (STATE WHOLE) (NEG NEG)) 
(A •HUM) 
CS SQUEAL1 CSUBJ A))) 
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(JUDGEGIFT ((RESULT G J >)) 
(G GIVE (OBJE A) (FOR B)) 
CJ FEEL (SUBJ B) (FOR A)) 
CA *PHYSOB) 
(B *HUM)) 
(JUDGFOOD ((RESULT C F <>)) 
CC CONSUME1 (SUBJ H) (FOR X)) 
(H *HUM) 
ex *INAN) 
CF FEEL (SUBJ H) (FOR X))) 
(LI KEGOOD ( (SUGGESTS F G) (SUGGESTS G F)) 
CF FEEL (SUBJ H) (FOR X)) 
CH *HUM) 
ex *ENT) 
(G BE (SUBJ X) (STATE GOOD))) 
(PERSB ((SUGGESTS PEW <>)) 
(PE PERSUADE1 (SUBJ H) (OBJE D)) 
CH *HUM) 
CD *DO) 
CW WANT (SUBJ H) (OBJE D))) 
CPROMB ((SUGGESTS PR W <>)) 
CPR PROM I SE1 (OBJE A) (FOR H)) 
CA *DO) 
(H *HUM) 
CW WANT · (SUBJ H) COBJE A))) 
(STRIKHURT ((RESULTS H <>)) 
(S STRIK (SUBJ P) (OBJE Q)) 
(P *PHYSOB) 
(Q *PHYSOB) 
CH BE (SUBJ Q) (STATE WHOLE) (NEG NEG))) 
(WANTEAT ((NO-EXIT W NIL)) 
CW WANT (SUBJ S) (OBJE E)) 
CS *HUM) 
(E CONSUME 1 (SUBJ S))) 
CWANTHAVE ((NO-EXIT W·NIL)) 
CW WANT (SUBJ S) (OBJE H)) 
CS *HUM) 
CH HAVE (SUBJ S) (OBJE P)) 
(P *PHYSOB)) 
CWANTPAY ((MOTIVATES W P <>)) 
(W WANT (SUBJ A) (OBJE D)) 
CD ACT (SUBJ B)) 
CA *HUM) 
CB *HUM) 
(P PAY1 (SUBJ A) (FOR B))) 
(WP ((SUGGESTS WP W <>) 
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.... 
(NO-EXIT W NIL)) 
CWP FUNC CSUBJ S)) 
CS • PHYSOB (POSS H)) 
CH • HUM) 
CW WANT (SUBJ H) (OBJE WP))) 
• 
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accessibility (in discourse representation theory) 35 
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actor focus (AF) 96,101 
actor focus stack (AFS) 96 
adequacy (referential) 205 
AF (Actor Focus) 96,101 
AFS (Actor Focus Stack) 96 
AI (Artificial Intelligence) 7 
anaphor 19 
anaphor starting point (for inference) 170 
anaphor tendril 1 70 
anaphora 19 
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c-command 39 
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discourse representation (DR) 34 
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